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Abstract  
  
In  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  fatigue  was  a  common  workplace  
complaint.  As  chairman  of  the  Civil  Aviation  Authority  Lord  John  Boyd-­
Carpenter  put  it  in  1974,  though,  it  occupied  an  ‘uncertain  zone’.1  Vague  and  
contestable  throughout  the  century,  and  linked  inextricably  to  working  
practices,  fatigue  proved  fertile  ground  for  debate.  With  a  specific  focus  on  
civil  aviation  and  aircrew,  this  thesis  traces  the  shifting  explanations  of  and  
responses  to  flying  fatigue  from  the  start  of  the  First  World  War  to  the  formal  
institution  of  Crew  Resource  Management  (CRM)  training  in  the  mid-­1990s.  
Beginning  with  a  discussion  of  fatigue  as  it  was  constituted  and  examined  in  
industrial  and  military  settings  in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  this  
thesis  then  turns  to  post-­war  civil  aviation.  The  models  of  fatigue  developed  
by  Flying  Personnel  Research  Committee  (FPRC)  researchers  during  wartime  
framed  post-­war  understandings  of  fatigue.  Conceptualised  as  performance  
decrement  in  some  instances,  in  other  contexts  fatigue  was  considered  in  
terms  of  sleep  and  wakefulness.  Regardless  of  definition,  the  apparent  
dangers  of  aircrew  fatigue  were  agreed  upon.  Linked  to  air  accidents  
throughout  the  century,  the  fatigue  of  aircrew  was  thought  to  have  implications  
for  flight  safety.  This  thesis  examines  how  these  various  discourses  of  fatigue  
informed  –  and  were  informed  by  –  military  policies,  regulatory  frameworks,  
and  airline-­union  negotiations.  Drawing  on  a  rich  base  of  oral  history  
interviews  with  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew,  it  looks,  also,  at  the  ways  in  which  
fatigue  was  experienced  and  given  new  meaning  in  quotidian  contexts.  
Examining  flying  fatigue  in  relation  to  broader  post-­war  concerns  about  
productivity,  public  safety,  and  the  health  and  welfare  of  workers,  this  thesis  
offers  new  perspectives  on  the  complex  interplay  between  science,  industry,  




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  The  National  Archives  BT  248/511:  Internal  CAA  Memo  to  Mr  Vivian  from  Lord  Boyd-­
Carpenter,  21  May  1974,  p.  1.  
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During  the  months  from  August  1917  to  November  1918,  inclusive,  
close  on  2,000  flying  officers  passed  through  [a]  special  hospital  unit;;  of  
these  over  forty  per  cent  were  deemed  to  be  suffering  from  the  fatigue  
inseparable  from  active  service.1  
  
Flying  fatigue  was  first  identified  as  a  discrete  issue  affecting  aircrew  during  
the  First  World  War,  but  was  subject  to  increasing  investigation  in  the  post-­
war  period.  From  1939,  the  Flying  Personnel  Research  Committee  (FPRC)  –  
a  research  team  composed  of  clinicians,  psychologists,  physiologists,  and  
members  of  the  Royal  Air  Force  (RAF)  –  investigated  the  causes,  signs,  and  
means  of  preventing  fatigue  in  aircrew.  The  rationale  for  this  research  was  
simple:  to  optimise  operational  efficiency.  The  research  undertaken  by  the  
FPRC  between  1939  and  1945  produced  a  complex  picture  of  flying  fatigue.  
While  some  FPRC  researchers  argued,  in  line  with  interwar  theories  of  flying  
stress,  that  flying  fatigue  was  primarily  a  psychological  phenomenon,  others  
looked  to  working  hours  and  physiology,  citing  hypoxia,  mechanical  factors,  
and  the  intensification  of  wartime  processes  as  the  primary  causes  of  pilot  
fatigue.2  Though  there  were  discrepancies,  an  essential  model  of  fatigue  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  James  L.  Birley,  ‘Goulstoninan  Lectures  on  the  Principles  of  Medical  Science  as  Applied  to  
Military  Aviation:  Lecture  I’,  The  Lancet,  195,  5048  (1920)  1147-­1151,  p.  1148.  
2  Wellcome  Library  (hereafter  referred  to  as  WL)  PP/HEW/L.7/6:  Institute  of  Aviation  Medicine  
Report  615,  ‘British  Aviation  Medicine  During  the  Second  World  War,  Part  5:  Fatigue,  Flying  
Stress  and  Accidents’,  1982.  
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emerged  in  this  period.  This  was,  in  a  sense,  a  dual  discourse.  Fatigue,  the  
FPRC  held,  should  be  considered  both  in  terms  of  performance  decrement  
and  wakefulness.  Consensus  existed,  though,  on  the  implications  of  fatigue.  
Thought  to  increase  the  likelihood  of  human  error  and  ‘accident  proneness’,  
flying  fatigue  was  a  ‘serious  concern’.3  
Turning  to  the  half  century  after  1939,  this  thesis  traces  shifting  
explanations  of  and  responses  to  flying  fatigue  from  the  start  of  the  Second  
World  War  to  the  formal  institution  of  Crew  Resource  Management  (CRM)  
training  in  the  aftermath  of  the  1989  Kegworth  air  crash.  Situating  flying  
fatigue  within  a  broader  context  of  employment  in  post-­war  Britain,  it  argues  
that  concerns  about  tiredness  within  civil  and  military  aviation  were  but  one  
manifestation  of  wider  middle  and  late-­twentieth  century  anxieties  about  work,  
productivity,  and  public  safety.  Political  and  cultural  attitudes  to  these  issues  
were  broadly  contested  and  refashioned  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Second  World  
War.4  In  this  period  health  and  safety  regulation  underwent  a  profound  shift;;  
British  economic  performance  and  the  apparent  ‘productivity  gap’  between  
Britain  and  other  western  European  countries  was  widely  debated;;  and  Britain  
transitioned  from  an  economy  built  around  manufacturing  and  manual  labour  
to  one  based  on  service  and  office  work.5  In  examining  the  fatigue  of  airline  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  The  National  Archives  (hereafter  referred  to  as  TNA)  AIR  57/10:  Squadron  Leader  D.  D.  
Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  508:  The  Influence  of  Psychological  Disorder  on  Efficiency  in  Operational  
Flying’,  September  1942,  p.  11;;  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Squadron  Leader  Denis  Williams,  ‘FPRC  
Report  505:  The  Effect  of  Mental  Fatigue  Upon  the  Electroencephalogram’,  December  1942,  
p.  1.  
4  Christopher  Sirrs,  ‘Accidents  and  Apathy:  The  Construction  of  the  “Robens  Philosophy”  of  
Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Regulation  in  Britain,  1961-­1974’,  Social  History  of  Medicine,  
29,  1  (2016)  66-­88.  
5  Ibid;;  Jim  Tomlinson,  ‘Inventing  “Decline”:  The  Falling  Behind  of  the  British  Economy  in  the  
Postwar  Years’,  Economic  History  Review,  49,  4  (1996)  731-­757;;  Stephen  Broadberry  and  
Nicholas  Crafts,  ‘UK  Productivity  Performance  from  1950  to  1979:  A  Restatement  of  the  
Broadberry-­Crafts  View’,  Economic  History  Review,  56,  4  (2003)  718-­735;;  Alan  Booth,  ‘The  
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pilots  in  relation  to  these  broader  post-­war  changes,  this  thesis  offers  a  new  
perspective  on  the  complex  interplay  between  science,  industry,  and  society  
in  middle  and  late-­twentieth  century  Britain.  
The  purpose  of  this  introduction  is  to  lay  the  historical  and  intellectual  
groundwork  for  the  four  thematic  chapters  that  follow.  It  begins  with  a  
discussion  of  how  fatigue  was  conceived  of  by  medical  and  industrial  writers  
in  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries.  The  second  section  introduces  
some  of  the  key  historiography.  This  thesis  intersects  with,  and  seeks  to  bring  
together,  a  diverse  and  extensive  range  of  historical  literature.  Thematically  
this  work  draws  not  only  on  histories  of  fatigue,  but  also  of  other  human  
factors,  transport,  employment,  occupational  health  and  safety,  gender,  and  
the  news  media.  Given  this  range,  the  literature  review  focuses  on  the  
histories  that  are  most  pertinent  to  the  central  themes  of  this  thesis:  histories  
of  aviation  and  occupational  health  and  safety.  Finally,  following  discussion  of  
sources  and  methodology,  the  arguments  made  across  the  four  central  
chapters  of  this  thesis  are  outlined.    
  
Framing  Fatigue:  Science,  Industry,  and  Society  Before  1939  
In  the  seventeenth  century  intellectual  and  cultural  attitudes  to  work  began  a  
profound  renegotiation.  In  philosophical  and  economic  treatises,  work  was  
increasingly  moralised  and  rationalised.  John  Locke  (1632-­1704),  and  other  
classical  political  economists,  drew  on  Calvinist  doctrine  to  justify  both  the  
centrality  of  work  and  the  source  of  its  value.  Productive  work,  according  to  
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Boom’,  Economic  History  Review,  56,  1  (2003)  1-­33.  
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this  new  intellectual  discourse,  was  at  once  noble,  rational,  and  moral.  
Idleness,  on  the  other  hand,  was  increasingly  critiqued.6  Though  idleness  had  
been  subject  to  criticism  long  before  this  –  the  Christian  concept  of  acedia  
featured  prominently  in  theological  treatises  on  sin  from  the  fourth  century  –  
the  new  discourse  of  productive  labour  popularised  in  the  seventeenth  century  
saw  idleness  as  not  just  sinful,  but  irrational.7    
In  the  last  quarter  of  the  nineteenth  century,  this  largely  intellectual  
debate  about  the  value  of  work,  gave  way  to  a  new  scientific  project.  It  was  in  
this  context  that  the  concept  of  fatigue  emerged.  In  the  1860s  and  1870s  new  
literature  stressing  the  hygienic  aspect  of  work  gained  traction.  Though  this  
literature  often  retained  moralistic  overtones,  it  increasingly  framed  work  in  
materialist  –  specifically  physiological  –  terms.  Indeed,  much  of  this  new  
literature  considered  the  physiological  and  moral  qualities  of  work  as  
complementary.  As  Apollonaire  Bourchardat  (1809-­1886),  professor  of  
hygiene  at  the  faculty  of  medicine  at  the  University  of  Paris,  told  an  audience  
of  skilled  workers  in  1862,  regular  labour  was  both  a  ‘condition  of  health’  and  
of  ‘morality’.8  Anson  Rabinbach  has  demonstrated  that  this  new  
conceptualisation  of  human  labour  relied  on  the  scientific  theory  of  
thermodynamics  popularised  by  German  physician  and  physicist  Hermann  
von  Helmholtz  (1821-­1894)  in  the  middle  decades  of  the  nineteenth  century.  
Helmholtz  held  that  energy  was  a  singular  and  universal  force  that  could  not  
be  created  or  destroyed;;  it  was  ever  shifting  but  constant.  In  his  popular  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Anson  Rabinbach,  The  Human  Motor:  Energy,  Fatigue,  and  the  Origins  of  Modernity,  (Los  
Angeles:  University  of  California  Press,  1992).  
7  Anna  Katharina  Schaffner,  Exhaustion:  A  History,  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  
2016).  
8  Rabinbach,  The  Human  Motor,  p.  36.  
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lectures  and  writings  Helmholtz  portrayed  the  movements  of  the  planets,  the  
productive  force  of  machines,  and  human  labour,  as  examples  of  the  
universal  law  of  energy  conservation.  They  were  all,  he  argued,  part  of  a  vast  
and  protean  reservoir  of  energy.9    
From  the  mid-­nineteenth  century  the  labour  of  men  and  machines  was  
increasingly  measured  using  techniques  developed  within  the  material  
sciences.  The  methodologies  pioneered  by  engineers  for  the  measurement  of  
metal  fatigue  proved  particularly  popular.  The  concept  of  metal  fatigue  was  
first  documented  in  an  1854  lecture  delivered  to  the  London  Institution  of  Civil  
Engineers  by  railway  engineer  Frederick  Braithwaite  (1798-­1865).  Braithwaite  
cited  the  ‘fatigue  of  metals’  as  a  primary  cause  of  railway  accidents:  
  
There  are  reasons  for  believing,  that  many  of  the  appalling,  and  
apparently  unaccountable  accidents  on  railways,  and  elsewhere,  are  to  
be  ascribed  to  that  progressive  action  which  may  be  termed,  the  
‘fatigue  of  metals’.  This  fatigue  may  arise  from  a  variety  of  causes,  
such  as  repeated  strain,  blows,  concussions,  jerks,  torsion,  or  
tension.10  
  
It  had  been  known  for  some  time  that  continuous  strain  caused  iron  to  
crystallise  and  eventually  break,  but,  as  Wolfgang  Schivelbusch  has  shown,  
the  expansion  of  railways  in  the  nineteenth  century  hastened  the  development  
of  this  concept.11  In  the  mid-­nineteenth  century  a  number  of  large-­scale  
railway  disasters  were  attributed  to  material  fatigue.  One  of  the  most  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Ibid.  
10  Frederick  Braithwaite,  ‘On  the  Fatigue  and  Consequent  Fracture  of  Metals’,  Minutes  of  the  
Proceedings  of  the  Institution  of  Civil  Engineers,  13  (1854)  463-­467,  p.  463.  
11  Wolfgang  Schivelbusch,  The  Railway  Journey:  The  Industrialisation  of  Time  and  Space  in  
the  Nineteenth  Century,  (Berkley:  University  of  California  Press,  1986).  
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catastrophic  rail  accidents  of  the  century  occurred  near  Versailles,  France,  in  
1842  as  the  result  of  a  broken  axle.  Fifty-­five  passengers  died  and  over  100  
others  were  injured.  Following  the  incident  engineers  throughout  continental  
Europe  increasingly  turned  their  attention  to  metal  fatigue.  In  1861  Scottish  
engineer  William  Fairbairn  (1789-­1874)  conducted  research  into  the  failure  of  
metallic  structures  at  the  request  of  the  British  parliament.  His  research,  
partially  funded  by  the  Board  of  Trade,  used  large-­scale  testing  set-­ups  to  
measure  the  effects  of  repeated  loading  on  wrought  and  cast-­iron  girders.  
Fairbairn  was  one  of  many  European  engineers  to  develop  testing  machinery  
of  this  kind.  In  the  same  decade  German  engineer  August  Wöhler  (1819-­
1914)  investigated  the  failure  mechanism  of  railway  axles  by  applying  
controlled  load  cycles  using  a  specially  developed  machine.  The  methodology  
developed  by  these  engineers  –  in  particular,  their  use  of  standardised  testing  
technology  –  pointed  to  new  ways  of  investigating  human  labour.12  
Physiologists  readily  adopted  both  the  semantic  and  conceptual  
apparatus  underlying  the  theory  of  thermodynamics  and  the  modes  of  testing  
popularised  by  material  scientists  in  the  mid-­nineteenth  century.  Interpreted  
through  the  dynamic  language  of  physics,  the  human  body  was  increasingly  
conceived  of  as  a  field  of  forces  to  be  investigated  and  measured  by  scientific  
technologies  designed  for  that  purpose,  such  as  Italian  physiologist  Angelo  
Mosso’s  (1846-­1910)  ergograph,  which  measured  muscular  exertion.  The  
human  body,  like  the  mechanical  motor,  became  framed  as  a  site  of  energy  
conservation  and  conversion.13  By  the  1890s,  the  laboratory  study  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  Ibid.  
13  Rabinbach,  The  Human  Motor.  
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energetic  work  was  well  established.  As  Rabinbach  has  described,  these  
early  laboratory  studies  of  human  labour  and  fatigue  were  largely  limited  to  
tracing  specific,  isolated  muscles  subjected  to  artificially  induced  stress.    
At  the  turn  of  the  twentieth  century,  however,  scientific  studies  of  
fatigue  were  increasingly  carried  out  within  the  workplace.  The  rapid  
expansion  of  factories,  mills,  mines,  and  other  industrial  workplaces  in  the  late  
nineteenth  century  ignited  fierce  debate  about  the  place  of  the  human  body  in  
industrial  production.14  Worker  fatigue  –  which  was  bound  up  with  broader  
concerns  about  working  practices,  social  justice,  and  productivity  –  was  
central  here.  Keen  to  contribute  to  this  debate,  physiologists  increasingly  
focused  their  attention  on  fatigue.  This  research,  which  centred  on  the  
physiology  of  labour,  looked  to  uncover  both  the  mechanism  of  human  fatigue  
and  the  most  efficient  means  of  energy  expenditure.    
From  the  1890s  advocates  of  the  new  science  of  work  became  
increasingly  interested  in  the  practical  implications  of  this  research.  In  Britain,  
and  elsewhere,  a  number  of  socially  minded  industrialists  conducted  
experiments  within  the  workplace.  Moving  beyond  the  laboratory,  these  
studies  sought  to  determine  the  relation  between  productivity,  working  hours,  
and  workers’  health  and  wellbeing.15  In  1893  William  Mather  (1838-­1920),  an  
industrialist  and  politician,  implemented  an  experimental  forty-­eight  hour  
working  week  at  the  Salford  Ironworks.  Mather  found  that  absenteeism  was  
significantly  reduced  (from  2.5%  in  a  fifty-­three  hour  working  week,  down  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Robin  Wolfe  Scheffler,  ‘The  Fate  of  a  Progressive  Science:  The  Harvard  Fatigue  
Laboratory,  Athletes,  the  Science  of  Work  and  the  Politics  of  Reform’,  Endeavour,  35,  2-­3  
(2011)  48-­54.  
15  A.  J.  McIvor,  ‘Employers,  the  Government,  and  Industrial  Fatigue  in  Britain,  1890-­1918’,  
British  Journal  of  Industrial  Medicine,  44,  11  (1987)  724-­732.  
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0.5%)  and  that  output  increased.  Mather  and  his  foremen  regarded  the  
reduction  of  fatigue  as  the  primary  cause  of  increased  productivity  and  denied  
that  workers  had  made  a  ‘special  effort’  during  the  trial  year.  As  Mather  noted  
in  a  letter  published  in  the  Times  on  31  May  1894:    
  
The  very  careful  observations  of  our  foremen  are  conclusive  on  this  
point.  They,  one  and  all,  declare  that  the  abolition  of  the  two  hours’  
work  before  breakfast,  with  its  accompanying  strain  of  a  very  early  rise  
and  for  many  men  a  long  walk  without  food,  has  produced  a  different  
mental  and  physical  condition  throughout  the  day.  The  foremen  
themselves  in  their  own  persons  feel  the  difference,  and  without  any  
conscious  spurt  on  their  part,  they  say  everything  is  lighter  and  easier  
in  the  performance  of  their  duties.  They  have,  therefore,  no  difficulty  in  
explaining  why  the  output  of  the  men  is  as  great  under  our  present  
system  as  under  the  longer  hours.  The  whole  gain  comes  from  the  
altered  conditions  of  employment.16  
  
The  reduction  in  working  hours,  Mather  argued,  had  a  cumulative,  rippling  
effect.  It  impacted  on  the  entire  lifestyle  of  the  worker.  Given  the  apparent  
success  of  Mather’s  experiment,  a  number  of  other  workplaces,  including  the  
Royal  Dockyards,  took  up  the  forty-­eight  hour  working  week.  In  the  main  
though,  British  employers  dismissed  Mather’s  experiment.  Few  private  
employers  took  the  suggestion  up,  and  a  fifty-­three  or  fifty-­four  hour  working  
week  remained  the  norm  in  most  British  firms.  Similar  experiments  were,  
however,  carried  out  elsewhere,  most  notably  at  Zeiss  Optics  in  Germany  in  
1901  and  at  the  Engis  Chemical  Works  in  Belgium  in  1905.17  Arthur  McIvor  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  William  Mather,  ‘Mr  Mather’s  Report  on  the  Forty-­Eight  Hour  Week’,  Times,  May  31  1894,  
p.  13.  
17  McIvor,  ‘Employers,  the  Government,  and  Industrial  Fatigue  in  Britain,  1890-­1918’.  
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has  suggested  that,  though  the  relationship  between  worker  fatigue  and  
industrial  efficiency  was  discussed  in  these  studies,  it  was  not  the  central  
concern  of  industrialists.  Reform  was,  rather,  motivated  by  humanitarian  
concerns:  it  was  an  ‘expression  of  Victorian  social  conscience’.18  
   On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic  reform  was  driven  by  economic  
interests.  Scientific  management,  a  school  of  thought  based  on  the  work  of  
American  engineer  Frederick  Winslow  Taylor  (1856-­1915)  was  employed  in  
American  workplaces  from  the  1880s.  It  was  primarily  concerned  with  the  
physical  efficiency  of  individual  workers  and  sought,  as  Daniel  Nelson  has  
shown,  to  ‘reintegrate  the  fragmented  industrial  plant  of  the  late  nineteenth  
century’  through  a  rationalisation  and  standardisation  of  work.19  These  aims  
underlay  a  number  of  studies  carried  out  by  Taylor  and  his  associates  at  
American  steel  companies  in  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries.  
In  these  experiments  Taylor  and  his  contemporaries  employed  time  and  
motion  studies,  and  measured  the  effect  of  incentive  –  or  piece  rate  –  wages  
on  productivity.20  These  studies  sought  to  maximise  productivity,  irrespective  
of  the  physiological  cost  to  the  worker  and,  as  such,  were  subject  to  criticism  
by  social  reformers  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  
   Partly  as  a  result  of  these  workplace  studies,  by  the  turn  of  the  
twentieth  century  industrial  fatigue  was  widely  discussed  throughout  Western  
Europe  and  America.  In  1903  the  International  Congress  on  Hygiene  and  
Demography  passed  a  resolution  urging  governments  to  seriously  investigate  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  Ibid.  p.  725.  
19  Daniel  Nelson,  ‘Scientific  Management,  Systematic  Management,  and  Labor,  1880-­1915’,  
The  Business  History  Review,  48,  4  (1974)  479-­500,  p.  480.  
20  Daniel  Nelson,  ‘Taylorism  and  the  Workers  at  Bethlehem  Steel,  1898-­1901’,  The  
Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  101,  4  (1977)  487-­505.  
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the  issue  of  industrial  fatigue.  In  1904  the  Interdepartmental  Committee  on  
Physical  Deterioration  made  a  similar  recommendation  to  the  British  
government.  The  Committee,  which  was  established  to  investigate  the  health  
of  the  nation  following  the  Boer  War  (1899-­1901),  found  that  physical  
deterioration  was  caused  by  several  interrelated  factors  including  ‘over-­
fatigue’  due  to  the  nature  and  conditions  of  industrial  work,  poor  diet,  and  
disease.21  The  Committee  concluded  that  ‘there  should  be  a  strictly  scientific  
enquiry  into  the  physiological  causation  and  effects  of  over-­fatigue’.22  As  a  
result,  in  1913  the  British  Home  Office  appointed  A.  F.  Stanley  Kent  (1863-­
1958),  professor  of  physiology  at  the  University  of  Bristol,  to  undertake  a  
series  of  experiments  on  industrial  fatigue.  Though  Kent  did  not  publish  the  
results  of  these  investigations  until  1915,  his  appointment  indicates  that  the  
concept  of  industrial  fatigue  had  penetrated  high  government  prior  to  the  First  
World  War.    
The  war,  with  the  demands  it  brought  for  strenuous  and  long-­
maintained  effort  by  workers  on  the  home  front,  however,  solidified  this  
interest.  The  experiences  of  workers  in  wartime  industries  exposed,  according  
to  McIvor,  a  ‘critical  lack  of  knowledge’  in  Britain  of  the  laws  governing  human  
health  and  efficiency.23  Alan  Derickson  has  shown  that,  when  Britain  first  
entered  the  war  in  1914,  it  launched  a  frenetic  drive  to  produce  military  
equipment  and  supplies.24  Hours  of  labour  lengthened  –  particularly  for  
munitions  workers  who,  between  1914  and  1915,  worked  an  average  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  McIvor,  ‘Employers,  the  Government,  and  Industrial  Fatigue  in  Britain,  1890-­1918’,  p.  729.  
22  Ibid.  p.  729.  
23  Ibid.  p.  730.  
24  Alan  Derickson,  ‘Physiological  Science  and  Scientific  Management  in  the  Progressive  Era:  
Frederic  S.  Lee  and  the  Committee  on  Industrial  Fatigue’,  The  Business  History  Review,  68,  4  
(1994)  483-­514.  
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seventy-­five  to  eighty-­five  hours  a  week  –  but  output  stalled.25  Accidents,  
spoiled  work,  absenteeism  and  other  manifestations  of  fatigue  abounded  in  
wartime  industries.26  In  response  to  these  concerns,  the  Health  of  Munitions  
Workers  Committee  (HMWC)  was  established  in  September  1915  to  consider  
and  advise  on  questions  of  industrial  fatigue,  hours  of  labour  and  other  
matters  affecting  the  personal  health  and  efficiency  of  workers  in  munitions  
factories  and  workshops.27  It  was  in  this  context  that  fatigue  became  
expressly  tied  to  concerns  about  output,  a  conceptual  orientation  that  would  
structure  fatigue  research  well  into  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  
The  HMWC  constituted,  for  the  first  time  in  British  industrial  history,  a  
conglomeration  of  medical  and  health  researchers,  industrialists,  
representatives  of  labour,  academics,  and  administrators.  Prior  to  this,  
medical  practitioners  were  virtually  absent  from  British  industry,  but  war  
provided  a  precondition  for  medical  and  scientific  entry  into  the  workplace,  
that  some  had  been  calling  for  since  the  1890s.28  The  Committee  functioned  
for  a  little  over  two  years,  until  the  end  of  1917,  during  which  time  it  produced  
twenty-­one  memoranda,  two  reports,  and  a  handbook  on  the  health  of  
munitions  workers.  Committee  members  interviewed  employers,  workers,  and  
factory  inspectorates,  and  visited  factories  to  ascertain  at  first  hand  the  
conditions  under  which  munitions  work  was  being  carried  out.  This  evidence  
was  combined  with  a  series  of  laboratory  experiments  by  physiologists,  
psychologists,  statisticians,  and  medical  researchers  on  a  range  of  issues  
relating  to  industrial  health,  efficiency,  and  fatigue.  Marking  a  break  with  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  McIvor,  ‘Employers,  the  Government,  and  Industrial  Fatigue  in  Britain,  1890-­1918’.  
26  Derickson,  ‘Physiological  Science  and  Scientific  Management  in  the  Progressive  Era’.  
27  McIvor,  ‘Employers,  the  Government,  and  Industrial  Fatigue  in  Britain,  1890-­1918’.  
28  Ibid.  
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nineteenth-­century  laboratory  studies  of  fatigue,  the  Committee  regarded  
diminished  capacity  for  work  –  in  other  words,  reduced  output  –  as  the  most  
‘direct  and  practical  indicator  of  fatigue’.29  
The  Committee’s  main  conclusions  can  be  summarised  as  follows:  that  
physical  health  was  key  for  successful  industrial  production  and  that,  contrary  
to  received  wisdom  on  industrial  illness,  the  dominant  cause  of  ill-­health  was  
long  working  hours.  The  relationship  between  hours  of  work  and  output  was,  
however,  found  to  be  complex.  The  Committee  found  that,  although  workers’  
rate  of  output  fell  after  eight  hours  on  the  job,  their  total  output  after  ten  or  
more  hours  of  work  still  exceeded  that  accomplished  on  the  shorter  shift.30  
With  labour  in  short  supply  and  production  demands  high,  intensive  working  
practices  were  deemed  necessary,  if  regrettable.  As  such,  the  Committee  
recommended  only  modest  limitations  on  working  hours.  A  January  1916  
memorandum,  for  example,  urged  that  adult  men  work  no  more  than  sixty-­
seven  hours  per  week  and  that  women  of  all  ages  and  boys  under  sixteen  
years  old  work  for  no  more  than  sixty  hours.31    
The  memoranda  produced  by  the  HMWC  were  widely  circulated  to  
employers  and  other  industrial  psychologists.  According  to  the  final  report  of  
the  Committee,  published  in  1918,  more  than  200,000  of  its  memoranda  were  
in  circulation  and  its  recommendations  had  received  a  ‘wide  measure  of  
acceptance’  among  British  industrialists.32  Partly  as  a  result  of  this  apparent  
success,  the  activities  of  the  HMWC  received  widespread  attention  in  Britain  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Ibid.  p.  731.  
30  Vicky  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory:  The  Politics  of  Industrial  Health  in  
Britain,  1914-­60,  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2011).  
31  Derickson,  ‘Physiological  Science  and  Scientific  Management  in  the  Progressive  Era’.  
32  Steven  Kreis,  ‘Early  Experiments  in  British  Scientific  Management:  The  Health  of  Munitions  
Workers’  Committee,  1915-­1920’,  Journal  of  Management  History,  1,  2  (1995)  65-­78,  p.  70.  
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and  elsewhere.  In  April  1917,  following  American  entry  into  the  First  World  
War,  the  country’s  Bureau  of  Labour  Statistics  reprinted  most  of  the  HMWC’s  
memoranda  and  the  Russell  Sage  Foundation  and  other  private  agents  also  
disseminated  the  Committee’s  recommendations.  Under  the  guidance  of  
Philip  Sargant  Florence  (1890-­1982),  previously  of  the  HMWC,  and  Frederic  
S.  Lee  (1859-­1939),  similar  studies  were  conducted  in  America  with  the  Ford  
Motor  Group  in  July  1917  and  the  Scovill  Manufacturing  Company  in  October  
1917.33  In  these  studies  Florence  and  Lee  found,  as  in  Britain,  that  short  rest  
breaks  and  limitations  on  hours  improved  the  productivity  of  workers.    
In  reaching  these  conclusions,  Florence  and  Lee  found  themselves  at  
odds  with  the  dominant  model  of  workplace  management  in  America:  
Taylorism.  Taylor  only  tacitly  acknowledged  the  costs  of  overwork.  In  The  
Principles  of  Scientific  Management  first  published  in  1911,  he  argued  that:  
  
It  should  be  distinctly  understood  that  in  no  case  is  the  workman  called  
upon  to  work  at  a  pace  which  would  be  injurious  to  his  health.  The  task  
is  always  regulated  that  the  man  who  is  well  suited  to  his  job  will  thrive  
while  working  at  this  rate  during  a  long  term  of  years  and  grow  happier  
and  more  prosperous,  instead  of  being  overworked.34  
  
For  Florence  and  Lee,  though,  scientific  management  was  too  preoccupied  
with  the  problem  of  underwork  –  particularly  deliberate  slow-­working,  or  
‘soldiering’  as  Taylor  termed  it  –  which,  they  argued,  implicitly  trivialised  
worker  fatigue.35    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Derickson,  ‘Physiological  Science  and  Scientific  Management  in  the  Progressive  Era’.  
34  Frederick  Winslow  Taylor,  The  Principles  of  Scientific  Management,  (London:  Harper  and  
Brothers  Publishers,  1919),  p.  39.  
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Florence’s  former  employer,  the  HMWC,  was  equally  critical  of  
Taylorism.  Steven  Kreis  has  demonstrated  that,  though  HMWC  investigators  
were  certainly  familiar  with  Taylor’s  work  they  believed,  like  their  American  
counterparts,  that  he  placed  too  great  an  emphasis  on  the  relationship  
between  work  and  remuneration.  The  1917  interim  report  of  the  Committee  
argued  that  the  Taylorite  system  of  scientific  management  was  too  
preoccupied  with  fixing  piece  rates  in  an  attempt  to  limit  ‘soldiering’:  
  
In  America  much  has  recently  been  done,  in  association  with  what  is  
known  as  ‘scientific  management’,  to  eliminate  useless  movements  
and  lessen  physical  effort,  but,  somehow  unfortunately,  the  subject  has  
got  wrapped  up  with  ‘time  studies’  used  for  fixing  piece  rates,  and  there  
is,  in  consequence,  a  tendency  for  it  to  be  looked  on  with  disfavour  by  
wage-­earners,  while  the  real  value  of  its  teaching  is  being  lost  sight  
of.36  
  
For  the  HMWC  the  duration  and  distribution  of  work  and  rest  was  more  
important  in  the  reduction  of  fatigue  and  the  maximisation  of  productivity  than  
an  incentive  system  based  on  fixed  piece  rates.  Tensions  between  the  
American  model  of  scientific  management  and  the  British  approach  to  
industrial  health  and  efficiency  continued  into  the  post-­war  period.    
In  the  interwar  years  the  work  of  the  HMWC  continued,  albeit  in  a  
different  form.  After  the  First  World  War  three  new  organisations  were  
established  to  develop  and  expand  the  work  of  HMWC:  the  Industrial  Fatigue  
Research  Board  (IFRB,  which  in  1928  was  renamed  the  Industrial  Health  
Research  Board),  the  National  Institute  of  Industrial  Psychology  (NIIP),  and  
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the  Industrial  Welfare  Society  (IWS).  All  these  organisations  had  similar  aims,  
but  approached  issues  of  worker  health  and  welfare  from  different  angles.  The  
IFRB  adopted  a  similar  approach  to  the  HMWC.  The  Board  positioned  itself  
within  the  science  of  work  tradition  and,  in  its  early  years,  took  a  mainly  
neurophysiological  approach  to  industrial  fatigue.  The  NIIP,  on  the  other  hand,  
situated  its  approach  within  the  burgeoning  field  of  industrial  psychology.  
Composed  mostly  of  psychologists,  the  NIIP  focused  on  aptitude,  workplace  
relations,  and  productivity.  Unlike  the  IFRB  and  the  NIIP,  the  IWS  extended  its  
remit  beyond  the  workplace.  Based  on  the  long-­held  assumption  that  living  
conditions  affected  the  health  and  welfare  of  workers  as  much  as  the  
conditions  of  the  workplace,  the  Society  claimed  an  interest  in  staff  both  at  
work  and  at  home.  Though  they  differed  in  scope  and  approach,  each  public  
agency  was  at  the  forefront  of  attempts  to  discover  and  elucidate  what  was  
routinely  called  ‘the  human  factor  in  industry’.37  All  engaged  with  the  problem  
of  fatigue.  This  both  legitimised  scientific  interest  in  industrial  fatigue  as  a  
concept  and  added  new  dimensions  to  how  it  was  conceived  of  in  scientific  
and  lay  circles.  
     Set  up  in  1918  to  ‘develop  and  extend’  the  investigations  of  the  HMWC,  
the  IFRB  investigated  how  factors  such  as  lighting,  temperature,  ventilation,  
nutrition,  personality,  and  hours  of  work  and  rest  affected  workers’  productivity  
and  health.38  Staffed  initially  by  physicians  and  physiologists,  the  Board  was  
chaired  by  Sir  Charles  Sherrington  (1857-­1952),  an  English  neurophysiologist  
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who  was  renowned  for  his  pioneering  work  on  neural  functioning.39  The  
academic  background  of  its  investigators  informed  the  Board’s  initial  approach  
and  methodology.  As  in  previous  investigations,  the  work  of  the  Board  
involved  a  mix  of  fieldwork  in  different  workplaces  and  laboratory  research.  
According  to  IFRB  investigator  B.  Muscio,  this  research  consisted  of  three  
major  strands.  The  first  involved  laboratory  research  on  somatic  expressions  
of  fatigue,  while  the  second  and  third  focused  on  indirect  measures  of  fatigue  
in  the  workplace  and  the  laboratory  respectively.  Reflecting  the  broader  early  
twentieth-­century  pursuit  of  somatic  correlates  for  psychic  states,  the  first  
strand  discussed  by  Muscio  used  non-­voluntary  physiological  phenomena,  
such  as  changes  in  blood  pressure  and  pulse,  as  indicators  of  fatigue.  
Ultimately  though,  IFRB  researchers  abandoned  this  mode  of  investigation.  
As  Muscio  described  in  a  1921  article  published  in  the  British  Journal  of  
Psychology,  in  these  studies  investigators  found  it  impossible  to  examine  
fatigue  in  isolation.  The  personality  and  emotional  states  of  subjects  
frequently  influenced  results,  which  made  it,  Muscio  argued,  difficult  to  
establish  the  role  of  fatigue  in  physiological  arousal.40    
From  the  early  1920s  the  Board  mainly  used  indirect  phenomena  as  
measures  of  fatigue.  Following  HMWC  precedent,  in  the  workplace  
investigators  measured  the  quantity  and  quality  of  output,  while  in  the  
laboratory  performance  tests  were  used  as  retrospective  indicators  of  fatigue.  
As  Muscio  described,  in  these  instances  fatigue  was  inferred  when  output  or  
performance  diminished:  
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Since  fatigue,  in  the  present  sense,  cannot  be  directly  observed,  we  
require  (before  fatigue  test  experimentation  begins)  something  
observable  (an  expression  of  fatigue)  from  which  its  presence  can  be  
inferred.  The  accepted  ‘expression’  (diminished  capacity)  is  itself  not  
directly  observable;;  and  consequently,  we  require  an  observable  
expression  of  this  ‘expression’  of  fatigue,  from  which  the  presence  of  
diminished  capacity  (and  hence  of  fatigue)  may  be  inferred.41  
  
As  with  investigations  for  non-­voluntary  physiological  expressions  of  fatigue,  
performance  tests  were  undertaken  in  the  laboratory.  Like  their  nineteenth-­
century  predecessors,  IFRB  investigators  tested  muscular  strength,  precision,  
and  rapidity  using  instruments  such  as  the  ergograph  and  the  kata-­
thermometer,  a  device  developed  by  British  physiologist  Leonard  Hill  (1866-­
1952)  to  measure  the  combined  effects  of  temperature  and  air  velocity.42  
Investigators  also  designed  mental  and  physical  tasks  that  had  readily  
quantifiable  results,  for  example  tapping  and  dart  throwing.    
Alongside  these  laboratory  studies,  the  Board  also  carried  out  a  
number  of  workshop  tests  designed  to  measure  the  quality  and  quantity  of  
industrial  output.  Some  investigators  charted  hourly  output  curves  under  
different  conditions  by  using  recording  equipment  to  quantify  the  impact  of  
certain  working  practices.  Others  employed  a  methodology  favoured  by  
American  researchers  but  widely  despised  by  workers  and  trade  unions:  time  
and  motion  studies.  IFRB  investigators  were,  however,  wary  of  causing  
conflict  with  workers  and  trade  union  officials  so  advocated  close  union  co-­
operation  during  any  work  measurement  exercise.  Also,  unlike  their  American  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41  Ibid.  pp.  35-­36.  
42  A.  J.  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’,  Medical  History,  
31,  2  (1987)  160-­189.  
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counterparts,  IFRB  researchers  did  not  use  stopwatches  to  set  standard  
times.  As  McIvor  has  suggested  though,  workers  continued  to  be  suspicious  
of  this  aspect  of  the  Board’s  work.  They  regarded  time  and  motion  studies  as  
‘an  interference  and  a  humiliation,  and  a  first  step  to  speeding  up  
production’.43    
Between  1918  and  1939  the  IFRB  produced  eighty-­four  special  
research  monographs  and  numerous  articles  on  the  optimum  conditions  and  
methods  of  work  for  operatives.  Much  of  the  work  produced  by  the  IFRB  
indicated  that  productivity  was  closely  linked  to  working  hours  and  rest.  
Productivity,  the  IFRB  argued,  dropped  significantly  towards  the  end  of  a  long  
shift  as  workers  became  increasingly  bored  and  tired.  The  most  productive  
worker,  the  Board  suggested,  was  ‘the  steady  worker’.44  Drawing  a  parallel  
with  professional  running,  the  Board  argued:  
  
It  confirms  what  might  have  been  anticipated  from  athletics,  where  the  
best  long  distance  runners  cover  lap  after  lap  at  the  same  rapid  rate,  in  
contrast  to  the  performance  of  less  efficient  runners  who  vary  their  
pace.45    
  
Workers  should  not,  the  IFRB  thus  reasoned,  be  compelled  to  complete  work  
quickly,  but  should  be  allowed  to  maintain  their  own  pace  of  work  and  take  
regular  rest  breaks.    
The  Board  emphasised  the  diversity  of  human  physical  and  mental  
capabilities,  as  well  as  the  variable  nature  of  energy  levels.  Like  its  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43  Ibid.  p.  170.  
44  Anon,  ‘Fatigue  and  Output  in  the  Boot  Industry’,  The  Lancet,  196,  5075  (1920)  1154-­1155,  
p.  1155.  
45  Ibid.  p.  1155.  
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predecessor,  the  IFRB  was  critical  of  the  American  model  of  scientific  
management.  The  Board  was  particularly  disparaging  of  the  idea  that  a  
universally  applicable  mode  of  efficient  work  existed.  The  IFRB’s  1937  annual  
report  argued  that  the  complexities  of  the  ‘human  machine’  should  be  
respected:  
  
The  work  of  the  human  machine  cannot  be  ticked  out  in  seconds  as  a  
clock.  It  has  a  rhythm,  and  the  rhythm  varies  –  work  has  its  ups  and  
downs  –  in  tune  to  the  pulse  of  physical  and  mental  energy,  which  itself  
rises  and  ebbs  in  accordance  with  the  physiological  laws  governing  the  
functions  of  all  living  organisms.46  
  
The  natural  rhythm  of  each  worker  was,  the  Board  argued,  different  and  as  
such  workers  should  not  be  required  to  conform  to  a  standardised  scheme  of  
work.    
This  focus  on  the  individuality  of  workers  marked  a  point  of  
convergence  between  the  IFRB  and  the  NIIP.  Founded  in  1921  by  Charles  
Myers  (1873-­1946)  and  Henry  Welch,  the  NIIP  professed  similar  aims  to  the  
IFRB.  It  was  founded,  according  to  Alan  Collins,  to  promote  and  encourage  
the  ‘practical  application  of  the  sciences  of  psychology  and  physiology  to  
commerce  and  industry’.47  It  set  out  to  be  scientific,  impartial,  and  
commercially  neutral  but,  unlike  the  IFRB,  investigated  issues  relevant  to  
particular  firms  rather  than  the  broader  workforce.  The  NIIP’s  investigations  
broadly  reflected  the  interests  and  expertise  of  its  founders:  Myers  was  a      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’,  p.  171.  
47  Alan  Collins,  ‘England’,  in  David  B.  Baker  (ed.),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  the  History  of  
Psychology:  Global  Perspectives,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2012),  pp.  182-­210,  p.  
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pre-­eminent  industrial  psychologist  in  interwar  Britain  who  left  his  post  at  the  
Psychology  Laboratory  at  the  University  of  Cambridge  for  the  NIIP;;  and  Welch  
was  a  businessman  with  interests  in  vocational  guidance  and  selection.  There  
were  two  main  strands  of  research.  The  first  focused  on  social  and  ethical  
issues  and  involved  studies  of  worker-­management  relations,  group  
organisation  and  workplace  participation.  The  other  –  ‘technical’  –  strand  
sought  to  enhance  worker  efficiency,  reduce  fatigue,  and  improve  training  and  
personnel  selection.48  The  dual  aims  of  the  NIIP  were  summarised  in  1929  by  
Welch:  
  
We  all  look  forward  to  a  time  when  working  people  of  all  types  in  this  
country  will  be  engaged  in  the  work  for  which  their  temperaments  and  
abilities  most  fit  them,  and  when  they  will  be  able  to  return  to  their  
homes  after  a  day’s  work  is  done,  not  too  fatigued  or  disgruntled  to  
interest  themselves  according  to  their  inclinations  and  capacities,  in  
literature,  art,  music  and  the  higher  things  of  life.49  
  
Expressing  a  similar  sentiment  to  Mather  half  a  century  earlier,  Welch  
proposed  that  work  should  not  exhaust.  The  whole  lifestyle  of  the  worker  was  
important  for  health  and  productivity.  
   Though  the  IFRB  and  NIIP  were  officially  separate,  partly  as  a  result  of  
reduced  central  funding  in  the  1920s,  the  organisations  formally  collaborated  
throughout  the  early  and  mid-­twentieth  century.  Investigators  moved  freely  
between  organisations.  Myers  was,  for  example,  involved  in  the  work  of  both  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Graham  Richards,  Putting  Psychology  in  its  Place:  A  Critical  Historical  Overview,  (New  
York:  Routledge,  2002),  p.  178.  
49  Sarah  Bakewell,  ‘Illustrations  from  the  Wellcome  Institute  Library:  The  Life  and  Times  of  the  
Myers  Collection’,  Medical  History,  37  (1993)  197-­200,  pp.  200-­201.  
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the  NIIP  and  the  IFRB  throughout  the  1920s  and  1930s.  The  close  
relationship  fostered  between  the  organisations  in  the  interwar  period  
influenced  the  approach  of  investigators.  Following  collaboration  with  NIIP  
psychologists,  IFRB  researchers  shifted  their  focus  from  hours  of  work  and  
environmental  conditions  to  methods  of  work,  job  design,  and  vocational  
psychology  –  the  main  interests  of  the  NIIP.  From  the  1920s,  the  IFRB  
increasingly  focused  on  vocational  guidance  and  performance  testing,  and  
worked  to  develop  techniques  to  ensure  workers  were  placed  in  the  
occupations  for  which  they  were  best  suited.  A  1922  report  produced  by  
Muscio  and  colleagues,  for  example,  investigated  the  relationship  between  job  
suitability  and  fatigue.  It  concluded  that  when  workers  were  unsuited  to  a  task  
they  were  more  liable  to  fatigue,  so  vocational  selection  was  an  important  
means  of  offsetting  overstrain.50  
Though  closely  connected  throughout  the  1920s  and  1930s,  the  
investigators  employed  by  the  NIIP  reached  different  conclusions  to  their  
colleagues  in  the  IFRB.  While  the  NIIP  located  the  problem  of  lost  productivity  
partly  in  long  working  hours  and  poor  safety  procedures  researchers  gave  
most  weight  to  other  factors,  namely  individual  psychology  and  workplace  
design.  One  of  the  major  conclusions  to  come  out  of  the  NIIP’s  research  was  
that  fatigue  could  be  reduced  by  ‘relatively  simple  changes’  in  work-­bench  
design  and  layout,  or  placement  of  materials.51  Given  this  emphasis,  the  NIIP  
was  subject  to  the  same  criticisms  levelled  at  the  American  model  of  scientific  
management,  the  HMWC,  and  the  IFRB:  that  the  organisation  intended  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­1939’.  
51  Richards,  Putting  Psychology  in  its  Place,  p.  178.  
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maximise  efficiency  at  any  cost.  For  this  reason,  the  psychologists  employed  
by  the  NIIP  were  often  met  with  hostility  from  workers,  who  saw  the  
organisation  as  siding  with  management.  Collins  has  shown,  however,  that  
the  NIIP  explicitly  tried  to  disassociate  itself  from  American  inspired  
systems.52  Indeed,  many  of  the  psychologists  employed  by  the  NIIP  were  
explicitly  critical  of  Taylorism.  For  them,  the  NIIP  intended  to  promote  a  more  
humanistic  model  of  workplace  efficiency  that  privileged  the  mental  and  bodily  
health  of  workers  above  industrial  output.  In  his  1920  monograph  Mind  and  
Work,  Meyers  laid  out  these  differences.  Like  his  colleagues  in  the  IFRB,  
Meyers  claimed  that  the  model  of  scientific  management  promoted  by  the  
NIIP  was  more  humane  than  that  practised  by  the  Taylorite  school  as  it  
recognised  and  allowed  for  the  fact  that  different  modes  of  work  suited  
different  people:  
  
Shorthand  reduces  fatigue  and  increases  efficiency,  but  there  are  
various  methods  of  shorthand  just  as  there  are  various  first-­class  styles  
of  golfing  or  violin-­playing.  It  is  psychologically  most  improbable  that  
any  one  good  method  or  style  can  ever  be  the  best  for  all  persons,  and  
it  remains  for  psychological  research  to  determine  the  relation  between  
individual  physical  and  mental  differences  and  the  different  methods  
needed  to  satisfy  these  differences.  While  the  employee  should  be  
trained  from  the  start  in  what  has  been  proved  to  be  one  of  the  best  
methods,  he  should  be  at  full  liberty  to  substitute  another,  if  he  prefers  
it  and  can  show  that  it  is  effective.  To  aim  at  pressing  all  workers  into  
the  same  mold  is  not  only  to  destroy  individuality  and  to  encourage  
needless  monotony,  but  also  to  run  counter  to  known  psychological  
principles.  It  is  the  outcome  of  so  called  ‘scientific’  management,  
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mechanically  formulated  by  the  engineer,  in  which  the  mental  factors  of  
personality,  sentiment,  and  sympathy  are  sacrificed  to  purely  physical  
considerations.53  
  
The  aim,  according  to  Myers,  was  not  to  exploit  workers  as  in  Taylorism,  but  
to  design  work  environments  and  practices  in  which  all  parties’  interests  were  
met.54    
The  IWS  professed  similar  aims.  Founded  in  1918  by  R.  R.  Hyde,  one  
of  Benjamin  Seebohm  Rowntree’s  (1871-­1954)  staff  at  the  Welfare  
Department  of  the  Ministry  of  Munitions,  the  IWS  worked  closely  with  the  
IFRB  and  the  NIIP.  The  Society  played  an  important  role  in  disseminating  the  
research  findings  of  both  organisations,  which  it  published  in  the  journal  
Industrial  Welfare  and  Personnel  Management.  The  recommendations  of  the  
IFRB  were  incorporated  into  the  1937  Factory  Act,  which  introduced  basic  
standards  of  health,  safety,  and  welfare  at  work.  McIvor  has  demonstrated,  
however,  that  in  general  diffusion  of  the  IFRB  and  NIIP’s  findings  was  
negligible.  Indeed,  following  the  Dunkirk  evacuation  in  1940  workers  involved  
in  war  industries  commonly  worked  up  to  seventy-­five  hours  a  week.  The  
Medical  Research  Council  (MRC),  which  oversaw  the  work  of  the  IFRB,  
lamented  the  limited  impact  of  the  Board’s  research  findings  in  a  report  
published  shortly  after  the  cessation  of  hostilities:  
  
It  is  regrettable  that  but  little  was  known  about  this  work  either  by  many  
industry  leaders  or  by  the  mass  of  workmen  in  the  early  stages  of  the  
war.  Had  this  information  been  more  widely  appreciated  it  might  have  
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been  possible  to  avoid  the  introduction  of  those  excessively  strenuous  
working  conditions  in  the  period  immediately  following  the  evacuation  
from  Dunkirk  which  proved  incompatible  with  a  large  sustained  output  
from  factories  and  with  a  good  standard  of  health  among  the  
workpeople.55  
  
McIvor  has  suggested  that  the  impact  of  the  IFRB  was  likely  limited  due  to  a  
communication  gap  between  the  Board  and  industrialists.  Employing  a  
criticism  often  levelled  at  academic  researchers  today,  McIvor  has  argued  that  
the  practical  men  of  business  clashed  with  the  inward-­facing  ‘ivory-­tower’  
academics  of  the  Board.56  Industrialists  mistrusted  the  work  of  the  IFRB,  
particularly  that  carried  out  in  laboratories,  which  was  held  to  be  largely  
theoretical  and  of  little  practical  value.57  As  such,  most  British  industry  
registered  a  negative  response  to  the  ideology  purported  by  the  IFRB  and  
associated  organisations  and  remained  committed  to  traditional  modes  of  
labour  management  based  on  the  scientifically-­outmoded  belief  that  a  ‘linear  
relationship’  existed  between  hours  of  work  and  output.58  
Vanessa  Heggie,  Robin  Wolfe  Scheffler,  and  others  have  shown  that  
similar  research  was  carried  out  in  America  during  this  period,  most  notably  in  
the  Harvard  Fatigue  Laboratory,  a  joint  venture  of  the  Harvard  Business  and  
Medical  Schools.59  Though  the  Laboratory  professed  an  interest  in  ‘everyday  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’,  p.  182.  
56  Ibid.  p.  186.  
57  Ibid.    
58  Ibid.  p.  187.  
59  Vanessa  Heggie,  ‘Special  Section:  Harvard  Fatigue  Laboratory’,  Journal  of  the  History  of  
Biology,  48  (2015)  361-­364;;  Robin  Wolfe  Scheffler,  ‘The  Power  of  Exercise  and  the  Exercise  
of  Power:  The  Harvard  Fatigue  Laboratory,  Distance  Running,  and  the  Disappearance  of  
Work’,  Journal  of  the  History  of  Biology,  48,  3  (2015)  391-­423;;  a  number  of  experiments  into  
the  effect  of  fatigue  on  productivity  were  also  performed  at  the  Hawthorne  works  of  the  
Western  Electric  Company  in  Chicago  from  November  1924  onwards,  see:  E.  A.  M.  Gale,  
‘The  Hawthorne  Studies  –  A  Fable  for  Our  Times?’,  Quarterly  Journal  of  Medicine,  97  (2004)  
439-­449.  
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life’,  including  industrial  fatigue,  much  of  the  work  carried  out  by  its  staff  
focused  on  extreme  physiology.60  Through  treadmill  experiments  –  in  which  
the  cardiac  function  and  energy  consumption  of  elite  athletes,  such  as  seven-­
time  Boston  Marathon  champion  Clarence  De-­Mar  (1888-­1958),  was  
measured  during  strenuous  cardiovascular  exercise  –  the  Laboratory  posited  
a  different  definition  of  fatigue  than  that  employed  in  Britain.  While  HMWC  and  
IFRB  studies  suggested  that  energy  was  finite  and  depleted  by  work,  the  
treadmill  studies  of  distance  running  conducted  in  the  Harvard  Fatigue  
Laboratory  suggested  that  it  was  possible  for  humans  to  maintain  a  ‘steady  
state’  –  or  internal  chemical  equilibrium  –  for  long  periods  of  exertion  with  no  
ill  effects.61    
Though  the  treadmill  studies  provided  the  first  tangible  scientific  
evidence  of  this  hypothesis,  the  idea  itself  was  not  entirely  new.  Indeed,  in  a  
December  1906  presidential  address  to  the  American  Philosophical  
Association  at  Columbia  University,  philosopher  and  psychologist  William  
James  (1842-­1910),  proposed  that  it  was  possible  for  humans  to  reach  an  
‘efficiency-­equilibrium’.62  Unlike  James’  suggestion  earlier  in  the  century,  the  
conclusion  reached  by  the  Harvard  team  was  ‘explosive  politically’.63  The  
implications  for  the  workplace  were  stark.  The  steady  state  hypothesis  held  
that  industrial  fatigue  could  be  alleviated  by  chemically  rebalancing  workers,  
removing  the  need  for  rest.  This  hypothesis  was  put  into  practice  in  the  
summer  of  1934,  when  the  Laboratory  was  invited  to  visit  a  steel  mill  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  Mark  Jackson,  Age  of  Stress:  Science  and  the  Search  for  Stability,  (Oxford:  Oxford  
University  Press,  2013),  p.  61.  
61  Scheffler,  ‘The  Fate  of  a  Progressive  Science’,  p.  48.  
62  William  James,  ‘The  Energies  of  Men’,  Science,  25,  635  (1907)  321-­332,  p.  324.  
63  Scheffler,  ‘The  Fate  of  a  Progressive  Science’,  p.  50.  
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Youngstown,  Ohio,  to  investigate  the  incidence  of  heat  exhaustion  among  
steelworkers.  The  visiting  team  endorsed  one  simple,  minimally  disruptive,  
change:  the  addition  of  trace  salts  to  workers’  drinking  water.  Rather  than  
wholesale  institutional  changes  to  the  conditions  or  practices  of  the  
workplace,  like  those  generally  proposed  by  IFRB  investigators  –  such  as  
reducing  working  hours  or  increasing  ventilation  around  blast  furnaces  –  the  
Laboratory’s  staff  advocated  an  approach  based  on  rebalancing  individual  
workers.64    
While  the  steady  state  hypothesis  did  not  inform  workplace  policy  in  
Britain,  as  it  did  in  America,  the  essential  model  of  fatigue  as  a  state  of  
imbalance  proposed  by  the  Harvard  Fatigue  Laboratory  was  reflected  in  the  
work  of  a  small  number  of  industrial  hygienists.  Howard  E.  Collier  (1890-­
1953),  a  reader  in  Industrial  Hygiene  at  the  University  of  Birmingham,  
described  fatigue  as  a  state  of  ‘unbalance’  in  a  1936  paper  read  at  a  meeting  
of  the  British  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science.65  For  Collier,  
fatigue  occurred  as  a  result  of  an  ‘absence  of  harmony’  between  ‘the  
organism  and  its  environment  or  between  the  various  subordinate  parts  within  
the  organism  itself’  or,  more  basically,  between  ‘intake  and  output’:  
  
In  fatigue,  output  exceeds  intake;;  katabolism  is  greater  than  anabolism.  
Rest,  change,  and  sleep  as  well  as  food  and  air  are  important  factors,  
therefore,  both  in  the  maintenance  of  health  and  the  production  of  
fatigue.  It  is  importance  to  recognise  that  ‘unbalance’  may  be  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Ibid.  
65  Howard  E.  Collier,  ‘The  Recognition  of  Fatigue,  With  Special  Reference  to  the  Clinical  
Diagnosis  of  Morbid  Fatigue  in  Industry’,  British  Medical  Journal,  2,  3964  (1936)  1322-­1325,  
p.  1323.  
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qualitative  and  quantitative,  and  that  it  may  be  due  only  to  the  time  
factor  –  that  is,  to  a  lag  in  recuperation  after  work  has  been  done.66  
    
Fatigue,  according  to  Collier,  was  caused  by  conditions  both  within  and  
beyond  the  factory.  Taking  a  more  radical  position  than  his  contemporaries  
employed  by  the  IFRB  and  the  NIIP,  Collier  argued  that  the  abolition  of  
‘morbid  fatigue  from  industry’  called  for  a  wholesale  reorganisation  of  British  
employment  practices.67  He  suggested,  in  particular,  that  night  work  and  
overtime  –  both,  he  argued,  ‘prolific’  causes  of  fatigue  –  should  be  
discouraged  and  that  the  time  and  cost  associated  with  travel  to  and  from  
work  should  be  subject  to  review.68  
In  the  years  following  the  First  World  War  human  factors  research  was  
not  limited  to  the  home  front.  Psychological  and  physiological  studies  of  
military  recruits  abounded.  Much  of  this  research  shared  similar  aims  to  that  
conducted  in  an  industrial  setting.  Military  investigations  were  interested,  
primarily,  in  maximising  the  efficiency  of  fighting  men  and  women  through  a  
combination  of  appropriate  selection  procedures  and  working  practices.69  The  
boundary  between  military  and  civil  research  during  this  period  was  
permeable  and  diffuse.  A  number  of  investigators  employed  by  the  IFRB  and  
NIIP  were  seconded  to  military  committees  following  the  1914-­1918  war.  In  
1919,  for  example,  two  leading  IFRB  investigators,  Major  Greenwood  (1880-­
1949)  and  Hilda  Mary  Woods  (1892-­1971),  were  seconded  to  a  committee  
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68  Ibid.  p.  1325.  
69  Alice  White,  From  the  Science  of  Selection  to  the  Pyschologising  of  Civvy  Street:  The  
Tavistock  Group,  1939-­1948,  PhD  Thesis,  (University  of  Kent,  2015).  
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appointed  to  advise  on  ‘certain  medical  aspects  of  the  Flying  Service’.70  With  
backgrounds  in  epidemiology  and  statistics,  Greenwood  and  Woods  
investigated  the  relationship  between  personality,  accidents,  and  fatigue.  
They  were  interested,  in  particular,  in  developing  tests  which  would  be  
suitable  to  determine  the  aptitude  of  entrants  for  the  Flying  Service,  and  to  
determine  whether  persons  who  had  broken  down,  or  who  had  been  sent  
back  from  the  front  for  wounds,  were  fit  to  return  to  duty.71    
Even  in  instances  where  researchers  did  not  explicitly  collaborate  with  
industrialists,  many  took  inspiration  from  industrial  fatigue  committees.  Air  
Commodore  A.  V.  J.  Richardson,  the  RAF’s  Director  of  Medical  Services,  
encouraged  engagement  with  industrial  fatigue  research  in  a  1935  address  to  
the  United  Services  Section  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Medicine:  ‘Are  there  not  
lessons  to  be  learnt  in  industry  and  applied  in  the  Services?’72  After  all,  he  
concluded,  were  not  the  primary  concerns  of  business  and  military  service  
synonymous?  A  decade  later  Lord  Moran  (1882-­1977)  made  a  similar  
argument  in  a  volume  outlining  the  psychological  effects  of  warfare.  While  
making  the  case  for  the  ‘healing  effect  of  leave’  for  soldiers,  Lord  Moran  noted  
that  the  ‘worker  at  his  bench  needs  rest  too,  for  he  is  suffering  the  same  
malady’.73  
The  relationship  between  industrial  fatigue  research  and  the  military  
services  was  solidified  in  January  1939,  following  the  creation  of  the  FPRC.  
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Established  by  the  Secretary  of  State  for  Air  to  investigate  medical  aspects  
relating  to  safety  and  efficiency  in  flying,  the  Committee  initially  prioritised  the  
technical  and  physiological  issues  associated  with  flight.  Research  was  
carried  out  into  oxygen  equipment,  protection  against  gravitational  forces,  
noise,  vision,  and  fatigue.  From  October  1939,  though,  psychological  studies  
began.  Research  was  split,  broadly,  between  the  RAF  Physiological  
Laboratory  (later  renamed  the  RAF  Institute  of  Aviation  Medicine)  and  the  
Psychological  Laboratory,  both  contained  within  the  University  of  Cambridge.    
The  Physiological  Laboratory  was  run  by  Bryan  Matthews  (1906-­1986),  
who  was  later  involved  in  the  first  ascent  of  Everest,  with  support  from  the  
secretary  of  FPRC,  Air  Commodore  Harold  Whittingham  (1887-­1983).  
Researchers  employed  by  the  Laboratory  investigated  the  physical  effects  of  
altitude  and  oxygen  deprivation  (hypoxia)  on  the  human  body,  and  looked  to  
find  ways  of  supplying  pilots  with  adequate  ventilation  in  flight.74  The  
Psychological  Laboratory,  run  by  Frederic  Bartlett  (1886-­1969),  paid  greater  
attention  to  selection  and  psychiatric  assessment.  Patrick  Waterson  has  
demonstrated,  however,  that  the  FPRC  set  up  clear  lines  of  communication  
between  the  two  institutions  and,  as  in  industrial  fatigue  research  in  the  
interwar  period,  psychologists  and  physiologists  often  worked  closely  to  solve  
complex  problems,  including  the  fatigue  of  RAF  pilots.75  Much  of  this  research  
was  influenced  by  the  work  produced  by  industrial  fatigue  committees  in  the  
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interwar  period,  in  part  because  many  of  the  investigators  seconded  to  the  
FPRC  had  previously  served  on  (either  or  both)  the  IFRB  or  NIIP.  Bartlett,  for  
example,  had  contributed  to  the  work  of  both  organisations  in  the  1930s.  
The  work  of  the  organisations  discussed  here  did  not  end  in  the  
aftermath  of  the  1939-­1945  war  but,  for  the  most  part,  their  remit  and  reach  
shrank  in  size  and  importance.  Both  the  IFRB  and  the  NIIP  continued  in  
operation  into  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century  –  they  closed  in  1959  
and  1977  respectively  –  but  in  the  post-­war  period  research  on  fatigue  and  
human  factors  was  increasingly  taken  over  by  other  bodies  including  the  
Applied  Psychology  Unit  (APU)  at  the  University  of  Cambridge,  of  which  
Bartlett  was  the  founding  director,  and  the  Ergonomics  Research  Society  
(ERS).76  The  work  of  the  FPRC,  however,  continued  in  earnest  in  the  post-­
war  period.  Indeed,  The  National  Archives  now  holds  over  1,200  of  the  reports  
produced  by  the  Committee  between  1939  and  1959.  In  an  article  published  
in  Agenda  in  1944,  Bartlett  made  the  case  for  the  continuation  of  the  FPRC  
clear:  
  
The  guiding  principle  [of  the  FPRC]  is  to  determine  how  the  most  
widely  distributed  capacities  in  the  way  of  mental  and  bodily  behaviour  
can  be  efficiently  exercised.  In  a  number  of  war  directions  this  has  
been  done,  but  exceedingly  little  has  been  effected  with  regard  to  
common  industrial  functions  or  any  of  the  arts  of  peace.77  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Warr,  ‘Some  Historical  Developments  in  I-­O  Psychology  Outside  the  United  States’.  
77  Waterson,  ‘World  War  II  and  other  historical  influences  on  the  formation  of  the  Ergonomics  
Research  Society’,  p.  1122.  
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Following  the  cessation  of  hostilities  the  FPRC  continued  to  research  and  
report  on  issues  relating  to  fatigue  and  work  capacity  in  both  military  and  civil  
settings  and,  from  the  1960s,  was  involved  in  arbitration  relating  to  fatigue  and  
workload  for  two  commercial  airlines.  
   Fatigue  was  researched  in  a  number  of  different  contexts  in  the  first  
half  of  the  twentieth  century,  but  it  remained  a  vague  and  indefinite  concept.  
Though  widely  acknowledged  as  a  common  and  sometimes  disabling  
complaint,  fatigue  was  an  elusive  entity.  The  word  had  many  different  
meanings.  It  was  a  slippery  concept,  thought  to  border  on  and  overlap  with  
various  kindred  phenomena,  such  as  boredom  and  depression.  It  was  thought  
to  manifest  both  physically  –  as  lassitude,  lethargy,  and  weakness  –  and  
mentally.78  Fatigue,  thus,  presented  a  dilemma  for  scientists.  As  British  
physiologist  Reginald  Passmore  (1910-­1999)  noted  in  a  1954  review  of  an  
ERS  volume  on  the  subject:  
  
For  although  a  phenomenon  familiar  to  everyone  it  has  defied  exact  
definition,  and  only  in  fragmentary  aspects  has  it  been  made  
accessible  to  scientific  methods  of  study  …  the  reader  is  left  with  no  
doubt  about  the  difficulties  and  uncertainties  of  the  subject.79  
  
In  the  twentieth  century  fatigue  was,  then,  a  malleable  concept.  The  scientific  
work  described  here  lent  the  term  legitimacy  –  and,  importantly,  cultural  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78  Schnaffner,  Exhaustion.  
79  R.  Passmore,  ‘Review:  The  Ergonomics  Research  Society:  Symposium  on  Fatigue’,  
Quarterly  Journal  of  Experimental  Physiology  and  Cognate  Medical  Sciences,  39,  2  (1954)  
121,  p.  121;;  see  W.  F.  Floyd  and  A.  T.  Welford  (eds.),  Ergonomics  Research  Society:  
Symposium  on  Fatigue,  (London:  H.  K.  Lewis  &  Company,  1953).    
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currency  –  but  neither  the  mechanisms,  nor  the  manifestations,  of  fatigue  
were  widely  agreed  on.    
This  thesis  is  as  much  about  how  fatigue  was  constituted,  negotiated,  
and  interpreted  in  various  contexts,  as  it  is  about  the  concept  of  fatigue  itself.  
Fatigue  occupied,  as  chairman  of  the  Civil  Aviation  Authority  (CAA)  Lord  John  
Boyd-­Carpenter  (1908-­1998)  put  it  in  1974,  an  ‘uncertain  zone’.80  Consistently  
bound  up  with  debates  about  pay,  working  practices,  and  worker  wellbeing,  
fatigue  meant  different  things  in  different  contexts.    
  
Histories  of  Occupational  Fatigue  in  Post-­War  Britain  
Implicit  in  the  histories  of  occupational  fatigue  discussed  so  far  is  a  statement  
about  chronology.  Many  of  the  histories  cited  here  examine  industrial  fatigue  
in  Britain  and  America  between  the  mid-­nineteenth  century  and  the  start  of  the  
Second  World  War.  In  these  histories,  industrial  fatigue  is  framed  as  a  
primarily  interwar  phenomenon,  with  intellectual  roots  in  the  middle  and  late  
nineteenth  century.  According  to  these  histories  industrial  fatigue,  like  the  
science  of  work  more  generally,  declined  in  intellectual  significance  in  the  
aftermath  of  the  Second  World  War.  The  decline  of  industrial  fatigue  research  
has  been  explained  by  the  formalisation  of  industrial  psychology  in  the  post-­
war  period.  Vicky  Long,  Alison  Haggett,  Sarah  Hayes,  and  Rhodri  Hayward  
have  argued  that  while  the  inter-­war  period  had  been  dominated  by  concerns  
about  physical  and  mental  fatigue,  the  decades  following  the  Second  World  
War  saw  a  shift  in  industrial  medicine  towards  a  focus  on  the  psychological  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80  TNA  BT  248/511:  Internal  CAA  Memo  to  Mr  Vivian  from  Lord  Boyd-­Carpenter,  21  May  
1974,  p.  1.  
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pressures  of  new  working  practices.  Research  on  workplace  fatigue  became  
subsumed  within  these  broader  projects  and  was,  these  histories  argue,  rarely  
investigated,  regulated,  or  discussed  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  
century.    
   In  the  post-­war  period  concerns  about  worker  wellbeing  and  
productivity  became,  according  to  these  histories,  bound-­up  with  a  different  
psychophysiological  complaint:  stress.  During  the  twentieth  century  the  
concept  of  stress  became  an  increasingly  popular  framework  for  
understanding  the  ability  of  workers  to  cope  with  the  demands  of  the  modern  
workplace.82  Historians  disagree  about  precisely  when  stress  emerged  as  a  
conceptual  tool  for  explaining  distress.  While  some  argue  that  stress  is  
inseparable  from  modern  life,  citing  the  Second  World  War  as  a  ‘watershed,  
or  turning  point’,  others  trace  a  longer  history.83  David  Cantor  and  Edmund  
Ramsden,  for  example,  have  suggested  that  stress  built  on,  but  also  gradually  
displaced,  nineteenth  and  early-­twentieth  century  work  on  nervous  exhaustion  
and  fatigue.84  Joseph  Melling  concurs.  While,  he  argues,  terms  such  as  
‘fatigue’  and  ‘strain’  were  commonly  used  in  scientific  and  quotidian  contexts  
until  the  1930s,  by  the  post-­war  period  ‘stress’  had  become  the  most  common  
way  of  framing  psychophysiological  distress  in  the  workplace.85  In  the  post-­
war  period  structural  responses  to  worker  distress  were  also  reframed  in  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  Mark  Jackson,  ‘Stress  in  Post-­War  Britain:  An  Introduction’  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  Stress  in  
Post-­War  Britain,  1945-­85,  (London:  Pickering  and  Chatto,  2015),  pp.  1-­16.  
83  Ibid.  p.  6.  
84  David  Cantor  and  Edmund  Ramsden,  ‘Introduction’  in  David  Cantor  and  Edmund  Ramsden  
(eds.),  Stress,  Shock,  and  Adaptation  in  the  Twentieth  Century,  (Rochester:  University  of  
Rochester  Press,  2014),  pp.  1-­20.  
85  Joseph  Melling,  ‘Making  Sense  of  Workplace  Fear:  The  Role  of  Physicians,  Psychiatrists,  
and  Labor  in  Reframing  Occupational  Strain  in  Industrial  Britain,  ca.  1850-­1970’  in  David  
Cantor  and  Edmund  Ramsden  (eds.),  Stress,  Shock,  and Adaptation  in  the  Twentieth  
Century,  (University  of  Rochester  Press:  Rochester,  2014),  pp.  189-­221. 
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language  of  stress.  These  came,  as  Ayesha  Nathoo  has  shown,  to  centre  on  
the  management  of  mental  distress  rather  than  the  avoidance  of  physical  
fatigue.86  This  saw  potent  manifestation  in  the  1980s,  with  the  expansion  of  
the  ‘stress-­management’  marketplace.87    
This  thesis  demonstrates,  however,  that  concerns  about  occupational  
fatigue  continued  into  the  post-­war  period.  Scientific  and  political  interest  in  
the  physical  fatigue  of  working  men  and  women  was  by  no  means  as  
widespread  as  it  had  been  prior  to  and  during  the  Second  World  War,  but  it  
remained  a  concern  in  industries  that  relied  on  precision  and  efficiency.88  In  
this  context,  fatigue  was  reconceptualised.  While  previously,  fatigue  was  
explicitly  framed  in  relation  to  productivity,  in  the  post-­war  period,  models  of  
fatigue  came  to  centre  on  the  effect  of  fatigue  on  performance,  and  the  
implications  this  had  for  safety.  As  Robert  S.  Schwab  (1903-­1972),  a  
neurologist  based  at  the  Harvard  Medical  School,  put  it  in  1953:  
  
People  with  chronic  fatigue  interfere  seriously  with  the  high  efficiency  
demanded  of  the  Army,  Navy  and  Air  Force.  They  are  a  source  of  
reduced  output,  lowered  quality  and  inefficiency  …  in  industry.  Tired  
look-­outs  lead  ships  into  disaster;;  and  weary  engineers  miss  red  
signals.89  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86  Ayesha  Nathoo,  ‘Initiating  Therapeutic  Relaxation  in  Britain:  A  Twentieth-­Century  Strategy  
for  Health  and  Wellbeing’,  Palgrave  Communications,  2  (2016),  1-­10,  available  at:  
http://www.palgrave-­journals.com/articles/palcomms201643  [last  accessed  20  July  2016].  
87  Ibid.  p.  9.	  
88  Alan  Derickson,  Dangerously  Sleepy:  Overworked  Americans  and  the  Cult  of  Manly  
Wakefulness,  (Philadelphia:  University  of  Pennsylvania  Press,  2014),  p.  27.  
89  Robert  S.  Schwab,  ‘Motivation  in  Measurements  of  Fatigue’  in  W.  F.  Floyd  and  A.  T.  
Welford  (eds.),  Ergonomics  Research  Society:  Symposium  on  Fatigue,  (London:  H.  K.  Lewis  
&  Company,  1953),  pp.  143-­148,  p.  143.  
   44  
The  fatigue  of  aircrew  was  deemed  particularly  high  risk.  As  Lord  Moran  put  it  
in  1945,  ‘the  pilot’s  life  is  forfeit  if  he  mishandles  his  instruments,  a  single  error  
may  be  fatal’.  The  isolated  nature  of  flight,  particularly  under  wartime  
conditions,  was  central  to  this  conceptualisation  of  risk.  With  few  (or,  in  the  
case  of  fighter  pilots,  no)  colleagues  to  directly  assist  in  the  prosecution  of  war  
in  the  air,  the  solitary  pilot  was  ‘without  the  support  of  numbers’.  90  In  this  
context  human  error  could  have  grave  consequences.  
It  was  recognised  that  workers  from  all  industries  could  become  
fatigued  under  certain  circumstances:  long  working  hours,  shift  work,  and  
night  work  were  all  preconditions  for  fatigue.  Though  these  conditions  were  
not  industry-­specific,  by  the  1940s  they  were  commonplace  in  only  a  handful  
of  different  occupations.  Gary  Cross  has  argued  that  by  1940  the  average  
working  day  in  Western  Europe  had  fallen  from  between  ten  and  twelve  
hours,  to  eight  hours.91  Some  industries,  however,  required  employees  to  
work  much  longer  hours  as  standard,  while  others  necessitated  shift  and  night  
work.92  Fatigue  was  endemic  in  industries  that  demanded  these  working  
practices.  Derickson  has  shown  that,  in  America,  sleep  deprivation  was  
common  in  a  number  of  different  industries,  including  the  steel  industry  and  
the  transport  sector.93  In  the  British  case  fatigue  was  also  endemic  within  the  
National  Health  Service  (NHS).  In  these  contexts,  the  fatigue  of  workers  was  
reconceptualised.  Although  still  thought  to  play  an  important  role  in  workplace  
efficiency,  it  was  also  linked  with  safety.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90  Lord  Moran,  The  Anatomy  of  Courage,  p.  104.  
91  Gary  Cross,  The  Quest  for  Time:  The  Reduction  of  Work  in  Britain  and  France,  1840-­1940,  
(Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1989).  
92  David  Walker,  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  in  the  British  Chemical  Industry,  1914-­1974,  
PhD  Thesis,  (University  of  Strathclyde,  2007).  
93  Derickson,  Dangerously  Sleepy.  
   45  
Fatigue  was  first  noted  as  a  problem  that  might  effect  healthcare  
practitioners  in  a  1919  article  by  German  physician  Geheimerat  Hecker.94  
Hecker  described  the  relationship  between  working  conditions,  cultural  
change,  and  the  mental  and  physical  health  of  nurses.  Arguing  that  nurses  
often  became  pathologically  fatigued  as  a  result  of  their  work,  Hecker’s  paper  
was  one  of  the  first  academic  publications  to  suggest  that  fatigue  might  be  an  
occupational  health  issue  specific  to  nursing.  By  the  1930s  his  contention  that  
nursing  could  negatively  impact  health  was  well  established  in  Britain.95  Both  
the  duties  involved  in  nursing  and  the  schedule  associated  with  it  were  
thought  to  be  potentially  fatigue-­inducing.  Deborah  Palmer  has  shown  that  
nursing,  particularly  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  was  a  physically  
demanding  job.96  Nurses  were  expected  to  move  and  bathe  patients  with  little  
assistance.  97  The  working  hours  associated  with  nursing  were  also  thought  to  
be  particularly  fatiguing.  Hospital  nurses  were  required  to  work  shifts,  which  
sometimes  involved  night  work.98    
In  the  late-­twentieth  century  these  commonly  described  complaints  
were  reconceptualised  as  a  discrete  syndrome  affecting  the  health  of  
healthcare  workers:  burnout,  a  term  coined  by  German-­born  American  
psychologist  Herbert  Freudenberger  (1926-­1999)  in  1974.99  The  defining  
features  of  burnout  were,  according  to  Freudenberger,  mental  and  physical  
exhaustion,  persistent  illness,  insomnia,  and  shortness  of  breath.  Burnout  also  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  G.  Hecker,  ‘The  Overstrain  of  Nurses’,  British  Journal  of  Nursing,  (1  March  1919)  134-­5.  
95  Deborah  Palmer,  Who  Cared  for  the  Carers?  A  History  of  the  Occupational  Health  of  
Nurses,  1880-­1948,  (Manchester:  Manchester  University  Press,  2014).  
96  Ibid.  
97  Bernice  Fash  and  Frances  Powell,  ‘Body  Mechanics  in  Nursing  Arts’,  The  American  Journal  
of  Nursing,  41,  2  (1941)  190-­195.  
98  Genevieve  E.  Fiedor  and  Majorie  L.  Keys,  ‘Coping  with  Nights’,  The  American  Journal  of  
Nursing,  87,  9  (1987)  1166-­1169.  
99  Herbert  J.  Freudenberger,  ‘Staff  Burn-­Out’,  Journal  of  Social  Issues,  30,  1  (1974)  159-­165.  
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affected  the  behaviour  of  healthcare  workers:  they  became  prone  to  paranoia,  
overconfidence,  and  were  easily  irritated.  Freudenberger  suggested  that  
individuals  were  most  likely  to  experience  burnout  if  they  worked  in  free  
clinics.  Clinics,  he  argued,  were  inherently  energy-­draining  institutions,  as  
they  required  both  long  and  intensive  working  hours,  and  a  deep  emotional  
commitment  on  the  part  of  the  worker.100  For  Freudenberger  then,  burnout  
was  at  once  a  physical  and  psychological  problem.  It  was  caused  as  much  by  
intensive  working  practices  as  it  was  by  mental  distress.  
In  the  middle  and  late  decades  of  the  twentieth  century,  fatigue  was  
also  endemic  in  the  transport  industry.  Railway  workers,  seafarers,  
professional  drivers,  and  workers  employed  in  civil  airlines  were  subject  to  
many  of  the  same  conditions  as  healthcare  workers:  long  hours  of  work,  shift  
work,  and  night  work  –  sometimes  referred  to  as  ‘sleeper’  operations  –  were  
common  in  all  these  contexts.101  As  Nicholas  McDonald  noted  in  a  1984  
monograph  on  the  fatigue  of  professional  drivers,  Fatigue,  Safety  and  the  
Truck  Driver,  a  number  of  other  issues  specific  to  transport  work  exacerbated  
fatigue.  These  included  long  monotonous  stretches  of  work,  congestion  and  
delays,  cab  temperature,  noise,  and  vibration.102  Fatigue,  McDonald  argued,  
was  problematic  for  transport  workers  –  particularly  for  the  drivers  of  heavy  
goods  vehicles  –  because  it  impacted  performance.  Fatigued  drivers,  he  
argued,  found  it  difficult  to  judge  the  speed  they  were  travelling,  they  were  
inattentive,  and  their  vehicle  handling  was  poor.  They  had  a  tendency  to  ‘lane  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  Ibid.  
101  Derickson,  Dangerously  Sleepy;;  Nicholas  McDonald,  Fatigue,  Safety  and  the  Truck  Driver,  
(London:  Taylor  and  Francis,  1984),  p.  175.  
102  McDonald,  Fatigue,  Safety  and  the  Truck  Driver.  
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wander’.103  In  extreme  circumstances,  fatigued  drivers  fell  ‘asleep  at  the  
wheel’.104  
In  both  the  healthcare  and  transport  industries,  worker  fatigue  had  
implications  beyond  occupational  health  and  efficiency.  Given  the  centrality  of  
the  public  to  these  services,  worker  fatigue  also  affected  the  wider  populace.  
Travellers  and  patients  were,  in  this  sense,  distinct  from  other  publics  in  the  
nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries.  They  served,  according  to  Ralph  
Harrington,  as  the  raw  material  for  what  was  in  effect  an  ‘industrial  system’,  
the  end-­product  of  which  was  mass  transportation  on  the  one  hand,  and  
healthcare  on  the  other.105  In  his  study  of  nineteenth-­century  railways,  
Schivelbusch  described  the  implications  of  the  ‘instant  consumer’  thus:  
  
The  railroad’s  industrial  product  is  transportation,  change  of  locality,  
what  makes  this  production  fundamentally  different  from  all  other  
industrial  production  is  exactly  that  simultaneity  of  production  and  
consumption.  The  consumption  of  industrially  manufactured  objects  
takes  place  at  a  temporal  and  spatial  distance  from  their  production.  
Their  industrial  character  finds  only  indirect  expression  …  But  in  the  
production  of  transportation,  where  the  traveller  is  the  instant  
consumer,  the  industrial  character  is  experienced  in  the  act  of  travel  
itself.106  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103  Ibid.  p.  178.  
104  Ibid.  p.  177.  
105  Ralph  Harrington,  ‘The  Railway  Journey  and  the  Neuroses  of  Modernity’  in  Richard  
Wrigley  and  George  Revill  (eds.),  Pathologies  of  Travel,  (Amsterdam:  Rodopi,  2000),  pp.  229-­
261,  p.  240.  
106  Schivelbusch,  The  Railway  Journey,  p.  120.  
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The  ‘simultaneity’,  as  Schivelbusch  termed  it,  of  production  and  consumption  
meant  that  travellers  were  subject  to  the  same  safety  concerns  as  railway  
workers,  bus  drivers,  and  commercial  pilots.107    
Trade  unions  representing  transport  workers  made  this  case  
throughout  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century.  Fatigued  drivers,  it  was  
argued,  were  more  likely  to  cause  accidents,  thus  endangering  the  lives  of  
other  road  users,  and  constituting  ‘a  danger  to  the  public’.108  Associations  
representing  healthcare  professionals  in  the  twentieth  century,  including  the  
British  Medical  Association  (BMA)  and  the  Junior  Hospital  Doctors’  
Association,  framed  the  fatigue  of  physicians  similarly.  As  Dr  Francis  Pigott,  
chairman  of  the  Junior  Hospital  Doctors’  Association,  stated  in  an  interview  
quoted  at  length  in  a  front-­page  article  in  the  Times  in  1969:  doctor  fatigue  
was  a  ‘death  risk’  for  patients.109    Doctors,  Pigott  argued,  became  fatigued  as  
a  result  of  excessive  working  hours  and  were  liable  to  serious  misjudgements  
and  medical  error  as  a  result.110  
In  civil  aviation,  the  fatigue  of  airline  pilots  was  first  conceptualised  as  
an  issue  with  the  potential  to  effect  passenger  safety  in  the  1950s  after  a  
number  of  accidents  were  attributed  to  crew  fatigue.  Fatigue  was  thought  to  
cause  accidents  in  two  different  ways:  firstly,  through  poor  performance  and  
error;;  and  secondly,  as  a  result  of  flight  crew  falling  asleep  at  the  controls.  
Researchers  interested  in  military  aviation  first  articulated  the  performance  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107  Ibid.  p.  120.  
108  TNA  MT/92/107:  Notes  of  a  Meeting  held  at  St.  Christopher  House  to  discuss  drivers’  
hours,  8  November  1961,  p.  1.  
109  Tim  Jones,  ‘Doctors’  Hours  “A  Death  Risk”’,  Times,  Mar  7  1969,  p.  1.  
110  Ibid.  
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decrement  model  of  fatigue.111  In  line  with  earlier  work  on  the  effect  of  fatigue  
on  industrial  performance  and  output,  researchers  argued  that  fatigue  
negatively  impacted  the  performance  of  pilots  in  a  number  of  ways.  Pilots  
might  complete  the  same  amount  of  work  as  when  well-­rested  but  at  a  slower  
pace;;  pilots  might  complete  work  to  a  lower  standard,  making  an  increasing  
number  of  errors;;  or  pilots  might  experience  a  combination  of  the  two,  
completing  work  at  a  slower  pace  and  with  more  errors  than  when  well  rested.  
Poor  performance,  researchers  argued,  made  accidents  more  likely.    
The  other  cause  of  accidents  –  pilots  unintentionally  sleeping  on  the  
flight  deck  –  gained  increasing  attention  from  regulators  in  the  1970s,  as  a  
spate  of  newspaper  reports  emerged  on  the  subject.  Sleepiness  was  thought  
to  be  a  particular  problem  for  long  haul  pilots,  who  had  to  contend  with  two  
major  issues:  disruption  to  their  circadian  rhythms  as  a  result  of  crossing  time  
zones;;  and  extended  flight  times.  It  was,  however,  a  problem  that  could  effect  
all  pilots.  One  former  pilot  and  trainer  explained  the  irresistible  urge  to  sleep  
when  fatigued  as  such:  
  
The  thing  about  sleep  is  that  if  your  body  really  wants  you  to  sleep,  
you’ll  sleep.  If  you’re  flying  an  aeroplane  on  the  approach,  if  you’re  
driving  at  seventy  miles  an  hour,  you’ll  sleep.  And  I  can  give  you  an  
even  better  example  of  that,  I’d  been  flying  very  hard,  a  lot  of  hours,  
training  navigators  and  …  I  got  back  into  the  circuit  and  I  was  
downwind  ready  to  turn  on  into  the  airfield  and  land  and  I  went  to  sleep.  
I  just  nodded  off  and  I  woke  up  and  I  saw  a  church  spire  and  so  I  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111  See  for  example:  TNA  DSIR  23/22938:  D.  C.  Fraser,  ‘The  Study  of  Fatigue’,  August  1954;;  
WL  PP/HEW/F.4/1:  Letter  to  Sir  Harold  Whittingham  from  Air  Commodore  Consultant  in  
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continued  to  turn,  and  there  was  the  runway  and  I  landed  the  airplane.  
But  that’s  what  can  happen  to  you.112    
  
Whether  related  to  skill  decrement  or  sleepiness,  the  dangers  of  pilot  fatigue  
were  clear  and  alarming.      
   Flying  fatigue  was,  then,  conceptualised  differently  to  industrial  fatigue.  
While  safety  and  accident-­proneness  had  been  a  concern  in  munitions  
factories  during  the  Second  World  War,  the  fatigue  of  industrial  workers  was,  
for  the  most  part,  framed  in  terms  of  output  and  productivity.  Flying  fatigue,  
however,  was  explicitly  framed  in  terms  of  public  safety  throughout  the  
twentieth  century.  As  this  thesis  will  set  out,  though,  in  the  middle  and  late-­
twentieth  century  scientists,  medical  officers,  and  regulatory  agencies  
continued  to  rely  on  models  of  fatigue  that  had  roots  in  the  nineteenth  century.  
Performance  continued  to  be  used  as  a  measure  of  fatigue.  While  nineteenth  
and  early-­twentieth  century  research  bodies  tended  to  use  diminished  output  
as  an  indicator  of  fatigue,  flying  fatigue  came  to  be  framed  in  relation  to  
performance  decrement.  Early-­twentieth  century  understandings  of  fatigue  as  
both  physical  and  psychological  also  saw  continuing  expression  in  the  middle  
and  late  twentieth  century.  The  FPRC  understood  fatigue  as  a  complex  
psychophysiological  phenomenon  but,  unlike  stress,  fatigue  continued  to  be  
measured  by  its  effects.  Though  attempts  to  find  a  biological  correlate  for  
subjective  fatigue  states  continued  well  into  the  late  twentieth  century,  no  
hormonal  marker  for  fatigue  was  agreed  upon.  This  thesis  traces  how  models  
of  fatigue  shifted  over  the  twentieth  century.  It  examines  how  and  why  certain  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112  Interview  with  Paul  White,  17  March  2016.  Given  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  material  
discussed  pseudonyms  are  used  throughout  this  thesis.  
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conceptualisations  of  fatigue  gained  traction  and  considers  how  trade  unions,  
workers,  airlines,  and  regulatory  agencies  sought  to  exploit  the  uncertainty  of  
the  condition  for  social,  financial,  or  political  gain.  
Given  the  space  that  pilots  inhabited  for  most  of  their  working  day,  
fatigue  posed  a  significant  risk  to  the  safety  of  the  travelling  public.  The  
potential  for  loss  of  life  in  accidents  was  significant.  By  the  mid-­1970s  
commercial  aircraft  could  carry  hundreds  of  passengers  and,  while  air  crashes  
were  not  common,  survival  rates  were  low.  Air  travel  was  fast  and  glamorous  
but,  like  the  nineteenth-­century  railway,  there  was  a  constant  sense  of  danger  
and  risk  of  catastrophic  disaster.113  Like  railway  accidents  in  the  nineteenth  
century,  aircraft  crashes  embodied  contemporary  concerns  about  new  
technological  risks.  A  resilient  image  of  modern  catastrophe,  air  crashes  
served  as  dramatic  case  studies  of  modernity’s  discontents.  Throughout  the  
latter  decades  of  the  twentieth  century,  newspaper  journalists  and  other  
contemporary  commentators  used  civil  aviation  as  a  lens  through  which  to  
examine  the  impact  of  broader  technological  and  social  changes  on  human  
health  and  happiness.  The  darkly  dystopian  documentary  Future  Shock,  for  
example,  used  images  of  flight  to  demonstrate  the  manner  in  which  human  
capacity  for  change  was  challenged  by  modern  life.114  Based  on  a  popular  
book  written  by  American  writer  and  futurist  Alvin  Toffler  (1928-­2016),  the  
documentary,  first  screened  in  1972,  opened  with  a  shot  of  a  Pan  American  
aircraft  touching  down  and  ended  with  a  scene  of  a  Concorde  airplane  taking  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113  Harrington,  ‘The  Railway  Journey  and  the  Neuroses  of  Modernity’.  
114  Jackson,  Age  of  Stress.  
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to  the  skies.  Were,  on-­screen  narrator  Orson  Welles  (1915-­1985)  asked,  
these  new  technologies  always  desirable?  
The  argument,  espoused  by  Toffler  and  Welles  in  the  1970s  –  that  
travel  and  the  technologies  associated  with  it  embodied  modern  risk  –  was  not  
novel.  Travel  had  long  been  associated  with  both  social  and  personal  ailments  
and  was  widely  taken,  to  use  George  Revill  and  Richard  Wrigley’s  phrasing,  
as  ‘evidence  of  pathology’  since  the  nineteenth  century.115  In  the  century  prior  
to  the  release  of  Future  Shock  the  railway  was  the  focal  point  for  Victorian  
concerns  about  urbanisation  and  modernity.  Though,  as  Harrington  has  
suggested,  many  aspects  of  industrialisation  had  inherent  dangers,  no  other  
technological  system  required  such  vast  numbers  of  ordinary  people  to  
surrender  their  safety  and  security  in  such  a  way.116  Anxieties  around  railroad  
accidents  manifested  in  medical  diagnoses,  most  famously  as  railway  
spine.117  Eric  Caplan  has  explained  that  though  the  aetiology  of  the  diagnosis  
shifted  over  time  railway  spine  was  always  linked  with  train  travel.  Initially  the  
disease  was  thought  to  be  entirely  somatic,  the  result  of  spinal  damage  
caused  by  vibration,  but  it  was  later  described  as  a  form  of  psychoneurosis,  
similar  to  neurasthenia,  caused  by  the  stresses  of  modern  life.118  
Civil  aviation  was  one  of  several  sites  in  which  fatigue  was  important  in  
post-­war  Britain,  but  it  was  in  many  ways  a  very  specific  case.  Civil  aviation  
saw,  undoubtedly,  the  most  potent  manifestations  of  post-­war  anxiety  about  
fatigue  at  work.  The  space  that  pilots  inhabited  during  their  working  day  was  
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116  Harrington,  ‘The  Railway  Journey  and  the  Neuroses  of  Modernity’.  
117  Eric  Michael  Caplan,  ‘Trains,  Brains,  and  Sprains:  Railway  Spine  and  the  Origins  of  
Psychoneuroses’,  Bulletin  of  the  History  of  Medicine,  69,  3  (1995)  387-­419.  
118  Ibid.  
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conceptually,  and  physically,  peculiar.  Twentieth-­century  British  pilots  spent  
much  of  their  working  day  up  to  30,000  feet  in  the  air,  flying  planes  carrying  
large  numbers  of  passengers.  The  fatigue  of  pilots  thus  had  different  
implications  than  the  fatigue  of  factory  workers,  administrators,  or  steel  
workers,  as  it  had  repercussions  for  the  health  and  safety  of  the  travelling  
public.  For  this  reason,  it  was  perceived  and  managed  differently  from  the  
fatigue  of  other  workers  in  the  twentieth  century.  As  this  thesis  will  make  clear,  
however,  the  management  of  fatigue  within  civil  aviation  was  not  entirely  
unique.  Throughout  the  century,  fatigue  was  perceived  and  responded  to  
comparably  in  the  transport  sector  more  broadly  and,  in  the  latter  decades  of  
the  twentieth  century,  in  healthcare  circles.  Though  the  physical  space  
inhabited  by  workers  in  these  occupations  was  different,  worker  fatigue  was  
similarly  framed  as  a  danger  to  public  safety,  whether  that  was  long-­haul  truck  
drivers  falling  asleep  at  the  wheel  and  endangering  other  road  users,  or  
healthcare  professionals  inadequately  caring  for  patients  as  a  result  of  
intensive  rotas.  As  such,  though  a  very  particular  case,  flying  fatigue  can  shed  
light  on  the  perception  and  management  of  fatigue  in  twentieth-­century  Britain  
more  broadly.  
  
The  Body  in  Flight,  the  Body  at  Work:  Historiographical  Contexts  
In  recent  years  fatigue  has  been  examined  by  a  number  of  organisational  
psychologists,  but  there  has  been  very  little  historical  work  produced  
specifically  on  fatigue  in  civil  aviation.119  While  some  military  historians  have  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119  Narinder  Kapur,  Anam  Parand,  Tayana  Soukup,  Tom  Reader,  and  Nick  Sevdalis,  ‘Aviation  
and  Healthcare:  A  Comparative  Review  with  Implications  for  Patient  Safety’,  Journal  of  the  
Royal  Society  of  Medicine  Open,  7,  1  (2016)  1-­10,  available  at:  
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4710114/  [last  accessed  17  September  2017].  
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discussed  related  issues,  such  as  flying  stress  and  the  use  of  amphetamines  
by  Fighter  and  Bomber  Command  in  the  Second  World  War,  there  has  been  
no  extended  discussion  of  flying  fatigue  as  it  affected  commercial  pilots  in  the  
twentieth  century.120    
This  chapter  has,  so  far,  discussed  one  of  the  central  contexts  of  this  
thesis:  industrial  fatigue.  Much  historical  research  has  been  done  here  and,  as  
noted  previously,  this  thesis  seeks  to  extend  the  story  of  occupational  fatigue  
told  in  histories  of  interwar  industrial  health  by  drawing  out  connections  with  
civil  and  military  aviation.    
Given  the  focus  of  this  thesis,  it  is  important  to  understand  fatigue  also  
in  relation  to  histories  of  aviation,  and  histories  of  occupational  health  and  
safety.  These  historiographical  contexts  give  a  sense  of  the  broader  
significance  of  flying  fatigue  in  twentieth-­century  Britain.  
  
Histories  of  Aviation  
Encompassing  the  use  of  airplanes  in  civil  and  military  settings,  ballooning,  
and  rocket  technology,  aviation  history  has  been  a  popular  area  of  study  for  
several  decades.121  Largely  written  by  aviation  enthusiasts  until  the  mid-­
1980s,  aviation  history  has  been  dominated  by  detailed  studies  of  
technological  development  and  a  narrow  focus  on  key  figures,  such  as  Wilbur  
(1871-­1948)  and  Orville  Wright  (1867-­1912),  without  much  critical  analysis  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120  These  histories  are  discussed  in  the  following  section.  
121  For  a  history  of  ballooning  see:  Richard  Holmes,  Falling  Upwards:  How  We  Took  to  the  
Air,  (London:  Harper  Collins,  2013);;  for  a  history  of  rocket  technology  see:  A.  Bodoin  Van  
Riper,  Rockets  and  Missiles:  A  Life  Story  of  a  Technology,  (Baltimore:  Johns  Hopkins  
University  Press,  2007).  
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the  economic,  social,  or  cultural  implications  of  aviation.122  This  ‘buff’  style  
history  has  tended  to  focus  narrowly  on  the  national  story  of  either  France  or  
America.123  Such  histories  were  widely  criticised  from  the  late-­1980s  for  
lacking  academic  rigour  and  distance  and  –  in  contrast  to  wider  trends  within  
the  history  of  technology  –  for  framing  aviation  technology  as  a  neutral  and  
autonomous  force  in  history.124  James  R.  Hansen  led  the  charge,  first  
articulating  a  detailed  criticism  of  aviation  history  in  1989.  In  an  article  
published  in  Technology  and  Culture,  Hansen  called  for  more  attention  to  be  
paid  to  the  social  and  cultural  ramifications  of  aviation.  Few  works,  he  argued,  
looked  at  the  ‘social  motives,  aims,  and  second-­order  consequences  of  the  
aviation  enterprise’.125  Primarily  studied  in  isolation,  Hansen  suggested  that  
aviation  history  had  fallen  behind  other  fields  of  history  wherein  broadly  
synthetic,  contextual,  and  interdisciplinary  studies  looked  at  the  meaning  of  a  
particular  field  of  history  in  terms  of  what  it  meant  to  and  for  others.126  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  From  the  early  2000s  some  historians  criticised  this  focus  on  individuals,  particularly  the  
Wright  brothers.  Many  attempted  to  resituate  the  Wrights  within  a  wider  context  of  aviation  
invention.  For  example:  Richard  Hallion,  Taking  Flight:  Inventing  the  Aerial  Age  from  Antiquity  
through  the  First  World  War,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2003);;  Guillame  de  Syon,  
‘What  the  Wrights  Wrought:  The  Centennial  of  Flight  in  Recent  Literature’,  Technology  and  
Culture,  45,  2  (2004)  350-­357;;  Deborah  G.  Douglas,  ‘The  Wright  Brothers  and  the  Invention  
of  the  Aerial  Age’,  Technology  and  Culture,  45,  2  (2004)  363-­367.  
123  For  histories  of  French  aviation  see:  Robert  Wohl,  A  Passion  for  Wings:  Aviation  and  the  
Western  Imagination  1908-­1918,  (London:  Yale  University  Press,  1994);;  for  histories  of  
American  aviation  see:  Henry  Serrano  Villard,  Contact!  The  Story  the  Early  Birds,  (London:  
Arthur  Barker,  1987);;  from  the  late  1990s  a  number  of  works  attempted  to  provide  an  
international  or  global  perspective,  see:  Joseph  P.  O’Grady,  ‘From  Baldonnel  to  Shannon:  
Irish  Civil  Aviation  Policy,  1921-­1935’,  New  Hibernia  Review,  1,  4  (1997)  64-­80;;  Anne  Nesbet,  
‘In  Borrowed  Balloons:  The  Wizard  of  Oz  and  the  History  of  Soviet  Aviation’,  The  Slavic  and  
East  European  Journal,  45,  1  (2001)  80-­95;;  Gordon  Pirie,  ‘British  Air  Shows  in  South  Africa  
1932-­1933:  “Airmindedness”,  Ambition  and  Anxiety’,  Kronos,  35  (2009)  48-­70;;  Waqar  H.  
Zaidi,  ‘“Aviation  Will  Either  Destroy  or  Save  Our  Civilization”:  Proposals  for  the  International  
Control  of  Aviation,  1920-­45’,  Journal  of  Contemporary  History,  46,  1  (2011)  150-­178.  
124  Examples  of  traditional  ‘buff’  histories  of  aviation  include:  Villard,  Contact!;;  Terry  Gwynn-­
Jones,  Farther  and  Faster:  Aviation’s  Adventuring  Years  1909-­1939,  (London:  Smithsonian  
Institution  Press,  1991).  
125  James  R.  Hansen,  ‘Aviation  History  in  the  Wider  View’,  Technology  and  Culture,  30,  3  
(1989)  643-­656,  p.  643.  
126  Ibid.    
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Although  some  historians  of  aviation  retained  a  narrow  enthusiasm  for  their  
subject,  largely  unparalleled  in  other  historical  fields,  since  the  early  1990s  a  
number  of  historians  have  looked  to  broaden  the  scope  of  aviation  history,  
drawing  on  and  incorporating  themes  from  economic  history,  military  history,  
and  cultural  history.127    
Military  historians  began  explicitly  investigating  issues  relating  to  
aviation  and  the  RAF  in  the  1970s.  Early  histories  of  military  aviation  were  
primarily  concerned  with  either  examining  the  relationship  between  the  armed  
forces  and  the  aviation  industry  or  telling  the  story  of  fighter  pilots  involved  in  
World  War  Two,  with  a  particular  focus  on  those  involved  in  the  Battle  of  
Britain.128  From  the  early  twenty-­first  century,  in  line  with  broader  trends  in  
military  history  towards  the  health  and  experiences  of  individual  fighting  men  
and  women,  a  number  of  historians  began  exploring  military  aviation  in  
relation  to  stress  and  exhaustion.    
  Patrick  Bishop  has  suggested  that  physical  exhaustion  and  
psychological  distress  often  went  hand  in  hand,  particularly  during  the  Battle  
of  Britain  when  duty  hours  were  extended  from  dawn  to  dusk  and  pilots  were  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  Robert  Wohl  is  one  notable  exception.  Wohl  learnt  to  fly  whilst  writing  his  1994  publication  
A  Passion  for  Wings,  a  cultural  history  of  aviation.  He  championed  enthusiasm  as  a  means  of  
understanding  early  aviators:  ‘Had  I  not  become  a  pilot,  I  would  have  written  a  very  different  
book.  I  think  I  now  understand,  even  if  dimly,  what  early  aviators  used  to  call  the  “intoxication  
of  flight”.  It  cannot  be  learned  in  books.’  Wohl,  A  Passion  for  Wings,  p.  3;;  for  examples  of  the  
cultural  history  of  aviation  see:  Douglas,  ‘The  Wright  Brothers  and  the  Invention  of  the  Aerial  
Age’;;  Martin  Francis,  ‘A  Flight  from  Commitment?  Domesticity,  Adventure  and  the  Masculine  
Imaginary  in  Britain  after  the  Second  World  War’,  Gender  and  History,  19,  1  (2007)  163-­185;;  
Martin  Francis,  ‘Men  and  the  Royal  Air  Force,  the  Cultural  Memory  of  the  Second  World  War  
and  the  Twilight  of  British  Empire’  in  Philippa  Levine  and  Susan  R.  Grayzel  (eds.),  Gender,  
Labour,  War  and  Empire,  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2008),  pp.  179-­196.  
128  For  histories  of  military-­industry  relations  in  Germany  see:  John  H.  Morrow,  Building  
German  Airpower,  1909-­1914,  (Knoxville:  University  of  Tennessee  Press,  1976);;  John  H.  
Morrow,  German  Air  Power  in  World  War  I,  (London:  University  of  Nebraska  Press,  1982);;  
bomber  pilots  received  far  less  scholarly  attention  in  part,  according  to  Patrick  Bishop,  
because  of  an  ethical  uneasiness  about  aerial  bombardment,  see:  Patrick  Bishop,  Bomber  
Boys:  Fighting  Back  1940-­1945,  (London:  Harper  Perennial,  2008).  
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only  permitted  to  sleep  for  four  to  six  hours.129  Drawing  heavily  on  oral  
histories  and  the  personal  memoirs  of  flyers,  Bishop’s  Fighter  Boys  points  to  a  
two-­way  relationship  between  ‘deep  fatigue’  and  depression.130  Fatigue,  
Bishop  argued,  affected  the  mentality  of  pilots  in  a  number  of  ways.  While  
some,  such  as  Birdy  Bird-­Wilson,  experienced  ‘jitters’,  others  felt  tearful  and  
isolated.131  Paul  Richey,  a  pilot  involved  in  the  Battle  of  Britain,  described  how  
he  ‘dared  not  speak  for  fear  of  bursting  into  tears’.132  Conversely,  
psychological  distress  and  fear  were  primary  causes  of  fatigue  for  many  men  
who  often  experienced  difficulty  sleeping  and  nightmares  related  to  flying.  
Both  Birdy  Bird-­Wilson  and  Paul  Richey  admitted  to  suffering  from  
nightmares,  indicating  the  complex  interplay  between  fear,  psychological  
distress,  and  sleeplessness.    
Also  interested  in  sleeplessness,  Alan  Derickson  has  described  a  
military-­wide  preoccupation  with  stamina,  resilience,  and  alertness  in  middle  
and  late  twentieth-­century  America.  World  War  Two,  he  argues,  saw  a  distinct  
shift  in  military  tactics  and  warfare.  There  was  a  move  towards  sustained  and  
continuous  operations  and  a  trend  toward  night  warfare.  Such  operations  
demanded  levels  of  stamina  which  often  exceeded  ‘the  normal  limits  of  
human  endurance’.133  Fighting  men  maintained  wakefulness  by  using  
chemical  stimulants  and  self-­discipline.  Derickson  argues  that  the  war  
deepened  American  society’s  tendency  to  ‘promote  sleeplessness’  in  two  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129  Patrick  Bishop,  Fighter  Boys:  Saving  Britain  1940,  (London:  Harper  Collins,  2004).  
130  Ibid.  p.  211.  
131  Ibid.  p.  337.  
132  Ibid.  p.  211.  
133  Alan  Derickson,  ‘“No  Such  Thing  as  a  Night’s  Sleep”:  The  Embattled  Sleep  of  American  
Fighting  Men  from  World  War  II  to  the  Present’,  Journal  of  Social  History,  47,  1  (2013)  1-­26,  
p.  2.  
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ways:  it  introduced  new  ways  to  alleviate  fatigue  (he  dwells,  particularly,  on  
the  widespread  use  amphetamines  in  civil  and  military  settings)  and  it  
elevated  the  value  of  alertness  and  stamina  by  linking  these  qualities  to  
patriotic  sacrifice  and  gender  identity.134  Fighting  men,  he  argues,  often  
accepted  sleep  deprivation  as  it  reinforced  the  cultural  values  and  social  
practices  of  hegemonic  masculinity.  Self-­denial  of  fatigue  may,  Derickson  
argues,  have  played  a  significant  part  in  the  gender  expression  of  American  
wartime  pilots.135    
Martin  Francis,  James  Pugh,  and  Mark  Jackson  have  also  explored  the  
links  between  stress,  exhaustion,  and  gender  in  relation  to  wartime  pilots.  
Their  focus  has,  however,  been  predominantly  on  lifestyle  and  coping  
mechanisms.  Francis  has  described  a  colourful  ‘off-­duty  culture’  in  which  
aircrew  drank  alcohol,  partied  with  members  of  the  Women’s  Auxiliary  Air  
Force  (WAAF),  and  ‘ran  their  fast  cars  on  potentially  lethal  aviation  fuel’.136  
While  senior  officers  occasionally  sought  to  control  access  to  amphetamines  
or  to  curtail  heavy  drinking,  according  to  Francis,  they  were  generally  willing  to  
‘indulge  their  aircrew,  providing  combat  capability  was  not  compromised’.  137    
Indeed,  he  argues,  senior  army  officials  recognised  that  the  ability  to  seek  
diversion  was  crucial  to  flyers’  ability  to  cope  with  what  otherwise  would  be  
‘intolerable  levels  of  strain’.138    
Pugh,  on  the  other  hand,  has  examined  how  the  RAF  managed  fatigue  
on  an  institutional  level.  Countering  Francis,  Pugh  has  argued  that  the  RAF  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134  Ibid.  p.  14.  
135  Ibid.  
136  Martin  Francis,  The  Flyer:  British  Culture  and  the  Royal  Air  Force  1939-­1945,  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2008),  p.  121;;  Ibid.  p.  120.  
137  Ibid.  p.  122.  
138  Ibid.  p.  122.  
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approved  the  use  of  Benzedrine  in  1942  for  use  on  operations  by  aircrews  
solely  as  a  means  of  promoting  wakefulness,  not  as  a  means  of  helping  flyers  
to  cope  with  the  psychological  strain  of  combat.139  Finally,  Jackson’s  chapter  
provides  details  of  the  theoretical  framework  on  which  senior  army  officers  
drew,  outlining  a  number  of  neuropsychiatric  studies  of  flying  stress  in  men  
and  women  from  the  early  twentieth  century.140  Jackson’s  work,  which  
focuses  on  men  and  women  in  equal  measure,  is  representative  of  a  wider  
trend  in  aviation  history  that  has  sought  to  critically  examine  the  place  of  
women  in  military  and  civil  aviation.  
Prior  to  the  1980s,  most  scholarship  in  this  area  focused  exclusively  
and  uncritically  on  male  pilots,  flight  deck  engineers,  and  early  aviation  
pioneers.  The  publication  of  Arlie  Russell  Hochschild’s  sociological  work  on  
the  emotional  labour  of  female  cabin  staff,  The  Managed  Heart,  in  1983  
encouraged  increasing  work  on  female  aircrew.141  A  number  of  popular  
histories  have  since  examined  the  role  of  female  pilots  in  World  War  Two.  
Journalists,  including  Giles  Whittell  and  Jacky  Hyams,  have  written  about  the  
role  of  women  in  British  military  organisations  including  the  Air  Transport  
Auxiliary  and  the  WAAF,  while  historians  such  as  Katherine  Sharp  Landdeck  
have  written  on  the  experiences  of  American  women  in  organisations  
including  the  Women’s  Army  Corps  and  the  Women’s  Auxiliary  Ferrying  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139  James  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  
Sulphate:  An  Examination  of  Policy  and  Practice  during  the  Second  World  War’,  Journal  of  
Contemporary  History,  (2016)  1-­22,  available  at:  https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009416652717  
[last  accessed  17  September  2017].  
140  Mark  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress:  Neuropsychiatric  Models  of  Resilience  
during  and  after  the  Second  World  War’  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  Stress  in  Post-­War  Britain,  
1945-­85,  (London:  Pickering  and  Chatto,  2015),  pp.  111-­130.  
141  Arlie  Russell  Hochschild,  The  Managed  Heart:  Commercialization  of  Human  Feeling,  
second  edition,  (London:  University  of  California  Press,  2003),  p.  7.  
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Squadron.142  A  number  of  historians  have  also  considered  the  place  of  
women  in  civil  aviation  in  America  and  Canada.  Scholarship  in  this  area  has  
engaged  with  three  key  debates:  the  public  perception  and  occupational  
status  of  female  cabin  crew,  the  role  and  responsibility  of  trade  unions  in  
protecting  the  health  of  female  workers,  and  the  relationship  between  female  
airline  work  and  feminism.    
Kathleen  Barry  historicised  the  first  issue  in  2007,  following  several  
similarly  framed  studies  by  sociologists.143  Barry  argued,  in  line  with  preceding  
works,  that  as  cabin  crew  work  became  formally  associated  with  women  in  the  
1930s,  female  cabin  crew  came  to  personify  white  middle-­class  ideals  of  
femininity.  Throughout  the  twentieth  century  female  cabin  crew  were  expected  
to  comply  with  a  litany  of  physical  and  personal  ideals.  Women  were  required  
to  be  ‘young’,  ‘slender’,  ‘attractive’,  and  unmarried.144  Until  the  late-­1960s  it  
was  common  practice  for  airlines  to  dismiss  female  cabin  crew  upon  marriage  
as  managers  reasoned  that  this  would  detract  from  their  ‘devotion  to  serving  
passengers’,  and  the  physical  rigours  and  long,  odd  hours  of  flying  would  
interfere  with  ‘wifely  duties  at  home’.145    
Some  historians  have,  however,  questioned  this  prevailing  narrative.  
Suzanne  Kolm  has  suggested  that  although  airline  work  was  sometimes  
described  as  ‘homemaking  or  hostessing’  in  the  1960s,  from  the  mid-­1970s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  Giles  Whittell,  Spitfire  Women  of  World  War  II,  (London:  Harper  Collins,  2008);;  Jacky  
Hyams,  The  Female  Few:  Spitfire  Heroines  of  the  Air  Transport  Auxiliary,  (Stroud:  The  
History  Press,  2012);;  Katherine  Sharp  Landdeck,  ‘Experiment  in  the  Cockpit:  The  Women  
Airforce  Service  Pilots  of  World  War  II’  in  Dominick  A.  Pisano  (ed.),  The  Airplane  in  American  
Culture  (Michigan:  University  of  Michigan  Press,  2003),  pp.  165-­198.  
143  See  for  example:  Roberta  Lessor,  ‘Social  Movements,  the  Occupational  Arena  and  
Changes  in  Career  Consciousness:  The  Case  of  Women  Flight  Attendants’,  Journal  of  
Occupational  Behaviour,  5  (1984)  37-­51.  
144  Kathleen  M.  Barry,  Femininity  in  Flight:  A  History  of  Flight  Attendants,  (London:  Duke  
University  Press,  2007),  p.  12.  
145  Ibid.  p.  25.  
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the  work  of  cabin  crew  was  rebranded  to  emphasise  the  special  knowledge  
and  skills  of  workers,  particularly  in  relation  to  health  and  safety.146  Kolm  has  
compared  the  occupational  status  of  female  cabin  crew  and  nurses,  who,  she  
argues,  occupied  an  ambiguous  and  sometimes  ‘uncomfortable’  position.147  
As  on  the  hospital  floor,  female  cabin  crew  were  in  a  position  ‘superior’  to  the  
consumers  of  their  service.148  Cabin  crew  controlled  the  aircraft  cabin  and,  
just  as  nurses  knew  more  than  most  patients  about  medical  conditions  and  
procedures,  cabin  crew  had  superior  knowledge  about  aviation  technology.  
Historians  of  trade  unionism  and  feminism  have  supported  Kolm’s  
reconceptualisation  of  female  cabin  crew.  Susan  Ware  has  suggested  that  
although  the  aviation  industry  was  undoubtedly  ‘sex-­segregated’  from  the  late-­
1930s,  historians  and  social  commentators  have  ‘too  starkly’  juxtaposed  the  
inclusivity  of  the  1920s  and  1930s,  at  which  time  women  were  free  to  train  as  
pilots,  and  the  segregation  and  sexism  of  the  late-­twentieth  century.149  Drew  
Whitelegg  has  argued  that  in  late-­twentieth  century  America,  particularly  
following  the  implementation  of  the  Civil  Rights  Act  in  1968,  women  workers  in  
the  aviation  industry  were  in  a  much  more  ‘powerful’  industrial  position  than  
popular  histories  have  suggested.150    
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Although  historically  male-­dominated  trade  unions  had  been  reluctant  
to  campaign  on  issues  affecting  female  members,  the  increasing  employment  
of  mostly  female  flight  attendants  in  the  1970s  magnified  the  bargaining  power  
of  female  flight  attendants.  By  the  1980s  eleven  trade  unions  represented  
flight  attendants  in  America.  Trade  unions  campaigned,  particularly,  on  issues  
relating  to  female  health  including  menstrual  irregularities  and  pregnancy.  
Andreas  Killen  has  gone  so  far  to  suggest  that  in  many  ways  Canadian  
female  flight  attendants  led  the  way  for  women  in  the  workplace,  particularly  in  
the  1970s  and  1980s  following  the  formation  of  Stewardesses  for  Women’s  
Rights.151  Drawing  on  this  extensive  literature  relating  to  North  American  flight  
attendants,  this  thesis  looks  to  historicise  the  experiences  of  flight  attendants  
working  for  British  airlines,  who  have  received  little  scholarly  attention  in  
comparison  with  their  counterparts  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  
  
Histories  of  Occupational  Health  and  Industrial  Accidents  
Occupational  diseases  and  industrial  accidents  provide,  as  David  Rosner  and  
Gerald  Markowitz  have  suggested,  a  window  into  the  complex  ‘interlocking  
relationships’  between  employment,  business,  government,  and  public  
health.152  Over  the  past  thirty  years  scholarship  in  this  area  has  engaged  with  
three  key  issues  and  debates:  job-­related  ailments  caused  by  specific  
workplace  practices  or  processes;;  health  and  multifactorial  illness;;  and  
workplace  accidents  and  workmen’s  compensation.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151  Andreas  Killen,  1973  Nervous  Breakdown:  Watergate,  Warhol,  and  the  Birth  of  Post-­
Sixties  America,  (New  York:  Bloomsbury,  2006).  
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Early  histories  of  occupational  health,  written  prior  to  or  at  the  turn  of  
the  century,  largely  focused  on  job-­related  illnesses  with  a  specific  and  
recognisable  causative  agent  of  disease.  Scholarship  has  centered  on  two  
particular  diseases:  asbestosis  and  silicosis.  Both  illnesses  were  caused  by  
the  inhalation  of  dust  containing  either  asbestos  or  silica,  often  took  decades  
to  develop,  and  are  assumed  to  have  affected  thousands  of  workers.  
Historical  analysis  of  these  illnesses  has  revealed  a  ‘culture  of  disregard  for  
health’  in  a  number  of  industries.153  Historians  have  been  critical  of  both  trade  
unions  and  medical  and  public  health  professionals  for  failing  to  raise  
awareness  of  the  dangers  of  asbestos  and  silica,  particularly  when  the  full  
implications  of  inhaling  the  substances  became  clear  in  the  1950s  and  
1960s.154  The  most  damning  criticisms  have,  however,  been  reserved  for  
employers.  In  Lethal  Work,  Ronald  Johnston  and  Arthur  McIvor  claim  that  
they  found  ‘no  evidence’  of  employers  ‘pro-­actively  encouraging  health-­
consciousness’  in  relation  to  asbestos.155  To  the  contrary,  they  conclude  that:  
  
The  available  evidence  suggests  quite  the  opposite.  Taking  short  cuts  
which  involved  serious  health  risks  in  order  to  maximise  production  
was  condoned,  even  encouraged.156  
  
The  asbestos  industry,  according  to  this  analysis,  was  more  concerned  with  
profit  than  with  the  health  of  employees.    
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Scotland,  (East  Linton:  Tuckwell  Press,  2000),  p.  3.  
154  Geoffrey  Tweedale,  Magic  Mineral  to  Killer  Dust:  Turner  and  Newall  and  the  Asbestos  
Hazard,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000).  
155  Johnston  and  McIvor,  Lethal  Work,  p.  215.  
156  Ibid.  p.  215.  
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The  past  ten  years  has  seen  a  distinct  shift  away  from  these  traditional  
areas  of  research  toward  a  more  inclusive  approach.  In  line  with  broader  
historiographical  changes,  historians  of  occupational  health  have  moved  their  
focus  on  disease  to  health  and  welfare.  These  histories,  best  exemplified  by  
Vicky  Long’s  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory,  stress  the  interaction  
of  mind  and  body,  the  prevention  of  disease,  and  the  promotion  of  mental  and  
physical  wellbeing:  in  short,  a  more  holistic  vision  of  workers’  health.157  
Recent  histories  of  occupational  health  have  used  the  widest  possible  
definition  of  the  workplace  and  of  the  work  and  health  relationship,  often  
including  an  analysis  of  indirect  causes  of  ill  health  such  as  pay,  pace  of  work,  
and  the  home  life  of  workers.    
Roger  Cooter  first  substantially  historicised  the  last  of  the  issues  
described  above,  workplace  accidents  and  workmen’s  compensation,  in  the  
1990s.158  Industrial  accidents  first  became  a  concern  in  the  late  nineteenth  
century,  following  the  factory  reforms  of  the  1830s  and  1840s.159  Prior  to  this,  
accidents  were  usually  framed  as  ‘arbitrary  and  individual  happenings’  with  
little  or  nothing  to  do  with  workplace  design  or  processes.160  For  this  reason  in  
the  nineteenth  century  British  employers  often  resisted  workers’  
compensation  claims.  Hazards  of  the  workplace  were  not,  businesses  argued,  
the  fault  of  the  employer,  so  the  responsibility  for  compensating  workers  
following  a  workplace  accident  did  not  lie  with  them.  Following  the  introduction  
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Injuries,  Fatalities  and  Social  Relations,  (Amsterdam:  Rodopi,  1997).  
159  Jamie  L.  Bronstein,  Caught  in  the  Machinery:  Workplace  Accidents  and  Injured  Workers  in  
Nineteenth-­Century  Britain,  (Stanford:  Stanford  University  Press,  2008).  
160  Roger  Cooter,  Surgery  and  Society  in  Peace  and  War:  Orthopaedics  and  the  Organization  
of  Modern  Medicine,  1880-­1948,  (Basingstoke:  Macmillan  Press,  1993),  p.  80.  
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of  the  Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  in  1897  employers  were  compelled  to  
compensate  injured  workers.  The  growth  of  statutory  compensation  for  
industrial  injuries  has  attracted  considerable  attention  from  both  historians  of  
labour  and  historians  of  state  welfare.161    
Other  historians  have  looked  at  the  prevention  of  workplace  accidents.  
In  Accident  Prone,  John  C.  Burnham  examines  accidents  and  safety  
management  quite  broadly,  but  accidents  in  the  workplace  are  most  
prominent.162  Like  Cooter,  Burnham  argues  that  accidents  were  framed  in  
naturalistic  terms  until  the  late  nineteenth  century.  The  growth  of  
transportation  and  manufacturing  technology,  however,  provoked  attempts  to  
understand  and  prevent  accidents.  Unlike  their  predecessors,  researchers  
and  campaigners  involved  in  the  early  twentieth-­century  safety  movement  
believed  that  accidents  could  be  prevented.  Four  different  means  of  
preventing  accidents  were  thought  to  be  effective  in  different  circumstances:  
safety  regulations  (whether  enforced  or  voluntary);;  safety  education;;  the  
protection  of  risk  groups  and  accident-­prone  individuals;;  and  ‘engineering  out’  
accidents.163    
In  recent  years,  the  first  of  these  measures  –  regulation  –  has  received  
increasing  attention  from  historians.  Particularly  pertinent  to  this  thesis  is  
Christopher  Sirrs’  examination  of  occupational  safety  and  health  regulation  in  
twentieth-­century  Britain.164  Sirrs’  work,  which  focuses  on  safety  and  health  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
161  See  P.  W.  J.  Bartrip,  Workmen’s  Compensation  in  Twentieth  Century  Britain,  (Aldershot:  
Gower  Publishing,  1987);;  Mark  W.  Bufton  and  Joseph  Melling,  ‘“A  Mere  Matter  of  Rock”:  
Organized  Labour,  Scientific  Evidence  and  British  Government  Schemes  for  Compensation  of  
Silicosis  and  Pneumoconiosis  among  Coalminers,  1926-­1940’,  Medical  History,  49,  2  (2005)  
155-­178.  
162  Burnham,  Accident  Prone.  
163  Ibid.  
164  Sirrs,  ‘Accidents  and  Apathy’.  
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equal  measure,  marks  a  break  with  previous  scholarship  in  this  area  which,  
until  the  mid-­2010s  tended  to  consider  safety  and  health  separately.  This  
thesis  builds  on  this  scholarship  by  demonstrating  that,  in  some  industries,  
health  and  safety  were  intimately  linked.  In  civil  aviation,  for  example,  the  
health  and  fitness  of  pilots  was  crucial  for  flight  safety.  If  the  captain  or  co-­pilot  
of  an  aircraft  became  medically  incapacitated  during  a  flight  there  were  
serious  safety  implications.  With  no  access  to  medical  care,  and  no  
opportunity  to  discontinue  work,  human  errors  –  and  air  accidents  –  were  
likely.    
  
Opening  the  Hangar  Door:  Sources  and  Methodology  
This  thesis  draws  on  a  diverse  range  of  primary  source  material,  including  
archival  records,  oral  sources,  medical  and  scientific  journals,  newspaper  
reports,  trade  union  membership  magazines,  and  the  published  and  
unpublished  reports  and  memoranda  of  regulatory  bodies.  The  combination  of  
sources  used  varies  from  chapter  to  chapter.  Chapter  Two,  which  draws  
primarily  on  military  accounts  of  flying  fatigue,  refers  mainly  to  reports  and  
papers  produced  by  the  Air  Ministry  and  the  Ministry  of  Defence.  It  focuses,  
particularly,  on  the  reports  and  memoranda  produced  by  the  FPRC  from  
1939,  which  are,  for  the  most  part,  housed  in  The  National  Archives.  Chapter  
Three  also  relies  heavily  on  archival  material  from  The  National  Archives,  
though  the  sources  used  here  are  mainly  those  produced  by  regulatory  
agencies  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  In  addition  to  drawing  on  
legal  publications,  I  have  also  used  archival  material  in  the  form  of  
correspondence,  report  drafts,  and  minutes  of  meetings  to  trace  how  and  why  
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various  committees  made  decisions  about  flight  time  limitations.  Chapter  Four  
draws  heavily  on  media  sources,  mostly  in  the  form  of  newspaper  reports.  As  
Chapter  Four  also  discusses  trade  unionism,  I  have  made  use  of  archival  
material  available  from  the  Modern  Records  Centre  relating  to  the  activity  of  
Britain’s  largest  aviation  union,  the  British  Airline  Pilots  Association  (BALPA),  
between  1946  and  2001.    
Owing  in  large  part  to  the  archival  silences  on  fatigue  as  it  affected  
cabin  crew,  Chapter  Five  relies  largely  on  oral  testimonies.  In  conjunction  with  
regulatory,  sociological,  and  scientific  evidence,  oral  history  is  used  here  to  
provide  new  details  and  perspectives.  Oral  sources  are,  of  course,  ‘not  
objective’,  but  robust  defences  of  this  methodology  over  the  past  thirty  years  
have  largely  replaced  academic  scepticism  about  the  historical  validity  of  oral  
testimony.165  Oral  history  can  provide  material  on  areas  rarely  glimpsed  in  the  
archives.  It  has,  for  this  reason,  proved  popular  with  historians  of  sexuality,  
political  violence,  and  other  issues  and  experiences  that  are  barely  
represented  in  the  archival  record.166  Here,  oral  histories  revealed  more  about  
an  issue  only  alluded  to  in  written  records:  the  unofficial  policy  of  in-­seat  rest  
employed  by  flight  deck  crew  in  civil  airlines  in  the  twentieth  century.  As  
airlines  and  regulators  did  not  formally  endorse  in-­seat  rest  in  this  period,  few  
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166  Kate  Fisher,  Birth  Control,  Sex,  and  Marriage  in  Britain  1918-­1960,  (Oxford:  Oxford  
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references  to  it  exist  in  the  official  record.  Conversations  with  flight  deck  crew,  
both  on  and  off  the  record,  revealed,  however,  that  this  practice  was  widely  
employed  throughout  the  latter  decades  of  the  twentieth  century.  As  Jeffrey  
Cooper  recalled  of  his  time  as  a  flight  engineer  with  BOAC  between  the  1970s  
and  1990s:  ‘oh  it  was  quite  common.  It  was  approved  really’.167  Oral  histories  
also  proved  valuable  more  broadly.  Formal  interviews,  in  addition  to  the  
informal  exchanges  that  often  accompanied  these,  allowed  me  to  gauge  the  
prevalence  of  fatigue,  as  well  as  information  about  how  it  was  managed  
beyond  regulatory  purview  and  subjectively  experienced  by  workers.  
   Interview  participants  were  recruited  from  a  number  of  organisations.  
Former  pilots,  navigators,  and  flight  engineers  were  recruited  through  the  
British  Association  of  Aviation  Consultants,  the  British  Airways  Retired  Staff  
Association  (BARSA),  and  the  Devon  Virtual  Jet  Centre.  Former  flight  
attendants  were  recruited  for  interview  from  both  BARSA  and  the  British  
Airways  (BA)  Crew  online  forum,  which  brings  together  current  and  former  BA  
crew  members.  In  total,  sixteen  participants  were  interviewed  for  this  thesis:  
six  former  pilots,  one  former  flight  engineer,  and  nine  former  cabin  crew  
members.  This  occupational  categorisation  belies  a  complex  reality.  
Participants  sometimes  held  multiple  job  roles,  or  retrained  during  their  
career.  James  Hall,  for  example,  was  employed  as  a  navigator  before  training  
as  a  pilot.  In  other  instances,  participants  also  had  important  roles  in  
regulation,  training,  or  research.168  Paul  White,  for  example,  was  seconded  to  
the  RAF  Institute  of  Aviation  Medicine  (IAM)  in  1976  to  assist  and  advise  on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167  Interview  with  Jeffrey  Cooper,  24  January  2017.    
168  Interview  with  James  Hall,  30  March  2016.  
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experimental  flying  to  measure  the  effects  of  sleep  loss  on  pilot  performance.  
He  then  served  as  a  member  of  the  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  
Reporting  Programme  (CHIRP)  from  its  foundation  in  1982  until  1995.169  Like  
many  of  the  other  participants  interviewed  for  this  thesis  then,  the  working  
identities  and  experiences  of  James  Hall  and  Paul  White  were  complex.  To  
interpret  the  testimony  of  interviewees  based  solely  on  their  job  role  would,  
thus,  be  too  simplistic.  In  recognition  of  this  issue  I  have  included,  where  
appropriate,  details  of  participants  beyond  their  primary  occupational  position.  
More  information  about  participants  is  available  in  the  appendix  of  this  thesis.  
   Given  the  sensitive  nature  of  the  material  discussed  here  –  participants  
sometimes  detailed  behaviours  that  may  have  been  subject  to  sanction  during  
their  working  life  –  all  digital  files  and  transcripts  and  have  been  anonymised  
and  pseudonyms  are  used  throughout  this  thesis.  It  is  worth  noting  that  for  
many  of  the  former  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  consulted  for  this  thesis,  the  
oral  history  interview  –  which  focused  on  their  working  life  –  required  reflection  
on  often-­private  life  events.  A  number  of  the  participants  noted  in  interview  
that  they  were,  under  usual  circumstances,  reluctant  to  discuss  their  working  
life.  As  former  cabin  attendant  Jacob  Evans  said  during  interview,  in  most  of  
his  day-­to-­day  conversations  he  tried  ‘not  to  open  the  hangar  door’.170  
Reflecting  on  his  routine  exchanges  with  family,  friends,  and  former  
colleagues,  Evans  said:    
     
We  don’t  make  any  references  at  all,  we  never  open  the  hangar  door,  
and  that  actually  is  a  part  of  our  lives  that  is  refreshing  in  many  ways  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
169  Interview  with  Paul  White,  17  March  2016.  
170  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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because  we  had  reached  saturation.  We’d  reached  the  end  completely.  
So  if  [former  colleagues]  come  over  here,  they  were  with  us  a  couple  of  
nights  ago  and  they  didn’t  leave  until  two  o’clock.  We  never  mentioned  
aircraft  once.  And  that’s  the  rule.  No  one  opens  the  hangar  door.171  
  
The  interview  encounter  was  then,  as  former  cabin  attendant  –  and  Jacob  
Evans’  wife  –  Julia  Evans  said,  ‘the  first  time’  they  had  discussed  their  
working  lives  in  years,  noting  ‘we  never  talk  about  it  individually  do  we?’172    
  
Themes  and  Chapter  Outlines  
In  seeking  to  extend  the  history  of  workplace  fatigue  in  Britain  beyond  1945,  
this  thesis  asks  four  central  questions.  First,  how  was  flying  fatigue  defined  
and  explained  in  post-­war  Britain?  Did  fatigue  remain  tied  to  performance  and  
productivity,  as  it  had  in  industrial  settings  in  the  nineteenth  and  early-­
twentieth  centuries?  Or  was  flying  fatigue  conceptualised  and  measured  in  
distinctive  ways?  Second,  in  what  circumstances  was  flying  fatigue  deemed  
important  in  post-­war  Britain?  Was  flying  fatigue  bound  up  with  concerns  
about  efficiency,  as  in  the  interwar  period,  or  did  novel  problems  structure  
approaches  to  it?  Third,  how  was  flying  fatigue  managed  in  the  middle  and  
late-­twentieth  century?  Where  did  responsibility  for  the  avoidance  or  
minimisation  of  flying  fatigue  lie:  with  workers,  employers,  or  regulatory  
agencies?  Fourth,  how  was  flying  fatigue  conceptualised  and  experienced  by  
people  of  the  past?  
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   My  argument  can  thus  be  divided,  broadly,  into  four  parts.  First,  I  argue  
that  complex  and  sometimes  competing  discourses  of  fatigue  persisted  
throughout  the  twentieth  century.  The  conceptual  apparatus  developed  by  
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth-­century  theorists  and  interwar  and  wartime  
research  bodies  persisted  into  the  post-­war  period.  Fatigue  was  imagined  –  in  
official  circles  at  least  –  as  a  complex  psychophysiological  phenomenon  and,  
while  a  number  of  novel  issues,  namely  circadian  dysrhythmia  resulting  from  
transmeridian  travel,  faced  civilian  airline  pilots  in  the  middle  and  latter  half  of  
the  twentieth  century,  in  post-­war  Britain  research  committees  tended  to  focus  
on  the  issues  identified  as  important  in  the  early  twentieth  century:  hours  of  
work  and  emotional  health.    
Second,  I  argue  that  in  the  post-­war  period  worker  fatigue  was  
reconceptualised  as  a  problem  of  health  and  safety.  Although  concerns  about  
productivity  and  efficiency  persisted  until  the  1960s,  these  were  largely  
sidelined  in  the  latter  decades  of  the  twentieth  century.  Worker  fatigue  instead  
became  bound  up  with  arguments  about  worker  health  and  public  safety.  I  
argue  that  this  post-­war  refashioning  of  fatigue  largely  explains  why  it  
remained  a  pertinent  issue  in  some  industries.  The  connections  drawn  
between  fatigue  and  safety  in  healthcare  and  the  transport  sector  transformed  
fatigue  from  a  problem  that  affected  only  workers,  to  one  that  had  
consequences  for  the  broader  populace.  This  change  had  implications  for  
how  fatigue  was  managed  at  work,  and  how  responsibility  for  ensuring  that  
worker  fatigue  did  not  endanger  members  of  the  public  was  distributed.    
I  argue,  third,  that  in  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century  responsibility  
for  managing  fatigue  at  work  was  consistently  located  beyond  the  state.  The  
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work  and  rest  of  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  was  more  strictly  regulated  than  in  
any  other  industry  in  post-­war  Britain,  but  these  regulations  consistently  
located  the  responsibility  for  fatigue  management  with  individual  workers  and  
employers  rather  than  state  agencies.  Though  the  fatigue  of  airline  pilots  was  
framed  as  a  barrier  to  flight  safety  throughout  the  century,  economic  and  
administrative  concerns  took  priority.  
Fourth,  I  argue  that  worker  experiences  of  fatigue  were  not  always  
consonant  with  research  findings.  The  issues  that  research  bodies  deemed  
most  important  were  not  always  reflected  in  the  lived  experiences  of  
crewmembers.  Throughout  the  century  airline  pilots  and  cabin  crew  attributed  
fatigue  to  causes  other  than  long  working  hours  and  emotional  labour.  They  
were,  as  Chapter  Five  demonstrates,  much  more  likely  to  attribute  fatigue  to  
circadian  dysrhythmia.  The  dissonance  between  how  research  bodies  and  
workers  imagined  fatigue  was  but  one  manifestation  of  broader  tensions  
between  research  and  practice  in  twentieth-­century  civil  aviation.  As  this  
thesis  will  demonstrate,  though  civil  aviation  is  often  hailed  as  a  research-­led  
industry,  throughout  the  century  regulations  and  policies  pertaining  to  the  rest  
and  working  practices  of  aircrew  were  consistently  based  on  a  common-­sense  
‘instinctive  feel’,  rather  than  the  findings  of  independent  research  bodies.173  
Most  of  the  historical  work  described  so  far  has  focused  almost  entirely  on  
intellectual  and  institutional  research  and  responses  to  fatigue.  As  this  thesis  
will  demonstrate,  however,  fatigue  was  also  a  social  issue  and,  though  it  is  
important  to  investigate  the  ways  in  which  it  was  conceived  of  by  academic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173  Patrick  Mitchell,  Safer  Care:  Human  Factors  for  Healthcare  Trainer’s  Manual,  (Argyll  and  
Bute:  Swan  and  Horn,  2013),  p.  viii.  
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bodies,  regulatory  agencies,  and  government  organisations,  it  is  also  
revealing  to  examine  the  ways  in  which  fatigue  was  discussed  and  managed  
through  informal  interpersonal  channels.  This  thesis  uses  oral  histories  to  
understand  the  ways  in  which  tiredness  at  work  was  experienced  and  
managed  by  historical  actors.  
With  multiple  overlapping  and  intersecting  themes,  the  history  of  flying  
fatigue  in  Britain  eludes  a  straightforward  chronological  narrative.  An  effort  
has  been  made,  though,  to  retain  a  sense  of  chronology  by  grouping  
chapters.  Chapters  One  and  Two  provide  the  early  history  of  fatigue.  The  
focus  here  is  on  medical  and  scientific  discourses  in  the  first  half  of  the  
twentieth  century.  Chapters  Three  and  Four  examine  the  immediate  post-­war  
period  until  the  early  1980s,  with  a  particular  focus  on  the  introduction  of  a  
new  regulatory  framework  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue  in  the  mid-­1970s.  The  
focus  here  is  on  trade  union  and  labour  politics  as  much  as  medicine.  Chapter  
Five  moves  the  discussion  on  to  workers,  with  a  particular  focus  on  the  1980s  
and  1990s.  
Chapter  Two  begins  with  the  early  military  history  of  flying  fatigue.  
Flying  fatigue  was  first  defined  as  a  discrete,  and  pressing,  issue  during  World  
War  Two.  Chapter  Two  argues  that  the  models  of  fatigue,  and  the  practices  
employed  to  prevent  and  alleviate  it,  between  1939  and  1945  were  firmly  
established  by  the  end  of  the  war.  When,  in  the  1960s,  civil  aviation  expanded  
and  former  RAF  pilots  sought  employment  with  commercial  airlines,  the  
established  military  discourses  and  practices  relating  to  the  fatigue  of  pilots  
were  transferred  to  a  civil  setting.  As  subsequent  chapters  demonstrate,  this  
relationship  persisted  through  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century  and,  as  a  
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result,  paramilitary  attitudes  continued  to  dominate  discussions  about  fatigue  
and  working  practices  in  civil  aviation  long  after  the  close  of  the  Second  World  
War.     
Chapter  Three  demonstrates  the  close  relationship  between  military  
and  civil  circles  most  explicitly.  With  a  particular  focus  on  the  regulation  of  
aircrew  schedules,  this  chapter  shows  that  a  number  of  the  regulatory  bodies  
and  advisory  committees  that  produced  guidelines  and  legislation  in  relation  
to  fatigue  management  and  working  hours  in  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  
century  had  strong  connections  with  the  RAF.  Some,  such  as  the  Bader  
Committee,  contained  members  who  had  previously  flown  for  the  RAF.  
Others,  such  as  CHIRP,  were  explicitly  embedded  within  the  RAF  IAM.  
Chapter  Three  charts  the  evolution  of  regulations  governing  aircrew  
schedules  in  post-­war  Britain.  It  argues  that,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  pilot  
fatigue  was  framed  as  a  safety  issue  throughout  the  century,  regulations  were  
largely  permissive.  In  line  with  broader  trends  towards  self-­regulation  in  the  
middle  and  late  twentieth  century,  airlines  and  pilots  –  rather  than  state  
regulators  –  were  charged  with  taking  responsibility  for  the  prevention  of  
fatigue.    
Chapter  Four  acts  as  a  counterpoint  to  Chapter  Three.  It  explores  
many  of  the  same  themes  –  including  risk,  responsibility,  and  regulation  –  but  
does  so  from  a  perspective  of  union-­airline  bargaining.  Chapter  Four  argues  
that  fatigue  was  prioritised  by  aviation  unions  in  their  negotiations  with  
employers  because,  given  its  nebulous  nature,  it  allowed  unions  to  campaign  
for  economic,  social,  health,  and  safety  objectives  simultaneously.  This  
chapter  charts  how  BALPA,  Britain’s  largest  aviation  union,  negotiated  with  
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airlines  on  issues  of  working  hours,  productivity,  and  scheduling,  paying  
particular  attention  to  the  Association’s  provocative  public  relations  campaign  
in  the  early  1970s.  
The  final  chapter,  Chapter  Five,  investigates  the  ways  in  which  fatigue  
was  experienced  and  managed  in  quotidian  contexts.  It  examines,  in  
particular,  crew  relations  prior  to  the  introduction  of  CRM  training  in  the  mid-­
1990s.  Extending  the  remit  of  this  thesis  beyond  structural  and  personal  
narratives  here  I  argue  that,  though  regulatory  policy  focused  on  individual  
and  company-­centered  strategies  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue,  throughout  the  
twentieth  century  crew-­wide  coping  mechanisms  were  integral  to  the  
management  of  fatigue  in  flight.  Drawing  on  a  rich  base  of  oral  testimonies,  I  
argue  that  these,  largely  informal,  solutions  relied  on  good  relations  both  
within  and  between  the  flight  deck  and  the  cabin.    
Finally,  in  a  short  concluding  chapter,  I  suggest  avenues  for  future  
research.  Given  the  on-­going  unrest  related  to  the  introduction  of  new  junior  
doctors’  contracts,  it  is  evident  that  further  research  on  fatigue  and  burnout  
among  medical  practitioners  is  warranted.  Examining  the  historical  roots  of  
the  current  conflict  may  help  to  inform  present-­day  debate  and  policy  relating  
to  the  regulation  of  working  hours  and  the  wellbeing  of  healthcare  workers.    
The  avenues  for  further  research  outlined  in  Chapter  Six  give  a  sense  
of  the  limitations  of  this  thesis,  which  will  also  be  considered  here.  The  
restrictions  of  this  work  fall  into  two  main  areas.  First,  the  thesis  focuses  quite  
narrowly  on  airline  pilots  and  flight  attendants.  Other  occupations  are  
considered  briefly  –  the  medical  profession,  for  example,  is  consistently  cited  
as  a  point  for  comparison  –  but  little  is  said,  for  instance,  about  fatigue  in  
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relation  to  other  safety  critical  industries  and  occupations  including,  for  
example,  the  work  of  air  traffic  controllers.  The  rationale  for  this  relates  to  the  
availability  of  primary  source  material.  Simply  put,  this  thesis  engages  with  a  
substantial  body  of  previously  under  or  unused  material  from  military  research  
committees,  aviation  unions,  and  regulatory  agencies.  To  do  this  rich  source  
material  justice,  a  narrow  focus  on  the  aviation  industry  was  adopted.  Building  
on  this  industry-­specific  work,  a  broader  history  of  occupational  fatigue  in  
Britain  now  needs  to  be  undertaken  to  see  if  the  conclusions  reached  here  are  
unique  to  civil  aviation  or  more  broadly  generalisable.    
Second,  this  thesis  offers  only  a  limited  discussion  of  scientific  and  
medical  discourses  after  the  close  of  the  Second  World  War.  For  the  most  
part  this  thesis  is  concerned  with  policy  and  practice.  This  is  not  to  suggest  
that  fatigue  became  divorced  from  its  scientific  context  in  the  post-­war  period.  
Indeed,  scientific  and  medical  research  into  flying  fatigue  continued  apace  
throughout  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century,  as  Chapters  Two,  Four,  and  
Five  note.  The  FPRC  continued  to  research  fatigue  in  laboratory  and  
operational  contexts  into  the  1970s  under  the  leadership  of  Hugh  Patrick  
Ruffell  Smith  (1911-­1980).  Research  was  also  carried  out  at  the  RAF  IAM  
and,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  by  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  
Administration  (NASA).    
The  focus  on  policy  and  practice  is,  in  part,  a  corrective.  Much  
historical  scholarship  on  fatigue  and  the  science  of  work  focuses  exclusively  
on  medical  and  scientific  discourses,  but  fatigue  also  has  a  rich  history  
beyond  this  context,  which  this  thesis  draws  out.  This  does,  however,  mean  
that  this  thesis  privileges  certain  medical  models  of  fatigue  over  others.  This  
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thesis  traces  the  ways  in  which  the  models  of  fatigue  developed  by  industrial  
and  military  research  bodies  in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century  endured  
into  the  post-­war  period.  As  such,  it  focuses  mostly  on  psychological  malaise,  
physical  exhaustion,  and  acute  fatigue  (or  ‘accident-­proneness’  as  it  was  
referred  to  in  wartime  psychological  literature).  Discussions  of  boredom,  
anticipatory  stress,  and  cumulative  fatigue  associated  with  health  risks,  are  
largely  absent.  Likewise,  little  is  said  about  circadian  disruption.  To  be  clear,  
these  models  of  fatigue  did  penetrate  aviation  medicine  in  the  twentieth  
century.  Importantly  for  the  purposes  of  this  thesis,  though,  they  did  not  inform  
policy  or  practice.  Regulators,  workers,  and  trade  unions  alike  were  
dissatisfied  with  medical  research  in  the  post-­war  period.  The  precise  
physiological  mechanism  of  fatigue  remained  contested,  so  the  functional  
model  of  fatigue  developed  during  wartime  continued  to  structure  discussions  
about  working  practices  beyond  the  laboratory.  Though  medical  research  in  
this  area  continued  to  be  commissioned  by  airlines  and  regulators  into  the  
late-­twentieth  century,  continuing  uncertainty  about  the  biological  reality  of  
fatigue  meant  that,  in  policy  settings,  medical  voices  were  muted.  
The  development  of  scientific  and  medical  understandings  of  flying  
fatigue  in  post-­war  Britain  is,  unquestionably,  a  history  that  needs  to  be  
written.  Though  this  thesis  gives  a  sense  of  medical  and  scientific  changes,  a  
broad  history  of  fatigue  research  in  the  twentieth  century,  building  on  and  
complementing  nineteenth  and  early-­twentieth  century  histories  of  industrial  
fatigue,  now  needs  to  be  written.  
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2  
Flying  Fatigue  During  and  After  World  War  Two  
  
  
Planes  were  first  utilised  by  the  British  military  in  World  War  One.  Military  air  
services  then  expanded  significantly  in  the  1920s  and  1930s.1  In  the  interwar  
period  military  planes  were,  increasingly,  technically  sophisticated  and  aircraft  
carriers,  a  major  innovation  in  fleet  operations,  became  commonplace.2  The  
growth  of  military  aviation  had  implications  for  both  military  strategy  and  
civilian  experiences  of  war.  From  1940  an  increasing  number  of  military  
operations  relied  heavily  on  British  airpower,  most  notably  the  Battle  of  
Britain.3  Fighter  pilots  thus  became  essential  to  military  strategy.  Bomber  
pilots  were  also  granted  an  increasingly  central  position  in  the  Royal  Air  Force  
(RAF),  although  their  role  is  often  played  down  in  histories  of  military  
aviation.4  By  the  early  years  of  the  Second  World  War,  then,  airpower  was  
central  to  the  British  war  effort.  It  was  in  this  context  that  the  fatigue  of  pilots  
was  first  deemed  important.  Though  flying  fatigue  was  first  identified  as  a  
discrete  issue  by  interwar  researchers,  wartime  concerns  about  manpower  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Roger  E.  Bilsten,  Flight  in  America:  From  the  Wrights  to  the  Astronauts,  (Baltimore:  Johns  
Hopkins  University  Press,  2001).  
2  Ibid.  
3  Patrick  Bishop,  Fighter  Boys:  Saving  Britain  1940,  (London:  Harper  Collins,  2004).  
4  A  small  number  of  academic  histories  have  been  published  on  the  subject  of  wartime  
bombing  offensives  since  the  turn  of  the  century,  many  of  which  focus  on  civilian  experiences  
of  aerial  bombardment,  see  for  example:  Hew  Strachan,  ‘Strategic  Bombing  and  the  Question  
of  Civilian  Casualties  up  to  1945’  in  Paul  Addison  and  Jeremy  A.  Crang  (eds.),  Firestorm:  The  
Bombing  of  Dresden,  1945,  (London:  Pimlico,  2006),  pp.  1-­17;;  Patrick  Bishop,  Bomber  Boys:  
Fighting  Back  1940-­1945,  (London:  Harper  Perennial,  2008);;  Juliet  Gardiner,  ‘The  Blitz  
Experience  in  British  Society  1940-­1941’  in  Claudia  Baldoli,  Andrew  Knapp,  and  Richard  
Overy  (eds.),  Bombing  States  and  Peoples  in  Western  Europe  1940-­1945,  (London:  
Continuum,  2011),  pp.  171-­183;;  Richard  Overy,  The  Bombing  War:  Europe  1939-­1945,  
(London:  Allen  Lane,  2013).  
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economy  and  wastage  prompted  intensive  research  into  the  causes,  signs,  
and  means  of  managing  fatigue  in  airmen.  From  1939,  the  Flying  Personnel  
Research  Committee  (FPRC)  carried  out  much  of  this  research.  Composed  of  
clinicians,  psychologists,  and  physiologists  –  many  of  whom  had  served  on  
industrial  fatigue  research  committees  prior  to  the  outbreak  of  war  –  the  FPRC  
advised  the  Air  Ministry  on  matters  relating  to  operational  inefficiency  in  
military  aircrew.  It  is,  in  part,  for  this  reason  that  this  chapter  focuses  largely  
on  FPRC  records.  There  is,  however,  a  second  reason:  that  the  FPRC  had  an  
enduring  post-­war  legacy  that  stretched  beyond  the  military  into  the  civil  
sector.  
   This  chapter  examines  fatigue  and  flying  stress  in  military  aviation,  and  
establishes  the  importance  of  wartime  debates  and  explorations  of  fatigue  for  
the  post-­war  period.  It  details  both  how  fatigue  came  to  be  problematised  
specifically  in  relation  to  flying,  and  how  concerns  with,  definitions  of,  and  
techniques  for  assessing  fatigue  moved  from  military  to  civil  settings.  It  is  
structured  in  two  parts.  The  first  begins  with  a  discussion  of  flying  stress  and  
the  place  of  fatigue  in  interwar  and  wartime  theories  of  neuropsychiatric  
resilience  and  disorder,  but  focuses  primarily  on  the  period  when  flying  fatigue  
was  subject  to  most  research:  1942-­1945.  It  demonstrates  that  during  this  
period  a  complex  discourse  of  flying  fatigue  existed.  While  some  researchers  
argued,  in  line  with  interwar  theories  of  flying  stress,  that  fatigue  was  a  
primarily  psychological  phenomenon,  others  looked  to  working  hours  and  
physiology,  citing  long  flying  hours  and  the  intensification  of  wartime  
operations  as  the  cause  of  pilot  fatigue.  In  order  to  explore  these  different  
discourses  in  detail,  psychology  and  physiology  are  discussed  separately  
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here.  To  be  clear,  this  separation  is,  to  some  extent  at  least,  arbitrary.  There  
was  no  clear-­cut  boundary,  in  that  researchers  rarely  endorsed  a  solely  
psychological  or  physiological  model  of  fatigue.  Reflecting  a  broader  
contemporary  discourse  about  the  relationship  between  emotions  and  
physical  health  promoted  by  British  and  American  physiologists  such  as  
George  Crile  (1864-­1943),  Walter  Cannon  (1871-­1945),  and  James  Lorimer  
Halliday  (1897-­1983),  British  military  researchers  often  acknowledged  the  
importance  of  both  psychological  and  physiological  factors  in  the  aetiology  
and  management  of  fatigue.5  I  argue  here,  that  while  the  precise  nature  and  
mechanism  of  fatigue  was  subject  to  debate  in  this  period,  an  essential  model  
of  fatigue  emerged.  In  this  period  fatigue  was  increasingly  conceived  of  in  
functional  terms.  In  some  instances  fatigue  was  discussed  in  relation  to  
accuracy  and  flying  efficiency,  in  others  it  was  considered  in  relation  to  sleep  
and  wakefulness.  
   The  second  part  of  the  chapter  examines  flying  fatigue  in  civil  aviation.  
It  argues  that  wartime  research  and  policies  informed  post-­war  approaches  to  
fatigue  in  civilian  airlines.  A  close  relationship  existed  between  civil  and  
military  aviation.  Throughout  the  twentieth  century  there  was  a  two-­way  
exchange  of  research,  ideas,  and  personnel  between  civil  and  military  
settings.  Wartime  military  research  and  policies  pertaining  to  flying  fatigue  
were  transferred  into  civil  settings  in  the  post-­war  period.  Although,  as  the  
following  chapters  lay  out,  wartime  military  research  and  practices  did  not  go  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Mark  Jackson,  ‘Perspectives  on  the  History  of  Disease’  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  The  
Routledge  History  of  Disease,  (London:  Routledge,  2017),  pp.  1-­18;;  Rhodri  Hayward,  
‘Enduring  Emotions:  James  L.  Halliday  and  the  Invention  of  the  Psychosocial’,  Isis,  100,  4  
(2009)  827-­838;;  Otniel  E.  Dror,  ‘From  Primitive  Fear  to  Civilized  Stress:  Sudden  Unexpected  
Death’  in  David  Cantor  and  Edmund  Ramsden  (eds.),  Stress,  Shock,  and  Adaptation  in  the  
Twentieth  Century,  (Rochester:  University  of  Rochester  Press,  2014),  pp.  96-­120.  
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uncontested,  the  essential  model  of  flying  fatigue  that  first  emerged  during  the  
Second  World  War  persisted  into  the  post-­war  period.    
As  this  chapter  will  demonstrate,  this  model  of  fatigue  built  on  the  
concept  of  industrial  fatigue  developed  in  the  nineteenth  and  early-­twentieth  
centuries.  As  in  pre-­war  discourses,  fatigue  was  closely  tied  to  performance.  
While  industrial  fatigue  was  framed  in  relation  to  productivity  and  output,  flying  
fatigue  came  to  be  configured  in  relation  to  manpower  economy  and  flight  
safety.  This  chapter,  then,  suggests  that  a  performance  model  of  fatigue  
dominated  wartime  research  and  policy.  This  argument  is  at  odds  with  military  
historiography  in  this  area,  which  largely  frames  fatigue  in  relation  to  
sleeplessness.  Historical  preoccupations  with  Benzedrine,  this  chapter  will  
argue,  have  obscured  concerns  about  performance  and  efficiency,  that  
dominated  both  wartime  and  post-­war  discussions  of  flying  fatigue.  
  
Fatigue  and  Flying  Stress  in  Military  Aviation  
Much  of  the  academic  research  that  discusses  flying  fatigue  does  so  in  
relation  to  military  aviation.  Though  the  literature  on  flying  fatigue  in  the  British  
military  is  sparse,  there  are  some  clear  historiographical  trends.  Scholars  
have  broadly  focused  on  the  categorisation  of  fatigue  and  the  use  of  
Benzedrine.  A  powerful  stimulant  with  the  ability  to  promote  both  wakefulness  
and  wellbeing,  Benzedrine  was  approved  for  use  in  Britain’s  RAF  in  
November  1942.  Historians  disagree  on  whether  its  primary  purpose  in  this  
context  was  psychological  or  physiological.  Implicit  in  this  disagreement  is  a  
debate  about  the  nature  of  flying  fatigue.  Few  academic  histories  have  
explicitly  examined  fatigue  in  relation  to  wartime  flying  but  in  many  instances  
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Benzedrine  has  been  used  as  a  conduit  for  discussion  of  flying  fatigue.  As  
such,  my  analysis  here  focuses  in  on  histories  of  Benzedrine  and  what  these  
reveal  about  historians’  thoughts  on  flying  fatigue  more  broadly.  
There  are  two  clear  camps  within  the  existing  historiography,  with  
Martin  Francis  and  Nicolas  Rasmussen  on  one  side  and  James  Pugh  on  the  
other.  Both  published  in  2008,  Francis’s  The  Flyer  and  Rasmussen’s  On  
Speed  present  a  similar  picture  of  Benzedrine  use  in  the  RAF  during  the  
Second  World  War.  Though  both  Francis  and  Rasmussen  concede  that,  
officially  at  least,  Benzedrine  was  distributed  to  flyers  in  the  RAF  and  the  
Women’s  Auxiliary  Air  Force  (WAAF)  to  alleviate  fatigue,  they  argue  that  the  
substance  was  most  valued  for  its  effect  on  mood  and  behaviour.  Benzedrine,  
they  argue,  was  approved  for  use  in  the  RAF  in  1942  because  it  raised  
morale,  helped  flyers  deal  with  ‘intolerable  levels  of  strain’  and  made  crews  
more  willing  to  work.6  The  stimulant  was  distributed  for  its  ‘consciousness-­
altering  properties’,  rather  than  as  a  means  of  allaying  the  effects  of  
physiological  fatigue.7  Implicit  in  this  argument  about  Benzedrine  use  is  a  
comment  on  the  nature  of  fatigue.  To  be  clear,  neither  Francis  or  Rasmussen  
deny  the  physical  effects  of  fatigue,  but  their  accounts  suggest  that  between  
1939  and  1945  the  British  military  was  more  interested  in  the  psychological  
components  of  fatigue.  
Pugh  challenged  this  account  in  a  series  of  articles  published  in  2016  
and  2017  on  the  use  of  Benzedrine  in  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  RAF.8  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  Martin  Francis,  The  Flyer:  British  Culture  and  the  Royal  Air  Force  1939-­1945,  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2008),  p.  122.  
7  Nicolas  Rasmussen,  On  Speed:  The  Many  Lives  of  Amphetamine,  (London:  New  York  
University  Press,  2008),  p.  71.  
8  James  Pugh,  ‘“Not…  like  a  rum-­ration”:  Amphetamine  Sulphate,  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  
Evolution  of  Policy  and  Medical  Research  During  the  Second  World  War’,  War  in  History,  
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Benzedrine,  according  to  Pugh,  was  not  primarily  used  to  help  with  the  
psychological  strain  of  combat.  Benzedrine  use  was,  rather,  limited  to  helping  
personnel  at  risk  of  falling  asleep  as  a  result  of  lengthy  or  intensive  
operations.  Though  conceding  that  the  Air  Ministry  was  concerned  about  the  
psychological  strain  placed  on  aircrew,  he  argues  that  these  issues  were  
managed  separately,  namely  by  the  promotion  of  exercise  and  good  diet  and  
by  the  provision  of  recreation  facilities.  For  Pugh,  Benzedrine  was  utilised  to  
help  with  a  relatively  narrow  aspect  of  the  fatigue  problem:  the  unpredictability  
of  sleeplessness.  The  Air  Ministry’s  advice  about  Benzedrine  was  cautious.  It  
was  intended  for  use,  Pugh  argues,  only  in  exceptional  circumstances  where  
the  benefits  of  wakefulness  outweighed  the  dangers  associated  with  the  drug.  
For  Pugh,  then,  wartime  flying  fatigue  was  a  physiological  phenomenon  
centred  on  the  problem  of  sleeplessness.    
Complicating  the  above  histories,  Mark  Jackson  has  argued  that  
Benzedrine  was  used  to  ‘enhance  mood  and  performance  and  to  maintain  
energy’;;  suggesting  that  wartime  flying  fatigue  was  multifaceted,  involving  
both  psychological  and  physiological  components.9  With  a  specific  focus  on  
the  records  of  the  FPRC  this  chapter  argues,  in  line  with  Jackson,  that  a  
complex,  and  contested,  psychophysiological  model  of  fatigue  emerged  in  the  
first  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  Here  I  argue  that  there  was  a  gradual  shift  
from  emotional  explanations  of  fatigue  in  the  interwar  period  and  early  years  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(2017)  1-­22,  available  at:  https://doi.org/10.1177/0968344516643348  [last  accessed  17  
September  2017];;  James  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  
Benzedrine  Sulphate:  An  Examination  of  Policy  and  Practice  during  the  Second  World  War’,  
Journal  of  Contemporary  History,  (2016)  1-­22,  available  at:  
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009416652717  [last  accessed  17  September  2017].  
9  Mark  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress:  Neuropsychiatric  Models  of  Resilience  
during  and  after  the  Second  World  War’  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  Stress  in  Post-­War  Britain,  
1945-­85,  (London:  Pickering  and  Chatto,  2015),  pp.  111-­130,  pp.  116-­117.  
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of  the  Second  World  War  towards  interest  in  the  physiology  of  fatigue  and  
‘mechanical  factors’  from  1942,  though  this  was  not  straightforward.10  Indeed,  
in  most  cases  fatigue  was  recognised  to  be  complex  and  multifaceted,  
bridging  the  mind-­body  binary  in  a  way  that  many  other  wartime  conditions  did  
not.  Finally,  I  argue  that  this  complex  understanding  of  flying  fatigue  as  both  
physical  and  mental  persisted  in  the  post-­war  years  in  civil  aviation  but  that  
another,  functional,  conceptualisation  of  flying  fatigue  –  as  accident  
proneness  –  came  to  dominate  regulatory  and  trade  union  discourses.    
  
Flying  Stress  in  Interwar  Britain  
Flying  fatigue  was  not  a  novel  concept  in  World  War  Two.  Researchers  first  
discussed  the  fatigue  of  military  pilots  in  the  interwar  period.  Fatigue,  interwar  
researchers  argued,  affected  pilot  performance  and  was,  as  such,  a  ‘highly  
important’  problem  that  required  investigation.  In  a  1935  address  to  the  United  
Services  section  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Medicine,  which  was  later  printed  in  
the  Journal  of  the  Royal  Army  Medical  Corps,  Air  Commodore  A.  V.  J.  
Richardson  explained  this  rationale:  
  
When  we  consider  that  the  fundamental  peculiarity  of  combatant  
service  in  the  air  lies  not  so  much  in  the  fact  that  the  air  is  not  the  
natural  element  of  man,  but  rather  in  the  fact  that  flying  demands  and  
encourages  a  degree  of  individualism  unknown  in  any  other  branch  of  
the  Services,  the  matter  of  fatigue  in  aircraft  crews  becomes  highly  
important.  This  is  especially  the  case  when  we  see  that  aircraft  of  today  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  Wellcome  Library  (hereafter  referred  to  as  WL)  PP/HEW/L.7/6:  Institute  of  Aviation  
Medicine  Report  615,  ‘British  Aviation  Medicine  During  the  Second  World  War,  Part  5:  
Fatigue,  Flying  Stress  and  Accidents’,  1982,  p.  2.  
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are  tending  more  and  more  to  strain  the  human  element  by  the  
increase  in  their  performance.11  
  
Given  the  independence  of  military  flight,  fatigue,  Richardson  argued,  had  a  
bearing  on  the  ‘continuance  of  air-­efficiency’  and  was,  for  this  reason,  under  
investigation  by  the  RAF.12  Fatigue,  Richardson  suggested,  resulted  from  a  
combination  of  physical,  physiological,  and  psychological  factors  including  
poor  aircraft  design,  cold  and  ‘oxygen  want’,  and  prolonged  ‘mental  stress’.13  
It  could  not,  however,  be  separated  from  the  ‘deeper  psychological  problems’  
that  affected  service  personnel.14  Richardson’s  discussion  of  fatigue  here  is  
representative  of  a  broader  contemporary  project  to  investigate  the  
relationship  between  fatigue,  stress,  and  psychological  disorders  in  aircrew.  
Indeed,  in  the  interwar  years  fatigue  was  considered  both  a  symptom  of  flying  
stress  and,  in  some  instances,  a  cause  of  psychological  disturbance.    
The  concept  of  flying  stress  appeared  for  the  first  time  in  the  writings  of  
British  military  physicians  in  1920.  As  Jackson  has  suggested,  like  its  
‘terrestrial  counterpart’  shell  shock,  flying  stress  was  thought  to  be  the  product  
of  mental  strain,  sleeplessness,  fatigue,  and  fear.15  Exhaustion  was  a  primary  
component  of  the  diagnosis  and,  as  such,  the  term  ‘flying  stress’  was  used  
interchangeably  with  terminology  that  foregrounded  fatigue,  such  as  ‘aviators’  
neurasthenia’  and  ‘flying  fatigue’.16  It  is  unclear  who  first  introduced  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  A.  V.  J.  Richardson,  ‘Efficiency  of  Personnel  in  the  Services’,  Journal  of  the  Royal  Army  
Medical  Corps,  66,  1  (1936)  14-­20,  p.  17.  
12  Ibid.  p.  17.  
13  Ibid.  p.  17;;  Ibid.  p.  18.  
14  Ibid.  p.  17.  
15  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress’,  p.  115.  
16  The  National  Archives  (hereafter  referred  to  as  TNA)  AIR  57/9:  Squadron  Leader  D.  D.  
Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  450:  A  Study  of  Some  Factors  in  the  Causation  of  Flying  Stress’,  June  
1942,  p.  1.  
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concept  of  flying  stress.  Some  historians  have  suggested  that  James  L.  Birley  
(1884-­1934),  the  Chief  Medical  Officer  for  the  RAF  first  theorised  the  
concept.17  A  number  of  near-­contemporary  sources  suggest,  however,  that  
Martin  Flack  (1882-­1931),  a  senior  RAF  researcher  who  became  Director  of  
Research  for  the  RAF  Medical  Service  after  the  First  World  War,  first  coined  
the  term.18    
Birley  and  Flack  had  very  different  explanations  of  how  flying  stress  
was  caused.  According  to  Flack,  the  breakdown  associated  with  flying  stress  
resulted  from  changes  to  the  pilot’s  respiratory  and  cardiovascular  systems.  
These  physiological  changes,  he  argued,  were  caused  by  the  environmental  
conditions  of  operational  flight,  the  most  important  of  which  was  altitude.19  
Changes  to  the  respiratory  system  as  the  result  of  flying  at  high  altitudes  
caused,  according  to  Flack,  deficient  oxygenation  (anoxia)  of  the  body  which,  
in  turn,  led  to  feelings  of  fatigue  and  mental  strain.20  As  Squadron  Leader  
Donald  Darnley  Reid  (1914-­1977),  a  Bomber  Command  Medical  Officer  in  the  
Second  World  War,  noted  in  1942,  Flack’s  explanation  of  flying  stress  was  
deemed  unsatisfactory  by  many  contemporary  researchers  and  medical  
officers.21    
Birley’s  concept  of  flying  stress,  which  foregrounded  emotions  and  
temperament,  was,  however,  widely  accepted.  Birley’s  model  of  flying  stress  
emphasised  situational  determinants  and  the  role  of  temperament  and  
emotional  reactivity  in  shaping  men’s  resilience  and  ability  to  fly  well  under  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress’.  
18  TNA  AIR  57/9:  Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  450’.  
19  TNA  AIR  57/8:  C.  P.  Symonds,  ‘FPRC  Report  412:  Memorandum  on  the  Use  and  Abuse  of  
the  Term  “Flying  Stress”’,  1941.  
20  TNA  AIR  57/9:  Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  450’.  
21  Ibid.  
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wartime  conditions.  Informed  by  the  works  of  Sigmund  Freud  (1856-­1939),  
William  H.  R.  Rivers  (1864-­1922),  and  Walter  Cannon,  Birley’s  theory  
emphasised  the  role  of  instinct,  the  interaction  between  environment  and  
individual  psychology,  and  the  physiology  of  emotions.22  According  to  Birley,  
in  many  ways  flying  stress  was  a  ‘perfectly  normal  reaction  to  a  very  abnormal  
environment’.23  Given  the  physical  and  psychological  strain  of  wartime  flying,  
some  level  of  stress,  he  argued,  was  to  be  expected  in  all  men  although  some  
individuals  may  be  more  constitutionally  susceptible  to  ‘mental  shock’  than  
others.24  Birley  concluded  that  the  RAF  should  only  recruit  men  who  were  
psychologically  suited  to  military  service,  and  should  –  once  men  were  
recruited  –  ensure  that  all  flyers  were  adequately  prepared  for  combat.25  
Birley’s  sentiment  was  not  shared  by  all,  but  his  recommendations  were  
broadly  instituted  by  the  RAF  throughout  the  1920s  and  early  1930s.    
Flack  and  Birley  died  in  1931  and  1934  respectively.  Their  deaths  
occasioned  a  shift  in  RAF  policy  with  regards  to  flying  stress,  and  military  
psychology  more  broadly.  Allan  D.  English  has  suggested  that  the  removal  of  
two  of  the  RAF’s  most  experienced  physicians  ‘created  a  void’,  which  a  
number  of  psychologists  and  neuropsychiatrists  filled.26  One  of  the  most  
influential  RAF  appointments  following  the  deaths  of  Birley  and  Flack,  was  
Frederic  Bartlett  (1886-­1969).  Chair  of  Experimental  Psychology  at  the  
University  of  Cambridge,  Bartlett’s  work  extended  Birley’s  theory  of  flying  
stress.  Giving  greater  weight  to  individual  temperament  than  Birley,  Bartlett  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress’.  
23  Ibid.  p.  115.  
24  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds,  ‘FPRC  Report  412’,  p.  1.  
25  Allan  D.  English,  ‘A  Predisposition  to  Cowardice?  Aviation  Psychology  and  the  Genesis  of  
“Lack  of  Moral  Fibre”’,  War  and  Society,  13,  1  (1995)  15-­34.  
26  Ibid.  p.  19.  
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argued  that  failure  to  adapt  to  military  life  was  caused  by  temperamental  
weakness.27  He  argued  that  ‘weaklings’  should  not  be  permitted  to  fly  in  the  
RAF  and  that  only  men  with  the  strength  of  will  to  resist  mental  breakdown  
should  be  recruited.28  According  to  Jackson,  this  position  dominated  Air  
Ministry  advice  to  medical  officers  responsible  for  the  health  and  fitness  of  
pilots  throughout  the  interwar  years.29  In  1939  Bartlett  was  appointed  as  a  
founding  member  of  the  FPRC.  Though  his  early  research  had  focused  on  
flying  stress,  Bartlett’s  research  for  the  FPRC  focused  mainly  on  fatigue  as  it  
related  to  performance.  
From  1939  two  other  researchers  –  Charles  Symonds  (1890-­1978)  and  
Denis  J.  Williams  –  became  the  RAF’s  foremost  advisors  on  flying  stress.  
Unlike  Bartlett,  Symonds  and  Williams  were  not  based  at  the  University  of  
Cambridge’s  Psychological  or  Physiological  Laboratories.  Differing  from  many  
of  their  colleagues  at  the  FPRC,  Symonds  and  Williams  had  military  
backgrounds.  Symonds  had  served  with  the  Royal  Flying  Corps  (RFC)  during  
the  1914-­1918  war  and  acted  as  a  consultant  neurologist  to  the  RAF  from  
1934.  He  was  then  commissioned  as  Group  Captain  on  11  September  1939,  
just  after  the  outbreak  of  war.30  Williams,  on  the  other  hand,  held  the  rank  of  
Squadron  Leader.  Symonds  and  Williams’  military  employment  history  
influenced  their  understanding  of  fatigue  and  flying  stress.  They  drew,  unlike  
many  of  their  colleagues  at  the  FPRC,  on  the  intellectual  traditions  
established  by  military  researchers  in  the  interwar  years  and  continued  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress’.  
28  Allan  D.  English,  Cream  of  the  Crop:  Canadian  Aircrew,  1939-­1945,  (London:  McGill-­
Queen’s  University  Press,  1996),  p.  67.  
29  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress’.  
30  Ibid.  
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propagate  an  understanding  of  fatigue  that  foregrounded  situational  
determinants  and  the  emotional  reactivity  of  personnel.  
  
Flying  Stress  and  Psychological  Disorder  
Flying  fatigue  became  an  increasingly  important  object  of  concern  for  the  
military  during  the  Second  World  War,  bringing  to  bear  new  priorities  and  
forms  of  assessment.  Though  researchers  remained  divided  over  the  causes  
and  effects  of  fatigue,  Symonds  and  Williams  confidently  situated  it  alongside  
other  forms  of  psychological  disorder.  Psychological  stress,  rather  than  
individual  temperament,  were  emphasised  here.  Influenced  by  the  reports  of  
Medical  Officers  and  Squadron  Leaders,  this  discourse  afforded  external  and  
environmental  factors  considerable  aetiological  importance,  and  thus  
regulatory  solutions  for  the  problem  of  fatigue  came  to  fix  on  living  and  
working  conditions.  These  interests,  however,  only  lasted  until  the  middle  of  
the  war,  when  new  requirements  reframed  fatigue  in  terms  of  wakefulness.    
The  FPRC,  formed  in  January  1939,  was  a  body  composed  of  military  
and  civilian  experts  whose  duty  was  to  investigate  and  advise  the  Air  Ministry  
on  matters  affecting  the  safety  and  efficiency  of  military  flight.  The  Committee  
was  composed  of  clinicians,  psychologists,  physiologists,  and  members  of  the  
RAF  including  General  Duties  Branch  officers  and  the  Director  General  of  the  
RAF  Medical  Services.  Between  1939  and  1945  the  Committee  produced  
over  600  reports  on  issues  relating  to  vision,  aircrew  selection,  the  impact  of  
age  on  flying  ability,  and  the  effects  of  fatigue  and  strain  on  flying  personnel.31    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  A.  D.  Harris  and  O.  L.  Zangwill,  ‘The  Writings  of  Sir  Frederic  Bartlett,  CBE,  FRS:  An  
Annotated  Handlist’,  British  Journal  of  Psychology,  64,  4  (1973)  493-­510;;  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/1  
Letter  to  Sir  Harold  Whittingham  from  Air  Commodore  Consultant  in  Neuro-­Psychiatry,  18  
December  1942.  
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In  April  1942  Symonds  and  Williams  published  a  report  on  
psychological  disorders  in  flying  personnel.32  The  report  reviewed  the  interwar  
literature  on  flying  stress  in  light  of  the  reports  of  psychological  disorder  
submitted  to  the  Air  Ministry  since  the  outbreak  of  war  in  1939  and  drew  on  
the  views  of  contemporary  Medical  Officers.  The  report  began  with  a  
discussion  of  nomenclature.  Referring  to  an  earlier  FPRC  report  by  Symonds  
on  the  uses  and  abuses  of  the  term  ‘flying  stress’,  the  report  outlined  the  
terms  used  by  contemporary  medical  officers  to  refer  to  psychological  
disorders  in  flying  personnel.33  According  to  Symonds,  RAF  medical  officers  
used  a  variety  of  terms  –  including  ‘flying  stress’,  ‘fatigue  syndrome’,  and  
‘acute  pilot’s  fatigue’  –  to  refer  to  mental  disorder.34  These  various  terms  were  
used,  according  to  Symonds,  to  suggest  the  existence  of  psychiatric  
disturbance  ‘without  introducing  the  term  neurosis’.  Though  medical  officers  
recognised  neurotic  symptoms  in  flyers  they  were  disinclined  to  use  familiar  
psychiatric  labels,  for  fear  of  stigmatising  men  who  had  contributed  to  the  war  
effort.  As  Symonds  and  Williams  described  in  the  report:  
  
The  tendency  to  invent  new  terms  for  neurosis  in  flying  personnel  is  
due  largely  to  the  desire,  especially  on  the  executive  side,  to  avoid  for  
the  man  who  has  often  achieved  much,  or  at  any  rate  has  done  his  
best,  any  appellation  which  would  class  him  as  ‘neurotic’.35  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  TNA  AIR  57/8:  C.  P.  Symonds  and  Denis  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(d):  Investigation  into  
Psychological  Disorders  in  Flying  Personnel:  Review  of  Reports  Submitted  to  the  Air  Ministry  
Since  Outbreak  of  the  War’,  April  1942.  
33  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds,  ‘FPRC  Report  412’.  
34  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(d)’,  p.  1.  
35  Ibid.  p.  1.  
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The  aforementioned  terms  were  used  in  the  stead  of  more  widely  recognised  
psychiatric  labels  –  such  as  neurasthenia  –  but  were,  as  Edgar  Jones  has  
suggested,  essentially  psychiatric  diagnoses.36  Such  terms  did  not  imply  
unwillingness  to  work  or  moral  deficiency,  as  in  the  contemporary  
classification  Lack  of  Moral  Fibre  (LMF),  and  as  such  attracted  popular  
sympathy  and  carried  an  entitlement  to  a  war  pension.37  The  report  argued  
that,  in  this  sense,  the  ambiguity  of  the  psychiatric  nomenclature  used  in  the  
RAF  was  favourable,  despite  the  ‘great  confusion’  this  sometimes  entailed.38  
The  report  concluded  that  psychological  disorders  in  airmen  had  both  
endogenous  and  exogenous  causes.  Symonds  and  Williams  suggested  that,  
after  predisposition,  fatigue  and  fear  constituted  the  two  most  potent  causes  
of  psychological  disorder.  Fatigue  was  caused,  they  argued,  by  a  number  of  
factors  including  inadequate  leave  and  recreation  facilities,  poor  living  
conditions,  inadequate  sleeping  and  sanitary  arrangements,  and  long  
operational  hours.  The  report  ended  with  a  number  of  recommendations  for  
the  reduction  of  psychological  disorders  in  airmen,  based  on  the  surveyed  
literature.  The  report  had  five  key  recommendations.  First,  that  an  operational  
limit  should  be  fixed  to  a  maximum  number  of  sorties  and  that  this  should  be  
known  to  flyers.  Second,  that  leave  should  be  known  and  fixed  beforehand.  
Three  conditions,  the  report  argued,  were  essential  in  planning  leave:  ‘that  the  
man  should  anticipate  his  leave  well  in  advance,  that  it  should  be  regular  and,  
that  it  should  be  brief’.39  Third,  the  report  argued  that  recreation  facilities  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  Edgar  Jones,  ‘“LMF”:  The  Use  of  Psychiatric  Stigma  in  the  Royal  Air  Force  during  the  
Second  World  War’,  Journal  of  Military  History,  70,  2  (2006)  439-­458.  
37  Ibid.  
38  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(d)’,  p.  2.  
39  Ibid.  p.  21.  
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should  be  available  at  every  unit,  and  that  the  Medical  Officer  should  use  
these  spaces  as  a  means  of  getting  to  know  flying  crews  personally.  Symonds  
and  Williams  maintained,  as  Birley  had,  that  it  was  the  Medical  Officer’s  duty  
to  recognise  aircrew  fatigue  and  to  prescribe  rest  prior  to  physical  or  
psychological  breakdown,  so  that  flyers  could  adequately  recover  and  be  
returned  to  duty  in  a  short  time.  Fourth,  the  report  argued  that  deep  shelters  
should  be  provided  for  sleeping  quarters  to  ensure  that  flyers  could  secure  
adequate  sleep  undisturbed  from  the  noise  of  active  combat.  Finally,  the  
report  recommended  that  aircrew  should  live  at  base  without  their  wives  and  
families.  As  Francis  has  noted,  in  many  cases  RAF  wives  lived  adjacent  to  the  
bases  on  which  their  husbands  were  stationed.  Francis  has  suggested  that  
wives  and  families  offered  flyers  emotional  support  that  was  otherwise  
unavailable.  They  offered,  he  has  argued,  a  ‘vital  antidote’  to  the  
dehumanising  consequences  of  military  discipline  and  the  violence  of  
combat.40  Symonds  and  Williams’s  April  1942  report,  however,  contended  
that  families  could  also  be  a  source  of  stress.  Living  with  or  in  proximity  to  
families,  the  report  concluded,  introduced  domestic  anxieties  and  lowered  
morale.41    
Following  the  publication  of  the  report  in  April  1942,  Symonds  and  
Williams  were  asked  to  undertake  further  research  on  the  effects  of  flying  
stress  and  fatigue  on  service  personnel.  Two  further  studies  were  
commissioned:  one  centred  on  Fighter  Command,  the  other  on  Bomber  
Command.  Both  investigations  were  directed  by  Harold  Whittingham  (1887-­
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  Francis,  The  Flyer,  p.  12.  
41  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(d)’.  
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1983),  the  RAF’s  Director  General  of  Medical  Services,  and  were  based  
entirely  on  interviews  with  Squadron  Commanders  and  Medical  Officers.  The  
investigators  visited  operational  stations  personally  and  conducted  interviews  
privately.  Interviewees  were  asked  two  broad  questions:  ‘What  are  the  things  
which  get  people  down?’  and  ‘How  do  you  tell  when  a  man  has  had  
enough?’42  The  final  reports,  both  published  in  August  1942,  contained  a  
number  of  verbatim  quotes  from  interviewees.    
The  reports  were  structured  in  two  parts.  The  first  part,  entitled  ‘The  
Effects  of  Flying  Stress’,  noted  the  signs  indicating  the  effects  of  stress,  the  
role  of  the  Medical  Officer  in  detecting  these  effects,  and  thoughts  on  the  
imposition  of  an  operational  limit  and  relief  employment.  According  to  
Symonds  and  Williams,  the  signs  indicating  the  effects  of  flying  stress  
included:  changes  in  appearance,  a  loss  of  keenness  for  flying  duties,  a  
‘falling  off  in  flying  performance  or  operational  efficiency’,  alcoholic  excess,  
and  fatigue.43  Echoing  the  conclusions  of  earlier  Air  Ministry  studies,  both  the  
Fighter  Command  and  Bomber  Command  reports  suggested  that  the  Medical  
Officer  should  play  a  key  role  in  the  detection  of  flying  stress.  As  one  General  
Duty  Officer  put  it,  Medical  Officers  occupied  a  unique  social  position  within  
the  station  that  should  be  utilised  to  its  fullest  advantage:  
  
The  Medical  Officer  has  the  advantage  that  he  can  mix  unofficially  with  
the  pilots  and  can  find  out  what  personal  troubles  they  have  …  The  
Medical  Officer  becomes  of  great  value  therefore  in  giving  all  sorts  of  
information  to  the  Squadron  Commander  –  exactly  the  things  we  want  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  TNA  AIR  57/8:  C.  P.  Symonds  and  Denis  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(e):  Investigation  of  
Psychological  Disorders  in  Flying  Personnel:  Personal  Investigation  in  Fighter  Command’,  
August  1942,  p.  2.  
43  Ibid.  p.  5.  
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to  know.  They  would  not  tell  us  these  things  because  they  are  afraid  
they  might  be  put  off  an  operation.44  
  
Medical  Officers,  the  reports  argued,  should  informally  socialise  with  flyers  as  
a  means  of  identifying  men  who  were  temperamentally  unfit  for  service  or  who  
were  psychologically  unstable.  
The  reports  also  detailed  the  opinions  of  interviewees  on  the  measures  
currently  in  place  to  relieve  excessive  stress  and  fatigue:  namely  the  
existence  of  an  operational  limit  and  the  arrangement  of  relief  employment.  
Almost  all  of  the  General  Duty  and  Medical  Officers  interviewed  were  in  favour  
of  a  limit  of  some  sort,  though  few  expressed  approval  of  the  200-­hour  limit  
that  had  been  in  place  since  1940.45  Some  interviewees  suggested  that  the  
limit  should  be  more  flexible,  to  take  account  of  individual  capacity  for  strain.  
The  imposition  of  an  arbitrary  scheme  was,  the  authors  argued,  wasteful  in  
two  respects:    
  
Men  with  high  endurance  are  taken  off  when  they  are  of  great  and  
increasing  value;;  and  men  of  low  endurance  have  to  go  beyond  their  
breaking  point  so  that  there  is  little  or  no  chance  of  their  returning  for  a  
second  tour.46    
  
Other  interviewees  argued  that  an  arbitrary  limit  was  preferable,  as  it  
alleviated  responsibility  from  Squadron  Commanders.  As  Symonds  and  
Williams  noted  in  the  report  produced  on  Bomber  Command:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Ibid.  p.  8.  
45  John  Terraine,  The  Right  of  the  Line:  The  Role  of  the  RAF  in  World  War  Two,  (Barnsley:  
Pen  and  Sword  Military,  2010).  
46  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(e)’,  p.  10.  
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Not  only  does  it  remove  great  responsibility  from  his  [the  Squadron  
Commander’s]  shoulders,  but  it  helps  in  handling  those  who  are  sub-­
standard.  It  also  provides  a  measure  of  safety,  for  some  Commanders  
find  it  impossible  to  assess  a  man’s  capacity,  and  some  men  do  not  
show  that  they  have  passed  their  peak  until  they  have  deteriorated  
greatly.47  
  
For  these  reasons,  Symonds  and  Williams  concluded,  an  arbitrary  limit  on  
operational  hours  was  ultimately  necessary  in  some  form.  The  Air  Ministry  
formalised  a  new  system  of  rules  relating  to  the  operational  limit  the  following  
year.  In  a  letter  of  8  May  1943,  the  Air  Ministry  formally  laid  this  out:  
  
Bomber  Command:  first  tour,  thirty  sorties;;  second  tour,  not  more  than  
twenty  sorties.  
Pathfinder  Force:  a  single  continuous  tour  of  45  sorties.  
Fighter  Command:    
Day  Fighters:  normal  maximum  200  hours.    
Night  Fighters:  100  hours  or  maximum  of  eighteen  months.  
Army  Cooperation  Command:  200  hours.  
Coastal  Command:    
Flying  boats  and  four-­engined  land-­plane  crews:  800  hours.    
Twin-­engined  general  reconnaissance  squadrons  (including  
meteorological  squadrons  and  flights):  500  hours.    
Photographic  Reconnaissance  squadrons:  300  hours.    
Fighter,  torpedo  and  other  squadrons  employed  offensively:  200  
hours.48  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  TNA  AIR  57/8:  C.  P.  Symonds  and  Denis  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(f):  Investigation  of  
Psychological  Disorders  in  Flying  Personnel:  Personal  Investigation  in  Bomber  Command’,  
August  1942.  
48  Terraine,  The  Right  of  the  Line,  p.  527.  
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Though  opinion  diverged  about  the  nature  of  an  operational  limit  for  flyers,  
most  interviewees  were  in  agreement  about  the  limited  benefits  of  relief  
employment.  Most  of  the  Medical  Officers  and  Squadron  Commanders  
interviewed  for  the  reports  criticised  the  present  arrangement  of  posting  flyers  
at  Operational  Training  Units  (OTU)  for  six-­month  periods  to  instruct  new  
recruits.  While  some  argued  that  placement  outside  the  operational  setting  for  
such  long  periods  was  detrimental  to  the  ‘offensive  spirit’  of  flyers,  the  most  
common  criticism  of  the  policy  related  to  fatigue  and  overwork.49  Interviewees  
drawn  from  both  Fighter  and  Bomber  Command  argued  that,  though  
placement  at  an  OTU  was  generally  seen  as  a  ‘rest’  or  ‘relief’  from  operational  
duties,  this  was  inaccurate.50  Though  relief  employment  offered  some  respite  
from  ‘nervous  tension’,  many  interviewees  argued  that  the  amount  of  work  
expected  of  personnel  at  OTUs  was  greater  than  in  operational  situations,  
thus  inducing  physical  fatigue.51  One  Squadron  Commander,  drawing  on  his  
own  experience  of  relief  employment,  said  that  for  men  who  were  
temperamentally  unsuited  to  teaching,  work  at  an  OTU  could  be  both  mentally  
and  physically  draining:  ‘I  went  to  an  OTU  and  was  dead  tired  in  no  time’.52    
The  second  part  of  the  reports  presented  interviewees  thoughts  on  ‘the  
load’.  In  line  with  interwar  stress  theorists,  such  as  Cannon  and  Crile,  for  
Symonds  and  Williams  ‘the  load’  referred  to  the  ‘external  pressures’  to  which  
pilots  were  subjected.53  For  Symonds  and  Williams,  flying  stress  was  the  
result  of  the  ‘total  sum  of  all  those  factors  which  together  make  up  the  load  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(e)’,  p.  10.  
50  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(f)’,  p.  12.  
51  Ibid.  p.  12.  
52  Ibid.  p.  12.  
53  Mark  Jackson,  Age  of  Stress:  Science  and  the  Search  for  Stability,  (Oxford:  Oxford  
University  Press,  2013),  p.  126.  
   97  
mental  and  physical  strain  imposed  upon  a  man  by  flying  under  war  
conditions’.54  When  the  load  was  ‘too  heavy  for  a  man  to  carry’,  fatigue  
resulted.55  Though  Nick  Chapman  has  suggested  that  the  term  ‘the  load’  was  
mostly  used  to  refer  to  Bomber  Command  in  other  wartime  psychological  
literature,  Symonds  and  Williams  used  the  term  in  both  reports.56  Reflecting  
interwar  theories  of  flying  stress,  a  number  of  interviewees  argued  that  fatigue  
significantly  added  to  the  stress  of  operations.  Some  suggested  that  fatigue  
was  largely  a  result  of  physical  discomfort,  ‘caused  by  unsuitable  seats,  [and]  
poorly  fitting  goggles  or  masks’.57  In  the  report  published  on  Fighter  
Command,  two  Squadron  Commanders  particularly  emphasised  the  design-­
related  causes  of  fatigue,  as  Symonds  and  Williams  noted:  
  
Both  mentioned  twisting  about  in  the  cockpit  to  look  round  as  a  cause  
of  physical  strain.  It  is  to  be  remarked,  however,  that  one  was  older  
than  the  average  pilot  and  had  suffered  a  physical  injury  which  would  
certainly  add  to  the  strain,  and  the  other  was  a  fat  type  who  when  
encumbered  with  flying  kit  might  well  find  it  hard  work  to  perform  this  
manoeuvre.58  
  
Other  interviewees  suggested  that  domestic  stress  contributed  to  fatigue.  In  
line  with  their  previous  report,  Symonds  and  Williams  argued  that  domestic  
factors  including  financial  worries,  precipitated  fatigue:  ‘The  wives  worry  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(e)’,  p.  1.  
55  Ibid.  p.  1.  
56  Nick  Chapman,  ‘Bearing  the  Load:  A  Fresh  Approach  to  Bomber  Command’,  in  Claus-­
Christian  W.  Szejnmann  (ed.)  Rethinking  History,  Dictatorship  and  War:  New  Approaches  and  
Interpretations,  (London:  Continuum,  2009),  pp.161-­174.  
57  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(f)’,  p.  19.  
58  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(e)’,  p.  14.  
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transfer  their  worry  to  the  husbands  during  leave  or  in  letters’.59  Others  
suggested  that  good  relations  between  crewmembers  and  between  pilots  and  
managers  were  important  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue.  Good  leadership  was  
thought  to  be  vital  in  reducing  ‘the  load’.  Squadron  leaders  should,  
interviewees  suggested,  praise  both  successes  as  well  as  ‘brave  failures’  in  
an  attempt  to  maintain  the  morale  of  crews.60  Confidence  in  other  
crewmembers  was  also  important  in  the  avoidance  of  fatigue,  particularly  in  
Bomber  Command.  As  Symonds  and  Williams  put  it:  ‘If  a  man  is  weak  but  is  
an  accepted  member  of  the  crew  the  rest  will  nurse  him  along’.61    
Most  interviewees,  however,  suggested  that  intensive  working  
practices  were  the  primary  cause  of  fatigue.62  As  one  Medical  Officer  put  it,  
the  spacing  of  operational  effort  was  the  central  issue.  Reflecting  theories  
about  the  relationship  between  rhythm,  energy  expenditure,  and  fatigue,  
propagated  by  the  Industrial  Fatigue  Research  Board  (IFRB)  in  the  interwar  
period,  one  Medical  Officer  argued:  
  
Fatigue  is  an  important  adverse  factor  and  is  largely  physical.  This  is  
not  due  to  the  length  of  the  trips,  but  to  the  uneven  rhythm  of  sleep  and  
feeding  during  operational  periods.63  
  
In  ordinary  circumstances  the  weather  spaced  operational  effort  so  that  
fatigue  did  not  arise,  but  in  instances  where  effort  was  concentrated  fatigue  
was  likely  to  develop  and  adversely  impact  operational  effectiveness.  In  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(f)’,  p.  31.  
60  Ibid.  p.  26.  
61  Ibid.  p.  23.  
62  Ibid.  p.  19.  
63  Ibid.  p.  19.  
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similar  vein,  another  interviewee  argued  that  missions  should  be  spread  
according  to  difficulty:  
  
It  is  of  great  psychological  importance  that  a  crew  who  have  had  a  
series  of  attacks  on  heavily  defended  targets  should  have  a  chance  or  
two  over  easy  targets  before  going  back  to  the  stiffer  job.64  
  
If  bomber  squadrons  were  required  to  partake  in  too  many  difficult  missions  in  
quick  succession  they  were,  another  argued,  likely  to  ‘get  tired’  and  not  ‘find  
the  target’.65  The  benefits  of  spacing  operational  effort  were,  Symonds  and  
Williams  thus  concluded,  both  psychological  and  physiological.  
Echoing  the  recommendations  of  the  Director  General  of  Medical  
Services  in  the  previous  report  published  in  April  1942,  Symonds  and  Williams  
argued  that  the  most  important  factors  affecting  a  man’s  ability  to  manage  
stress  and  fatigue  were  extrinsic.  Though  the  constitution  of  the  man  was  
deemed  important,  external  factors  such  as  recreation  and  leave  were  most  
heavily  emphasised  by  interviewees.  Of  the  eighty-­two  Squadron  
Commanders  and  Medical  Officers  interviewed  from  Fighter  Command,  over  
half  emphasised  the  importance  of  recreation  and  time  off.  A  number  of  
interviewees  argued  that  days  off  were  best  spent  away  from  base.  One  
Squadron  Commander  revealed  that  he  sent  flyers  to  a  country  house  or  hotel  
over  twenty  miles  away  so  that  they  would  ‘feel  freer  and  relax  better’.66  
Several  interviewees  suggested  that  release  days  of  this  kind  were  only  useful  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Ibid.  p.  25.  
65  Ibid.  p.  25.  
66  TNA  AIR  57/8:  Symonds  and  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(e)’,  p.  20.  
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if  they  were  fixed  in  advance,  in  the  main  so  men  could  ‘indulge  in  an  
alcoholic  party  without  restraint’.67  As  one  interviewee  put  it:  
  
A  release  day  to  be  any  good  must  be  fixed  beforehand.  It  enables  a  
man  to  have  a  party  the  night  before  and  know  he  won’t  be  flying.  The  
worst  thing  in  the  world  is  to  be  told  you  are  going  to  have  a  day  off  and  
then  have  to  go  flying  with  a  hang-­over.68  
  
Interviewees  argued  that  excessive  consumption  of  alcohol  as  a  means  of  
relaxation,  when  combined  with  ‘enough  leave’,  allowed  men  to  ‘go  on  
alright’.69  For  this  reason  senior  officers  rarely  sought  to  ‘curtail  heavy  
drinking’  among  crews.  Generally,  they  were  willing  to  ‘indulge  their  aircrew’,  
providing  that  combat  capability  was  not  compromised.70  It  was,  as  Francis  
has  shown,  recognised  that  the  ability  to  seek  diversion  was  crucial  to  flyers’  
ability  to  cope  with  what  otherwise  would  be  unendurable  levels  of  stress.71  
The  reports  produced  by  Symonds  and  Williams  in  August  1942  
marked  the  end  of  FPRC  research  into  flying  stress.  RAF  policy,  and  
consequently  FPRC  research,  shifted  rapidly  in  this  period.72  Interwar  theories  
of  flying  stress  that  recognised  the  complex  interplay  between  fatigue,  fear,  
and  morale  were  replaced  by  a  discourse  that  focused  to  a  greater  degree  
than  ever  before  on  flying  efficiency.  Faced  with  a  manpower  crisis  the  RAF  
became  increasingly  fixated  on  performance.  In  this  context,  fatigue  was  
reconceptualised  in  functional  terms.  In  some  circles  it  became  framed  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  Ibid.  p.  20.  
68  Ibid.  p.  20.  
69  Ibid.  p.  21.  
70  Francis,  The  Flyer,  p.  122.  
71  Ibid.  
72  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’.  
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specifically  in  relation  to  performance  decrement,  while  in  others  research  
centred  on  the  problem  of  wakefulness.      
  
  
Fatigue  and  Performance  Decrement    
Rationalisations  of  medical  procedures  and  practices  to  enable  military  
efficiency  can  be  traced  at  least  as  far  back  as  the  Napoleonic  Wars,  but  it  
was  above  all  during  the  First  World  War  that  these  processes  became  
manifest.  Out  of  mounting  concerns  with  efficiency  and  wastage,  the  medical  
repair  of  soldiers  came  to  occupy  a  central  position  in  military  strategy.73  The  
physical  and  mental  health  of  troops  was  seen  as  essential  to  the  prosecution  
of  a  war  which,  despite  ‘many  technological  advances’,  relied  heavily  on  
manpower.74  As  manpower  became  increasingly  scarce  in  the  latter  years  of  
the  war,  the  British  military  looked  to  maximise  the  efficiency  of  personnel  in  a  
number  of  ways.75  Although  some  attention  was  paid  to  general  factors  
affecting  morale,  such  as  diet  and  living  conditions,  greatest  emphasis  was  
placed  on  the  curative,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  preventative,  power  of  
medicine.  Mark  Harrison  has  suggested  that  medicine  contributed  to  
manpower  economy  in  a  number  of  ways.  Sanitary  arrangements,  personal  
cleanliness,  and  inoculation  against  diseases  prevented  the  loss  of  thousands  
of  men  through  sickness.  Indeed,  the  1914–18  war  was  the  first  conflict  in  
which  deaths  from  battle  injuries  exceeded  those  from  disease.  Improved  
curative  and  rehabilitation  facilities  similarly  returned  many  injured  men  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73  Roger  Cooter,  ‘Medicine  and  Modernity’,  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  
the  History  of  Medicine,  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2011),  pp.  100-­116.  
74  Mark  Harrison,  The  Medical  War:  British  Military  Medicine  in  the  First  World  War,  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2010),  p.  2.  
75  Ibid.  
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duty.76  Deemed  crucial  to  the  military’s  ‘manpower  problem’,  by  the  close  of  
the  war  in  1918  medicine  had  become,  as  Roger  Cooter  has  described,  
fundamental  to  military  efficiency  and  strategy.77  
Military  interest  in  manpower  economy  and  efficiency  became  even  
more  pressing  during  the  Second  World  War.  According  to  Alan  Derickson,  
the  1939-­1945  war  marked  a  ‘decisive  moment’  in  modern  warfare.78  
Although  some  prior  conflicts,  including  the  First  World  War,  had  required  
combatants  to  maintain  efficiency  and  alertness  for  extended  periods,  World  
War  Two  marked  a  trend  toward  night  warfare,  extended  engagement,  and  
restless  movement.  Beyond  strategic  and  tactical  calculations,  technological  
advances  made  in  the  interwar  years  promoted  exhausting  battles  and  made  
human  endurance  a  major  operational  constraint.  Aircraft,  ships,  and  other  
types  of  mechanised  vehicles  could  operate  for  lengthier  periods  than  was  
possible  in  prior  wars,  and  the  invention  of  radar  and  other  imaging  and  
communications  technologies  facilitated  night-­time  operations.79  During  the  
1939-­1945  war  aerial  bombing  raids  routinely  lasted  up  to  eighteen  hours;;  
naval  vessels  often  commenced  amphibious  assaults  in  the  predawn  hours;;  
and  protracted  tank  battles  were  undertaken.  World  War  Two  was,  then,  the  
first  ‘around-­the-­clock’  war  in  which  fighting  men  and  women  were  expected  
to  maintain  alertness  and  efficiency  for  extended  periods  without  rest.80  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  Ibid.  
77  Cooter,  ‘Medicine  and  Modernity’,  p.  108.  
78  Alan  Derickson,  ‘“No  Such  Thing  as  a  Night’s  Sleep”:  The  Embattled  Sleep  of  American  
Fighting  Men  from  World  War  II  to  the  Present’,  Journal  of  Social  History,  47,  1  (2013)  1-­26,  
p.  2.  
79  Ibid.  
80  Ibid.  p.  2.  
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Following  the  Battle  of  Britain  in  October  1940  –  the  first  major  
campaign  to  be  fought  entirely  by  air  forces  –  increasing  attention  was  paid  to  
the  effects  of  pilot  fatigue  by  military  researchers.  This  was  increasingly  so  
from  1942,  as  senior  RAF  commanders  became  seriously  concerned  with  
manpower  economy.  According  to  Pugh  a  number  of  hard  campaigns  had  
been  fought  in  1942.  These  campaigns  saw  heavy  losses  and  widespread  
failure  to  hit  targets,  and  the  close  spacing  of  missions  placed  a  significant  
burden  on  squadrons.  Moreover,  from  April  1942  bomber  pilots  generally  flew  
alone,  following  a  decision  to  abandon  the  inclusion  of  second  pilots  in  heavy  
bombers  as  a  result  of  the  strain  on  the  RAF’s  training  establishment.  As  
such,  from  April  bomber  pilots  were  generally  without  respite  during  
operations.    
Under  significant  strain  the  RAF  was  compelled  to  make  the  most  of  its  
human  resources,  and  in  this  context  the  alleviation  of  physiological  fatigue  
was  invaluable.81  As  Bartlett  noted  in  August  1942,  fatigue  was  a  concern  for  
the  RAF  because  operational  flight  required  constant  vigilance:  
  
He  [the  pilot]  must  remain  mentally  alert  because  the  signals  for  every  
movement  he  makes  come  from  changes  in  the  instrument  panel  or  in  
the  outside  world  which  have  to  be  noticed  and  assessed  as  soon  as  
they  occur.  He  must  also  keep  physically  alert  …  because  all  these  
signals  must  be  met  with  smoothly  executed,  accurately  timed,  and  co-­
ordinated  bodily  movements.82    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’  
82  TNA  AIR  57/9:  F.  C.  Bartlett,  ‘FPRC  Report  488:  Fatigue  in  the  Air  Pilot’,  August  1942.  
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Fatigue  –  with  its  implications  for  pilot  alertness  and  bodily  coordination  –  
was,  thus,  considered  to  be  a  potential  problem  and,  as  such,  was  
increasingly  researched  by  the  FPRC  as  an  issue  distinctive  from  flying  
stress.    
Between  April  and  December  1942,  a  number  of  reports  were  
produced  examining  the  relationship  between  fatigue,  alertness,  and  pilot  
performance.  Marking  a  break  with  previous  military  fatigue  research,  which  
had  relied  largely  on  expert  testimony,  a  number  of  the  studies  carried  out  in  
1942  drew  on  experimental  evidence,  as  in  the  science  of  work  tradition.  This  
is  likely  at  least  in  part  because  a  number  of  FPRC  researchers,  including  
Bartlett,  had  been  involved  in  experiments  of  this  kind  in  the  interwar  years.  
Indeed,  a  number  of  the  researchers  seconded  to  the  FPRC  during  the  1939-­
1945  war  had  previously  investigated  industrial  fatigue  under  the  direction  of  
the  IFRB  or  the  National  Institute  of  Industrial  Psychology  (NIIP).  Even  in  
instances  when  researchers  had  not  formally  served  on  industrial  fatigue  
boards,  they  were  likely  familiar  with  the  research  such  committees  produced  
due,  in  part,  to  the  wide  dissemination  of  IFRB  and  NIIP  research  papers  
within  academic  circles.  The  location  of  research  studies  was  also  a  factor  
here.  As  noted  in  the  introduction  to  this  thesis,  much  of  the  research  
undertaken  for  the  IFRB  and  NIIP  was  carried  out  at  the  University  of  
Cambridge’s  Psychological  and  Physiological  Laboratories.  Almost  all  the  
experiments  undertaken  on  behalf  of  the  FPRC  were  also  carried  out  in  these  
laboratories  and  it  is  likely  that  FPRC  researchers  located  here  were  familiar  
with  the  work  of  their  colleagues.  
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The  FPRC  studies  carried  out  by  Bartlett  and  others  in  1942  sought  to  
quantify  the  physiological  state  of  pilots  by  technological  means  beyond  the  
laboratory.  Much  like  the  physiological  research  carried  out  at  high  altitudes  in  
the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries,  these  studies  rejected  
straightforward  laboratory  investigations  of  fatigue.  Vanessa  Heggie  has  
noted  in  the  case  of  Everest  that  projects  of  this  kind  decentred  the  laboratory  
as  a  site  of  knowledge  production.83  Unlike  high  altitude  experiments,  though,  
for  the  most  part  FPRC  researchers  rejected  the  ‘natural  laboratory’:  
operational  aircraft.84    
Simulator  studies  were  instead  prioritised  for  flying  fatigue  research.85  
Unlike  operational  flight,  simulators  allowed  for  ready  quantification.  The  
Cambridge  Cockpit,  designed  by  Kenneth  Craik  (1914-­1945)  of  the  University  
of  Cambridge  Psychology  Laboratory,  recorded,  for  example,  the  movement  
of  controls  for  analysis  after  the  fact.86  The  object,  according  to  Craik,  was  to  
‘simulate  the  behaviour  of  standard  blind-­flying  instruments  and  the  
movements  of  controls  required  to  carry  out  manoeuvres  in  the  air,  and  to  
record  the  subject’s  response  in  detail’.87  The  movement  of  the  instruments  
was  recorded  graphically.  As  Craik  noted  in  the  first  FPRC  report  produced  on  
the  apparatus,  the  physical  record  of  pilot  performance  consisted  of  ‘four  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83  Vanessa  Heggie,  ‘Experimental  Physiology,  Everest  and  Oxygen:  From  the  Ghastly  
Kitchens  to  the  Gasping  Lung’,  British  Journal  for  the  History  of  Science,  46,  1  (2013)  123-­
147.  
84  Ibid.  p.  125;;  an  exception  here  is  Ronald  Winfield,  who  accompanied  Coastal  and  Bomber  
Command  crews  on  sorties  to  observe  first-­hand  the  effects  of  Benzedrine  on  the  onset  of  
fatigue.  Winfield’s  studies  are  discussed  later  in  this  chapter.  
85  TNA  AIR  57/9:  D.  Russell  Davis,  ‘FPRC  Report  486:  Experiments  on  Mental  Fatigue  in  the  
Silloth  Trainer’,  August  1942;;  TNA  AIR  57/9:  Bartlett,  ‘FPRC  Report  488’;;  TNA  AIR  57/10:  
The  Cambridge  Psychological  Laboratory  RAF  Research  Group,  ‘FPRC  Report  529(f):  A  First  
Report  on  the  Harrogate  Investigation’,  November  1944;;  TNA  AIR  57/10:  D.  Russell  Davis,  
‘FPRC  Report  530:  Behaviour  of  Neurotic  Subjects  in  the  Cambridge  Cockpit’,  May  1943.  
86  TNA  AIR  57/2,  K.  J.  W.  Craik,  ‘FPRC  Report  119:  Fatigue  Apparatus’,  March  1940.  
87  TNA  AIR  57/2,  Craik,  ‘FPRC  Report  119’,  p.  1.  
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pencil  lines  and  a  central  datum  line  on  paper  moving  at  four  feet  three  inches  
per  hour’.88  Though  simple,  this  provided,  as  D.  Russell  Davis,  of  the  
Psychology  Laboratory  at  the  University  of  Cambridge,  noted,  a  measure  of  
flying  fatigue  that  –  for  the  first  time  –  ‘could  readily  be  scored’.89    
As  Bartlett  described  in  an  obituary  notice  preceding  a  posthumous  
collection  of  Craik’s  essays,  this  apparatus  revolutionised  the  study  of  mental  
and  physical  fatigue  in  aviation.  It  moved,  for  the  first  time,  beyond  the  simple  
laboratory  and  factory  studies  of  fatigue  privileged  by  industrial  fatigue  
research  committees  in  the  interwar  years:  
  
For  some  time  I  had  been  trying  to  think  how  the  conventional  
laboratory  procedure  for  the  study  of  fatigue  might  be  supplemented  in  
certain  ways,  perhaps  improved.  The  common  methods,  based  upon  
an  investigation  of  simple  and  relatively  isolated  muscular  and  mental  
processes,  seemed  to  me  so  devised  that  practically  only  three  types  
of  result  could  be  recorded  accurately:  the  amount  of  deterioration  of  
work,  checks  and  spurts  in  work,  and  the  final  collapse  of  work.  I  
thought  something  was  needed  which  would  show  clearly  and  exactly  
how  skill,  long  continued,  may  change  and  perhaps  disintegrate.90  
  
Bartlett  asked  Craik  to  design  an  ‘experimental  cockpit’  that  could  accurately  
record  these  changes  and  he  ‘jumped  at  the  idea’.91  By  early  1940  the  
apparatus  was  complete  and  FPRC  researchers  began  using  it  in  studies  of  
fatigue  and  neuropsychiatric  resilience.  The  Cambridge  Cockpit,  which  Craik  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
88  Ibid.  p.  4.  
89  D.  Russell  Davis,  ‘The  Disorganization  of  Behaviour  in  Fatigue’,  Journal  of  Neurology,  
Neurosurgery  and  Psychiatry,  9,  1  (1946)  23-­29,  p.  23.  
90  Frederic  Bartlett,  ‘Obituary  Notice’,  in  Kenneth  J.  W.  Craik,  The  Nature  of  Psychology:  A  
Selection  of  Papers,  Essays  and  Other  Writings  by  the  Late  Kenneth  J.  W.  Craik,  
(Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1966),  p.  xvi.  
91  Ibid.  p.  xvi.  
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originally  termed  the  ‘Fatigue  Apparatus’,  made  it  possible,  as  Bartlett  
described  in  1966,  to  ‘submit  highly  complex  bodily  and  mental  processes  to  
exact  and  illuminating  measurement’.92    
The  FPRC  reports  produced  using  the  Cambridge  Cockpit  and  other  
similar  apparatus  suggested  that  fatigue  affected  a  pilot’s  ability  to  perform  in  
a  number  of  ways.  A  1940  report  published  by  G.  C.  Drew  suggested  that,  
when  fatigued,  pilots  lowered  their  standards:  
  
Subjects  set  themselves  a  progressively  easier  task  as  they  get  tired;;  
they  are  satisfied  with  wider  and  wider  approximations  to  the  true  
position  of  the  needles.  When  they  are  fresh,  the  side-­slip  needle  is  
regarded  as  being  satisfactorily  central  if  it  fluctuates  within  two  to  three  
degrees  each  side  of  the  vertical.  As  fatigue  develops  …  the  ‘correct  
band’  of  the  instrument  is  unconsciously  widened  from  two  or  three  
degrees  each  side  of  the  vertical  to  five  degrees,  and  then  ten  degrees,  
until  ultimately,  when  the  subjects  are  really  fatigued,  the  needle  is  
allowed  to  swing  from  side  to  side  and  is  regarded  as  being  perfectly  
satisfactory.93  
  
In  addition  to  setting  themselves  ‘progressively  easier’  tasks,  tired  pilots  also,  
according  to  Drew,  increasingly  split  the  task  of  flying  into  its  ‘component  
parts’  as  a  means  of  simplifying  the  process:  
  
The  fatigued  pilot  will  not  look  at  his  panel  as  a  whole.  He  will  instead  
make  whichever  of  the  conventional  movements  to  correct  that  kind  of  
situation  which  first  occurs  to  him.94  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92  Ibid.  p.  xvii.  
93  TNA  AIR57/3:  G.  C.  Drew,  ‘FPRC  Report  227:  An  Experimental  Study  of  Mental  Fatigue’,  
December  1940,  p.  11.  
94  Ibid.  p.  11;;  Ibid.  p.  14.  
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Later  FPRC  researchers  noted  that,  when  fatigued,  accuracy  decreased  and  
pilots  were  likely  to  experience  behavioural  changes.  They  were,  for  example,  
increasingly  likely  to  show  signs  of  irritation.  In  a  report  published  in  April  1942  
Davis  summarised  the  behavioural  changes  attributable  to  fatigue  as  such:  
  
The  first  sign  to  appear  was  generally  …  an  awareness  of  increasing  
difficulty  in  controlling  the  trainer,  and  this  was  projected  into  the  
machine  and  was  in  four  subjects  accompanied  by  irritability.  There  
were  some  examples  of  forgetfulness  of  things  that  had  to  be  done  
occasionally.  These  changes  are  attributed  mainly  to  an  inability  in  the  
fatigued  state  to  attend  to  all  the  various  aspects  of  the  task  and  to  
concentrate  upon  one  aspect,  upon  which  difficulty  is  temporarily  
projected.95  
  
At  the  most  basic  level,  Davis  argued  in  an  article  published  in  the  Journal  of  
Neurology,  Neurosurgery,  and  Psychiatry  in  1946,  fatigue  resulted  in  a  
‘disorganization  of  skilled  activities’.96  
The  investigations  undertaken  using  the  Cambridge  Cockpit  and  other  
simulators  warned,  particularly,  of  a  phenomenon  known  as  ‘end  deterioration’  
in  which  pilots  made  an  increasing  number  of  errors  towards  the  end  of  a  
flight.  As  Bartlett  noted  in  a  report  published  in  August  1942:    
  
When  a  tired  man  knows  he  is  nearing  home  there  is  an  almost  
irresistible  tendency  to  relax.  The  crisis  is  past,  the  dangerous  period  
apparently  over,  and  unless  he  takes  special  care,  he  will  go  slack.97    
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95  TNA  AIR  57/9:  Davis,  ‘FPRC  Report  486’.  
96  Davis,  ‘The  Disorganization  of  Behaviour  in  Fatigue’,  p.  23.  
97  TNA  AIR  57/9:  Bartlett,  ‘FPRC  Report  488’,  p.  5.  
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The  apparent  effect  of  end  deterioration  was,  in  some  cases,  ‘enormous’.98  
Drew  estimated  in  1940  that,  for  example,  the  phenomenon  caused  between  
150-­200%  deterioration  in  timing.  End  deterioration  was  a  particular  concern  
for  flyers  in  Bomber  Command,  who  were  at  risk  of  being  shot  down  over  
Axis-­held  territories  following  bombing  operations.    
In  April  1942  Bartlett,  in  a  seminal  study  of  flying  accidents,  argued  that  
human  error  was  the  cause  of  most  air  crashes.  He  claimed  that:  
  
Without  exception  every  serious  and  prolonged  investigation  of  flying  
accidents  that  has  ever  been  made  has  come  to  the  conclusion  that  a  
very  large  number  of  such  accidents  are  due  to  mistakes  made  by  the  
pilot  or  by  some  other  member  of  an  air-­crew.99    
  
It  seemed  likely,  he  argued,  that  around  70%  of  air  accidents  in  wartime  were  
attributable  to  human  error.  One  of  the  major  causes  of  human  error,  
according  to  Bartlett,  was  skill  fatigue.  Reid  echoed  Bartlett’s  sentiments  in  a  
report  published  in  September  1942.100  According  to  Reid,  fatigue  was  one  of  
many  causes  of  ‘accident  proneness’.101  This,  he  argued,  was  a  major  
concern  as  failure  to  correctly  respond  to  mid-­air  emergencies  could  have  
‘fatal  results  in  aerial  warfare’.102  As  an  RAF  Institute  of  Aviation  Medicine  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98  TNA  AIR57/3:  Drew,  ‘FPRC  Report  227’,  p.  10.  
99  TNA  AIR  57/9:  F.  C.  Bartlett,  ‘FPRC  Report  447:  Some  Notes  on  the  Investigation  of  Flying  
Accidents’,  April  1942,  p.  1  
100  G.  Rose,  ‘Biography:  Professor  D.  D.  Reid’,  Journal  of  Epidemiology  and  Community  
Health,  32,  4  (1978)  229-­234.  
101  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Squadron  Leader  D.  D.  Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  508:  The  Influence  of  
Psychological  Disorder  on  Efficiency  in  Operational  Flying’,  September  1942,  p.  11;;  Reid’s  
use  of  the  term  ‘accident  proneness’  here  refers  to  the  likelihood  of  an  accident  occurring,  
rather  than  the  propensity  for  certain  groups  of  people  to  be  involved  in  accidents.  For  a  
history  of  the  concept  of  psychophysiological  proneness  to  risk  and  accidents,  see:  John  C.  
Burnham,  Accident  Prone:  A  History  of  Technology,  Psychology,  and  Misfits  of  the  Machine  
Age,  (Chicago:  University  of  Chicago  Press,  2009).  
102  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  508’,  p.  11.  
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(IAM)  report  put  it  in  1982:  ‘To  lose  highly  trained  aircrew  because  of  enemy  
action  was  one  thing;;  to  lose  aircrew  because  of  mistakes  was  entirely  
another.’  103    For  the  RAF  air  accidents  were  a  tragic,  and  unacceptable,  
waste  of  men  and  machines.    
  
Fighting  Fatigue:  Wakefulness  and  Physiology  
Following  the  publication  of  these  reports  in  1942,  FPRC  researchers  
increasingly  turned  their  attention  to  the  management  of  fatigue  in  flight.  It  
was  generally  agreed  that  prior  methods  of  alleviating  fatigue  –  namely  the  
movement  of  pilots  out  of  the  line  of  duty,  often  to  an  OTU,  for  a  rest  –  was  no  
longer  possible,  given  the  pressing  nature  of  concerns  about  manpower  
economy.104  Research  focused  instead  on  quick  and  easy  ways  of  mitigating  
the  effects  of  fatigue.  Though  the  performance  decrement  model  of  fatigue  
remained  important  here,  in  some  of  these  studies  fatigue  was  framed  in  
terms  of  sleepiness.  Much  of  this  FPRC  research  focused  on  the  maintenance  
of  wakefulness.  FPRC  researchers  investigated  a  number  of  different  ways  of  
alleviating  fatigue  in  flight  including  the  consumption  of  vitamins,  sugar,  and  
caffeine,  but  from  1940  research  interest  centred  on  the  benefits  and  potential  
pitfalls  of  amphetamines.    
Benzedrine,  by  far  the  most  widely  investigated  amphetamine  by  the  
FPRC,  generated  interest  in  medical  and  lay  circles.  Touted  as  a  miracle  
drug,  the  benefits  of  amphetamines,  such  as  Benzedrine,  were  widely  
documented  in  the  public  domain  both  prior  to  and  during  the  Second  World  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103  WL  PP/HEW/L.7/6:  Institute  of  Aviation  Medicine  Report  615,  p.  1.  
104  Bishop,  Fighter  Boys.  
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War.105  Discussion  of  the  drug  appeared  in  the  public  domain  through  
newspaper  reports  throughout  the  1939-­1945  war.  According  to  Sam  
Goodman,  many  reports  emphasised  Benzedrine’s  ‘stamina-­enhancing  
qualities’  and  its  apparent  ability  to  combat  fatigue.106    The  drug  also  made  
appearances  in  popular  fiction,  most  notably  the  James  Bond  series.  After  
one  particularly  arduous  mission  in  Live  and  Let  Die,  Bond  credited  the  
ingestion  of  Benzedrine  as  the  mechanism  that  prevented  him  from  losing  
consciousness  as  a  result  of  extreme  pain  and  fatigue.107  
First  synthesised  in  the  late-­nineteenth  century  in  the  form  of  nasal  
inhalers  to  treat  respiratory  difficulties,  the  stimulating  properties  of  
amphetamines  were  widely  recognised  by  the  early-­twentieth  century.108  The  
stimulating  effect  of  amphetamines,  and  their  success  at  relieving  fatigue,  
placed  the  drugs,  as  a  1947  advertisement  for  Methedrine  suggested,  ‘in  an  
exceptional  position  in  general  therapeutics’.109  They  were  prescribed  for  a  
number  of  ailments  in  which  fatigue  played  a  part,  including  depression  and  
disorders  of  the  central  nervous  system.110  From  the  1930s  there  were  
increasing  concerns  about  unregulated  access  to  and  indiscriminate  use  of  
amphetamines.  Benzedrine  tablets  were  placed  on  the  Poisons  List  in  
January  1939.  Amphetamine  use  was  not,  however,  stigmatised  in  the  same  
manner  as  other  drugs,  such  as  cocaine.111  Pugh  has  suggested,  however,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’.  
106  Sam  Goodman,  ‘Thrills,  Spills  and  Pills:  Bond,  Benzedrine  and  the  Pharmacology  of  
Peace’,  Medical  Humanities,  36  (2010)  27-­30,  p.  29.  
107  Ibid.  
108  Ibid.  
109  WL  WF/M/PL/197:  ‘For  mental  depression  Tabloid  Methedrine',  1947.  
110  Goodman,  ‘Thrills,  Spills  and  Pills’;;  Benzedrine  was  also  sometimes  used  to  treat  
morphine  addiction,  see:  H.  Cecil  Duckworth,  ‘Benzedrine  in  Treatment  of  Morphine  
Addiction’,  British  Medical  Journal,  2,  4166  (1940)  628-­9.  
111  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’.  
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that  broader  lay  acceptance  of  amphetamines  was  not  reflected  in  the  RAF’s  
approach  to  the  drug,  which  was  cautious  throughout  the  period.  Indeed,  
Benzedrine  was  not  officially  sanctioned  for  use  by  aircrews  on  operations  
until  November  1942.112  
German  use  of  the  stimulant  drug  Pervitin  during  the  summer  of  1940  
drew  attention  to  the  potential  use  of  Benzedrine  in  the  British  armed  
forces.113  International  news  media  reported  on  the  provision  of  the  
methamphetamine  Pervitin  to  German  pilots.114  Media  outlets  reported  that  it  
imbued  German  fighters  with  courage  and  allowed  them  to  work  for  long  
periods  of  time,  for  example  during  Blitzkrieg,  without  the  need  for  sleep.115  As  
Pugh  has  suggested,  however,  RAF  interest  in  amphetamines  preceded  this.  
Indeed,  the  Air  Ministry  sought  advice  from  the  Director  General  of  Medical  
Services  in  August  1939  regarding  the  use  of  stimulants,  and  Benzedrine  was  
cleared  for  use  by  aircrew  in  exceptional  circumstances  at  this  time.    
Sustained  research  on  the  drug,  however,  only  began  in  1941.  In  May  
of  that  year  Bartlett  was  asked  to  review  the  existing  literature  on  Benzedrine,  
with  a  view  to  providing  recommendations  relating  to  its  safety,  dosage,  and  
frequency  of  use.  Bartlett  found  that,  though  Benzedrine  did  not  improve  
performance,  it  did  have  an  important  effect  in  terms  of  sustaining  both  
wakefulness  and  interest  in  the  task  at  hand.  His  1941  report  concluded  that  
Benzedrine  thus  had  a  role  to  play  in  preventing  the  degradation  of  
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115  Stephen  Snelders  and  Toine  Pieters,  ‘Speed  in  the  Third  Reich:  Methamphetamine  
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performance  as  a  result  of  fatigue,  but  argued  that  it  should  not  be  considered  
as  a  substitute  for  sleep.116  He  also  concluded  that,  wherever  possible,  the  
administration  of  the  drug  should  be  subject  to  strict  medical  control  and,  
because  of  the  subjectivity  of  its  action,  flyers  should  take  a  test  dosage  on  
the  ground  prior  to  using  it  on  operations.  The  publication  of  these  cautious,  
but  positive,  recommendations  was  followed  by  a  number  of  operational  trials.  
Initial  operational  trials  were  scheduled  to  take  place  in  Coastal  
Command  where  intensive  maritime  patrol  operations  were  commonplace.  
Ronald  Winfield,  an  RAF  Medical  Officer  who  worked  closely  with  the  FPRC,  
undertook  the  research.  Winfield’s  1941  report  concluded  that  Benzedrine  
was  best  used  in  aircraft  where  sleep  was  impossible,  for  example  in  the  
aircraft  types  used  by  Coastal  and  Bomber  Commands.  Though  
pharmacology  was  only  one  strand  of  his  investigation  –  he  also  emphasised  
the  important  role  of  diet  and  ergonomics  –  the  report  recommended  
Benzedrine  for  use  in  certain  circumstances.117  In  September  1942,  Winfield  
published  a  further  report  based  on  twenty  operational  sorties  with  Bomber  
Command.  As  in  the  previous  study,  Winfield  accompanied  crews  on  sorties  
‘in  order  to  observe  the  effects  of  the  drug  on  the  onset  of  fatigue’.118  Winfield  
found  that,  while  crews  of  both  Coastal  and  Bomber  Commands  experienced  
fatigue,  the  signs  and  causes  of  fatigue  were  different.  He  argued  that,  while  
in  Coastal  Command  fatigue  was  caused  by  ‘the  boredom  of  long  hours  of  
uneventful  flight’,  flyers  in  Bomber  Command  faced  different  challenges.119  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’.  
117  Ibid.  
118  TNA  57/9:  Wing  Commander  R.  Winfield,  ‘FPRC  Report  493:  The  Use  of  Benzedrine  to  
Overcome  Fatigue  on  Operational  Flights  in  Bomber  Command’,  September  1942,  p.  5.  
119  Ibid.  p.  2.  
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For  bomber  aircrews  the  drivers  of  fatigue  were  tension,  excitement,  and  
relief.  It  was,  according  to  Winfield,  in  the  final  stages  of  flight  that  the  
‘objective  and  subjective  signs  of  fatigue’  became  noticeable:  
  
This  relaxation  begins  before  any  member  of  the  crew  can  afford  to  
slacken,  and  probably  causes  the  loss  of  many  crews  because  of  
failure  to  take  sufficient  care  while  danger  is  still  very  real.  The  feeling  
of  relief  after  leaving  the  target  area  gives  such  a  false  sense  of  
security  that  it  is  frequently  difficult  to  believe  that  the  enemy  coast  over  
which  one  passes  on  the  way  home  is  the  same  as  that  which  one  
regarded  with  such  apprehension  and  suspicion  only  a  few  hours  
before,  although  the  same  coastal  defences,  flak  ships,  and  
concentrations  of  high  fighters  lie  in  wait  for  the  unwary.  The  use  of  any  
drug  to  restore  mental  alertness  is  therefore  of  great  value.120  
  
Echoing  the  sentiment  of  Bartlett’s  August  1942  report,  which  emphasised  the  
‘irresistible  tendency’  for  tired  flyers  to  relax  and  become  sleepy  as  they  
neared  home,  Winfield  concluded  that  it  was  on  the  return  leg  of  the  journey  
that  Benzedrine  would  be  of  most  use  to  pilots.121  In  other  words,  Benzedrine  
would  be  most  useful,  according  to  Winfield,  as  means  of  ensuring  pilots  
remained  awake  and  alert  during  the  return  flight.  It  was  along  such  lines  that  
Whittingham,  the  RAF’s  Director  General  of  Medical  Services,  recommended  
the  approval  of  Benzedrine  for  use  by  aircrews  in  an  operational  context  in  
November  1942.  
Following  the  implementation  of  this  policy  a  number  of  FPRC  reports  
called  for  greater  caution.  One  report,  produced  by  Flight  Lieutenant  R.  C.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120  Ibid.  p.  2.  
121  TNA  AIR  57/9:  Bartlett,  ‘FPRC  Report  488’,  p.  5.  
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Browne,  argued  that  Benzedrine  did  not,  as  Winfield  had  claimed,  improve  the  
performance  of  bomber  pilots  and  in  some  instances  pilots  were  ‘worse  after  
it’.122  As  such,  in  1943  the  Air  Ministry  issued  further  guidance  relating  to  the  
use  of  Benzedrine  in  operational  settings.  In  a  pamphlet  on  the  prevention  of  
fatigue  first  circulated  in  June  1943,  the  Air  Ministry  called  for  a  cautious  
approach  to  Benzedrine.123  Though  Benzedrine  was  useful  in  staving  off  
sleepiness,  the  pamphlet  stated,  after  a  time  it  diminished  one’s  desire  to  
work  and  sleep,  and  could  lead  to  long-­term  sleep  decrement.  More  
concerning,  the  pamphlet  argued  however,  were  the  effects  Benzedrine  had  
on  mood  and  performance:  
  
Benzedrine  has  the  effect  of  causing  the  individual  to  feel  on  top  of  
things  and  able  to  carry  on  with  his  duties  without  rest:  he  feels  that  he  
is  doing  well,  when  in  fact  he  is  making  all  sorts  of  mistakes.  Whatever  
danger  there  is  in  the  tired  state  is  then  apt  to  become  greater,  not  
less.124  
  
Far  from  supporting  the  wellbeing  agenda  suggested  by  Francis  and  
Rasmussen,  or  for  that  matter  the  wakefulness  benefits  suggested  by  Pugh,  
the  Air  Ministry  cautioned  against  the  use  of  amphetamines.  Benzedrine,  the  
Air  Ministry  argued,  had  dangerous  effects  on  mood  and  subjective  
assessment  of  performance,  though  it  could  help  with  wakefulness  it  made  
human  error  more  likely.  As  such,  the  Air  Ministry  advocated  that  Benzedrine  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Flight  Lieutenant  R.  C.  Browne,  ‘FPRC  Report  507:  Benzedrine  and  the  
Beam  Approach’,  December  1942,  p.  3.  
123  TNA  AIR  2/14723:  Air  Ministry  Pamphlet  154,  ‘Notes  on  the  Prevention  of  Fatigue  in  Flying  
Personnel’,  October  1947  (first  issued  June  1943).  
124  Ibid.  p.  4.  
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be  used  only  in  an  ‘occasional  temporary  emergency’  in  which  the  possible  
dangers  from  sleepiness  were  greater  than  those  arising  from  performance  
decrement.125    
On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  the  American  Air  Force  advocated  a  
similarly  cautious  approach  to  Benzedrine.  American  medical  officers  
recognised  that  Benzedrine  was  ‘no  substitute  for  sleep’  so  recommended  its  
use  only  in  instances  where  rest  was  not  possible.  A  1944  article  published  in  
the  Science  Newsletter  described  the  rationale  of  the  American  Benzedrine  
policy  thus:  
  
The  importance  of  the  ‘sleep  crisis’  may  be  appreciated  if  one  
remembers  that  military  success  depends  not  only  upon  the  
arrival  of  enough  men  and  equipment  at  the  right  place  at  the  
right  time,  but  also  upon  their  continuation  in  action  the  right  
length  of  time.  To  win  a  battle,  in  other  words,  striking  power  
must  be  supported  by  staying  power  …  Ideally,  staying  power  is  
obtained  by  replacement  of  tired  men  with  rested  reserves.  This  
is  not  always  possible  and  at  such  times  it  is  better  to  give  the  
men  a  ‘Benzedrine  alert’  than  to  risk  losing  not  only  the  battle  
but  the  men  themselves.126  
  
Echoing  the  sentiments  of  the  Air  Ministry,  American  military  strategists  
argued  that  Benzedrine  was  only  useful  in  circumstances  where  manpower  
shortages  necessitated  the  continued  use  of  tired  fighters.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125  Francis,  The  Flyer;;  Rasmussen,  On  Speed,  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  
Command,  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’;;  TNA  AIR  2/14723:  Air  Ministry  Pamphlet  
154,  p.  4.  
126  Anon,  ‘Army  Uses  Benzedrine  Only  When  Necessary’,  The  Science  Newsletter,  46,  4  
(1944)  55,  p.  55.  
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In  a  pamphlet  first  published  in  June  1943,  the  Air  Ministry  
recommended  the  use  of  sugar  as  a  ready  source  of  energy,  and  caffeine,  
which  also  worked  to  stave  off  sleepiness  but  did  not  give  a  ‘false  impression  
of  well-­being’,  like  Benzedrine.127  Flyers  consumed  caffeine  in  large  quantities  
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  According  to  Derickson,  the  American  military  
went  through  coffee  at  the  ‘extraordinary’  annual  rate  of  thirty-­two  pounds  per  
person  during  the  country’s  involvement  in  World  War  Two.128  In  another  Air  
Ministry  pamphlet,  also  published  in  June  1943,  guidance  was  issued  to  
aircrews  on  the  bodily  and  mental  signs  of  tiredness  ‘so  that  they  maintain  
due  accuracy  and  care  when  in  a  fatigued  state,  and  thus  avoid  accidents’.129  
Based  on  the  psychological  research  of  Davis,  the  guidance  was  premised  on  
the  assumption  that  if  crews  were  issued  with  ‘special  instructions’  prior  to  
flight  they  would  be  more  likely  to  ‘maintain  a  higher  standard  of  accuracy  and  
care,  with  a  reduction  of  the  number  of  flying  accidents  contributed  to  by  
fatigue.’130  The  squadron’s  Medical  Officer,  the  pamphlet  recommended,  was  
best  placed  to  provide  flyers  with  details  of  what  signs  of  deterioration  to  look  
out  for  including:  decreased  speed,  overcorrection,  and  –  as  Winfield  and  
Bartlett  had  established  previously  –  the  tendency  to  relax  towards  the  end  of  
flight.131  The  release  of  these  pamphlets  in  1943  demonstrates  the  RAF’s  
cautious  approach  to  Benzedrine  and  indicated  to  Medical  Officers  and  crews  
that  means  other  than  pharmacology  were  central  to  the  fight  against  fatigue.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  TNA  AIR  2/14723:  Air  Ministry  Pamphlet  154,  p.  4.  
128  Derickson,  ‘“No  Such  Thing  as  a  Night’s  Sleep”’,  p.  8.  
129  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Air  Ministry  Pamphlet  153,  ‘Notes  on  the  Prevention  of  Fatigue  in  Flying  
Personnel’,  June  1943,  p.  1.  
130  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Dr  D.  Russell  Davis,  ‘FPRC  Report  509:  Effect  of  Special  Instructions  on  
the  Development  of  Signs  of  Mental  Fatigue’,  December  1942,  p.  1.  
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As  Pugh  has  suggested,  however,  there  was  a  tension  between  official  
Air  Ministry  guidelines  on  the  use  of  Benzedrine  and  the  practicalities  of  
managing  the  substance  at  squadron  level.  Though  an  estimated  seventy-­two  
million  amphetamine  tablets  were  purchased  for  Britain’s  armed  forces  
between  1942  and  1943,  little  is  known  about  the  rate  of  Benzedrine  use  in  
the  RAF.132  Francis  and  others  have  argued  that  ‘little  effort  was  made  to  
regulate  the  supply’  of  Benzedrine,  and  that  use  for  off-­label  reasons,  
including  use  to  ‘sustain  the  energies’  of  flyers  during  off-­duty  parties,  was  
common  but  there  is  little  convincing  evidence  of  this.133  Francis  based  his  
argument  largely  on  the  memoirs  of  WAAFs  and  other  aircrew,  but,  given  the  
lack  of  context,  it  is  difficult  to  establish  whether  the  experiences  these  record  
are  representative  of  broader  trends.    
In  some  instances  historians  have  drawn  on  oral  history  testimonies  to  
provide  evidence  of  use  but,  as  Pugh  has  suggested,  this  can  also  be  
problematic.134  In  interviews  Benzedrine  is  rarely  referred  to  directly.  
Ambiguous  language  is  often  used,  and  former  pilots  rarely  admit  to  taking  
amphetamines,  perhaps  because  of  the  overtly  negative  discourse  
surrounding  drug  use  today.  One  former  flyer  I  interviewed,  who  served  in  the  
RAF  in  the  post-­war  period  claimed  he  knew  people  who  took  ‘pills’  and  that  
from  his  experience  it  was  ‘quite  common’.135  Paul  White’s  intentional  use  of  
ambiguous  language  here  makes  it  difficult  to  establish  what  exactly  he  is  
referring  to,  whether  to  stimulants,  hypnotics  or  something  else  altogether.  
Also,  given  that  his  knowledge  was  based  largely  on  ‘bar  talk’,  as  he  referred  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’.  
133  Francis,  The  Flyer,  p.  121.  
134  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’.  
135  Interview  with  Paul  White,  17  March  2016.  
   119  
to  it,  Paul  White’s  account  may  not  be  representative  of  common  practice  
beyond  his  immediate  group  of  friends  and  colleagues.136    
Derickson  has  argued  that  amphetamine  use  may  not  have  been  as  
widespread  as  some  historians  believe.  He  has  suggested  that  during  the  
1939-­1945  war  the  ability  to  sustain  wakefulness  became  a  measure  of  
manliness.137  Building  on  this  idea,  Pugh  has  argued  that,  operating  in  the  
hyper-­masculine  squadron  environment,  a  number  of  men  chose  not  to  utilise  
Benzedrine  on  operations.  Drawing  on  oral  history  interviews  carried  out  for  
the  Imperial  War  Museum,  Pugh  has  concluded  that  a  number  of  men  actively  
refused  to  take  the  drug  to  demonstrate  their  masculine  mastery  over  fatigue  
and  sleeplessness.138  It  would,  therefore,  be  unwise  to  assume  that  
Benzedrine  was  widely  used,  as  Norman  Ohler  has  stated  in  the  German  
case  of  Pervitin.139  Given  the  RAF’s  cautious  approach  to  the  drug  throughout  
the  war  it  seems  more  sensible,  rather,  to  conclude  that  Benzedrine  was  one  
of  many  means  of  fighting  fatigue.    
Though  histories  of  flying  fatigue  have  focused  extensively  on  the  use  
of  Benzedrine  by  British  flyers  during  the  Second  World  War,  the  evidence  
suggests  that  the  RAF  did  not  strongly  advocate  amphetamine  use.  Even  
after  Benzedrine  was  formally  cleared  for  use  in  an  operational  context  in  
November  1942,  the  RAF  continued  to  advocate  other  means  of  mitigating  the  
effects  of  fatigue.  Some  of  these  methods  drew  on  pre-­war  psychological  
models  of  fatigue,  such  as  the  distribution  of  special  instructions,  while  others  
emphasised  the  importance  of  dietary  supplements.  As  an  article  printed  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136  Ibid.  
137  Derickson,  ‘“No  Such  Thing  as  a  Night’s  Sleep”’.  
138  Pugh,  ‘The  Royal  Air  Force,  Bomber  Command  and  the  use  of  Benzedrine  Sulphate’.  
139  Ohler,  Blitzed.  
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leading  medical  journal  The  Lancet  in  1942  suggested,  caffeine  –  in  the  form  
of  coffee  or  ‘strong  sweet  tea’  –  was  often  just  as  effective  as  
amphetamines.140  The  RAF’s  approach  to  the  management  of  flying  fatigue  
was,  then,  more  complex  than  some  previous  histories  have  indicated.  
Though  Benzedrine  was  one  means  by  which  RAF  flyers  alleviated  tiredness,  
other  methods  existed  and  were  often  advocated  by  the  Air  Ministry.    
As  the  previous  section  demonstrates,  the  RAF  framed  fatigue  in  
relation  to  performance  throughout  the  Second  World  War.  Though  Pugh  has  
argued  that  the  RAF’s  approach  to  Benzedrine  demonstrates  a  new  
preoccupation  with  wakefulness  and  the  physiology  of  fatigue  in  this  period,  
the  methods  of  mitigating  fatigue  advocated  by  the  Air  Ministry  during  the  war  
also  suggest  increasing  concerns  with  performance  decrement.  Guidelines  
relating  to  the  use  of  Benzedrine  and  ‘special  instructions’  focused  on  
mitigating  the  effects  of  deterioration,  particularly  towards  the  end  of  flight.141  
As  the  Air  Ministry  pamphlet  published  in  1943  made  clear,  wakefulness  alone  
was  not  enough.142  Precision  and  accuracy  were  also  central  to  the  avoidance  
of  air  accidents,  and  thus  remained  key  concerns  for  the  RAF.    
  
Flying  Fatigue  After  the  War  
Given  its  implications  for  the  efficiency  and  safety  of  RAF  pilots,  military  
interest  in  flying  fatigue  persisted  long  after  the  cessation  of  the  Second  World  
War.  Research  carried  out  by  the  FPRC  continued  to  examine  fatigue  in  
functional  terms,  but  in  the  immediate  post-­war  years,  increasing  attention  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140  Anon,  ‘Fatigue’,  The  Lancet,  239,  6189  (1942)  450-­451,  p.  451.  
141  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Russell  Davis,  ‘FPRC  Report  509’,  p.  1.  
142  TNA  AIR  2/14723:  Air  Ministry  Pamphlet  154.  
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was  paid  to  the  relationship  between  fatigue  and  physiology.  In  line  with  
contemporary  research  on  the  physiology  of  emotions  taking  place  on  both  
sides  of  the  Atlantic,  many  post-­war  studies  carried  out  by  the  FPRC  sought  
to  find  physiological  correlates  for  subjectively  experienced  fatigue  states.  An  
FPRC  report  produced  by  Reid  in  1949  detailed  a  number  of  different  
physiological  measures  of  fatigue,  including  ‘finely  balanced  physiological  
functions’  which  might  be  expected  to  react  sensitively  to  environmental  
stresses  on  the  individual,  yet  which  would  be  susceptible  to  reliable  
measurement,  such  as  visual  acuity,  and  ‘cruder  measures’,  such  as  loss  in  
bodyweight.143    
Other  FPRC  researchers  privileged  hormonal  measures.  Given  the  
apparent  importance  of  the  adrenal  cortex  in  stress  and  Addison’s  disease  
according  to  studies  carried  out  by  American  researchers,  FPRC  investigators  
such  as  Margaret  I.  Stern,  attempted  to  correlate  the  quantity  of  adrenal  waste  
–  ketosteroids  –  in  urinary  excretions  with  subjective  fatigue  states.144  Stern  
found  in  a  1949  study  of  university  students  that,  contrary  to  the  conclusions  
of  her  American  colleagues,  levels  of  17  and  20-­ketosteroids  did  not  increase  
following  long  flights.145  In  the  same  year  another  FPRC  report,  which  outlined  
the  work  of  W.  S.  Frederick,  chief  of  the  research  branch  of  the  KLM  Royal  
Dutch  Airlines  Medical  Department,  concluded  that  no  correlation  existed  
between  the  concentration  of  17-­ketosteroids  and  subjectively  reported  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
143  TNA  AIR  57/20:  D.  D.  Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  721:  Visual  Tests  of  Fatigue  in  Operational  
Flying’,  reprinted  from  British  Journal  of  Social  Medicine,  3,  3  (1949)  101-­109,  p.  102;;  Ibid.  p.  
108.  
144  Hudson  Hoagland,  ‘Adventures  in  Biological  Engineering’,  Science,  100,  2587  (1944)  63-­
67.  
145  TNA  AIR  57/20:  Margaret  I.  Stern,  ‘FPRC  Report  719:  The  Determination  of  Urinary  Total  
Neutral  17  and  20  Ketosteroids  in  “Stress”’,  July  1949.  
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fatigue.  In  a  lecture  read  before  the  International  Air  Transport  Association  
(IATA)  Technical  Conference  in  May  1949,  Frederick  argued  that  no  
convincing  correlation  had  been  established  between  the  production  of  17-­
ketosteroids  or,  for  that  matter,  any  other  measurable  physiological  function:  
  
To  our  astonishment  the  majority  of  these  experiments  never  showed  a  
deviation  from  normal  values  due  to  fatigue.  In  other  words,  during  
these  experiments  no  appreciable  changes  were  found  in  the  functions  
of  hearing,  vision  etc.  While  the  subjects  under  test  suffered  a  strong  
feeling  of  fatigue  and  wanted  nothing  but  to  rest,  the  functions  of  a  
great  many  organs  and  organic  systems  were  completely  unaffected  by  
fatigue.146  
  
The  apparent  failure  of  FPRC  researchers  to  establish  a  meaningful  
relationship  between  physiology  and  subjective  fatigue  states  did  not  deter  
later  researchers  from  taking  inspiration  from  physiological  studies  of  stress.    
In  1955  D.  C.  Fraser  of  the  FPRC  and  RAF  IAM  proposed  that  fatigue  
should  be  considered  a  ‘special  form  of  stress  condition’.147  Drawing  explicitly  
on  earlier  research  on  the  physiology  of  stress  –  he  referenced,  in  particular,  
his  own  publications  on  this  topic  –  Fraser  applied  the  ‘theoretical  framework’  
established  in  the  field  of  stress  research  to  the  ‘problem  of  fatigue’.148  He  
reformulated  a  number  of  general  principles  that  had  become  accepted  in  the  
field  of  stress  research:  that  increasing  stress  beyond  a  certain  level  caused  
performance  to  deteriorate;;  and  that  the  effect  of  stress  was  differential,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146  TNA  AIR  57/20:  Dr  W.  S.  Frederick,  ‘FPRC  Report  723(a):  Some  Aspects  of  Fatigue’,  May  
1949,  p.  3.  
147  TNA  DSIR  23/22938:  D.  C.  Fraser,  ‘The  Study  of  Fatigue’,  August  1954,  p.  2.    
148  Ibid.  p.  2.  
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affecting  some  people  more  than  others.  In  this  vein,  he  argued  that  fatigue  
should  be  considered  as  a  ‘deterioration  in  performance’,  which  affected  
individuals  according  to  their  skill  and  experience  as  pilots.149  Several  other  
researchers  also  drew  a  link  between  fatigue  and  stress.  In  a  1958  article  
produced  for  the  RAF  IAM,  K.  F.  Jackson  proposed  that  fatigue  should  be  
considered  as  a  temporary  effect  of  stress.150  More  willing  than  Fraser  to  
recognise  the  subjective  experience  of  fatigue  though,  Jackson  suggested  the  
use  of  rating  scales  to  take  into  account  how  pilots  felt  in  addition  to  
measuring  urinary  output  of  17-­ketosteroids.  
A  gradual  shift  away  from  physiological  explanations  and  measures  of  
fatigue  in  the  post-­war  period  was  reflected  in  the  countermeasures  for  fatigue  
proposed  by  FPRC  researchers  from  1949.  Following  the  cessation  of  
hostilities  interest  shifted  away  from  the  role  of  biochemical  aids  in  the  
management  of  fatigue.  Instead  British  research  increasingly  focused  on  the  
impact  of  factors  such  as  sleep  and  nutrition.  In  a  discussion  of  the  Berlin  
airlift  (26  June  1948-­30  September  1949),  during  which  crews  commonly  
worked  between  twelve  and  sixteen  hours  a  day,  R.  H.  Stanbridge  (1897-­
1986),  a  former  Squadron  Leader  who  had  worked  alongside  members  of  the  
NIIP  in  the  1930s  and  later  served  as  a  medical  officer  for  the  Civil  Aviation  
Authority  (CAA),  emphasised  the  importance  of  food  in  the  alleviation  of  
fatigue.151  Hot  meals,  he  argued,  ‘should  be  provided  on  the  airfield  and  
should  be  freshly  cooked  and  well  presented  so  that  the  original  calorie  value  
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150  TNA  AIR  2/14723:  K.  F.  Jackson,  ‘Methods  in  the  Study  of  Fatigue’,  November  1958,  p.  1.  
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is  preserved  and  the  meal  is  made  attractive’.152  Food  was  important,  he  
argued,  for  nutritional  purposes  as  well  as  for  crew  morale.  Though  the  use  of  
Benzedrine  and  other  biochemical  aids  was  increasingly  side-­lined  by  British  
military  forces  following  the  close  of  the  Second  World  War,  amphetamines  
retained  a  prominent  position  in  the  fatigue  prevention  policies  of  the  
American  Air  Forces.  As  Derickson  has  shown,  Dexedrine  –  an  amphetamine  
widely  prescribed  for  attention  deficit  hyperactivity  disorder  and  narcolepsy  –  
was  permitted  for  use  by  the  American  military  up  until  the  Vietnam  War,  
when  use  was  curtailed  as  the  result  of  ‘unpleasant  revelations’  about  friendly-­
fire  incidents  and  ‘ugly  associations’  with  addicted  veterans.153  
  
Civil  Aviation  in  Post-­War  Britain  
In  the  post-­war  period,  civil  aviation  was  dominated  by  former  military  
personnel.  Following  national  service,  many  RAF  pilots  retrained  and  were  
then  employed  by  commercial  carriers.  Though  the  context  was  different,  
former  RAF  pilots  retained  their  militaristic  values  and  facilitated  an  informal  
cultural  transfer  of  military  discourse  into  a  civil  context.  This  had  important  
implications  for  how  fatigue  was  perceived  and  managed  in  post-­war  civil  
aviation.  What  follows  here  traces  the  enduring  relationship  between  civil  and  
military  aviation  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century.    
Civil  aviation  was  a  largely  post-­war  phenomenon,  but  it  was  first  
established  in  the  early-­twentieth  century.  Though  some  had  flown  for  
pleasure  since  the  late-­nineteenth  century,  it  was  only  after  the  First  World  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152  R.  H.  Stanbridge,  ‘Fatigue  in  Aircrew:  Observations  in  the  Berlin  Airlift’,  The  Lancet,  258,  
6671  (1951)  1-­3,  p.  2.  
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War  that  a  commercial  air  service  was  established.154  The  first  regular  
international  passenger  air  service  was  inaugurated  on  25  August  1919  by  
Aircraft  Transport  and  Travel  (AT&T)  between  London  and  Paris.  The  journey  
took  just  over  two  and  a  half  hours  and  cost  £15  for  a  single  passenger  fare.  A  
number  of  other  small  airlines  followed  AT&T,  flying  passengers  to  and  from  a  
selection  of  European  destinations.  Following  the  First  World  War  there  was  
an  enormous  surplus  of  cheap  former  military  aircraft.  Many  of  these  were  
adapted  for  civil  service,  offering  small  airlines  an  inexpensive  way  to  begin  
business.155  Most  of  the  newly  founded  airlines  focused  on  carrying  mail  and  
express  freight,  such  as  newspapers  and  perishable  goods,  rather  than  
carrying  passengers.156    
This  was  in  part  because  the  British  public  was  largely  disinterested  in  
air  travel  at  this  time.  As  a  means  of  transport,  flying  was  expensive,  
uncomfortable,  and  flight  times  even  for  short  trips  were  often  lengthy  as  pilots  
depended  on  visual  navigation,  usually  following  railway  lines.157  As  most  
planes  had  been  converted  from  military  use,  they  were  not  geared  towards  
passenger  comfort.  The  most  commonly  used  type,  the  DH  4,  a  wood  and  
fabric  biplane,  had  a  single  Rolls  Royce  engine  and  cruised  at  around  ninety  
miles  per  hour.  It  only  had  space  to  carry  two  passengers.  There  was  no  
cabin  pressurisation  or  soundproofing,  so  earplugs  were  necessary  to  
withstand  the  noise  of  the  engine.  The  heating  and  ventilation  equipment  were  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154  Bilsten,  Flight  in  America.  
155  Peter  Fearon,  ‘The  Growth  of  Aviation  in  Britain’,  Journal  of  Contemporary  History,  20,  1  
(1985)  21-­40.  
156  Peter  Lyth,  ‘The  Empire’s  Away:  British  Civil  Aviation  from  1919-­1939’,  Revue  Belge  de  
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also  inadequate,  so  passengers  often  experienced  bouts  of  airsickness  as  a  
result  of  fuel  inhalation.158  
The  Air  Ministry  did  not  control  civil  aviation  in  the  way  that  it  controlled  
the  RAF,  there  was  a  general  presumption  that  civil  aviation  was  a  matter  for  
the  private  sector,  but  from  the  mid-­1920s  a  number  of  civil  airlines  were  
granted  subsidies  by  the  government  department.159  In  1924  the  Labour  
government  established  the  first  major  British  airline,  Imperial  Airways  (IA).  IA  
received  a  government  subsidy  of  over  £1  million  over  ten  years  and,  in  
return,  was  expected  to  fly  a  minimum  of  800,000  operational  miles  a  year.  In  
its  early  years  IA  focused  on  transporting  passengers  to  European  
destinations.  In  1928  IA  offered  what  might  now  be  called  an  inclusive  
package  tour  by  air.  Anxious  that  services  be  measured  against  the  standards  
of  deluxe  rail  and  ocean  travel,  IA  offered  a  luxurious  package.  Aimed  at  
wealthy  clientele  –  customers  could  expect  to  pay  £435  each  –  it  was  a  winter  
holiday  comprising  a  thirty-­five  day  tour  of  France,  Spain,  Morocco,  Tunisia,  
Algeria,  and  Italy,  and  included  meals  and  accommodation.160  By  the  late-­
1920s  civil  aircraft  were  much  improved  technically  and  structurally.  They  had  
better  engines,  burnt  higher  octane  fuels,  and  had  all-­metal  bodies.  They  did  
not,  however,  meet  the  standards  associated  with  luxury  rail  and  ocean  
travel.161  Failing  to  attract  significant  public  interest,  IA  relinquished  most  of  its  
European  routes  to  other  international  operators  and  from  the  1930s  focused  
on  the  carriage  of  mail  to  and  from  the  British  Empire.162  The  focus  on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158  Lyth,  ‘The  Empire’s  Away’.  
159  David  Edgerton,  England  and  the  Aeroplane:  Militarism,  Modernity  and  Machines,  
(Basingstoke:  Macmillan,  1991).  
160  Lyth,  ‘The  Empire’s  Away’.  
161  Fearon,  ‘The  Growth  of  Aviation  in  Britain’.  
162  Lyth,  ‘The  Empire’s  Away’  
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passengers  only  re-­emerged  in  1938,  when  IA  merged  with  a  smaller  
government-­subsidised  operator,  British  Airways,  to  form  the  British  Overseas  
Airways  Corporation  (BOAC).  The  onset  of  war  in  1939,  however,  severely  
disrupted  British  air  passenger  services.  Air  travel  only  emerged  as  a  viable  
commercial  industry  in  the  post-­war  period.  
British  civil  aviation  expanded  significantly  following  the  cessation  of  
hostilities  in  1945.  A  number  of  scholars  have  argued  that  civil  aviation  
benefitted  significantly  from  developments  relating  to  technology  and  
infrastructure  that  were  hastened  as  a  result  of  wartime  necessity.163  
According  to  Peter  Fearon,  the  1939-­1945  period  saw  considerable  
improvement  in  airport  facilities,  navigational  aids,  and  engine  power.164  
These  developments  meant  that,  post-­war,  civil  aviation  was  better-­
established  than  it  had  ever  been.  In  the  early  1950s  jet  engine  planes  were  
first  put  into  service.  Able  to  cruise  at  altitudes  of  up  to  40,000  feet,  they  
offered  a  smoother  and  quieter  flying  experience.  Jets  could  also  travel  at  
much  faster  speeds  than  propeller  aircraft,  reducing  flight  times  to  distant  
destinations  by  up  to  half.165  As  Lucy  Budd,  Morag  Bell  and  Adam  P.  Warren  
have  suggested,  when  BOAC  introduced  its  first  jet-­powered  aircraft  –  a  de  
Havilland  Comet  –  in  1952,  flight  times  were  immediately  reduced.  Flight  
times  from  London  to  Johannesburg  fell  from  thirty-­two  to  eighteen  hours,  
Singapore  could  be  reached  in  twenty-­five  hours  rather  than  two  days,  and  
flight  times  to  Tokyo  were  reduced  from  eighty-­six  to  thirty-­three  hours.  As  
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BOAC’s  chairman,  Miles  Thomas,  commented  at  the  time,  jet  flight  had  
‘shrunk  the  world  to  half  its  former  size  and  …  created  a  new  vogue  for  
international  travel’.166    
Until  1960  commercial  airlines  were  controlled  by  the  British  
government  through  the  Ministry  of  Civil  Aviation.  On  taking  office  in  1945,  the  
Labour  government  had  nationalised  all  British  airfields  and  civil  air  
operations.  Existing  national  carrier  BOAC  was  joined  by  two  more  airlines:  
British  European  Airways  (BEA)  for  domestic  European  routes,  and  British  
South  American  Airways,  which  operated  on  Caribbean  and  South  American  
routes.  All  three  operators  were  state-­owned,  but  were  expected  to  operate  on  
an  ordinary  profit  and  loss  basis,  with  the  Treasury  taking  the  profits  and  
bearing  the  deficits.  In  1960  the  Civil  Aviation  Licensing  Act  established  a  
system  of  licensing  for  civil  aviation  in  Britain  that  allowed  privately  owned  
airlines  to  enter  the  market  for  the  first  time  since  1945.  This  change  in  policy  
led  to  a  significant  shift  in  civil  aviation  trends  towards  inclusive  tour  services.  
A  number  of  new  privately-­owned  airlines  offered  package  holidays  to  
Mediterranean  resort  areas.  Inclusive  tour  traffic  from  Britain  increased  
dramatically  during  the  1960s.  In  1961  295,000  passengers  travelled  abroad  
on  an  inclusive  tour.  By  1971  2,698,000  passengers  were  choosing  package  
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National  Service  and  the  Civil  Airlines  
The  growth  of  air  tourism  in  the  1960s  called  for  an  increasing  number  of  
pilots  to  enter  civil  aviation.  Although  some  of  those  entering  the  job  market  
were  drawn  from  civil  flying  schools,  a  large  proportion  of  the  pilots  who  were  
offered  jobs  came  from  a  military  background.  According  to  A.  N.  J.  Blain,  who  
published  widely  on  industrial  relations  in  the  transport  sector  in  the  middle  
decades  of  the  twentieth  century,  around  70%  of  those  employed  in  civil  
airlines  in  the  1960s  and  early  1970s  had  started  their  career  and  received  
their  initial  flight  training  in  the  armed  forces.167  This  was  in  part  due  to  the  fact  
that  initial  training,  if  completed  in  a  civil  setting,  was  expensive  to  fund.  
Individuals  could  expect  to  pay  up  to  £8,000  for  an  eighteen-­month  course  at  
the  College  of  Air  Training  in  Hamble,  although  some  cadets  were  able  to  
obtain  financial  support  in  the  form  of  Local  Education  Authority  maintenance  
grants  or  airline  sponsorship.  As  Gerard  Hunt,  who  trained  as  a  pilot  in  the  
early  1970s,  described:  
  
In  1970  having  left  school  with  A  Levels  I  went  to  the  College  of  Air  
Training  for  an  eighteen  month  …  course  on  gaining  a  commercial  
pilot’s  licence  which  was  sponsored  by  British  Airways,  we  even  got  a  
grant  from  the  local  council  as  if  you  were  going  to  university,  so  
actually  I  was  incredibly  lucky  and  it  was  completely  free  for  me  to  
learn.  So  I  came  out  of  that  in  April  1972  with  a  commercial  pilot’s  
licence.168  
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George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1972).  
168  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
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Gerard  Hunt  was  in  the  minority  though,  as  many  of  those  employed  in  the  
1960s  and  early  1970s  had  military  flying  experience  as  a  result  of  completing  
national  service.    
Between  1945  and  1963,  when  the  British  policy  of  national  service  
officially  ended,  over  two  million  men  were  conscripted  into  the  British  armed  
forces.169  Young  men  between  the  ages  of  eighteen  and  twenty-­six  were  
conscripted  for  between  eighteen  months  and  two  years.170  Conscripts  were  
able  to  state  a  preference  for  service  and,  as  Roger  Broad  has  shown,  the  
RAF  and  the  Royal  Navy  were  popular  choices.  Indeed,  by  1949  the  RAF  had  
the  majority  of  ‘regulars’.171  Paul  White,  who  was  conscripted  into  the  RAF  in  
1950,  explained  why  he  chose  to  fly:  
  
There  was  a  choice  then  of  going  to  the  navy  or  to  the  RAF  …  Well,  
you’re  never  really  sure  at  that  stage  whether  you’re  going  to  be  able  to  
do  the  job  or  not  and  if  you  can’t  you’re  liable  to  be  sent  to  do  some  
other  horrid  job  because  you’re  now  part  of  an  armed  force.  So  rather  
than  find  that  after  a  year  I  was  now  scrubbing  decks  or  something  in  
the  navy  I  decided  to  go  to  the  RAF.172  
  
Some  of  the  men  conscripted  between  1945  and  1963  were  deployed  to  
various  theatres  of  war.  The  British  colonial  wars  in  Malaya,  Kenya,  and  
Cyprus  all  involved  conscripts.  For  most  men,  though,  national  service  mainly  
entailed  extended  training.  Thousands  of  men  attended  RAF  training  bases  at  
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Random  House,  2015).  
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Padgate,  Cardington,  and  West  Kirby.173  Following  military  service  a  number  
of  men,  including  Paul  White,  sought  employment  in  civil  airlines.  Paul  White  
explained  his  reasoning  for  this  as  such:  
  
Well  I  thought  I  can  fly  airplanes,  let’s  see  if  I  can  get  into  an  airline.  
And  after  going  and  doing  all  sorts  of  new  courses,  because  it’s  
surprising  how  difficult  it  is  to  go  from  flying  a  military  airplane  to  flying  
a  commercial  airplane,  it’s  a  very  different  prospect  altogether,  so  there  
were  a  number  of  variations  that  I  had  to  learn  and  various  
examinations  I  had  to  [take],  and  demonstrations  of  my  ability  before  I  
could  get  a  licence,  an  airline  transport  pilot’s  licence,  and  a  chance  to  
apply  to  airlines.174  
  
After  securing  a  commercial  pilot’s  licence  Paul  White  was  offered  a  job  with  
BOAC.    
The  movement  of  former  military  personnel  to  the  commercial  sector  
had  profound  implications  for  the  culture  and  practices  that  permeated  civil  
aviation  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century.  Many  of  the  former  
servicemen  who  were  employed  as  commercial  pilots  observed  and  expected  
militaristic  standards  and  practices:  strict  hierarchy,  deference  to  authority,  
and  efficiency.  This  militaristic  rhetoric  existed  even  at  the  most  basic  level  of  
pilot  image  and  language.  Commercial  pilots  wore  military-­style  uniforms  and  
were  allowed  on  ‘leave’  rather  than  holiday.175  James  Hall,  a  retired  pilot  who  
was  employed  by  BOAC  between  1966  and  1977,  referred  to  this  culture  as  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173  Vinen,  National  Service.  
174  Interview  with  Paul  White,  17  March  2016.  
175  Modern  Records  Centre  (hereafter  referred  to  as  MRC)  MSS/248/4/2:  BALPA,  ‘Flight  
Fatigue:  Report  of  the  Special  Committee’,  second  edition  May  1972  with  notes  by  Ninian  
Davies,  p.  36.  
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‘hangover  from  the  Second  World  War’.176  These  sentiments  were  echoed  by  
a  number  of  former  flight  and  cabin  crew  interviewed  for  this  thesis.  Former  
BOAC  pilot  Gerard  Hunt  described  the  practices  in  post-­war  civil  aviation,  
particularly  the  heavy  ‘drinking  culture’,  as  ‘a  bit  like  the  RAF’.177  Charles  
Green,  who  worked  as  cabin  crew  for  BOAC  during  the  1960s,  recalled  an  
instance  when  he  was  scolded  by  a  former  military  flyer  for  failing  to  
conversationally  defer  to  his  authority:  
  
At  the  beginning  in  ’67  it  was  still  very  much  hung  up  with  the  military  
and  there  was  a  lot  of  people  [that]  still  …  thought  that  they  were  in  the  
forces  and  I  can  give  you  an  example  …  I  was  a  very  junior  new  
steward  and  I  didn’t  call  the  captain  ‘sir’  on  the  greeting  of  the  day  and  I  
was  hauled  from  the  back  of  the  airplane  to  the  front  of  the  airplane  to  
welcome  this  captain.  ‘Good  afternoon  captain  sir’.  But  what  I’d  actually  
said  was  ‘good  afternoon  captain’,  I  missed  ‘sir’.178  
  
Though  the  context  was  different,  former  RAF  pilots  retained  their  militaristic  
values  and  facilitated  an  informal  cultural  transfer  of  military  discourse  and  
practices  into  a  civil  context.  
  
Models  of  Civilian  Flying  Fatigue    
In  the  post-­war  period  then,  particularly  from  the  1960s,  former  military  pilots  
dominated  civil  aviation.  Former  service  personnel  also  staffed  many  of  the  
government  departments  and  research  committees  associated  with  civil  
aviation.  Notably,  in  the  post-­war  period  the  FPRC  became  central  to  
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177  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
178  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
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research  on  fatigue  as  it  affected  pilots  employed  by  civil  airlines.  In  1949  
FPRC  researchers  partnered  with  BOAC,  Britain’s  leading  long-­haul  airline,  in  
a  study  of  skill  fatigue.179  This  partnership  marked  the  beginning  of  an  
enduring  research  relationship  between  military  and  civil  circles  on  the  subject  
of  flying  fatigue,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  several  contemporary  commentators  
questioned  the  similarities  between  military  and  civil  aviation.  Particularly  
during  the  final  years  of  the  Second  World  War,  researchers  and  military  
personnel  suggested  that  wartime  flying  subjected  pilots  to  specific  stresses  
and  strains  that  did  not  effect  civilian  pilots.180  It  was  held  that,  during  conflict,  
pilot  fatigue  was  largely  the  result  of  ‘the  prolonged  exercise  of  courage’.181  
This  source  of  fatigue  was  thought  to  be  peculiar  to  military  aircrew  as  
wartime  flying  was  ‘never  free  from  danger’,  so  did  not  offer  any  opportunity  
for  ‘occasional  complete  relaxation’  as  was  the  case  for  other  combatants  and  
civilian  pilots.182  Many  of  the  other  causes  of  fatigue  in  military  pilots  were,  
Whittingham  argued  in  an  article  published  in  the  British  Medical  Journal  in  
1946,  also  thought  to  be  present  in  civil  aviation.183  These  environmental  
stresses  included  ‘prolonged  visual  concentration’,  ‘noise’,  ‘cramped  positions  
in  some  types  of  aircraft  without  opportunity  to  change’,  ‘vibration’,  ‘lack  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179  TNA  AIR  57/20:  A.  T.  Welford,  Ruth  Brown,  and  J.  E.  Gabb,  ‘FPRC  Report  725:  
Experiments  on  Fatigue  as  Affecting  Skilled  Performance  in  Civilian  Aircrew’,  August  1949.  
180  Anon,  ‘Fatigue  in  Aircraft  Pilots’,  The  Lancet,  239,  6182  (1942)  234-­235.  
181  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/1  Letter  to  Sir  Harold  Whittingham  from  Air  Commodore  Consultant  in  
Neuro-­Psychiatry,  18  December  1942,  p.  2;;  Lord  Moran  built  on  these  sentiments  in  a  book  
published  in  1945,  see:  Lord  Moran,  The  Anatomy  of  Courage:  The  Classic  WWI  Account  of  
the  Psychological  Effects  of  War,  second  edition,  (London:  Robinson,  2007).  
182  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/1  Letter  to  Sir  Harold  Whittingham  from  Air  Commodore  Consultant  in  
Neuro-­Psychiatry,  18  December  1942,  p.  2.  
183  Harold  Whittingham,  ‘Progress  of  Aviation  Medicine  in  the  Royal  Air  Force  and  its  
Application  to  the  Problems  of  Civil  Aviation’,  British  Medical  Journal,  2,  4462  (1946)  39-­45.  
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sleep  and  lack  of  a  hot  meal’.184    It  was  on  these  areas  of  convergence  that  
the  FPRC  initially  focused  its  research  on  flying  fatigue  in  a  civil  setting.  
Models  of  flying  fatigue  were  often  entangled  with,  and  influenced  by,  
broader  economic  and  social  concerns  in  the  aviation  industry.  From  the  
1960s  the  Ministry  of  Labour  commissioned  much  of  the  research  carried  out  
by  the  FPRC.  The  FPRC  was  asked  on  several  occasions  to  investigate  pilot  
workload  and  working  conditions  as  part  of  a  process  of  arbitration  between  
pilots  and  airline  managements.  The  Committee  was  involved  in  arbitration  for  
BEA  in  1960-­1961,  and  again  in  1963  and  1965-­1966,  and  was  involved  in  
arbitration  for  BOAC  in  1966.  Led  by  Hugh  Patrick  Ruffell  Smith  (1911-­1980),  
who  had  been  employed  in  the  RAF  Medical  Branch  between  1938  and  1961,  
many  of  the  workload  studies  carried  out  by  the  FPRC  adopted  the  model  of  
civilian  flying  fatigue  suggested  by  Whittingham.  A  number  of  the  reports  and  
memoranda  published  by  the  FPRC  between  1961  and  1966  framed  fatigue  
as  the  result  of  environmental  conditions.185  Indeed,  in  a  letter  to  Whittingham  
written  in  September  1961,  Ruffell  Smith  listed  the  following  five  
environmental  stresses  as  the  primary  causes  of  pilot  fatigue:  excessive  heat,  
very  low  relative  humidity,  glare,  noise,  and  sleep  deprivation.  ‘In  my  opinion’,  
Ruffell  Smith  argued,  ‘the  combination  of  stresses  in  this  operation  are  likely  
to  produce  dangerous  fatigue  effects  in  the  pilots  undertaking  them.’186  For  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/1  Letter  to  Sir  Harold  Whittingham  from  Air  Commodore  Consultant  in  
Neuro-­Psychiatry,  18  December  1942,  p.  3.  
185  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/8:  H.  P.  Ruffell  Smith,  ‘An  Investigation  of  Pilots’  Working  Conditions  in  a  
Civil  Air  Line’,  November  1961;;  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/8:  H.  P.  Ruffell  Smith,  ‘Present  Position  of  
B.E.A.  Pilots’  Work  Load  Investigation:  Memorandum  to  the  FPRC  Working  Party  on  Aircrew  
Fatigue’,  January  1963  
186  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/8:  Letter  from  H.  P.  Ruffell  Smith  to  Sir  Harold  Whittingham,  21  
September  1961.  
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Ruffell  Smith,  then,  fatigue  was  synonymous  with  dangerous  performance  
decrement.  
Importantly,  though,  Ruffell  Smith  diverged  from  Whittingham  on  the  
role  of  psychology  and  emotion  in  fatigue.  A  number  of  unpublished  draft  
reports  produced  in  association  with  the  investigation  of  BEA  pilot  workloads  
in  1960-­1961  indicate  that,  for  Ruffell  Smith,  emotional  stress  was  a  major  
cause  of  fatigue  in  civil,  as  well  as  military,  settings.  One  draft  report,  
produced  in  November  1961,  argued  that  the  discordant  relations  between  
management  and  aircrew  were  a  ‘source  of  stress’  for  pilots.  Ruffell  Smith  
contended  that  his  experience  during  the  period  of  investigation  gave  the  
impression  that  relations  between  aircrew  and  management  were  
‘unsatisfactory’,  and  that  this  ‘lack  of  harmony’  might  be  an  important  cause  of  
fatigue.187  Another  draft  interim  report  of  the  same  name,  likely  also  produced  
in  November  1961,  expanded  this  discussion  of  stress  and  morale,  arguing  
that:  
  
While  there  may  be  genuine  cause  for  concern  about  some  of  the  
conditions  of  service,  and  the  work-­load  on  certain  BEA  schedules,  our  
experiences  and  relationships  during  the  period  of  investigation  lead  us  
to  the  conclusion  that  the  root  cause  of  the  complaints  and  
dissatisfaction  goes  much  deeper.  It  lies  in  the  ever-­worsening  
relations  between  aircrew  and  management.188  
  
According  to  this  draft  report,  pilots  expressed  a  ‘lack  of  confidence  in,  lack  of  
respect  for,  and  rank  mistrust’  of  BEA  management,  and  felt  that  when  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/8:  H.  P.  Ruffell  Smith,  ‘Independent  Investigation  of  Work-­Load  and  
Working  Conditions  of  British  European  Airways’  Pilots’,  November  1961,  p.  13.  
188  Ibid.  p.  8.  
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mistakes  occurred  there  was  ‘one  law  for  aircrew  and  another  for  
management’.189  The  draft  report  recommended  that  ‘strenuous  efforts’  be  
made  to  regain  the  good  relationships  and  mutual  confidence  ‘without  which  
no  airline  can  operate  efficiently’.190  It  is  unclear  whether  BEA  management  
ever  had  sight  of  this  draft  report,  but  it  is  evident  that  Ruffell  Smith  removed  
all  discussion  of  aircrew-­management  relations  from  the  final  version  of  the  
report.  The  increasingly  carefully  worded  nature  of  criticism  in  the  draft  reports  
suggests  that  Ruffell  Smith  may  have  been  under  pressure  from  BEA  
management  to  present  a  favourable  account  of  aircrew-­management  
relations.    
   Partly,  perhaps,  as  a  result  of  pressure  to  underplay  the  psychological  
and  emotional  causes  of  fatigue,  in  later  workload  studies  Ruffell  Smith  
examined  somatic  expressions  of  subjective  fatigue  states.  Using  techniques  
comparable  to  those  employed  by  Reid  and  Frederick  shortly  after  the  1939-­
1945  war,  and  by  contemporary  stress  researchers,  Ruffell  Smith  attempted  
to  measure  fatigue  by  recording  the  heartbeat  and  the  adrenaline  levels  of  
airline  pilots  in  a  1966  workload  study.191  Ultimately,  however,  the  1966  report  
gave  most  weight  to  the  subjective  feelings  of  tiredness  described  by  flight  
crew.  Ruffell  Smith  explained  the  decision  to  privilege  ‘subjective’  rather  than  
‘objective’  biological  measures  of  fatigue  as  follows:  
  
The  ambiguity  of  the  word  ‘fatigue’,  when  used  in  a  scientific  context  is  
well  recognised.  In  this  report  it  is  used  to  describe  the  subjective  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189  Ibid.  p.  9.  
190  Ibid.  p.  9.  
191  WL  PP/HEW/F.4/8:  FPRC  Second  Report  on  Flight  Deck  Work  Loads  in  Civil  Air  Transport  
Aircraft  by  a  team  from  the  Board  of  Trade  (Civil  Aviation  Department)  and  the  Royal  Air  
Force  Institute  of  Aviation  Medicine,  Farnborough,  December  1966.  
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feelings  of  tiredness  described  by  captains  after  a  particular  working  
period.  Ideally  we  would  have  wished  to  use  an  objective  measure  of  
fatigue  or  performance  decrement  instead  of  a  subjective  one.  Up  to  
the  time  of  writing  no  objective  measure  was  available  so  that  a  
subjective  ‘Fatigue  Score’  was  used  during  these  trials.192  
  
  In  lieu  of  an  ‘objective’  biological  measure,  Ruffell  Smith  suggested  rating  
scales  provided  the  ‘best  alternative’,  as  the  results  were  usually  confirmed  by  
the  observers’  assessment  of  a  subject’s  fatigue  state.193    
The  1966  workload  study  utilised  the  Pearson  and  Byers  Feeling  Tone  
Checklist  to  obtain  a  score  of  the  pilots’  subjective  impression  of  their  energy  
levels.194  The  checklist,  which  was  originally  developed  by  the  American  Air  
Force  to  quantitatively  measure  aircrew  fatigue,  required  pilots  to  rate  
themselves  as  ‘better  than’,  ‘same  as’,  or  ‘worse  than’  a  number  of  statements  
that  described  different  parts  of  a  ‘fatigue  continuum’.195  The  statements  
ranged  from  words  that  implied  energy  and  vigour  –  such  as  ‘very  lively’,  
‘extremely  peppy’,  and  ‘somewhat  fresh’  –  to  phrases  that  suggested  different  
increments  of  fatigue  –  such  as  ‘slightly  pooped’,  ‘petered  out’,  and  ‘ready  to  
drop’.196  To  make  the  checklist  data  quantifiable  on  a  large  scale,  Ruffell  
Smith  allocated  points  for  each  answer.  Every  response  in  the  ‘worse  than’  
column  received  two  points,  while  each  answer  in  the  ‘same  as’  column  
received  one  point.  Answers  in  the  ‘better  than’  column  did  not  receive  points.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192  Ibid.  p.  4.  
193  Ibid.  p.  43.  
194  Richard  G.  Pearson  and  George  E.  Byers,  ‘The  Development  and  Validation  of  a  Checklist  
for  Measuring  Subjective  Fatigue’,  Air  University,  School  of  Aviation  Medicine,  USAF,  
Randolph  AFB,  Texas,  December  1956,  1-­16,  available  at  
<http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/128756.pdf>  [last  accessed  15/04/15].  
195  Ibid.  p.  1.  
196  Ibid.  p.  16.  
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Pilots  could  score  between  zero  and  twenty  points  overall,  with  higher  scores  
indicating  greater  feelings  of  tiredness.  Ruffell  Smith  suggested  that  the  
quantification  of  subjective  fatigue  states  using  a  points-­based  system  
removed  the  need  to  find  a  somatic  expression  of  fatigue.  Ultimately,  he  
argued,  pilots’  self  reports  were  reliable  and  provided  the  best  available  
means  of  measuring  and  understanding  fatigue.    
  
Conclusion:  The  Wartime  Hangover  
The  period  between  the  outset  of  the  Second  World  War  and  the  growth  of  
commercial  airlines  in  the  1960s  was  crucial  in  establishing  the  rhetoric  and  
practices  relating  to  pilot  fatigue  that  permeated  British  civil  aviation  
throughout  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century.  Fatigue  was  first  identified  
as  an  issue  that  might  effect  the  health  and  performance  of  pilots  by  
researchers  shortly  before  the  outset  of  the  Second  World  War.  This  
research,  along  with  that  published  by  the  Air  Ministry  during  and  shortly  after  
the  1939-­1945  war  established  a  complex  picture  of  fatigue.  While  some  
investigators  argued,  in  line  with  interwar  research  on  flying  stress,  that  flying  
fatigue  was  a  primarily  psychological  phenomenon,  others  looked  to  working  
hours  and  physiology,  citing  loss  of  sleep  and  long  flying  hours  as  the  primary  
causes  of  pilot  fatigue.  A  functional  model  of  fatigue,  however,  emerged.  
Framed  in  some  instances  in  relation  to  wakefulness,  and  in  others  in  terms  of  
performance  decrement,  this  model  of  fatigue  was  not  entirely  consistent,  but  
the  prevailing  narrative  was  clear.  As  in  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth-­
century  science  of  work,  fatigue  was  said  to  have  implications  for  efficiency.  
Unlike  in  earlier  factory-­based  studies  though,  fatigue  was  not  framed  in  terms  
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of  lost  productivity.  FPRC  researchers  instead  framed  fatigue  in  relation  to  
manpower  economy.  Interest  centred,  then,  less  on  output  and  more  on  the  
efficient  use  of  resources.  The  avoidance  of  human  error  and  accidents  was  
central  here.  
The  modes  of  management  and  regulation  employed  by  military  bodies  
and  civil  airlines  during  and  shortly  after  the  Second  World  War  reflected  this  
model  of  fatigue.  Striking  an  often-­precarious  balance  between  the  avoidance  
of  breakdown  and  the  maximisation  of  crews  and  machines,  the  RAF  and,  
later,  civil  airlines,  employed  a  range  of  measures  for  combatting  fatigue.  
Reflecting  the  primary  modes  of  management  established  by  industrial  fatigue  
research  prior  to  the  war,  some,  such  as  the  use  of  pharmaceuticals  and  
special  instructions,  focused  on  the  individual,  while  others  took  a  broader  
institutional  approach.  
     While  this  and  the  previous  chapter  have  focused  largely  on  scientific  
and  medical  research,  the  following  chapters  take  a  different  approach.  Later  
chapters  focus  on  policy  and  labour  politics,  rather  than  science  and  
medicine.  This  focus  on  policy  and  practice  should  not  suggest,  though,  that  
research  on  fatigue  ceased  in  the  post-­war  period.  Quite  to  the  contrary,  
scientific  research  on  the  effects  of  fatigue  and  sleep  loss  on  pilot  
performance  continued  to  be  undertaken  by  the  FPRC  and  the  RAF  IAM  well  
into  the  1970s.    Much  of  this  research  continued  to  frame  and  investigate  
fatigue  in  broadly  functional  terms,  as  the  precise  mechanism  of  fatigue  
remained  contested.    
The  following  chapters  trace  the  legacy  of  the  developments  described  
here.  They  show  that,  after  the  war  the  dual  discourse  of  flying  fatigue  
   140  
established  in  wartime  structured  discussions  of  fatigue  in  civil  contexts.  In  
most  instances,  fatigue  was  considered  in  relation  to  performance  decrement,  
while  in  some  circumstances  sleep  and  wakefulness  took  priority.  The  
following  chapters  show,  also,  that  the  medically  uncertain  nature  of  fatigue  
had  clear  consequences  for  the  regulation  and  the  industrial  negotiation  of  
aircrew  schedules  in  post-­war  Britain.  Chapter  Four  demonstrates  that  
aviation  unions  and  associations  made  fatigue  a  priority  at  least  in  part  
because  the  nebulous  nature  of  the  condition  allowed  them  to  convincingly  
campaign  for  economic,  social,  health,  and  safety  objectives  simultaneously.  
It  was  in  this  context  that  the  wakefulness  model  of  fatigue  was  taken  up  most  
forcefully  in  the  post-­war  period.  A  potent,  and  terrifying,  manifestation  of  
aircrew  fatigue,  sleepiness  came  to  dominate  trade  union  rhetoric  in  the  
1970s.  Though  anxieties  about  aircrew  unintentionally  sleeping  on  the  flight  
deck  certainly  proved  a  forceful  motivation  for  the  regulation  of  aircrew  
schedules,  it  was  concerns  about  human  error  resulting  from  fatigue  that  first  
prompted  regulatory  review  of  aircrew  schedules  in  post-­war  Britain,  an  issue  
that  the  next  chapter  takes  up.  
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3  
Flight  Time  Limitations  and  the  Avoidance  of  Fatigue    
  
  
On  13  March  1954,  a  British  Overseas  Airways  Corporation  (BOAC)  
Lockheed  Constellation  aircraft  crashed  at  Kallang  Airport,  Singapore.  Part  
way  through  a  scheduled  flight  from  Sydney  to  London  the  aircraft  struck  a  
seawall  on  approach  to  runway  six  at  Kallang  Airport.  The  undercarriage  was  
damaged  and  the  integral  fuel  tank  was  disrupted.  When  the  aircraft  touched  
down  on  the  runway  the  starboard  wing  broke  off  and  the  undercarriage  
collapsed.  The  aircraft  came  to  rest  eighty  yards  from  the  seawall,  in  flames.  
A  number  of  crew  members,  including  Captain  T.  W.  Hoyle,  managed  to  
escape  the  burning  wreckage  through  a  glass  panel  in  the  cockpit.  The  main  
cabin  door  and  emergency  exits  were,  however,  immovable  and  though  
attempts  were  made  to  rescue  passengers  through  holes  cut  into  the  fuselage  
these  were,  as  one  report  commented  following  the  accident,  ‘almost  
completely  unsuccessful’.1  Of  the  forty  passengers  and  crew  on  board  the  
aircraft,  thirty-­three  were  killed.    
Following  the  accident,  Singapore’s  Supreme  Court  conducted  a  public  
inquiry.  On  16  November  1954,  the  inquiry  commission  published  a  forty-­six  
page  report,  which  detailed  the  causes  and  circumstances  of  the  crash.  The  
report  drew  attention  to  the  ‘undoubtedly  long  hours’  worked  by  crew  and  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Anon,  ‘The  Kallang  Inquiry’,  Flight  International,  Nov  19  1954,  754,  p.  754.  
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limited  availability  of  in-­flight  rest  facilities.2  The  crew,  it  was  found,  had  
worked  for  a  total  of  twenty-­one  and  a  half  hours  and,  while  rest  facilities  were  
available,  the  inquiry  commission  deemed  them  inadequate.  The  
Constellation  aircraft  was  not  equipped  with  bunks  and  crew  were  required  to  
rest  instead  on  a  mattress  ‘placed  over  the  luggage’.  As  the  report  noted,  it  
seemed  ‘unlikely’  that  this  provided  ‘a  very  comfortable  resting  place’.3  The  
report  concluded  that  insidious  fatigue  might  have  affected  Captain  Hoyle’s  
judgement  in  the  last  stages  of  the  approach.  As  the  Singapore  Free  Press  
explained  following  the  report’s  publication:  
  
The  fact  that  his  first  point  of  touch  down  came  closer  to  the  threshold  
markings  (at  the  seawall  end  of  the  runway)  than  he  originally  intended  
can  probably  be  attributed  to  a  degree  of  tiredness  which  he  may  or  
may  not  have  been  aware.4  
  
Given  the  possibility  that  ‘tiredness’  might  have  affected  Hoyle’s  performance  
and,  in  turn,  caused  the  accident,  the  report  published  by  Singapore’s  
Supreme  Court  made  two  recommendations  on  the  subject  of  crew  fatigue:  
first,  that  crew  fatigue  be  scientifically  investigated;;  and,  second,  that  the  
legislation  which  controlled  pilots’  hours  of  work  and  rest  be  reviewed.  
   Though  an  international  industry,  in  the  twentieth  century  civil  aviation  
was  governed  almost  entirely  by  national  regulations.5  As  such  it  was  not  
within  the  remit  of  Singapore’s  inquiry  commission  to  produce  directives  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  The  National  Archives  (hereafter  referred  to  as  TNA)  BT/248/110:  Extract  from  the  Kallang  
Accident  Inquiry  Report,  1954,  p.  1.  
3  Ibid.  p.  1.  
4  Anon,  ‘The  Pilot,  Not  Ridge  Gets  Blame’,  The  Singapore  Free  Press,  Nov  16  1954,  p.  1.  
5  Thomas  C.  Lawton,  ‘Governing  the  Skies:  Conditions  for  the  Europeanisation  of  Airline  
Policy’,  Journal  of  Public  Policy,  19,  1  (1999)  91-­112.  
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relation  to  the  working  practices  of  pilots  and  flight  crew  employed  by  British  
airlines.  The  recommendations  outlined  by  the  commission  did,  however,  
receive  wide  attention  in  Britain.  Indeed,  in  the  days  immediately  following  the  
report’s  publication  a  number  of  British  airline  unions  and  associations  publicly  
called  for  a  review  of  pilots’  hours  of  duty,  in  line  with  the  recommendations  of  
the  Kallang  inquiry.  On  20  November  1954  Denis  Follows,  General  Secretary  
of  the  British  Airline  Pilots  Association  (BALPA),  penned  an  article  for  the  
Times  in  which  he  called  for  the  introduction  of  a  ‘broad  policy  for  maximum  
hours  of  duty  for  pilots  …  on  a  national  scale’:  
  
The  public  has  a  right  to  expect  that,  whatever  else  may  be  the  
hazards  of  air  travel,  at  least  those  which  can  definitely  be  eliminated  
by  straightforward  ministerial  regulation  should  not  be  allowed  to  
persist.  With  the  onrush  of  air  transport  in  the  short  space  of  a  
generation,  there  is  a  gap  in  our  social  legislation  which  only  by  
widespread  public  support  can  we  hope  to  fill.6  
  
It  was  important,  Follows  argued,  that  long  hours  of  continuous  duty  –  the  
apparent  cause  of  the  Kallang  crash  –  were  limited  wherever  possible.  
At  the  time  of  the  1954  accident,  there  were  no  statutory  regulations  
governing  flight  times  in  Britain.  The  regulations  that  did  exist  were  not  
obligatory,  and  laid  the  responsibility  for  establishing  flight  time  limitations  on  
operators.7  The  1954  Air  Navigation  Order  required  only  that  airlines  
produced  flight  time  limitations  in  conformity  with  the  permissive  
recommendations  of  the  International  Civil  Aviation  Organisation  (ICAO),  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  D.  Follows,  ‘Duty  Hours  of  Pilots:  Recommendations  to  Minister’,  Times,  Nov  20  1954,  p.  7.  
7  TNA  BT  248/110:  Ministry  of  Civil  Aviation  minutes,  26  November  1954,  p.  19.  
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which  required  that  flight  times  of  some  sort  ‘should  be  established  such  as  to  
ensure  safety’.8  Airlines  variously  interpreted  this  rule  but,  in  most  cases,  
imposed  an  upper  limit  on  the  number  of  hours  pilots  were  permitted  to  fly  in  a  
month  in  line  with  the  principle  of  the  operational  limit  utilised  by  the  Royal  Air  
Force  (RAF)  during  the  Second  World  War.9  Airlines  rarely  imposed  limits  on  
the  number  of  hours  a  pilot  could  fly  in  a  day  or  week,  however,  and  given  the  
excessive  hours  worked  by  the  crew  of  the  BOAC  aircraft,  the  Ministry  of  
Aviation  felt  it  was  important  that  the  current  system  be  re-­examined.  The  
Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue  and  Flight  Time  Limitations  
(hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Bowhill  Working  Party)  was  established  to  do  just  
this.  Demonstrating  the  close  post-­war  relationship  between  civil  and  military  
aviation,  the  Working  Party  was  led  by  Sir  Frederick  Bowhill  (1880-­1960),  a  
senior  military  figure  who  had  acted  as  Commander-­in-­Chief  of  Coastal  
Command  and  later  Transport  Command  during  the  1939-­1945  war.  
Following  extensive  consultation  with  airlines,  trade  unions,  and  the  Air  
Ministry,  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  made  a  number  of  recommendations  for  
regulatory  review  in  a  report  published  on  15  December  1954.  Breaking  with  
the  military  model  of  a  single  monthly  limit  on  flying  hours,  the  Bowhill  
Working  Party  recommended  quantitative  limitations  on  daily  and  weekly  
hours  of  work.  Based  on  the  premise  that  fatigue  was  a  short-­term  reaction  to  
imbalanced  working  practices  in  a  single  day,  the  regulation  of  daily  working  
hours  was  recommended  above  all  else:  
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  TNA  BT  248/110:    Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue  and  Flight  Time  
Limitations,  15  December  1954.  
9  John  Terraine,  The  Right  of  the  Line:  The  Role  of  the  RAF  in  World  War  Two,  (Barnsley:  
Pen  and  Sword  Military,  2010).  
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Considering  the  detailed  aspects  of  quantitative  limitations  the  most  
likely  source  of  fatigue  is  the  individual  flight  rather  than  the  amount  of  
flying  done  during  a  month,  a  quarter  or  a  year.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  
that  the  pattern  of  public  transport  operations  is  long  consecutive  hours  
of  duty  followed  by  very  generous  rest  periods.  The  Working  Party,  
therefore,  consider  that  any  policy  of  quantitative  limitations  should  pay  
particular  attention  to  the  individual  flight.10  
  
The  nature  of  civil  flying  in  1950s  Britain  –  long  hours  of  work  followed  by  long  
hours  of  rest  –  caused,  according  to  the  Bowhill  Working  Party,  acute  rather  
than  ‘cumulative’  fatigue.11  As  such,  the  committee’s  final  report  
recommended  that  a  limit  on  the  number  of  hours  pilots  could  work  in  a  single  
day  was  the  single  most  important  countermeasure  for  fatigue.  The  report  
recommended  a  daily  maximum  of  sixteen  hours,  but  suggested  that  this  
could  be  extended  to  twenty-­four  consecutive  hours  ‘to  provide  operators  with  
reasonable  flexibility  in  respect  of  slipping  and  rostering’.12  The  report  also  
recommended  limits  on  weekly,  monthly,  and  yearly  flying  hours.  It  suggested  
a  maximum  of  fifty  flying  hours  per  week,  125  flying  hours  per  month,  and  
1,000  flying  hours  per  year.  The  recommendations  of  the  Bowhill  Working  
Party  formed  the  basis  of  a  new  Air  Navigation  Order,  which  came  into  effect  
on  1  May  1957.  
Like  previous  regulations,  the  new  Air  Navigation  Order  was  permissive  
and  allowed  airline  managements  scope  to  apply  limits  as  they  saw  fit.  While  
carriers  were  encouraged  to  adopt  the  daily,  weekly,  monthly,  and  yearly  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  TNA  BT/248/110:  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue  and  Flight  Time  
Limitations,  15  Dec  1954,  p.  7.  
11  Ibid.  p.  7.  
12  TNA  BT/248/110:  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue:  Meetings  2  and  3  September  
1954,  p.  8.  
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limits  recommended  by  the  Bowhill  Working  Party,  this  was  not  mandatory  or  
enforceable.  The  regulations  introduced  by  the  Ministry  of  Transport  in  the  
1950s  set  the  tone  for  all  subsequent  regulation  of  aircrew  schedules  for  the  
following  twenty  years.  As  in  the  1957  Air  Navigation  Order,  later  regulations  
tended  to  be  permissive  –  to  allow  airlines  discretion  in  terms  of  their  
implementation  –  and  to  conceptualise  fatigue  as  a  short-­term,  rather  than  
cumulative,  problem.    
This  approach  to  flight  time  regulation  was  first  challenged  in  the  1970s  
when,  in  response  to  growing  concerns  about  the  relationship  between  pilot  
workload,  stress,  and  flight  safety,  the  recently  formed  Civil  Aviation  Authority  
(CAA)  introduced  new  regulations  that  intended  to  balance  the  work  and  rest  
of  pilots  both  within  and  between  rosters.  This  established  a  regulatory  
framework  that  remains  largely  unchanged  to  the  present  day.  
This  chapter  disentangles  the  relationship  between  fatigue,  working  
hours,  rest,  and  regulation  in  post-­war  Britain.  With  a  specific  focus  on  the  
flight  time  limitations  introduced  by  regulatory  agencies  in  1957  and  1975,  it  
examines  how  and  why  fatigue  was  managed  in  civil  aviation  in  the  second  
half  of  the  twentieth  century.  It  is  structured  in  two  parts.  The  first  examines  
the  rationale  for  the  regulatory  changes  discussed  here.  It  engages,  in  
particular,  with  Alan  Derickson’s  argument  about  the  regulation  of  workers’  
hours  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic.  Fatigue  and  sleepiness  were,  
according  to  Derickson,  only  a  concern  for  regulators  in  twentieth-­century  
America  in  instances  where  publics  were  endangered.13  Legislation  that  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Alan  Derickson,  Dangerously  Sleepy:  Overworked  Americans  and  the  Cult  of  Manly  
Wakefulness,  (Philadelphia:  University  of  Pennsylvania  Press,  2014).  
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strictly  controlled  hours  of  work  and  rest  was  only  introduced  for  occupations  
where  fatigued  workers  posed  a  threat  to  publics.  The  rationale  for  such  
regulation  was  clear:  protection  of  the  public.  The  first  part  of  this  chapter  
examines  the  rationale  for  the  regulation  of  pilots’  hours  of  work  and  rest  in  
post-­war  Britain.  With  a  specific  focus  on  the  documents  produced  by  the  
Bowhill  Working  Party  and  the  Bader  Committee  I  argue  that  while  public  
safety  was  emphasised  in  both  regulatory  reviews  other  –  mostly  
administrative,  but  also  economic  –  issues  were  important.    
Situating  flight  time  limitations  in  a  broader  history  of  health  and  safety  
regulation,  in  the  second  part  of  this  chapter  I  argue  that,  though  formally  in  
place  to  protect  publics,  the  regulations  that  governed  aircrew  schedules  in  
post-­war  Britain  were  permissive  and  premised  on  voluntarism  rather  than  a  
strict  system  of  command  and  control.  Operators  were  able,  as  in  the  interwar  
years,  to  schedule  intensive  and  imbalanced  rosters  with  little  oversight  from  
regulatory  agencies  and,  as  such,  fatigue  remained  endemic  in  commercial  
aviation  throughout  the  twentieth  century.  
  
Dangerous  Fatigue:  Regulatory  Rationale  in  Post-­War  Britain  
Aircrew  schedules  were  first  subject  to  regulation  in  the  post-­war  period,  but  
efforts  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  fatigue  in  industry  began  long  before  this.  Of  
course,  for  much  of  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries  working  times  
were  under-­regulated.  Indeed,  a  number  of  occupations  in  Britain  encouraged  
workers  to  stay  on  the  job  beyond  their  contracted  hours.  The  increasing  
popularity  of  scientific  management  and,  specifically,  Frederick  Winslow  
Taylor’s  (1865-­1915)  piece  rate  system  in  America,  and  from  the  1910s  
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Britain,  engendered  a  culture  where  overwork  was  normalised.14  The  rise  of  
piece  work  and  bonus  systems,  which  explicitly  connected  output  and  
remuneration,  redefined  what  constituted  a  fair  day’s  work.  With  the  rewards  
of  labour  closely  tied  to  output,  workers  from  all  sectors  of  industry  and  
service  were  encouraged  to  increase  their  effort  to  enhance  their  
employability  and  earning  potential.  The  intensification  of  work  caused  by  
incentive-­based  systems  often  exacerbated  problems  of  fatigue  and  
overstrain.  As  Arthur  McIvor  and  others  have  shown,  though  some  
industrialists  restricted  the  working  hours  of  their  employees  from  the  
nineteenth  century,  the  British  state  was  loath  to  introduce  any  regulations  
that  might  fetter  industry,  including  limitations  on  hours  of  work.15    
In  some  instances,  though,  working  hours  were  formally  restricted.  In  
Britain  regulations  intending  to  minimise  worker  fatigue  stretch  back  to  the  
nineteenth  century.  Many  of  these  state  regulations  –  including  the  1844  and  
1850  Factory  Acts  –  had  a  social  and  moral  imperative.  They  were  intended  to  
protect  vulnerable  groups  from  exploitation.16  Gary  Cross  has  argued  that  in  
Britain  and  elsewhere,  shorter  hours  campaigns  were  bound  up  with  both  the  
burgeoning  phenomenon  of  leisure  and  Victorian  social  concerns  about  self-­
improvement.  Indeed,  many  advocates  of  limited  working  explicitly  framed  
their  campaigns  as  part  of  broader  projects  aimed  at  inculcating  the  working  
population  with  middle-­class  values  through  rational  recreation  and  purposeful  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Daniel  Nelson,  ‘Taylorism  and  the  Workers  at  Bethlehem  Steel,  1898-­1901’,  The  
Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  101,  4  (1977)  487-­505;;  Daniel  Nelson,  
‘Scientific  Management,  Systematic  Management,  and  Labor,  1880-­1915’,  The  Business  
History  Review,  48,  4  (1974)  479-­500.  
15  Arthur  J.  McIvor,  A  History  of  Work  in  Britain,  1880-­1950,  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave,  2001).  
16  Vicky  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory:  The  Politics  of  Industrial  Health  in  
Britain,  1914-­60,  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2011).  
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leisure.  The  argument  held,  as  Cross  has  shown,  that  time  away  from  work  
was  crucial  for  personal,  and  also  communal,  development.  Time  off  allowed  
workers  the  opportunity  to  consume  culture,  to  further  their  education,  to  
become,  essentially,  better  people.17  Some  advocates  of  shorter  hours  
framed  their  arguments  in  line  with  the  those  of  the  International  Labour  
Organisation  and,  later,  the  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  which  
held  that  rest,  leisure,  and  reasonable  limitations  on  working  hours  were  
fundamental  human  rights.18  Humans,  no  matter  their  race,  class,  or  religion  
had  a  right  to  time.  It  was  a  matter  of  social  justice.    
In  other  instances,  though,  activists  argued  that  allocated  time  for  rest  
had  implications  within  the  workplace.  Content  and  well-­rested  workers  were,  
according  to  this  line  of  argument,  more  productive.  This  argument  had  its  
roots  in  the  nineteenth  century.  In  the  1890s  a  number  of  socially  minded  
industrialists  argued  that  productivity  was  closely  related  to  the  health  and  
wellbeing  of  workers.19  In  the  early  twentieth  century,  though,  productivity  
became  the  dominant  discourse  surrounding  and  justification  for  limitations  on  
hours  of  work  in  Britain.20  In  the  early  and  middle  decades  of  the  century  
research  committees  including  the  Health  of  Munitions  Workers  Committee  
(HMWC),  the  Industrial  Fatigue  Research  Board  (IFRB),  and  the  National  
Institute  of  Industrial  Psychology  (NIIP)  demonstrated  experimentally  that  a  
relationship  existed  between  hours  of  work  and  rate  of  output.  A  major  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  Gary  Cross,  The  Quest  for  Time:  The  Reduction  of  Work  in  Britain  and  France,  1840-­1940,  
(Berkeley:  University  of  California  Press,  1989).  
18  Sangheon  Lee,  Deirdre  McCann  and  Jon  C.  Messenger,  Working  Time  Around  the  World:  
Trends  in  Working  Hours,  Laws  and  Policies  in  Global  Comparative  Perspective,  (Abingdon:  
Routledge,  2007).  
19  A.  J.  McIvor,  ‘Employers,  the  Government,  and  Industrial  Fatigue  in  Britain,  1890-­1918’,  
British  Journal  of  Industrial  Medicine,  44,  11  (1987)  724-­732.  
20  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory.  
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contention  of  these  committees  was  that  human  energy  was  a  finite  resource.  
Very  long  hours  of  work  were,  these  committees  thus  argued,  a  false  
economy.  Long  hours  of  work  depleted  energy  reserves,  which  explained  why  
the  productivity  of  workers  fell  towards  the  end  of  long  shifts.21  When  workers  
were  allowed  to  take  brief  rest  breaks,  however,  output  increased.  One  IFRB  
study,  carried  out  in  1924,  found  that  fifteen-­minute  rest  pauses  resulted  in  a  
‘slight  but  real  improvement  of  output’  of  5-­10%,  even  when  diminution  of  
working  time  was  taken  into  account.22  Rest  pauses  of  this  type  were  widely  
popular  with  workers.  As  the  British  Medical  Journal  reported  in  1925:  
  
The  writers  of  the  present  report  draw  attention  to  the  fact  that  the  
operatives  were  unanimous  in  their  appreciation  of  the  rests,  and  often  
volunteered  such  remarks  as  ‘The  work  is  not  so  depressing’,  and  ‘I  
feel  less  tired  at  the  end  of  the  work’.23  
  
Limitations  on  working  hours  and  the  introduction  of  rest  periods  thus  made  
both  good  economic  and  humanitarian  sense.    
   As  a  result  of  these  investigations  hours  of  work  and  rest  were  
increasingly  regulated  in  interwar  Britain.  The  recommendations  of  the  IFRB  
and  NIIP  were  incorporated  into  the  1937  Factory  Act,  which  made  limitations  
on  working  hours  and  provisions  for  rest  mandatory  for  women  and  young  
people.24  Weekly  working  hours  were  capped  at  forty-­eight,  daily  hours  at  
eleven,  and  limits  were  placed  on  when  work  could  start  and  end.  Though  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  A.  J.  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’,  Medical  History,  
31,  2  (1987)  160-­189.  
22  Anon,  ‘Rest  Pauses  in  Industry’,  British  Medical  Journal,  1,  3298  (1924)  482-­483,  p.  483.  
23  Anon,  ‘Restpauses  in  Industrial  Repetition  Work’,  British  Medical  Journal,  2,  3386  (1925)  
964,  p.  964.  
24  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory.  
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detailed  and  expansive  the  1937  Factory  Act  was  permissive.  There  were  
numerous  exemption  clauses  so,  while  ambitious,  implementation  of  the  Act  
was  patchy  and  its  impact  limited.  Indeed,  during  the  Second  World  War  
intensive  working  practices,  similar  to  those  common  in  the  First  World  War,  
returned  to  some  areas  of  industry.  As  McIvor  has  demonstrated,  following  
the  Dunkirk  evacuation  in  1940  workers  involved  in  war  industries  commonly  
worked  up  to  seventy-­five  hours  a  week;;  twenty-­seven  hours  more  than  the  
1937  Factory  Act  prescribed.25  
   Although  much  useful  historical  literature  has  explored  the  regulation  of  
work  and  rest  in  factory  settings,  fatigue  was  also  experienced  and  managed  
beyond  the  factory  floor.26  In  nineteenth  and  twentieth-­century  Britain  fatigue  
was  widespread  beyond  the  factory.  It  was  endemic  in  a  number  of  industries  
and  professions,  particularly  those  that  required  round-­the-­clock  work  such  as  
transportation,  construction,  agriculture,  healthcare,  and  other  public  services.  
The  regulation  of  working  hours  in  these  industries  was,  however,  
inconsistent.  For  some,  such  as  railway  workers,  hours  of  work  were  
controlled  from  the  late  nineteenth  century.27  For  many  others,  though,  
industry-­specific  regulation  of  work  and  rest  was  absent.  This  trend  was  not  
specific  to  Britain.  On  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  working  hours  were  only  
regulated  beyond  the  factory  in  certain  circumstances.  It  is  the  central  premise  
of  Derickson’s  Dangerously  Sleepy  that  regulation  was  limited  to  industries  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’.  
26  McIvor,  ‘Employers,  the  Government,  and  Industrial  Fatigue  in  Britain,  1890-­1918’;;  McIvor,  
‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’;;  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  
Healthy  Factory;;  Anson  Rabinbach,  The  Human  Motor:  Energy,  Fatigue,  and  the  Origins  of  
Modernity,  (Los  Angeles:  University  of  California  Press,  1992);;  Anna  Katharina  Schaffner,  
Exhaustion:  A  History,  (New  York:  Columbia  University  Press,  2016);;  and  ongoing  doctoral  
work  by  Steffan  Blayney.  
27  Bridget  M.  Hutter,  Regulation  and  Risk:  Occupational  Health  and  Safety  on  the  Railways,  
(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2001).  
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where  ‘sleeplessness  posed  a  threat  to  general  welfare’.28  In  other  words,  
regulatory  agencies  only  limited  hours  of  work  in  instances  where  publics  
were  potentially  endangered  by  worker  fatigue.  In  twentieth-­century  America  
federal  legislation  was  introduced  to  control  the  work  and  rest  of  train  
operators,  long-­haul  truckers,  and  commercial  pilots.  In  some  instances,  
further  legislation  was  enacted  at  a  state  level.  For  example,  in  the  1980s  
New  York  state  introduced  restrictions  on  the  number  of  hours  postgraduate  
medical  trainees  could  work.29  According  to  Derickson,  in  these  instances  the  
primary  rationale  for  regulation  was  the  protection  of  publics.    
  
  
Regulatory  Review  from  Bowhill  to  Bader    
While  Derickson’s  argument  holds  for  Britain  to  some  extent,  in  civil  aviation  
concerns  about  profitability  and  administration  sat  alongside  questions  of  
danger  in  creating  regulatory  frameworks.  Legislation  governing  health  and  
safety  in  Britain  emerged  in  a  piecemeal  fashion.  Christopher  Sirrs  has  shown  
that  regulators  responded  to  particular  problems  as  they  arose.  Industrial  
disasters  aroused  public  and  political  attention,  and  were,  as  such,  often  
followed  by  regulatory  review  and  the  reactive  extension  of  legislation.  In  the  
twentieth  century,  a  number  of  regulations  were  updated  following  large-­scale  
industrial  accidents.  In  1959  the  Factory  Act  was  reviewed  following  a  deadly  
mill  fire  in  Keighley,  Yorkshire,  while  in  1969  the  Mines  and  Quarries  (Tips)  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28  Derickson,  Dangerously  Sleepy,  p.  27.  
29  Ibid.  
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Act  advanced  new  requirements  for  spoil  tips  following  the  1966  Aberfan  
disaster.30    
In  the  twentieth  century,  the  regulatory  agencies  responsible  for  flight  
safety  adopted  a  similarly  reactionary  approach  to  regulation.  Air  accidents  
acted  as  flashpoints  for  regulatory  review  throughout  the  twentieth  century.  In  
the  post-­war  period  a  number  of  air  accidents  demonstrated  the  scale  of  
human  hurt  that  worker  fatigue  made  possible.  The  crash  at  Kallang  Airport  
on  13  March  1954  killed  thirty-­three  people,  the  largest  death  toll  of  any  
accident  to  date  in  Singapore.  It  was  widely  reported  in  the  British  media.31  An  
article  published  in  the  Times  shortly  after  the  accident,  described  the  crash  
vividly:  
  
Spectators  say  that  as  the  aircraft  came  to  land  it  tilted  sharply  to  the  
right  as  the  wheels  touched  the  runway,  then  ran  on  for  100  yards  
before  it  slewed  off  the  runway,  turned  completely  round,  broke  in  two,  
and  exploded.  The  right  wing  was  torn  off  and  the  other  buckled;;  one  of  
the  four  engines  was  hurled  a  distance  of  100  yards.  Smoke  and  
flames  shot  high  into  the  air,  and  almost  immediately  a  second  
explosion  occurred.  Attempts  were  made  to  release  the  trapped  
passengers  by  attacking  the  fuselage  with  axes.  Several  injured  
passengers  were  taken  from  the  wreckage  in  this  way,  but  all  died  
before  reaching  hospital.32  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  Christopher  Sirrs,  ‘Accidents  and  Apathy:  The  Construction  of  the  “Robens  Philosophy”  of  
Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Regulation  in  Britain,  1961-­1974’,  Social  History  of  Medicine,  
29,  1  (2016)  66-­88.  
31  See  for  example,  Anon,  ‘MPs  to  Hear  of  Plane  Tragedy’,  Daily  Mirror,  Mar  15  1954,  p.  1;;  
Anon,  ‘The  Air-­Crash  Girl  Dies  and  Her  Fiancé  Weeps’,  Daily  Express,  Mar  15  1954,  p.  1.  
32  Anon,  ‘Airliner  Death  Roll  33’,  Times,  Mar  15,  1954,  p.  6.  
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This  detailed  and  linguistically  emotive  description  was  provided  in  the  Times  
in  lieu  of  a  photograph,  but  other  newspapers  published  harrowing  images  of  
the  ‘burning  wreck’.33  On  16  November  1954,  the  Daily  Mirror  carried  a  front-­
page  photograph  of  a  harrowing  scene:  air  stewardess  Josephine  Butler  being  
dragged  from  the  burning  BOAC  Constellation  aircraft  by  fire  fighters.  The  
accompanying  article  provided  an  overview  of  the  Singapore  Supreme  Court’s  
report.  Though  aircrew  fatigue  was  just  one  area  covered  by  the  report,  it  
featured  heavily  in  the  article.  Indeed,  the  subtitle  made  the  apparent  
importance  of  fatigue  clear:  ‘Pilot  Was  Tired’.34  Reports  of  this  kind  caused  
widespread  public  dismay  and  justified  trade  union  calls  for  regulatory  
change.  It  was  in  this  context  that  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  was  formed  in  
1954.  
   Led  by  Group  Captain  Douglas  Bader  (1910-­1982),  the  Committee  on  
Flight  Time  Limitations  (hereafter  referred  to  as  the  Bader  Committee)  was  
established  in  response  to  similar  concerns.  It  was  widely  argued  by  
contemporary  commentators  that  1972  was  a  bad  year  for  the  aviation  
industry:  over  1,700  passengers  and  crew  died  in  air  crashes  in  the  space  of  
twelve  months.35  The  most  widely  reported  accident,  the  Staines  air  disaster,  
killed  118  people.  It  was,  by  far,  the  worst  ever  air  accident  in  British  history.  
The  Air  Accidents  Investigation  Branch  (AAIB)  concluded  following  a  public  
inquiry  that  the  incident  occurred  as  a  result  of  poor  crew  coordination  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Anon,  ‘Verdict  on  Amazing  Air  Crash’,  Daily  Mirror,  Nov  16  1954,  p.  1.  
34  Ibid.  p.  1.  
35  A.  N.  J.  Blain,  Pilots  and  Management:  Industrial  Relations  in  the  UK  Airlines,  (London:  
George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1972).  
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pilot  error  caused  by  an  ‘abnormal  heart  condition’.36  As  in  1954,  though,  the  
British  media  focused  on  other  issues.  Much  was  made,  for  example,  of  the  
conditions  of  work  commonly  experienced  by  British  European  Airways  (BEA)  
pilots  prior  to  the  accident  and  Captain  Stanley  Key’s  complaints  about  
intensive  working.  In  November  1972,  the  Times  published  an  article  detailing  
Key’s  complaints,  prior  to  his  death,  about  the  length  of  his  ‘working  days  and  
lack  of  free  weekends’.37  While  the  Staines  air  disaster  was  never  explicitly  
attributed  to  fatigue,  the  wide  publicity  afforded  to  Key’s  complaints  following  
the  crash  pointed  to  a  relationship  between  working  conditions,  pilot  morale,  
and  pilot  health  that  the  newly  created  CAA  was  keen  to  address.  The  Bader  
Committee  was  established  in  response  to  these  concerns.  
   Both  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  and  the  Bader  Committee  were  
established  to  improve  the  safety  of  public  transport  aircraft.  Indeed,  the  
formal  remit  of  the  Bader  Committee  was,  as  stated  by  CAA  Chairman  Lord  
John  Boyd-­Carpenter  (1908-­1998):  
  
To  inquire  into  the  adequacy  of  present  measures  taken  to  prevent  
such  fatigue  in  flight  crews  of  public  transport  aircraft  as  is  likely  to  
endanger  the  safety  of  the  aircraft  and  to  make  recommendations.38  
  
The  Bader  Committee  was,  thus,  concerned  ‘solely  with  fatigue,  and  the  
measures  taken  to  prevent  fatigue,  in  relation  to  safety’.39  The  onus  here  was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36  Air  Accidents  Investigation  Branch,  Trident  I  G-­ARPI:  Report  of  the  Public  Inquiry  into  the  
causes  and  circumstances  of  the  accident  near  Staines  on  18  June  1972,  (London:  HMSO,  
1973),  p.  54.  
37  Anon,  ‘Pilot  gave  warning  of  crash  risk  in  using  inexperienced  crews  “two  hours  before  
Trident  take-­off”’,  Times,  Nov  29  1972.  
38  TNA  DR/13/4:  Douglas  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  June  
1973,  p.  1.  
39  Ibid.  p.  2.  
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on  the  safety  of  the  travelling  public,  rather  than  the  health  and  wellbeing  of  
those  involved  in  the  operation  of  aircraft.  According  to  Bridget  Hutter,  the  
same  rationale  underlay  the  regulation  of  railways  workers’  hours  in  the  
nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries.40  While  compensation  dominated  
discussion  of  railroad  regulation,  regulatory  reviews  of  flying  fatigue  were  
most  concerned  with  the  location  of  responsibility  for  air  safety.  
   In  meetings  on  2  and  3  September  1954  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  
explicitly  discussed  where  the  responsibility  for  fatigue  management  lay.  The  
committee  agreed  that,  ultimately,  flight  crew  should  be  held  accountable:  
  
There  appears  to  be  a  tendency  to  take  away  certain  responsibilities  
from  the  captain  of  the  aircraft  and  replace  this  by  legislation.  Surely  
this  is  a  wrong  attitude.  The  captain  of  the  aircraft  must  be  responsible  
for  the  safety  of  his  aircraft  and  in  this  safety  factor  fatigue  must  always  
be  predominantly  in  his  mind.  The  question  has  been  mooted  by  the  
unions  that  the  captain  may  be  influenced  by  fear  of  his  owners  or  by  
financial  reasons,  or  being  paid  more  by  continuing  flying.  Of  course  
this  can  happen,  human  nature  being  what  it  is,  but  we  cannot  legislate  
for  every  human  factor,  and  our  examinations  have  shown  that  this  
position  very  rarely,  if  ever,  arises.41  
  
In  the  view  of  the  Bowhill  Working  Party,  ultimate  responsibility  for  flight  safety  
lay  with  the  pilot,  who  should,  if  necessary,  be  able  to  self-­manage  fatigue  in-­
flight.  The  committee  softened  this  stance,  however,  following  further  
consultations  with  aviation  unions.  The  final  report  of  the  Bowhill  Working  
Party  called  for  operators  to  take  responsibility  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  Hutter,  Regulation  and  Risk.  
41  TNA  BT/248/110:  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue:  Meetings  2  and  3  September  
1954,  p.  2.  
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flight  crew.  Operators,  it  proposed,  should  set  quantitative  limitations  on  flying  
times.  While  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  did  not  think  operators  should  be  left  
with  too  ‘much  discretion  on  a  subject  in  which  the  effect  on  airline  costs  may  
come  into  conflict  with  safety  requirements’,  the  committee  concluded  that  
only  operators  were  in  a  position  to  ‘assess  satisfactorily  the  nature  and  
effects  of  the  work  falling  on  …  operating  crews’.42  Operators,  then,  were  held  
responsible  for  fatigue  management  by  virtue  of  their  specialist  knowledge.  
   Twenty  years  later  the  Bader  Committee  adopted  a  similar  approach  to  
flight  safety.  For  the  Bader  Committee,  the  avoidance  of  fatigue  relied  on  co-­
operation  between  airlines  and  employees.  Airlines,  the  Committee  proposed,  
must  provide  adequate  conditions  and  facilities  for  rest,  while  flight  crew  were  
to  ‘make  optimum  use  of  the  opportunities  and  facilities’  for  sleep  and  rest  at  
work  and  home  and  to  ‘plan  rest  periods  properly’.43  Fatigue  often  resulted,  
the  Bader  Committee  argued,  from  misuse  of  rest  periods.  ‘It  would  appear  to  
us’,  the  Committee’s  report  noted,  ‘that  some  crew  members  fail  to  make  the  
best  use  of  their  rest  periods’.44    The  implication  here  was  that  flight  and  cabin  
crew  deliberately  misused  periods  allocated  for  recuperation  and  sleep  for  
various  leisure  and  social  activities.  At  the  time  of  the  Bader  Committee’s  
regulatory  review  this  view  was  widespread.  In  December  1972,  retired  pilot  
Anthony  Cavendish  wrote,  in  a  letter  to  the  Times  that:  
  
The  captains,  if  they  do  not  have  local  friendships,  or  do  not  wish  to  
dine  with  one  of  their  stewardesses,  drink,  read  or  browse  …  Let  me  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42  TNA  BT/248/110:  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue,  p.  6;;  TNA  
BT/248/110:  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue:  Meetings  2  and  3  September  1954,  
p.  7.  
43  TNA  DR/13/4,  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  p.  24.  
44  Ibid.  p.  24.  
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choose  my  words  carefully.  Stewardesses  regularly  use  their  rest  
periods  to  have  a  good  time  when  they  lay-­over.  They  often  have  boy  
friends  in  their  ports  of  call,  and  make  up  their  sleep  on  flights.45  
  
A  number  of  the  former  cabin  and  flight  crew  interviewed  for  this  thesis  spoke  
of  a  culture  not  dissimilar  to  that  described  by  Cavendish.  As  one  retired  cabin  
attendant  put  it:  ‘you  get  a  seven-­four-­seven  to  take  you  from  one  party  to  
another  and  I  slept  when  I  could’.46    
   Unlike  fatigue  committees  in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  
neither  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  nor  the  Bader  Committee  were  involved  in  
the  collection  of  laboratory  or  observational  data.  No  investigations  were  
commissioned  or  undertaken  by  the  committees  either  in  laboratories  or  
operational  aircraft.  Instead,  like  the  wartime  surveys  of  fatigue  undertaken  by  
Charles  Symonds  (1890-­1978)  and  Denis  J.  Williams  in  1942,  fatigue  and  its  
management  were  reframed  in  terms  of  subjective  opinion.  In  both  cases  
committee  members  were  merely  involved  in  the  review  of  existing  data  and  
the  collection  of  opinion  from  different  parties.  Aeromedical  evidence  was  
side-­lined  by  both  committees.  While  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  consulted  a  
number  of  medical  officials  from  military  and  civil  circles  –  including  Director  of  
Medical  Services  to  BOAC  Sir  Harold  Whittingham  (1887-­1983)  –  the  
committee  disregarded  medical  evidence  on  the  basis  that  no  ‘practical  test’  
could  be  applied  to  operating  crews,  ‘other  than  intelligent  observation  of  the  
individual,  to  decide  when  performance  had  deteriorated  to  a  dangerous  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Anthony  Cavendish,  ‘Pilots’  Hours  of  Work  and  Rest’,  Times,  Dec  15  1972,  p.  15.  
46  Interview  with  Matthew  Hart,  26  January  2017.  
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extent’.47  In  1972  the  Bader  Committee  made  a  similar  argument  for  the  
exclusion  of  aeromedical  evidence  from  its  regulatory  review:  
  
At  present  it  appears  that  no  satisfactory  psychological  or  physiological  
tests  have  been  devised  which  will  provide  positive  evidence  of  the  
presence  of  fatigue.  Tests  of  performance,  similarly  cannot  yet  be  
correlated  with  established  standards  of  fatigue.  Consequently  we  have  
concluded  that  the  assessment  of  fatigue  can  only  be  undertaken  
subjectively  at  this  time.48  
  
Both  committees  relied,  instead,  on  subjective  accounts  of  fatigue  proffered  
by  trade  unions  and  airlines.  As  a  result,  the  committees  relied  on  a  model  of  
fatigue  grounded  in  anecdote  and  molded  by  financial  and  lifestyle  concerns.  
Medical  evidence  did  not  inform  regulations.  
In  the  1970s  this  entailed  the  exclusion  of  evidence  relating  to  circadian  
‘desynchronization’.49  Though  a  well-­established  physiological  side  effect  of  
transmeridian  air  travel  by  the  1960s,  the  Bader  Committee  did  not  consider,  
or  seek  to  relieve  by  way  of  regulation,  circadian  disruption  in  aircrew.  Tacitly  
recognised  for  centuries,  the  cyclical  functions  of  the  body  were  increasingly  
investigated  in  the  twentieth  century.  Extensive  animal  studies  and,  later,  
experiments  on  humans  in  laboratories  and  workplaces  confirmed  early  
assumptions  about  biological  periodicity.50  Human  and  animal  life,  it  was  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  TNA  BT/248/110:  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue,  p.  4;;  during  the  
1939-­1945  war  Whittingham  served  as  Director  General  of  Medical  Services  in  the  RAF,  he  
also  had  a  long  association  with  the  FPRC.  He  was  Chief  Executive  Officer  1939-­1941  and  
Chairman  1949-­1967.    
48  TNA  DR/13/4:  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  p.  3.  
49  Jürgen  Aschoff,  ‘Circadian  Rhythms  in  Man’,  Science,  148,  3676  (1965)  1427-­1432,  p.  
1432.  
50  P.  J.  Taylor,  ‘Shift  and  Day  Work:  A  Comparison  of  Sickness  Absence,  Lateness,  and  other  
Absence  Behaviour  at  an  Oil  Refinery  from  1962  to  1965’,  British  Journal  of  Industrial  
Medicine,  24,  2  (1967)  93-­102;;  R.  T.  W.  L.  Conroy,  Ann  L.  Elliot,  and  J.  N.  Mills,  ‘Circadian  
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found,  biologically  oscillated  over  hours,  days,  and  weeks.  Though  no  
consensus  existed  in  relation  to  the  precise  mechanisms  involved  in  
mediating  biological  rhythms  until  later  in  the  twentieth  century,  by  the  early  
1970s  it  was  widely  agreed  that  hormones  excreted  by  the  pineal  gland  
played  a  role  in  synchronising  biological  rhythms.51  Though  widely  covered  in  
industrial  medical  journals  from  the  1960s,  discussion  of  circadian  disruption  
in  the  airline  industry  only  began  in  earnest  in  the  mid-­1970s,  after  the  Bader  
Committee  had  completed  its  regulatory  review.    
The  Bader  Committee  based  its  recommendations,  instead,  on  a  model  
of  work  and  rest  it  deemed  similar  to  the  normal  working  week  in  other  
occupations.  The  Committee  suggested  that  quantitative  limitations  on  pilots’  
hours  of  work  and  rest  should  be  based  on  a  new  concept:  the  ‘duty  cycle’.52  
As  the  Bader  Committee  set  out  in  its  rationale  for  recommendations:  ‘This  
concept  [the  duty  cycle]  is  akin  to  the  normal  manner  of  covering  a  like  
situation  in  other  occupations  and  professions  in  industry  and  business.’53  The  
shift-­based  system  of  scheduling  common  to  civil  aviation  should  be  replaced,  
the  Bader  Committee  argued,  with  one  that  replicated  the  model  found  in  
office-­based  occupations  as  closely  as  possible.  Drawing  on  contemporary  
discussions  about  work-­life  balance  and  male  emotional  health,  the  Bader  
Committee  suggested  that  proper  attention  be  paid  to  the  overall  planning  of  
the  duty  cycle  –  including  working  hours,  rest  periods,  and  time  off  –  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Rhythms  in  Plasma  Concentration  of  11-­Hydroxycorticosteroids  in  Men  Working  on  Night  
Shift  and  in  Permanent  Night  Workers’,  British  Journal  of  Industrial  Medicine,  27,  2  (1970)  
170-­4.  
51  Ross  A.  McFarland,  ‘Air  Travel  Across  Time  Zones’,  American  Scientist,  63,  1  (1975)  23-­
30.  
52  TNA  DR/13/4:  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  p.  15.  
53  Ibid.  p.  15.  
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between  consecutive  duty  cycles.54  This,  the  Committee  argued,  was  the  
‘most  appropriate  framework  for  …  preventing  fatigue’.55  Marking  a  break  with  
previous  regulatory  trends,  the  Bader  Committee  argued  that  balance  across  
the  whole  duty  cycle  was  a  better  antidote  to  crew  fatigue  than  limitations  on  
single  duty  periods.    
The  Bader  Committee  then  proposed  a  more  complex  regulatory  
framework  than  existed  in  other  occupational  contexts,  but  limitations  on  
working  hours  remained  important.  The  Bader  Committee  suggested  limits  on  
daily,  monthly,  and  yearly  hours  of  work:  fourteen  hours  a  day,  100  hours  a  
month,  and  900  hours  a  year.  Single  duty  periods  were  then  to  be  subject  to  a  
number  of  conditions.  Flights  that  required  any  form  of  work  that  might  
impinge  on  the  normal  hours  of  sleep  were  subject  to  stricter  limitation.  For  
example,  the  maximum  permissible  length  of  a  flying  duty  period  that  
commenced  between  ten  o’clock  and  night  and  six  o’clock  in  the  morning  was  
eleven,  rather  than  fourteen  hours.  The  Committee  recommended  that  the  
following  table  ‘should  be  mandatory’  for  flights  scheduled  out  of  a  pilot’s  
home  base.56  
     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Michael  Young  and  Peter  Wilmott,  The  Symmetrical  Family  (London:  Penguin,  1973);;  
Frederick  Cooper,  ‘Medical  Feminism,  Working  Mothers,  and  the  Limits  of  Home:  Finding  a  
Balance  Between  Self-­Care  and  Other-­Care  in  Cross-­Cultural  Debates  About  Health  and  
Lifestyle,  1952-­1956’,  Palgrave  Communications,  2  (2016)  1-­11,  available  at:  
http://www.palgrave-­journals.com/articles/palcomms201642  [last  accessed  14  July  2016].  
55  TNA  DR/13/4,  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  p.  15.  
56  Ibid.  p.  8.  
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Flying  Duty  Period  Commencing  at  ‘Base’  
Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  Table  8.7,  p.  18  
  
This  basic  framework,  which  limited  duty  periods  according  to  time  and  
location,  remained  in  place  for  the  rest  of  the  century.    
   Though  the  Bader  Committee  and  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  had  been  
created  to  investigate  and  provide  recommendations  on  fatigue  and  
scheduling  solely  in  relation  to  flight  safety,  both  committees  considered  the  
regulation  of  flight  and  rest  periods  from  additional  perspectives.  Over  the  
course  of  eight  meetings  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  listened  to  the  views  of  
both  airlines  and  trade  unions.  Operators  argued  that  no  more  regulations  
were  necessary  or  required,  while  unions  made  the  case  for  specific  statutory  
limits.  The  Bowhill  Working  Party  recognised  that  neither  operators  nor  trade  
unions  considered  the  regulation  of  flight  times  ‘from  an  entirely  fatigue  point  
of  view’.  As  Bowhill  noted  after  meeting  with  both  parties  in  September  1954:  
  
The  questions  of  operations,  schedules,  etc.  loom  very  largely  into  the  




Maximum  length  of  flying  duty  period/number  of  sectors  
  




















1301-­1800   13   12.25   11.5   10.75   10   9.25   9   9  
1801-­2200   12   11.25   10.5   9.75   9   9   9   9  
2201-­0600   11   10.25   9.5   9   9   9   9   9  
0601-­0800   12.5   11.75   11   9.5   9.5   9   9   9  
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the  good  of  their  aircrew  and  one  for  their  good  name,  while  the  unions  
are  out  to  improve  the  conditions  of  the  aircrew.57  
  
Fatigue  could  not,  as  Bowhill’s  notes  make  clear,  be  considered  within  a  
vacuum  as  it  related  directly  to  issues  of  scheduling,  working  hours,  and  rest  
time.  In  other  words,  the  safety,  social,  and  economic  aspects  of  operating  
crew  fatigue  were  inextricably  linked.  The  apparent  tension  between  
economic  and  safety  considerations  formed  an  important  part  of  the  Bowhill  
Working  Party’s  final  report.  In  the  1954  report  the  committee  argued:  
  
Any  consideration  of  flight  time  limitations  requires  careful  attention  to  
be  paid  to  the  economic  consequences.  Every  addition  to  the  minimum  
operating  crew  of  an  aircraft  means  less  pay  load.  Every  additional  
stop  to  enable  crew  to  rest  may  mean  adding  to  an  operator’s  crew  
strength  or  slowing  down  a  schedule.  Bearing  in  mind  the  highly  
competitive  nature  of  international  air  transport  it  will  be  necessary  
when  determining  limitations  which  ensure  adequate  safety  standards  
to  ensure  that  an  operator’s  ability  to  compete  successfully  is  not  
necessarily  impaired.58  
  
Though  safety  was  paramount,  for  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  it  was  important  
that  operators  were  not  financially  ‘impaired’  by  strict  legislation.59    
Economic  considerations  also  loomed  large  for  the  Bader  Committee,  
which  noted  in  1972  that  ‘limitations  on  flight  and  duty  periods  have  a  marked  
influence  on  the  economy  of  airline  operations’.60  For  the  Bader  Committee  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57  TNA  BT/248/110:  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue:  Meetings  2  and  3  September  
1954,  p.  1.  
58  TNA  BT/248/110:  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue,  7-­8.  
59  Ibid.  p.  8.  
60  TNA  DR/13/4:  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  p.  2.  
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though,  administrative  ease  was  a  more  important  motive  for  regulatory  
review.  The  Bader  Committee’s  final  report  published  in  June  1973  
recommended  that  existing  legislation  should  be  simplified.  The  report  argued  
that  the  current  system  of  regulation  –  an  ‘interconnected  mass  of  rules,  law,  
directions  and  guidance’  –  was  fragmented  and  confusing,  even  for  those  who  
administered  and  enforced  it.61    
By  1972  British  civil  aviation  was  subject  to  a  number  of  national  and  
international  obligations.  As  a  signatory  to  the  1944  Chicago  Convention  on  
International  Civil  Aviation,  Britain  had  an  obligation  to  comply  with  the  
international  standards  and  recommended  practices  in  the  various  annexes  to  
the  Convention.62  The  Bader  Committee  identified  one  annex  that  was  
particularly  relevant  to  fatigue  and  flight  time  limitations  –  Annex  Six,  Part  One  
‘The  Operations  of  Aircraft’,  which  stated  that:  
  
An  operator  shall  formulate  rules  limiting  the  flight  time  and  flight  duty  
periods  of  flight  crew  members.  These  rules  shall  also  make  provision  
for  adequate  rest  periods  and  shall  be  such  as  to  ensure  that  fatigue,  
occurring  either  in  a  flight  or  successive  flights  or  …  over  a  period  of  
time  due  to  these  and  other  tasks,  does  not  endanger  the  safety  of  the  
flight.63  
  
The  guidance  contained  within  Annex  Six  of  the  Chicago  Convention  was  
general  in  nature  and  did  not  provide  any  numerical  values  for  rest  or  duty  
periods.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61  Ibid.  p.  8.  
62  Ibid.    
63  Ibid.  p.  7.  
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A  number  of  national  requirements  did  lay  down  explicit  limitations  on  
flight  time,  but  these  rarely  matched  up.  There  was,  for  example,  a  disparity  
between  the  limits  proposed  by  the  1972  Air  Navigation  Order  and  the  


















2  pilots   15   12  
2  pilots  and  1  flight  navigator   15   13  
2+  pilots   15   15  
2+  pilots  with  sufficient  bunks  for  
inflight  rest  
  
22   18  
  
The  Basic  Limiting  in  Flying  Duty  Periods  for  Scheduling  Purposes  
Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations,  Table  4.3,  p.  8  
  
Operators  variously  interpreted  the  guidelines,  and  often  set  different  internal  
limits  on  flying  hours  than  those  laid  down  by  law  as  a  result  of  industrial  
agreements  with  trade  unions.  There  was  significant  variation  between  
airlines.  Some  airlines,  such  as  BOAC,  scheduled  pilots  right  up  to  the  legal  
limits,  while  others,  such  as  BEA,  imposed  much  more  restrictive  limits.  A  
number  of  airlines  set  different  limits  depending  on  the  model  of  aircraft.  The  
Bader  Committee  summarised  their  findings  in  the  following  table.  
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BOAC   1000   Non-­comparable  
‘credited’  hours  
system  subject  to  
100hr/28  day  legal  
limit  
9.5-­12  
BEA  Trident  Fleet   600   75   12  




Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations,  Table  5.1,  p.  10  
  
Existing  measures  for  the  prevention  of  aircrew  fatigue  were,  the  Bader  
Committee  concluded,  complicated  and  disjointed.  The  Committee  advocated,  
instead,  a  more  rational  and  flexible  system  of  control,  ‘preferably  in  one  
document’,  that  simplified  and  clarified  the  limitations.64  Following  the  
publication  of  the  Bader  Committee’s  final  report  in  1973  administrative  
concerns  came  to  dominate  discussion  of  subsequent  legislation.  
  
Cabin  Crew,  Fatigue,  and  the  Civil  Aviation  Authority  
The  Bowhill  Working  Party  and  the  Bader  Committee  examined  fatigue  solely  
as  it  pertained  to  flight  deck  crew:  pilots,  navigators,  and  flight  engineers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  Ibid.  p.  9.  
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Tasked  with  the  investigation  of  fatigue  exclusively  as  it  affected  flight  safety,  
both  committees  formally  excluded  cabin  attendants  from  the  remit  of  study.  
Framed,  as  in  America,  as  ‘carefree  hostesses  and  waitresses’,  cabin  crew  
were  not  thought  to  have  a  bearing  on  the  safety  of  passengers.65  As  such,  in  
the  post-­war  period  the  working  practices  of  cabin  crew  were  subject  to  far  
less  investigation  and  control  than  their  counterparts  in  the  cockpit.    
In  the  earliest  years  of  commercial  aviation,  the  special  knowledge  and  
skills  of  cabin  attendants  were  emphasised.  Indeed,  prior  to  World  War  Two  
only  trained  only  nurses  were  hired  as  cabin  attendants  in  Britain.  As  Suzanne  
Kolm  and  Kathleen  Barry  have  argued  of  American  airlines,  though,  in  the  
post-­war  period  the  work  of  cabin  crew  was  rebranded  to  emphasise  the  
service  of  passengers.66  The  health  and  safety  aspects  of  the  job  were  
downplayed,  and  airlines  instead  emphasised  the  social  and  emotional  skills  
of  crew  members.  The  medical  care  of  passengers  remained  important,  
however.  Even  when  the  need  for  a  nursing  qualification  was  removed  in  the  
post-­war  period,  cabin  crew  were  trained  to  recognise  and  respond  to  
symptoms  of  disease  in  flight.67    
Cabin  crew  were  also  held  to  have  an  important  role  in  emergencies.  
They  were  primarily  responsible  for  the  evacuation  of  passengers.  As  one  
former  pilot  described,  ‘if  you’ve  got  a  very  effective  well-­trained  cabin  crew  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65  Derickson,  Dangerously  Sleepy,  p.  40.  
66  Suzanne  L.  Kolm,  ‘Who  Says  It's  a  Man's  World?  Women's  Work  and  Travel  in  the  First  
Decades  of  Flight’  in  Dominick  A.  Pisano  (ed.),  The  Airplane  in  American  Culture  (Michigan:  
University  of  Michigan  Press,  2003),  pp.  147–64;;  Kathleen  M.  Barry,  Femininity  in  Flight:  A  
History  of  Flight  Attendants,  (London:  Duke  University  Press,  2007).  
67  Lucy  C.  S.  Budd,  Morag  Bell  and  Adam  P.  Warren,  ‘Taking  Care  in  the  Air:  Jet  Air  Travel  
and  Passenger  Health,  a  Study  of  the  British  Overseas  Airways  Corporation  (1940-­1974)’,  
Social  History  of  Medicine,  25,  2  (2011)  446-­461.  
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they  will  save  a  lot  of  people’s  lives’.  ‘Oh  I’ve  got  very  strong  views  about  that’,  
said  retired  pilot  James  Hall  in  interview:    
  
I  get  very  irritated  with  the  sort  of  image  some  airlines  project  as  cabin  
crew  being  dolly  birds  that  go  around  to  smile  sweetly  at  you  and  serve  
you  coffee  or  drinks  or  whatever  …  I  mean  the  fact  of  the  matter  is,  the  
cabin  crew  legally  are  there  to  get  …  the  passengers  out  on  the  
assumption  that  the  flight  crew  are  incapacitated,  and  if  you’ve  got  a  
good  cabin  crew  it’ll  make  a  lot  of  difference  in  …  those  sort  of  
situations.68  
  
The  importance  of  cabin  crew  for  the  evacuation  of  passengers  was  
highlighted  in  the  aftermath  of  the  crash  at  Singapore’s  Kallang  Airport  in  
1954.  As  previously  described,  passengers  were  not  evacuated  through  
emergency  exits  following  the  crash  and,  as  a  result,  perished  in  the  burning  
wreckage.  Though  the  Bowhill  Working  Party  made  no  reference  to  cabin  
crew  in  their  recommendations  for  regulatory  review,  in  1957  the  Air  
Navigation  Order  was  amended  to  require  the  carriage  of  at  least  one  cabin  
attendant  on  public  transport  flights  with  twenty  or  more  passengers  for  the  
‘purpose  of  performing  in  the  interests  of  the  safety  of  passengers  duties  to  be  
assigned  by  the  operator  or  the  person  in  command  of  the  aircraft’.69  This  
amendment  formalised  the  role  of  cabin  crew  as,  first  and  foremost,  one  of  
safety  management.  Indeed,  this  is  how  most  of  the  former  cabin  attendants  
interviewed  for  this  thesis  described  their  role.  As  retired  cabin  attendant  Julia  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  Interview  with  James  Hall,  30  March  2016.  
69  1957  Air  Navigation  Order  cited  in  TNA  BT  248/511:  CAA  Committee  on  Flight  Time  
Limitations  Working  Paper,  ‘Background  Notes:  Cabin  Attendants’,  5  September  1973,  p.  1.  
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Evans  explained,  the  ‘primary  function  of  cabin  crew  members  on  the  aircraft  
is  for  safety’.70  
   Though  the  work  of  cabin  crew  was  bound  up  with  safety  from  at  least  
the  mid-­1950s,  cabin  attendants’  hours  of  work  and  rest  were  not  subject  to  
regulatory  control  until  ten  years  later.  In  1967  the  Air  Navigation  Order  was  
amended  to  require  that  airlines  limited  the  flying  duty  periods  of  cabin  crew  
and  established  minimum  rest  periods.  No  numerical  limits  were  contained  
within  the  Air  Navigation  Order,  but  guidelines  were  contained  within  Civil  
Aviation  Publication  (CAP)  295:  
  
5.1  Because  of  the  nature  of  their  duties  it  is  reasonable  that  cabin  staff  
can  undertake  somewhat  longer  flying  duty  periods  than  the  flight  
crews  with  which  they  are  associated,  but  the  scheduled  maximum  
should  not  normally  exceed  fourteen  hours.  
5.2  If  adequate  rest  facilities  –  a  passenger-­type  seat  for  example  –  are  
provided,  this  period  may  be  extended  by  an  amount  equal  to  the  time  
for  which  a  cabin  crew  member  is  relieved  of  all  duties,  within  an  
overall  scheduled  maximum  of  twenty  hours.  
5.3  For  off-­schedule  operations  the  maximum  flying  duty  period  for  
cabin  staff  should  not  exceed  twenty-­two  hours.  Where  fourteen  hours  
flying  duty  is  exceeded  during  off-­schedule  operations,  rest  facilities  
should  be  provided,  including  a  suitable  seat  on  the  aircraft.71  
  
The  guidelines  introduced  to  minimise  the  fatigue  of  cabin  attendants  were  
more  flexible  and  permissive  than  those  covering  flight  crew.  Rest  facilities  
were,  for  example,  deemed  ‘adequate’  for  cabin  crew  if  a  ‘passenger-­type  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
71  Board  of  Trade,  CAP  295:  Flight  Time  Limitations  and  Avoidance  of  Excessive  Fatigue  in  
Aircrews,  (London:  HMSO,  1967),  p.  10.  
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seat’  was  available.72  Flight  crew,  however,  were  entitled  to  bunk  rest  under  
the  same  conditions.  
   When  the  Bader  Committee  began  a  review  of  flight  time  limitations  in  
1972,  cabin  crew  were  deliberately  excluded  from  the  field  of  inquiry.  
Throughout  the  Bader  Committee’s  period  of  investigation  though,  the  
Transport  and  General  Workers’  Union  (TGWU)  –  the  major  union  
representing  cabin  crew  in  Britain  –  campaigned  for  their  inclusion.  In  March  
1973,  a  few  months  prior  to  the  publication  of  the  Bader  Report,  the  TGWU  
submitted  a  report  to  the  CAA  detailing  the  ‘plight  of  cabin  crew’  and  made  the  
case  for  more  restrictive  flight  time  limitations  for  cabin  as  well  as  flight  deck  
staff.  73  Under  CAP  295,  the  report  argued,  cabin  crew  were  permitted  to  work  
‘Dickensian’  hours.74  Citing  a  survey  completed  by  Hugh  Patrick  Ruffell  Smith  
(1911-­1980)  and  others  in  1973,  the  TGWU  contended  that  cabin  crew  
experienced  significant  sleep  loss,  particularly  on  transmeridian  routes,  that  
was  not  adequately  alleviated  by  in-­flight  rest  periods  or  post-­flight  time  off.75    
The  Bader  Committee,  however,  took  no  heed  of  these  complaints.  
While  regrettable,  the  fatigue  of  cabin  crew  was,  the  Committee  argued,  not  a  
safety  concern.  Walter  Tye,  the  Committee’s  chief  medical  adviser,  outlined  
this  reasoning  in  a  letter  to  BOAC’s  medical  officer  shortly  after  the  publication  
of  the  Bader  Report:  
  
I  have  always  felt  that  on  pure  safety  grounds  duty  periods  for  cabin  
crews  were  extremely  difficult  to  determine  …  Cabin  crews’  principal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72  Ibid.  p.  10.  
73  TNA  BT  248/511:  Paper  submitted  to  CAA  by  the  TGWU  in  March  1973,  p.  1.  
74  Ibid.  p.  3.  
75  See:  TNA  BT  248/511:  F.  S.  Preston,  H.  P.  Ruffell  Smith,  V.  M.  Sutton-­Mattocks,  ‘Sleep  
Loss  in  Cabin  Crew’,  Clinical  Aviation  and  Aerospace  Medicine,  44,  8  (1973)  931-­935.  
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contribution  to  safety  is  their  ability  to  assist  in  the  evacuation  after  a  
crash,  and  I  imagine  that  a  pretty  exhausted  crew  would  still  recover  
sufficiently  to  do  this  job.  Thus  the  safety/fatigue/duty  period  argument  
for  cabin  crews  is  even  more  tenuous  than  it  is  for  flight  crews.76  
  
Undeterred  by  the  exclusion  of  cabin  crew  from  the  Bader  Committee’s  
regulatory  review,  the  TGWU  continued  to  campaign  for  more  restrictive  
limitations  on  cabin  crews’  hours  of  work  and  rest  on  safety  grounds.    
Following  the  publication  of  the  Bader  Report  further  communications  
took  place  between  the  TGWU  and  the  CAA  and  in  September  1973,  Lord  
Boyd-­Carpenter  asked  the  Bader  Committee  to  meet  with  representatives  
from  the  TGWU.  On  10  September  1973,  a  meeting  was  held  between  
members  of  the  Bader  Committee  and  John  Cousins,  the  National  Secretary  
of  the  TGWU.  Cousins  argued  in  the  meeting  that  the  exclusion  of  cabin  staff  
from  the  remit  of  the  Bader  Committee’s  investigation  was  a  ‘glaring  
omission’.  77  He  contended,  as  in  the  report  submitted  to  the  CAA  in  March,  
that  the  guidelines  introduced  under  CAP  295  ‘had  not  proved  satisfactory  in  
controlling  excessive  working  hours  among  cabin  crew’.78  According  to  
Cousins  some  ‘unscrupulous  airlines’  routinely  exceeded  the  maximum  limits  
suggested  in  CAP  295.79  As  a  result,  Cousins  and  his  colleagues  argued,  
fatigue  was  endemic  among  cabin  crew.  This  was,  he  argued,  a  problem  as  
cabin  crew  ‘had  a  safety  function  to  fulfil  in  respect  of  evacuation,  and  if  they  
got  fatigued  this  could  be  a  hazard’.80  While  sympathetic  to  the  concerns  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76  TNA  BT  248/511:  Letter  from  W.  Tye  to  Dr  G.  Bennett,  31  August  1973,  p.  1.  
77  TNA  BT  248/511:  Notes  of  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations  Meeting  held  on  Monday  
10  September  1973  in  Room  816  Aviation  House,  p.  2.  
78  Ibid.  p.  2.  
79  Ibid.  p.  2.  
80  Ibid.  p.  2.  
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the  TGWU,  the  Bader  Committee  explained  that  it  would  be  ‘difficult’  to  
regulate  the  hours  of  cabin  crew  on  ‘public  safety  grounds’,  but  accepted  that  
there  may  be  ‘staff  safety  and  health  considerations’.81    
The  meeting  was  informal,  but  ended  with  an  agreement  between  the  
TGWU  and  the  Bader  Committee  to  submit  a  request  to  the  CAA  for  further  
study  of  cabin  crew  fatigue  prior  to  the  implementation  of  a  new  system  of  
flight  time  limitations.  No  such  investigation  was  ever  carried  out,  but  in  1974  
the  CAA  agreed  to  introduce  ‘revised  provisions’  for  cabin  staff  to  coincide  
with  the  introduction  of  the  new  system  of  flight  time  limitations  in  1975.82  The  
rationale  for  this  did  not  relate  to  safety,  economic,  or  any  other  issue  
discussed  in  relation  to  flight  deck  crew.  The  justification  was,  instead,  entirely  
administrative.    
The  introduction  of  revised  regulations  of  cabin  crew  schedules  was  
intended  to  extend  the  regulatory  reach  of  the  newly-­formed  CAA.  Established  
in  1972  under  the  terms  of  the  1971  Civil  Aviation  Act,  the  CAA  took  on  
responsibilities  that  had  previously  been  spread  across  three  separate  
regulatory  bodies.83  Keen  to  mark  the  CAA  out  as  an  industry-­wide  regulator  
distinct  from  other  government  agencies,  Lord  Boyd-­Carpenter  saw  the  
inclusion  of  cabin  crew  under  the  purview  of  flight  time  limitations  as  a  means  
of  limiting  the  reach  of  the  Department  of  Employment  and  the  agencies  born  
of  the  1974  Health  and  Safety  at  Work  Act  (HSWA):  the  Health  and  Safety  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
81  Ibid.  p.  2.  
82  TNA  BT  248/511:  Letter  to  unknown  recipient  from  J.  A.  Chadwell,  20  June  1974.  
83  Civil  Aviation  Act  1971,  available  at:  
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1971/75/contents/enacted  [last  accessed  17  August  
2016].  
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Executive  and  the  Health  and  Safety  Commission.  Lord  Boyd-­Carpenter  
articulated  this  rationale  in  an  internal  CAA  memorandum:  
  
The  important  point  is  that  if  anybody  is  to  start  laying  down  maximum  
hours  for  aircraft  cabin  crews  that  person  should  be  us  (if  I  may  be  
guilty  of  an  Irishism!)  Otherwise  we  may  get  into  considerable  
difficulties  …  So  far  as  I  am  concerned,  I  never  contemplated  our  
assuming  a  general  responsibility  for  cabin  crew  welfare  any  more  than  
we  have  assumed  it  for  pilots.  But  there  is  an  uncertain  zone  in  which  
the  effect  of  hours  of  work  (both  in  respect  of  number  of  hours  worked  
and  of  time  changes)  do  have  significance  both  from  the  safety  angle  
(which  is  solely  our  business)  and  from  the  ‘health  and  welfare  angle’  
…  we  shall  have  to  get  round  to  this  fairly  soon  as  it  is  important  that  
the  ground  should  not  be  wholly  occupied  by  the  Department  of  
Employment.84  
  
Keen  to  avoid  the  inclusion  of  cabin  crew  under  the  purview  of  broader  health  
and  safety  legislation,  Lord  Boyd-­Carpenter  decided  to  regulate  cabin  crews’  
hours  of  work  and  rest  alongside  flight  crews’  in  one  broad  system  of  
control.85    
   A  new  system  of  flight  time  limitations,  which  included  limitations  for  
flight  deck  and  cabin  crews,  was  introduced  in  1975.  Some  changes  were  
made  to  the  Air  Navigation  Order,  but  most  of  the  new  regulations  were  
contained  within  the  accompanying  guidance  document  CAP  371,  which  held  
the  title:  ‘The  Avoidance  of  Excessive  Fatigue  in  Aircrews:  Requirements  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84  TNA  BT  248/511:  Internal  CAA  Memo  to  Mr  Vivian  from  Lord  Boyd-­Carpenter,  21  May  
1974,  p.  1.  
85  TNA  BT  248/511:  Letter  from  Miss  G.  M.  E.  White  to  Dr  Tye,  29  August  1973,  p.  1.  
   174  
Document’.86  Under  CAP  371,  cabin  crews’  hours  of  work  and  rest  were  
subject  to  stricter  control  than  in  the  past.  The  regulations  were,  however,  less  
nuanced  and  more  flexible  than  those  affecting  flight  crew.  The  maximum  
flying  duty  period  for  cabin  crew  was  longer  than  that  permitted  for  flight  crew  
by  one  hour,  and  the  conditions  affecting  the  length  of  flying  duty  periods  were  
less  complex.  While  rules  about  duty  length  differed  hour  to  hour  for  pilots,  the  
hours  of  work  of  cabin  crew  were  grouped  together,  and  though  calculated  
similarly  to  pilots  –  by  the  length  of  the  immediately  preceding  duty  period  –  
the  minimum  rest  periods  for  cabin  crew  were  shorter  by  one  hour  than  those  
for  flight  crew.  The  flexibility  of  regulations  pertaining  to  cabin  crew,  in  
comparison  with  flight  crew,  continued  to  be  justified  on  the  grounds  that  
cabin  crew  had  a  lesser  role  in  flight  safety.  In  a  meeting  with  the  TGWU  in  
July  1975,  the  formal  line  from  the  CAA  remained  that  it  was  ‘justifiable  to  
treat  cabin  crew  less  restrictively  than  flight  crew’  because  the  ‘primary  safety  
role  of  cabin  crew’  only  came  into  play  after  an  accident  ‘and  the  degree  of  
arousal  engendered  in  these  circumstances  is  enough  to  overcome  some  
degree  of  fatigue’.87  
   Throughout  the  post-­war  period,  then,  while  flight  safety  remained  the  
formal  justification  for  flight  time  limitations,  other  concerns  frequently  entered  
into  regulatory  debate.  The  rationale  for  British  regulatory  practice  was  more  
complex  than  the  model  outlined  by  Derickson.88  In  Britain  flight  safety  was  
one  of  many  concerns.  Other  issues  consistently  influenced  regulatory  bodies  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
86  Civil  Aviation  Authority,  CAP  371:  The  Avoidance  of  Excessive  Fatigue  in  Aircrews:  
Requirements  Document,  (London:  Civil  Aviation  Authority,  1975).  
87  TNA  BT  248/511:  Meeting  between  CAA  Chairman  and  TGWU  10  July  1975:  notes  on  
matters  which  may  be  raised  by  TGWU,  p.  1.  
88  Derickson,  Dangerously  Sleepy.  
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including,  as  this  chapter  has  demonstrated,  economic  and  administrative  
concerns.  The  relationship  between  the  CAA  and  other  regulatory  bodies  was  
particularly  important  here.  What  follows  moves  on  from  regulatory  review.  
The  next  section  examines  the  implementation  of  regulations,  specifically  
CAP  371,  in  the  broader  context  of  British  health  and  safety  reform  in  the  
1970s.  
  
Civil  Aviation,  Aircrew  Fatigue,  and  the  British  Regulatory  State  
The  1970s  marked  a  new,  and  increasingly  complex,  regulatory  phase  in  
Britain.  While  new  right  ideologies  –  which  advocated  deregulation,  
denationalisation,  and  a  move  away  from  redistributive  welfare  policies  –  were  
gaining  momentum  politically,  in  the  same  decade  the  most  detailed  statutory  
health  and  safety  regulations  to  date  were  introduced  under  the  1974  
HSWA.89  The  HSWA,  though,  represented  a  paradox.  While  the  Act  extended  
health  and  safety  coverage  to  more  workers  than  ever  before  it  was,  like  
nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  century  legislation,  premised  on  the  ideal  of  
self-­regulation  by  industry.  It  enacted  the  recommendations  of  the  Safety  and  
Health  at  Work  Committee.  Chaired  by  Lord  Alfred  Robens  (1910-­1999),  
previously  of  the  National  Coal  Board,  the  Committee  argued  that  voluntary  
self-­reform  should  lie  at  the  core  of  legislative  initiatives.90  This  was,  the  
Committee  argued,  particularly  important  for  health  and  safety  regulation,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89  Neil  Rollings,  ‘Cracks  in  the  Post-­War  Keynesian  Settlement?  The  Role  of  Organised  
Business  in  Britain  in  the  Rise  of  Neoliberalism  Before  Margaret  Thatcher’,  Twentieth  Century  
British  History,  24,  4  (2013)  637-­659;;  Ben  Jackson,  ‘The  Think-­Tank  Archipelago:  
Thatcherism  and  Neo-­Liberalism’  in  Ben  Jackson  and  Robert  Saunders  (eds.),  Making  
Thatcher’s  Britain,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  2012),  pp.  43-­61.  
90  Matthias  Beck  and  Charles  Woolfson,  ‘The  Regulation  of  Health  and  Safety  in  Britain:  From  
Old  Labour  to  New  Labour’,  Industrial  Relations  Journal,  31,  1  (2000)  35-­49.  
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which  was,  if  expansive  and  detailed,  made  rapidly  obsolete  by  new  
technologies  and  processes.  As  Vicky  Long  has  described,  the  HSWA  
discarded  the  detailed  regulations  which  had  characterised  the  1937  Factory  
Act  in  favour  of  generalised  rules.91  The  HSWA  was,  like  the  1901  Factory  
Act,  flexible  and  permissive.92  Premised  on  the  assumption  that  overly  
detailed  statutory  regulation  promoted  ‘apathy’,  the  HSWA  placed  
responsibility  for  health  and  safety  beyond  the  state,  with  ‘those  who  create[d]  
the  risks  and  those  who  work[ed]  with  them’.93  
While  the  Safety  and  Health  at  Work  Committee  recommended  that  
subsequent  health  and  safety  legislation  provide  universal  protections  for  all  
workers,  the  HSWA  did  not  apply  to  a  number  of  industries.  Healthcare,  
teaching,  and  transport  were  all  excluded  from  coverage,  except  where  
transport  workers  were  stationed  at  static  bases.  Indeed,  the  Committee  had  
explicitly  excluded  transport  workers  –  including  train  operators,  lorry  drivers,  
and  pilots  –  from  the  remit  of  the  study  as  transport  safety  was  deemed  to  be  
too  ‘large’  and  ‘difficult’  an  area  to  legislate  on:  
  
Provisions  for  the  safety  and  health  of  those  engaged  in  flying  aircraft,  
driving  trains,  lorries  and  so  on  …  [could  not  be]  considered  in  isolation  
from  a  whole  complex  of  special  considerations  such  as  the  constraints  
imposed  by  the  design  of  transport  vehicles;;  the  circumstances  in  
which  they  operate  which  include  many  eventualities  beyond  the  
control  of  the  employer;;  and  the  predominant  need  –  in  terms  of  
numbers  at  risk  –  to  safeguard  the  travelling  public  and  the  public  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory.  
92  Sirrs,  ‘Accidents  and  Apathy’.  
93  Lord  Robens,  Safety  and  Health  at  Work:  Report  of  the  Committee  1970–72,  vol.  1,  Cmnd.  
5034,  p.  1;;  Ibid.  p.  7.  
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generally.  We  accept  these  matters  must  be  dealt  with  within  transport  
legislation.94  
  
For  this  reason,  even  after  1974  the  transport  sector  continued  to  be  
governed  by  industry-­specific  regulations.  That  is  not  to  say  that  the  transport  
industry  was  unaffected  by  the  publication  of  the  Committee’s  report.  Indeed,  
the  report  acted  as  a  ‘catalyst’  for  change  in  a  number  of  sectors,  including  
the  rail  industry.95  Likewise,  civil  aviation,  while  not  directly  under  the  purview  
of  the  HSWA,  was  influenced  by  the  Act’s  deregulatory  agenda.  The  CAA,  like  
the  Safety  and  Health  at  Work  Committee,  trusted  that  regulation  based  on  
market  mechanisms  would  be  effective.  After  all,  the  argument  went,  it  was  in  
the  interests  of  both  airlines  and  crew  members  to  ensure  flight  safety.  It  was  
on  this  basis  that  the  CAA  introduced  flight  time  limitations  in  1975.  A  co-­
operative  model  of  regulation,  similar  to  the  HSWA,  CAP  371  and  the  
accompanying  Air  Navigation  Order  were  reliant  on  voluntarism.  
   The  flight  time  limitations  introduced  by  the  CAA  in  1975  were  more  
detailed  and  comprehensive  than  any  previous  regulations.  The  amended  Air  
Navigation  Order  and  accompanying  circular  made  allowances  for  a  number  
of  different  circumstances  but,  crucially,  limitations  were  premised  on  a  model  
of  fatigue  that  took  little  account  of  the  major  causes  and  effects  of  exhaustion  
identified  by  crew  members.  Following  the  publication  of  the  Bader  Report  
aviation  weekly,  Flight  International,  noted  that  the  proposed  regulations  
made  little  effort  to  allay  the  ‘time-­zone  effect’.  Circadian  disturbance  was  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  Ibid.  p.  xiv;;  Ibid.  p.  56.  
95  Hutter,  Regulation  and  Risk,  p.  37;;  Hutter  has  described  the  effects  of  the  Robens  Report  
and  the  HSWA  on  the  regulation  of  occupational  health  and  safety  on  the  railways,  see:  Ibid.  
pp.  40-­47.  
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be  mitigated  by  restrictions  on  flying  duty  periods;;  specifically  by  reductions  of  
one  hour  for  early  morning  departures  and  instances  where  crews  were  not  
adjusted  to  local  time.  For  Flight  International,  however,  this  did  not  represent  
a  ‘real  attempt’  to  deal  with  the  effects  of  circadian  disruption:  
  
The  committee  has  therefore  failed  to  grapple  with  one  main  area  of  
complaint,  and  seems  to  think  we  [flight  crew]  can  be  relied  on  to  keep  
London  time  in  Tokyo  (GMT  plus  9hr)  and  in  Anchorage  (GMT  minus  
10hr)  on  the  same  trip.96  
  
The  1975  limitations  also  made  no  attempt  to  control  the  travel  of  crew  to  and  
from  work,  a  major  concern  of  trade  unions.  A  number  of  the  former  flight  and  
cabin  crew  interviewed  for  this  thesis  explained  the  rationale  for  this  concern:  
tiredness  made  the  drive  to  and  from  work  dangerous.    
Most  airlines  recommended  that  crew  members  live  less  than  half  an  
hour  from  base,  but  a  number  of  the  former  flight  and  cabin  crew  interviewed  
for  this  thesis  resided  much  further  away  than  this.  They  lived,  often,  in  
remote  village  locations  in  Devon,  Dorset,  and  Cambridgeshire,  locations  they  
chose,  at  least  in  part,  for  respite  from  the  noise  of  cities  and  airports.  Sleep  
during  time  off  was  an  important  consideration  here.  For  these  crew  
members,  the  drive  to  work  could  be  several  hours  long.  Some  identified  this  
travel  as  a  cause  of  tiredness,  but  in  most  instances  interviewees  framed  
commute-­related  difficulties  as  an  effect,  rather  than  cause,  of  work-­induced  
fatigue.  As  one  former  pilot,  James  Hall,  put  it:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  Anon,  ‘Time  Enough  to  Rest?  Pilot’s  Point  of  View  on  the  “Bader  Report”’,  Flight  
International,  Jul  5  1973,  7-­9,  pp.  7-­8.  
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That’s  probably  when  I  felt  the  most  fatigue  of  all  is  driving  back  from  a  
flight  …  and  I  can  remember  on  some  occasions  really  struggling  to  
keep  awake  as  I  was  driving  home  and  almost  nodding  off  …  You  
know  you’d  come  back  after  an  overnight  flight  to  London  and  by  the  
time  you’d  gone  through  customs  and  all  the  rest  of  it,  signed  off  in  
crew  reporting  and  got  to  your  car,  by  that  stage  your  body  was  just  
[about  ready  to]  collapse  and  go  to  sleep  …    I  would  probably  single  
out  as  the  greatest  impact  that  fatigue  had  on  me  was  a  safe  drive  
home  after  a  night  flight.97  
  
The  lethargy  experienced  by  workers  following  flight  was  framed  as  a  major  
occupational  hazard  by  many  of  the  former  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  
interviewed  for  this  thesis.  A  number  of  respondents,  like  James  Hall,  found  
that  lethargy  prompted  instances  of  sleepiness.  One  former  pilot,  Paul  White,  
described  one  such  occasion,  during  a  one-­hour  drive  home  from  Heathrow:  ‘I  
actually  did  notice  this  on  one  occasion,  you  can  actually  fall  asleep  driving  
home’.98    
The  regulations  introduced  in  1975  made  no  attempt  to  deal  with  this  
problem  and  crew  members  were,  thus,  required  to  self-­manage  fatigue  in  
these  instances.  Many  engaged  in  the  practices  described  by  former  flight  
attendant  Jeffrey  Cooper:  they  drove  with  the  windows  down,  listened  to  loud  
music,  ‘screm[ed]  and  shout[ed],  and  drove  ‘fast’.99  In  some  instances  though,  
when  fatigue  was  particularly  severe,  crew  members  incorporated  rest  stops  
into  the  drive  home.  Former  cabin  attendant  Julia  Evans,  described  one  such  
instance:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97  Interview  with  James  Hall,  30  March  2016.  
98  Interview  with  Paul  White,  17  March  2016.  
99  Interview  with  Jeffrey  Cooper,  24  January  2017.  
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I  was  driving  down  the  motorway  and  the  traffic  was  terrible  just  before  
the  Winchester  bypass  started,  and  I  was  so  tired  and  I  had  the  window  
down  and  I  had  the  radio  on  and  I  knew  …  how  tired  I  felt  and  I  thought  
I’ll  just  pull  over  and  have  half  an  hour’s  sleep  until  the  traffic  goes  so  I  
drove  north  of  Winchester  …  I’ll  just  you  know  nip  in  here  somewhere  
I’ll  lock  myself  in  the  car  and  I’ll  put  the  seat  back  and  I’ll  just  go  to  
sleep  for  a  little  while.  Which  I  duly  did,  and  I  was  woken  up  nine  hours  
later  by  a  policeman  knocking  on  the  window,  and  I’d  lost  that  
completely  …  I  just  lost  all  that  time.  That’s  how  tired  I  must  have  been.  
My  neck  was  all  hanging.  You  know,  you’re  just  so  tired.100  
  
Like  the  workplace  regulations  premised  on  the  HSWA,  the  system  of  flight  
time  limitations  introduced  in  1975  was  more  expansive  and  detailed  than  any  
prior  regulatory  framework  governing  aircrew  schedules  in  Britain.  But,  as  
these  testimonies  make  clear,  CAP  371  and  the  accompanying  Air  Navigation  
Order  did  not  entirely  eradicate  fatigue.  This  was  in  part  because,  as  outlined  
above,  the  regulations  did  not  attempt  to  control  a  number  of  the  issues  that  
workers  identified  as  problematic.  Broader  changes  to  the  aviation  industry  
were  also  important  though.  The  1970s  and  1980s  saw  increasing  economic  
deregulation  and  marketisation  of  civil  aviation  in  Britain.  Competition  between  
airlines  intensified  in  this  period.  Pilot  utilisation  and  scheduling  were  key  
concerns  and,  as  the  following  sections  show,  increasing  competition  
prompted  a  number  of  airlines  to  exploit  the  permissive  nature  of  flight  time  
limitations  for  commercial  gain.  
  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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Reasonable  Freedom:  CAP  371  and  Associated  Variations  
Following  the  publication  of  the  Bader  Committee’s  report  in  June  1973,  the  
CAA  published  a  circular,  CAP  371,  to  accompany  the  amended  Air  
Navigation  Order.101  The  1975  publication  closely  followed  the  
recommendations  of  the  Bader  Committee.  The  maximum  permissible  flying  
duty  hours  were  lifted  straight  from  the  report:  fourteen  hours  a  day,  100  
hours  a  month,  and  900  hours  a  year.  Also  on  the  recommendation  of  the  
Bader  Committee’s  report,  the  CAA  appointed  an  advisory  Flight  Time  
Limitations  Board  (FTLB),  initially  led  by  Bader,  to  advise  the  CAA  on  issues  
of  flight  safety,  flight  time  limitations  and  associated  legislation,  and  to  act  as  a  
reference  body  to  advise  the  Flight  Operations  Inspectorate  on  any  
contentious  application  of  the  requirements.102    
The  main  function  of  the  FTLB  was  to  approve  or  disprove  requests  for  
variations.  The  Bader  Committee  recommended  that  ‘arbitrary’  figures,  like  
those  stated  previously,  be  used  as  a  general  scheduling  guide,  but  that  
operators  could  submit  a  scheme  with  slight  variations  to  the  FTLB  for  
consideration  if  compensatory  factors  meant  that  the  overall  scheme  
‘achieved  an  equivalent  level  of  safety’  to  CAP  371.103  Paragraph  13.2  of  the  
Bader  Committee’s  report,  the  seed  from  which  the  concept  of  variations  
grew,  explained  the  justification  for  this:  
  
We  consider  it  important  that  any  written  requirement  for  Flight  Time  
Limitations  should  have  as  uniform  an  effect  as  possible  in  achieving  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101  Civil  Aviation  Authority,  CAP  371:  The  Avoidance  of  Excessive  Fatigue  in  Aircrews:  
Requirements  Document,  (London:  Civil  Aviation  Authority,  1975).  
102  TNA  DR/13/4:  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’.  
103  TNA  DR/13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  1  July  1975,  p.  5;;  TNA  
DR/13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  13  November  1975,  p.  1.  
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the  objective  of  fatigue  prevention.  It  is  clear  that  the  several  factors  
which  determine  the  periods  of  work  and  rest  vary  considerably  with  
the  nature  of  the  operation.  The  written  requirements,  therefore,  must  
either  be  detailed  and  elaborate,  or  in  basic  form  with  reasonable  
freedom  to  apply  them  with  commonsense.  
  
The  Bader  Committee  recommended  that  the  latter  would  offer  a  ‘practicable  
solution  for  the  future’.  The  ‘freedom’  to  apply  requirements  did,  however,  
leave  CAP  371  potentially  open  to  manipulation  by  unscrupulous  operators.104  
In  August  1973,  shortly  after  the  publication  of  the  report,  the  Bader  
Committee  discussed  this  potential  problem.  The  Committee  suspected  that,  
particularly  in  the  early  stages  of  the  new  requirements,  ‘there  could  be  very  
large  numbers  of  requests  made  for  variations’,  and  that  any  ‘widespread  use  
of  variations  could  debase  the  general  level  of  protection’  intended  in  CAP  
371.105    
The  Bader  Committee’s  initial  misgivings  proved  correct.  In  the  years  
following  the  implementation  of  the  new  regulatory  system  virtually  all  sections  
of  CAP  371  were  varied  by  one  company  or  another.  Variations  were  granted  
for  a  number  of  issues  including  the  length  of  flying  duty  periods,  the  length  of  
rest  periods,  and  the  maximum  number  of  hours  a  crew  could  work  in  seven  
consecutive  days.  This  allowed  for  significant  differences  between  airlines.  
While  Monarch  pilots  could  expect  a  flying  duty  period  of  twelve  hours  and  
fifteen  minutes,  a  British  Caledonian  pilot  with  ‘exactly  the  same  aircraft  and  
route’  could  expect  a  more  restricted  flying  duty  period  of  eleven  hours  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104  TNA  DR/13/4:  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  p.  32.  
105  TNA  DR/13/4:  Bader  Committee,  ‘Flight  Time  Limitations  Board’,  29  August  1973,  p.  3.  
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forty-­five  minutes.106  Laker  pilots  were  granted  eighteen  hours  rest  following  a  
period  of  twelve  hours  on  standby  and  five  hours  flying.  Under  the  same  
conditions  Dan  Air  pilots  were  only  permitted  to  rest  for  twelve  hours.  
Britannia  pilots  were  permitted  to  work  up  to  fifty-­five  duty  hours  in  any  seven  
consecutive  days,  while  Alan  Mann  Helicopters  pilots  could  expect  to  fly  up  to  
sixty  duty  hours  a  week.107  
Though  the  widespread  use  of  variations  was,  in  and  of  itself,  
disturbing  for  trade  unions,  one  issue  caused  particular  concern:  exemption  
from  CAP  371.  Companies  without  approved  schemes  were  legally  allowed  to  
operate  in  compliance  with  the  limitations  laid  out  in  CAP  295,  which  were,  
trade  unions  argued,  less  restrictive  than  CAP  371.  As  BALPA’s  chairman,  J.  
H.  Wickson,  argued  in  a  letter  to  Bader  in  July  1975:  
  
There  must  be  many  ways  around  the  new  requirements,  and  there  are  
some  operators  who  will  not  hesitate  to  seek  them  out  to  gain  
commercial  advantage  over  their  competitors.  We  know  that  there  are  
responsible  operators  who  have  produced  schemes  under  the  new  
requirements.  I  have  been  told,  nevertheless,  that  there  are  those  who  
do  not  yet  have  approved  schemes  and  who  have  thus  been  given  
dispensation  to  operate  under  the  old  limits.108  
  
Wickson’s  concern  was  valid.  In  1975  a  number  of  airlines  intentionally  
submitted  schemes  to  the  FTLB  that  would  be  rejected  in  an  attempt  to  exploit  
this  regulatory  loophole.  Monarch  Airlines,  for  example,  deliberately  frustrated  
the  approval  process  so  that  operations  could  continue  under  the  limits  set  out  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106  Ibid.  p.  3.  
107  TNA  DR/13/1,  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  13  November  1975.  
108  TNA,  DR  13/6:  Letter  from  J.  H.  Wickson  to  Douglas  Bader,  25  July  1975,  p.  2.  
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in  CAP  295.  Throughout  1974  and  1975  the  airline’s  management  team  
submitted  schemes  to  the  FTLB  that  were  ‘totally  unlike  CAP  371’.109  In  a  
meeting  with  the  FTLB  on  19  August  1975  BALPA  argued  that  operators  like  
Monarch  Airlines  had  intentionally  ‘submitted  schemes,  knowing  that  they  
would  be  rejected,  as  a  delaying  measure’.110  In  October  1975,  the  TGWU  
raised  similar  concerns.  Though,  the  trade  union  argued  in  a  letter  to  the  
FTLB,  cabin  crew  employed  by  national  carriers  were  mostly  operating  under  
conditions  recommended  by  CAP  371,  a  number  of  smaller  companies  were  
not  conforming  to  the  minimum  conditions  it  set  out:  
  
Surely,  the  whole  concept  of  CAP  371  was  to  create  minimum  basic  
conditions  for  all  flying  crews;;  yet  since  May  1975,  companies  have  
been  allowed  to  seek,  and  gain,  deferment  from  introduction  of  the  
basic  conditions  specified  by  CAP  371.111  
  
The  weight  of  trade  union  concerns  were  acknowledged  by  the  FTLB,  but  
there  was  little  that  could  be  done  in  these  instances.112  As  the  FTLB  noted  in  
May  1975:  
  
An  operator’s  scheme  should  follow  the  model  of  the  CAP  371  but  if  it  
does  not,  according  to  Legal  Branch,  the  CAA  can  only  refuse  to  
approve  the  scheme  if  an  equivalent  level  of  safety  is  not  achieved.113  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109  TNA  DR  13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  13  November  1975,  p.  1.  
110  TNA  DR/13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  20  August  1975,  p.  1;;  
TNA  DR/13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  20  August  1975,  p.  2.  
111  TNA  DR/13/6:  Letter  from  TGWU  to  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  2  October  1975,  p.  1.  
112  TNA  DR/13/6:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  20  April  1976,  p.  1.  
113  TNA  DR/13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  21  May  1975,  p.  1.  
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The  FTLB  were,  then,  hamstrung  in  these  instances.  Despite  its  subtitle  
‘Requirements  Document’,  CAP  371  was  ‘purely  a  guidance  document’.114  
The  recommendations  it  set  out  had  no  legal  standing.  There  was,  then,  no  
requirement  that  operators  conform  exactly,  or  even  closely,  to  the  model  of  
flight  time  limitations  CAP  371  laid  out.  As  the  FTLB  noted  in  May  1975,  the  
CAA  was  only  able  to  reject  schemes  where  ‘an  equivalent  level  of  safety’  to  
CAP  371  had  not  been  achieved.115  There  were,  however,  no  clear  guidelines  
about  what  constituted  a  safe  scheme.  While  it  was  generally  agreed  that  
‘similar  limits’  to  CAP  371  should  be  deemed  safe,  and  that  ‘less  restrictive’  
schemes  might  be  unsafe,  these  were  not  quantified.116  There  were  no  
agreed  upper  and  lower  limits.  Since  the  ‘fatigue  line’  was  a  ‘matter  of  
opinion’,  the  FTLB,  rather,  assessed  each  scheme  on  a  case-­by-­case  
basis.117    
In  an  attempt  to  mitigate  the  problems  associated  with  variations,  in  
1976  the  CAA  began  consultations  on  revisions  to  CAP  371.  After  distributing  
two  draft  circulars  to  interested  parties  for  comment,  the  second  edition  of  
CAP  371  was  published  in  July  1982.  In  keeping  with  the  philosophy  of  
deregulation  favoured  by  the  CAA  in  the  1980s,  it  was  ‘downgraded’  from  a  
‘Requirements  Document’  to  a  ‘Guide  to  Requirements’,  clarifying  its  lack  of  
legal  standing.118  To  this  end,  CAP  371  had  been  considerably  simplified  and  
former  requirements  had  been  relaxed.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114  Ibid.  p.  5.  
115  TNA  DR/13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  21  May  1975,  p.  1.  
116  TNA  DR/13/1:  Flight  Time  Limitations  Board,  Minutes  of  Meeting,  1  July  1975,  p.  5.  
117  Ibid.  p.  5.  
118  Modern  Records  Centre  (hereafter  referred  to  as  MRC)  MSS  248/8/1:  Anon,  ‘Flight  Time  
Limitations  Special  CAP  371  Mk.  II’,  The  Log,  43,  4  (1982)  1-­2,  p.  1.    
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Trade  unions  opposed  these  changes.  BALPA  argued,  in  a  special  
edition  of  the  union’s  quarterly  publication  The  Log,  that  CAP  371  had  been  
revised  in  order  to  ‘ease  the  administrative  burden  of  the  CAA  rather  than  
increase  safety  for  pilots  and  their  passengers’.119  The  CAA,  BALPA  
contended,  had  ‘passed  the  buck’  of  responsibility  for  air  safety  to  trade  
unions  and  airline  operators  which,  the  Association  argued,  was  dangerous  as  
airlines  sought  to  take  advantage  of  ‘lax’  regulations  for  commercial  gain.120  
The  new  iteration  of  CAP  371  marked,  BALPA  argued,  a  return  to  the  system  
of  control  in  place  until  1957,  which  relied  on  industrial  agreements  between  
aircrew  and  operators:  
  
Flight  time  limitations,  which  BALPA  has  seen  historically  as  being  
primarily  concerned  with  flight  safety  and  thus  non-­industrial,  have  now  
been  stretched  to  such  limits  that  they  have  been  put  very  much  in  the  
same  category  as  accommodation,  promotion  and  conversions  …  to  be  
negotiated  industrially.121  
  
This  argument  was  overstated.  Throughout  the  century  flight  time  limitations  
of  the  kind  introduced  in  1975  remained  in  place.  Though  the  updated  edition  
of  CAP  371  introduced  in  1982  was  less  detailed  than  its  previous  iteration,  
the  general  principle,  which  required  that  work,  rest,  and  time  off  be  balanced  
across  duty  cycles,  remained  intact.  The  changes  to  CAP  371  were,  for  the  
most  part,  minor  but  the  tone  of  the  guidelines  shifted.  The  language  of  the  
revised  edition  of  CAP  371  recognised  pre-­existing  limitations.  It  marked  a  
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120  Ibid.  p.  1.  
121  Ibid.  p.  1.  
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pragmatic  realisation  on  the  part  of  the  CAA  rather  than  a  paradigmatic  shift  in  
regulatory  policy.  CAP  371  was,  from  the  outset,  flexible  and  permissive.  The  
updated  edition  merely  recognised  this.  As  the  following  section  will  
demonstrate,  however,  the  deregulatory  philosophy  popularised  by  the  
Conservative  Party  in  the  late  twentieth  century  permeated  civil  aviation  in  the  
middle  and  late  1980s  and  early  1990s.  
  
The  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reporting  Programme  
In  the  late  twentieth  century  neoliberalism  increasingly  influenced  government  
policy.122  Neoliberalism  has  received  a  multitude  of  definitions  but,  at  heart  the  
term  denoted  the  conviction  that  the  state  needed  to  roll-­back  and  allow  
unfettered  markets  to  deliver  all  goods  and  services  in  order  to  achieve  a  
more  efficient  and  equitable  distribution  of  resources  than  possible  under  
state  direction.  The  only  role  for  the  state  in  these  visions  was  in  creating  an  
efficient  framework  and  incentive  system  for  individuals  and  businesses  to  
conduct  economic  exchange.123  Accordingly,  command-­and-­control  forms  of  
regulation,  whereby  the  activities  of  individuals  and  companies  were  regulated  
directly  through  legislation,  gave  way  to  forms  based  on  compliance  and  self-­
regulation.  The  government  and  associated  agencies  thus  became,  as  Sirrs  
has  put  it,  ‘less  direct  and  less  visible’.124  The  Conservatives’  deregulatory  
agenda  was  broad.  It  encompassed  the  privatisation  of  national  industries  as  
well  as  legal  reform,  but  workplace  regulations  received  particular  attention.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122  Jackson,  ‘The  Think-­Tank  Archipelago’.  
123  Rollings,  ‘Cracks  in  the  Post-­War  Keynesian  Settlement?’.  
124  Christopher  Sirrs,  Health  and  Safety  in  the  British  Regulatory  State,  1961-­2001:  The  HSC,  
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Indeed,  a  number  of  white  papers  produced  in  the  1980s  identified  health  and  
safety  at  work  as  part  of  an  insidious  problem  of  ‘red  tape’  and  over-­
regulation.125    
The  CAA  was  not  formally  affected  by  any  of  the  Conservatives’  
deregulatory  reforms.  As  noted  previously,  the  CAA  was  officially  outside  of  
government  control,  a  quango  rather  than  a  state  department.126  The  CAA  
was,  however,  influenced  by  government  rhetoric  and  policy,  and  in  the  1980s  
adopted  its  own  deregulatory  agenda.  The  Authority  relaxed  a  number  of  rules  
relating  to  competition  and  domestic  fares.  From  the  1980s  fares  no  longer  
needed  prior  approval,  and  the  CAA  only  stepped  in  where  there  was  
evidence  of  monopoly  or  unfair  practices.  As  part  of  this  broader  deregulatory  
project,  the  CAA  also  reconsidered  the  regulation  of  aircrew  schedules.  As  
noted  above,  in  1982  flight  time  limitations  were  relaxed  in  the  amended  
version  of  CAP  371.  In  addition,  from  the  early  1980s  the  CAA  increasingly  
ceded  much  of  its  regulatory  control  to  other  agencies,  particularly  on  issues  
relating  to  human  factors.  
   Though  a  detailed  system  of  flight  time  limitations  was  introduced  in  the  
1970s,  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  continued  to  complain  of  fatigue  throughout  
the  late  twentieth  century.  The  1980s  saw  an  increasing  number  of  informal  
reports  from  pilots  about  the  negative  effect  of  human  factors  on  performance  
and  flight  safety.  Pilots  attributed  these  issues  to  increasingly  busy  schedules  
as  a  result  of  economic  deregulation,  which  had  allowed  a  number  of  new  
low-­cost  operators  to  enter  the  market.  Many  of  these  were  more  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125  Ibid.  p.  277.  
126  Michael  Cole,  ‘Quangos:  The  Debate  of  the  1970s  in  Britain’,  Contemporary  British  
History,  19,  3  (2005)  321-­352.  
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commercially  motivated  than  the  traditional  flag  carriers.  Employment  of  pilots  
was  one  of  the  major  costs  for  airlines  –  after  aircraft  and  fuel  –  and  new  low-­
cost  airlines  were  keen  to  ensure  a  good  return.  This  meant,  essentially,  that  
pilots  employed  by  small  airlines  were,  in  many  cases,  scheduled  to  work  the  
maximum  number  of  hours  legally  possible.  The  CAA  was  reluctant  to  
introduce  further  regulations  but,  in  an  attempt  to  mitigate  the  concerns  of  
flight  crew,  established  a  confidential  reporting  service  –  the  Confidential  
Human  Factors  Incident  Reporting  Programme  (CHIRP)  –  in  1982.  
The  official  aim  of  CHIRP,  according  to  co-­founder  Paul  White,  was  ‘to  
get  people  to  talk’.127  Pilots  were  asked  to  share  concerns  about  the  effect  of  
human  factors  on  flight  safety  and  to  report  any  potentially  dangerous  
incidents.  To  encourage  reporting,  CHIRP  was  run  independently  from  the  
CAA.128  It  was  housed  within  the  RAF  Institute  of  Aviation  Medicine  (IAM)  in  
Farnborough  and  staffed  entirely  by  former  pilots,  the  assumption  being  that  
workers  were  more  likely  to  talk  frankly  to  individuals  with  first-­hand  
experience  of  commercial  aviation.  Paul  White  cited  his  ‘wide  experience’  of  
flight  as  one  of  the  reasons  he  was  chosen  to  work  at  CHIRP:  
  
One  of  the  things  that  I  found  when  I  was  working  at  CHIRP,  because  
I’d  got  wide  experience,  because  I’d  been  frightened  to  death  many  
times  in  airplanes,  when  somebody  said  ‘I  had  an  engine  failure,  I  had  
a  fire  in  the  airplane  …  the  wheels  wouldn’t  come  down,  I  had  this  that  
and  the  other’,  I  could  say  ‘oh  and  did  this  happen  as  well’  and  they’d  
say  ‘yeah  how’d  you  know  that?’  and  I’d  say  ‘it’s  happened  to  me’.  You  
get  the  rapport  and  you  get  people  opening  up  and  letting  you  know  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  Interview  with  Paul  White,  17  March  2016.  
128  Ibid.  
   190  
what’s  going  on.  Very  difficult  to  do  that  with  an  answerphone  or  with  
somebody  who  hasn’t  flown  airplanes.129  
  
There  is  likely  some  truth  to  these  foundation  stories  –  that  CHIRP  needed  to  
be  independent  and  informal  in  order  to  foster  a  culture  of  openness  and  
honesty  –  but  the  formation  of  CHIRP  can  also  be  read  as  an  attempt  by  the  
CAA  to  delegate  responsibility  for  flight  safety  elsewhere.    
The  issues  experienced  by  flight  crew  were  shared  by  CHIRP  in  
Incident  Reports,  which  were  made  available  in  crew  rooms  for  pilots  to  
peruse  and  recurrent  issues  were  reported  to  regulatory  bodies,  including  the  
FTLB.130  The  impact  of  Incident  Reports  was  thus  intended  to  be  two-­fold:  to  
impact  pilot  behaviour  from  the  bottom  up,  and  to  influence  regulatory  policy  
from  the  top  down.  In  reality,  though,  CHIRP  Incident  Reports  had  limited  
impact  on  regulation.  Though  CHIRP  reported  dangerous  incidents  to  the  
CAA,  as  the  Authority  was  reluctant  to  introduce  new  regulations,  CHIRP  
Incident  Reports  rarely  engendered  change.  As  founder  members  of  CHIRP  
Roger  Green  and  Roy  Skinner  put  it  in  1987,  five  years  after  CHIRP  was  first  
established:  
  
The  point  of  CHIRP,  of  course,  is  to  bring  incidents  …  to  the  attention  
of  the  authorities,  so  that  action  may  be  taken  which  will  prevent  a  
similar  accident.  Sadly,  rectifying  a  problem  is  not  as  easy  as  
identifying  it.131  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129  Ibid.  
130  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  9,  December  1985,  available  
at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  2016].  
131  MRC  MSS.248/8/1:  Roger  Green  and  Roy  Skinner,  ‘CHIRP  and  Fatigue’,  The  Log,  48,  5  
(October  1987)  6-­11,  p.  7.  
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In  spite  of  the  organisation’s  initial  aim  –  regulatory  impact  –  by  the  mid-­
1980s,  then,  the  dissemination  of  information  was  CHIRP’s  chief  remit.    
Many  of  the  Incident  Reports  circulated  by  CHIRP  covered  issues  
concerning  fatigue  and  flight  time  limitations.  Between  1982  and  1987  over  
one  third  of  reports  focused  on  issues  relating  to  sleep,  fatigue,  or  rostering.132  
Some  were  cautionary  in  nature.  A  number  of  reports,  for  example,  alerted  
others  to  ‘inherently  dangerous  approaches’  to  airports  and  issued  warnings  
to  take  extra  precautions  when  fatigued.133  Others  offered  advice  about  
coping  with  fatigue  in  flight.  Some  recommended  introducing  additional  
periods  of  bunk  rest  on  flights  with  three  person  crews,  with  one  pilot  resting  
while  the  others  worked.134  As  one  anonymised  account  described:  
  
Fortunately  on  the  normal  three  crew  747  we  all  take  it  in  turns  to  have  
a  sleep  especially  if  bunks  are  fitted  and  this  greatly  enhances  the  
safety  of  the  operation.  I  know  of  Captains  who  keep  to  the  law  and  do  
not  allow  this.  I  pity  their  crews  on  some  flights.  If  and  when  I  fly  a  two  
crew  747  and  it  is  6am  my  local  body  time  I  shall  have  a  nap.  I  am  not  
superhuman  or  specially  trained  to  stay  awake.135  
  
Others  suggested  that  cockpit  floodlights  be  kept  on  when  the  crew  was  tired  
and  finally,  in  line  with  earlier  military  practice,  some  reports  advocated  the  
use  of  stimulants  and  hypnotics.136  A  number  of  reports  recommended  
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133  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  15,  December  1987,  p.  5,  
available  at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  2016].  
134  For  example  see:  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  5,  August  
1984,  available  at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  
2016];;  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  8,  August  1985,  available  
at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  2016].  
135  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  19,  April  1989,  p.  4,  available  
at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  2016].  
136  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  5.  
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sleeping  pills  prior  to  night  flights  to  ensure  adequate  sleep  during  the  day,  
when  many  found  sleep  was  more  difficult.137  
   The  coping  mechanisms  recommended  in  CHIRP  Incident  Reports  
were  widely  employed  by  crew  members.  As  Chapter  Five  describes,  informal  
rest  periods  were  widely  popular  in  British  airlines,  and  sleeping  pills  were  
used  by  a  number  of  men  and  women  employed  as  cabin  attendants.138  Many  
crew  members,  though,  employed  strategies  learned  elsewhere.  Some  relied  
on  the  coping  mechanisms  they  were  introduced  to  during  military  service.  
The  use  of  alcohol  as  a  soporific  was  common,  particularly  among  pilots  with  
RAF  backgrounds.  As  one  former  fighter  pilot  who  later  worked  in  civil  airlines  
put  it:    
  
We  used  to  have  monumental  piss  ups  um  and  you’d  think  nothing  
about  going  to  bed  very  much  the  worse  for  wear  [but]  that  sort  of  thing  
was  considered  sort  of  more  or  less  acceptable  back  then.139  
  
This  practice  was  used  to  both  induce  sleep  and  cope  with  the  psychological  
strains  and  stresses  associated  with  long-­haul  operations.140  Over-­use  of  
alcohol  was  a  common  coping  mechanism  in  a  number  of  professions  in  the  
twentieth  century.  The  practice  was  so  widely  employed  that,  according  to  
Alison  Haggett,  employers  were  advised  to  be  alert  to  absences  on  Monday  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  For  example  see:  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  15;;  
Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  19.  
138  The  practice  of  controlled  rest  is  discussed  in  Chapter  Five.  
139  Interview  with  James  Hall,  30  March  2016.  
140  Interview  with  Patrick  Smith,  3  February  2017;;  interview  with  Matthew  Hart,  26  January  
2017;;  interview  with  James  Hall,  30  March  2016.  
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mornings,  since  this  might  indicate  a  weekend  of  excessive  alcohol  
consumption.141      
Alcohol  abuse  was  but  one  means  of  coping  with  psychological  
disorders  beyond  medical  purview.  Resistance  to  medicalisation  was  a  
common  thread  in  the  management  of  flying  fatigue  on  both  sides  of  the  
Atlantic.  As  sociologist  Roberta  Lessor  described,  self-­care  practices  were  
well  entrenched  in  American  airlines  by  the  1970s:  
  
These  self-­care  strategies  involved  assessment  of  the  effect  of  the  
work  environment  on  physical  and  mental  health  and  the  pursuit  of  
activities  related  to  reclaiming,  countering,  readjusting  and  replacing  
the  unhealthy  practices  for  the  healthy.142  
  
Preservation  of  the  self  had  various  implications  but  usually  involved,  
according  to  Lessor,  either  the  reclamation  of  space  or  the  assertion  of  priority  
over  others.  In  her  study  of  flight  attendants  working  for  American  airlines,  
Lessor  found  a  number  of  expressions  of  this,  including  the  substitution  of  
‘good-­looking’  high-­heeled  shoes  for  ‘non-­regulation’,  but  ‘comfortable’,  
footwear.143    
Cabin  attendants  and  flight  crew  employed  a  number  of  self-­care  
practices  in  the  management  of  fatigue  and  circadian  disruption.  As  Lessor  
described  of  crew  behaviour  on  the  other  side  of  the  Atlantic,  this  mostly  
involved  lifestyle  choices:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
141  Alison  Haggett,  A  History  of  Male  Psychological  Disorders  in  Britain,  1945-­1980,  
(Basingstoke:  Palgrave  Macmillan,  2015).  
142  Roberta  Lessor,  ‘Consciousness  of  Time  and  Time  for  the  Development  of  
Consciousness:  Health  Awareness  Among  Women  Flight  Attendants’,  Sociology  of  Health  
and  Illness,  7,  2  (1985)  191-­213,  p.  199.  
143  Ibid.  p.  200.  
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A  number  of  women  [flight  attendants]  have  tried  to  find  ways  to  keep  
from  ‘medicalising’  their  sleep  problem  by  running  or  aerobic  exercises,  
practising  yoga,  or  transcendental  meditation.  Some  advocate  ‘just  will  
power’  …  Those  who  said  that  they  ‘take  something  if  necessary’,  
indicated  an  increased  awareness  of  the  need  for  moderation  in  
practices  that  will  very  likely  be  continued  over  a  long  period  of  time.144  
  
In  Britain  flight  and  cabin  crews  employed  similar  strategies.  A  number  of  the  
respondents  interviewed  for  this  thesis  engaged  in  aerobic  exercise.  While  
some  ran,  others  cycled.  Several  crew  members  also  walked  dogs  or  rode  
horses  during  their  time  off.145  Others  practiced  yoga.146    
Many  crew  members  attempted  also  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  fatigue  in  
flight.  They  relied,  like  their  military  counterparts,  on  the  consumption  of  
energy-­rich  food  and  drink.  Former  flight  attendant  Julia  Evans  consumed  
copious  cans  of  Coca  Cola  in  flight.  ‘I  must  have  drunk’,  she  recalled,  ‘half  of  
the  cans  of  Coca  Cola  on  the  aircraft  because  it  was  an  instant  hit  of  sugar.’147  
Consumption  of  sugar-­rich  and  caffeinated  beverages  was  common,  at  least  
in  part  because  such  refreshments  were  easily  accessible  in  flight.  As  Julia  
Evans  described,  Coca  Cola  was  the  obvious  choice,  because  it  was  
available  in  the  in-­flight  bar:  ‘just  got  to  grab  it,  don’t  have  to  fiddle  around  with  
it,  pull  the  can,  instant  hit’.148  Others  found  that  fatigue  was  alleviated  through  
dietary  control.  A  number  of  the  respondents  interviewed  for  this  thesis  said  
that  heavy  meals  induced  feelings  of  sluggishness  and,  as  such,  many  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144  Ibid.  p.  201.  
145  Interview  with  Julia  and  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016;;  interview  with  Andrew  Murray,  4  
March  2016;;  interview  with  Albert  Watson,  5  January  2017.  
146  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
147  Ibid.  
148  Ibid.  
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preferred  to  ‘graze’  rather  than  eat  full  meals  while  working.149  Former  long-­
haul  flight  attendant  Jacob  Evans,  for  example,  chose  to  eat  simple  snacks:  
  
A  banana  roll.  I  used  to  cross  the  Atlantic  on  bananas  …  Everyone  else  
in  the  crew  would  eat  first  class  meals  ...  I  never  used  to  participate  in  
any  of  that.  I  used  to  go  bananas  only.  You’d  think  I  was  in  a  zoo.150  
  
Flight  and  cabin  crew  developed  these  coping  strategies  in  part  through  self-­
experimentation  but,  in  the  main,  as  a  result  of  exchanges  with  colleagues.  As  
former  cabin  attendant  Elizabeth  Powell  described:  
  
We  knew  about  them,  because  …  once  you’re  in  the  airline  and  then  
you  all  talk  amongst  each  other,  you  talk  amongst  yourselves  when  
you’re  at  the  end  of  a  work  day.  You  get  a  lot  of  information  from  sitting  
around  and  talking  the  day  out,  and  because  you’ve  had  a  few  
problems,  and  then  somebody  will  say  ‘oh  I’ve  had  that  problem  before  
and  we  dealt  with  it  like  this’.151  
  
Through  these  informal  discussions  with  colleagues  at  the  end  of  the  work  
day,  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  were  introduced  to  a  range  of  coping  
strategies.  
While  CHIRP  disseminated  information  about  coping  with  fatigue  in  
Incident  Reports,  this  was  but  one  mode  of  knowledge  transmission.  Informal  
channels  of  exchange  were  present  throughout  the  twentieth  century  and  
were,  it  seems,  widely  used.  Indeed,  it  is  telling  that  CHIRP  was  referenced  by  
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150  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
151  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
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only  one  of  the  respondents  interviewed  for  this  thesis:  Paul  White,  who  was  
employed  by  the  Programme.  It  seems,  however,  that  for  the  most  part  flight  
and  cabin  crew  were  unaware  of  or  uninterested  in  reading  Incident  Reports.  
An  article  written  by  CHIRP  workers  in  1992  gauged  the  success  of  the  
scheme  thus:  
  
CHIRP  has  undoubtedly  acted  as  a  catalyst  for  a  number  of  changes  
that  are  of  clear  safety  benefit.  Even  if  this  were  not  so,  and  even  if  no  
reports  had  ever  been  submitted  to  CHIRP,  the  system  would  still  be  
required.  It  is  a  manifestation  of  the  principle  that,  in  aviation,  safety  is  
an  issue  superordinate  to  any  considerations  of  commercial  gain,  
industrial  politics,  or  disciplinary  action;;  pilots  and  controllers  must  be  
given  a  means  to  voice  their  anxieties  about  safety  freely  and  without  
fear  of  retribution.152  
  
In  the  late-­twentieth  century,  though,  the  CAA  was  uninterested  in  the  strict  
enforcement  or  revision  of  regulations  except  in  the  most  extreme  
circumstances.  As  such,  while  CHIRP  had  some  success  engendering  
technical  changes  –  for  example,  in  relation  to  flight  deck  lighting  and  seat  
harnesses  –  its  impact  on  flight  time  limitations  was  limited.153    
The  formation  of  CHIRP  represents  a  shift  in  the  regulation  of  human  
factors  in  civil  aviation.  Although  the  formal  industry  regulator,  the  CAA,  
remained  intact  throughout  the  late  twentieth  century,  its  light  touch  approach  
to  enforcement  meant  that  the  Authority  had  very  little  impact  on  the  day-­to-­
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reporting  Programme:  Feedback  No.  28,  December  
1992,  p.  2,  available  at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  
March  2016].  
153  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reporting  Programme:  Feedback  No.  24,  July  1991,  
available  at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  2016].  
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day  imposition  of  regulations.  External  agencies  without  regulatory  powers,  
such  as  CHIRP,  were  instead  granted  greater  responsibility  for  safety.  As  it  
was  outside  CHIRP’s  remit  to  impose  guidelines,  policy  focused  instead  on  
the  amendment  of  crew  behaviour.    
  
Conclusion:  From  the  Cockpit  to  the  Operating  Theatre  
In  the  late-­twentieth  century  the  fatigue  of  healthcare  professionals  was,  
increasingly,  framed  as  a  danger  to  patients.  Though,  as  Adam  Moreton  has  
demonstrated,  concerns  of  this  sort  stretch  back  at  least  as  far  as  the  1960s,  
this  discourse  increasingly  gained  traction  in  the  1970s  when,  in  1975,  junior  
hospital  doctors  engaged  in  a  limited  form  of  industrial  action  ‘in  support  of  the  
junior  hospital  staff  contract’.154  In  this  period  there  were,  as  Morteon  has  
shown,  increasing  calls  for  doctors’  hours  to  be  regulated.  A  number  of  
commentators  suggested  that  a  system  similar  to  the  model  of  flight  time  
limitations  introduced  in  Britain  in  1975  to  regulate  pilots’  hours  of  work  and  
rest,  should  be  applied  to  healthcare  professionals.  In  1988  Simon  Durnford,  a  
consultant  in  aviation  medicine  based  at  the  RAF  IAM,  first  posited  the  idea  in  
a  comment  piece  for  the  British  Medical  Journal.  Durnford  argued  that,  while  
many  senior  consultants  considered  the  intensive  hours  worked  by  juniors  as  
‘a  necessary  evil,  a  rite,  or  even  an  advantageous  education’,  tiredness  might  
result  in  reduced  medical  ability  and  inadequate  care.155  Both  aviation  and  
medicine,  he  argued,  were  ‘unforgiving  of  seemingly  minor  slips’:  ‘A  wrong  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154  Adam  Moreton,  ‘The  Acrimonious  Road  to  the  48  Hour  Week’,  British  Medical  Journal  
Blog,  Nov  3  2014,  http://careers.bmj.com/careers/advice/view-­article.html?id=20019902  [last  
accessed  3  Jun  2015];;  Patrick  O’Connor,  ‘Who  Will  Follow  the  Juniors  Now?’,  British  Medical  
Journal,  2,  6152  (1978)  1660,  p.  1660.  
155  Simon  Durnford,  ‘Junior  Hospital  Doctors:  Tired  and  Tested’,  British  Medical  Journal,  297,  
6654  (1988)  931-­932,  p.  931.  
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decimal  point,  a  forgotten  drug  interaction,  or  incorrect  labelling  of  right  or  left  
and  the  results  may  be  catastrophic.’156  As  fatigue  had  implications  for  patient  
safety,  Durnford  argued,  the  hours  worked  by  junior  doctors  should  be  
carefully  regulated  in  line  with  those  of  flight  deck  crew.    
The  following  year  a  study  by  two  consultant  anaesthetists  –  A.  Murray  
Wilson  and  G.  Weston  –  examined  whether  this  was  possible.  As  Murray  
Wilson  and  Weston  noted  in  their  1989  article,  though  the  medical  press,  
‘often  referred  to  these  restrictions’,  their  study  marked  the  first  formal  
investigation  of  CAA  guidelines  in  a  medical  setting.157  Murray  Wilson  and  
Weston  surveyed  the  workload  of  junior  anaesthetists  between  March  and  
May  1988.  The  rules  contained  within  CAP  371  were  then  retrospectively  
used  to  allocate  anaesthetists  to  cover  the  work  that  they  had  performed  ‘as  
though  scheduling  aircrew’.158  The  study  found  that  the  number  of  people  
required  to  cover  junior  anaesthetists’  rotas  when  the  guidelines  laid  down  in  
CAP  371  were  followed  was  ‘surprisingly  high’,  suggesting  that  the  workload  
of  junior  anaesthetists  was  excessive.159    
Though  Murray  Wilson  and  Weston  questioned  the  validity  of  the  
comparison  between  aircrew  and  anaesthetists  –  anaesthetists,  they  argued,  
were  only  occupied  by  work  between  42%  to  62%  of  the  time,  and  had  ‘long  
periods  of  inactivity  when  they  could  take  rest’  –  they  nevertheless  
recommended  that  the  National  Health  Service  (NHS)  should  introduce  rules  
similar  to  those  employed  by  the  aviation  industry  to  prevent  junior  hospital  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156  Ibid.  p.  931.  
157  A.  Murray  Wilson  and  G.  Weston,  ‘Application  of  Airline  Pilots’  Hours  to  Junior  Doctors’,  
British  Medical  Journal,  299,  6702  (1989)  779-­781,  p.  779.  
158  Ibid.  p.  779.  
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doctors  working  unsafe  hours.160  In  their  conclusion  to  the  study,  Murray  
Wilson  and  Weston  argued  that  the  responsibility  for  avoiding  doctor  fatigue  
lay,  ultimately,  with  NHS  Trusts:  
  
Fatigue  is  but  one  of  the  factors  that  threaten  a  person’s  concentration,  
but  it  can  be  anticipated.  There  is  no  excuse  for  demanding  that  junior  
anaesthetists  continue  working  their  present  unsafe  number  of  hours  or  
for  subjecting  patients  to  a  new  generation  of  tired  doctors.  The  
responsibility  for  errors  resulting  from  fatigue  will  belong  to  those  who  
fail  to  plan  appropriately.161  
  
Though  junior  doctors’  associations  broadly  supported  these  conclusions,  
others  were  more  sceptical.    
Following  the  publication  of  the  study,  the  British  Medical  Journal  
published  a  series  of  critical  responses.  While  some  contributions  argued  that  
CAP  371-­style  regulations  were  ‘not  economically  feasible’,  others  argued  that  
doctors  should  be  responsible  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue  by  taking  rest  
where  possible.162  In  other  instances,  detractors  argued  that  the  limits  
proposed  by  Murray  Wilson  and  Weston  were  too  restrictive.  P.  J.  Helliwell  
and  M.  P.  Coplans  of  the  Association  of  Anaesthetists  of  Great  Britain  and  
Ireland  argued,  following  the  publication  of  the  1989  article  that:  
  
The  practice  of  medicine  in  general  is  too  unpredictable,  and  the  
specialty  of  anaesthesia  too  immediate,  to  warrant  the  formulation  of  
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162  Brian  Kennedy,  ‘Application  of  Airline  Pilots’  Hours  to  Junior  Doctors’,  British  Medical  
Journal,  299,  6705  (1989)  974;;  John  A.  T.  Duncan,  ‘Application  of  Airline  Pilots’  Hours  to  
Junior  Doctors’,  British  Medical  Journal,  299,  6705  (1989)  975.  
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strict  rules  of  clinical  conduct;;  thus  it  is  not  possible  to  apply  the  rigid  
regulations  applicable  to,  for  example,  airline  pilots  directly  to  practising  
anaesthetists.163  
  
These  critical  voices  reflected  the  regulatory  concerns  of  parliament.  As  
Moreton  has  shown,  though  various  iterations  of  the  Junior  Hospital  Doctors  
(Regulations  of  Hours)  Bill  –  which  called  for  a  seventy-­two  hour  weekly  limit  
on  juniors  hospital  doctors’  hours  –  were  debated  in  the  1980s,  all  attempts  to  
introduce  working  hours  legislation  of  the  kind  common  to  civil  aviation  
ultimately  failed.164  The  reasons  for  this  are  complex,  and  are  worthy  of  further  
research.  Of  course,  medicine  traditionally  resisted  regulation,  and  the  
financial  and  bureaucratic  concerns  of  the  NHS  were  expansive.    
For  the  purposes  of  this  thesis  the  rationale  of  NHS  regulators  in  their  
rejection  of  CAP  371-­style  limitations  is  not  important.  What  is  crucial,  
however,  is  what  this  episode  reveals  about  how  the  people  of  Britain  
understood  and  conceptualised  flight  time  limitations  in  the  late  twentieth  
century.  That  CAP  371  was  so  widely  discussed  in  the  medical  press  says  
something  about  how  healthcare  professionals  perceived  the  regulation  of  
work  and  rest  in  civil  aviation.  The  model  of  limitations  introduced  in  1975  was  
held  up,  by  medical  practitioners  and  professionals  in  other  high-­risk  
industries,  as  a  gold  standard,  an  ideal.  It  was  believed,  ultimately,  to  be  safe  
and  was  framed  as  a  model  to  aspire  to  and,  if  possible,  closely  replicate.  
   The  idealistic  discourse  surrounding  flight  time  limitations  in  other  
occupations  is  interesting,  and,  no  doubt,  telling  of  the  lower  level  of  
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protections  afforded  to  workers  elsewhere.  It  is,  however,  ultimately  incorrect.  
As  this  chapter  has  shown,  reflecting  a  broader  separation  of  research  and  
policy  in  civil  aviation,  flight  time  limitations  were  not  grounded  in  evidence.  As  
former  pilot  Gerard  Hunt  put  it:  
  
Well  actually  we  weren’t  data  driven,  we  weren’t  research  and  
evidence  based,  compared  with  doctors,  and  so  if  …  you  said  
something  that  they  [pilots]  kind  of  could  agree  with  they’d  say  ‘yeah  
this  seems  to  make  sense,  I’ll  do  that’.165  
  
Flight  time  limitations  were  not  based  on  original  psychological  or  
physiological  research.  The  committees  charged  with  designing  regulations  
deemed  this  evidence  too  crude,  and  fatigue  too  medically  ambiguous,  to  
engage  with.  As  a  result,  medical  evidence  was  largely  side-­lined.  Regulatory  
reviews  relied  instead,  as  in  wartime  studies  of  flying  stress,  on  expert  
testimonies.  In  many  cases,  regulatory  committees  privileged  the  economic  
and  administrative  concerns  of  operators  and,  as  a  result,  throughout  the  
century  flight  time  limitations  were  consistently  flexible  and  permissive.    
The  immediate  post-­war  era  ushered  in  a  ‘new  wave  of  state  
interventionism’  in  some  respects.166  The  period  is  often  defined  as  one  of  
collective  provision,  with  the  nationalisation  of  industry,  transport,  and  
healthcare  cited  as  primary  examples  of  this  overarching  trend.  Liberal  values,  
which  stressed  self-­reliance  rather  than  state  intervention,  however,  persisted.  
As  this  chapter  has  shown,  throughout  the  post-­war  period  British  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
165  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
166  Greg  Eghigian,  Andreas  Killen,  and  Christine  Leuenberger,  ‘The  Self  as  Project:  Politics  
and  the  Human  Sciences  in  the  Twentieth  Century’,  Osiris,  22,  1  (2007)  1-­25,  p.  22.  
   202  
governments  were  consistently  reluctant  to  extend  their  regulatory  reach.  As  
such,  though  the  work  and  rest  of  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  was  more  strictly  
regulated  than  in  any  other  industry  in  post-­war  Britain,  these  regulations  
consistently  located  the  responsibility  for  fatigue  management  with  individual  
workers  rather  than  employers  or  state  agencies.  Reflecting  broader  
regulatory  trends  in  post-­war  Britain,  pilots  were  tasked  with  finding  means  of  
balancing  work  and  rest  themselves  rather  than  relying  on  the  state.    
Civil  aviation  was  but  one  arena  where  responsibility  for  the  health,  
safety,  and  wellbeing  of  workers  and  publics  was  negotiated  in  twentieth-­
century  Britain.  Debates  about  fatigue  management  in  civil  aviation  spoke  to  
and  were  influenced  by  broader  discussions  about  health  and  safety  at  work  
and  home.  Responsibility  for  the  health,  safety,  and  wellbeing  of  publics  and  
workers  was  broadly  contested  and  refashioned  in  the  twentieth  century.167  
Responsibility  was,  in  the  latter  decades  of  the  twentieth  century,  increasingly  
located  beyond  the  state:  with  individuals  and  workplaces,  rather  than  
government  agencies.  Chronic  sick  patients  were  increasingly  expected  to  
monitor  and  manage  their  symptoms  themselves,  outside  of  a  medical  setting.  
Employers  and  workers  were,  from  the  1970s,  charged  with  managing  health  
and  safety  at  work.  Employees  were  expected  to  manage  stress,  fatigue,  and  
other  health  issues  individually,  with  lifestyle  changes,  or  with  the  help  of  their  
employer,  through  stress-­management  courses.  More  broadly,  publics  were  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167  Martin  Moore,  A  Question  of  Control?  Managing  Diabetes  and  its  Professionals  in  Britain,  
1910-­1994,  PhD  Thesis,  (University  of  Warwick,  2014);;  Sirrs,  Health  and  Safety  in  the  British  
Regulatory  State,  1961-­2001;;  Deborah  Palmer,  ‘Cultural  Change,  Stress  and  Civil  Servants’  
Occupational  Health,  c.  1967-­85’  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  Stress  in  Post-­War  Britain,  1945-­85,  
(London:  Pickering  and  Chatto,  2015),  pp.  95-­110;;  Ayesha  Nathoo,  ‘Initiating  Therapeutic  
Relaxation  in  Britain:  A  Twentieth-­Century  Strategy  for  Health  and  Wellbeing’,  Palgrave  
Communications,  2  (2016),  1-­10,  available  at:  http://www.palgrave-­
journals.com/articles/palcomms201643  [last  accessed  20  July  2016].  
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charged  with  taking  responsibility  for  their  own  individual  health  by  engaging  
in  health-­promoting  behaviours,  and  curbing  bad  habits.  Broader  structural  
changes  were  rarely  considered.  
This  chapter  has  focused  predominantly  on  statutory  limitations  and  
guidance  from  quasi-­state  regulators,  but  throughout  the  twentieth  century  
flight  times  and  rest  periods  were  also  controlled  by  union-­airline  agreements.  
Even  after  the  introduction  of  CAP  371,  which  proposed  universal  limits,  
variations  meant  that  in  reality  the  rules  governing  the  hours  of  work  and  rest  
of  aircrew  were  not  the  same  across  the  board.  Aviation  unions  –  particularly  
BALPA  –  played  a  significant  role  in  the  negotiation  of  variations  and,  as  the  
following  chapter  will  show,  also  in  airline-­specific  policies  prior  to  the  
introduction  of  CAP  371.  What  follows  examines  how,  and  to  what  end,  
aviation  unions  negotiated  hours  of  work  and  rest  with  civil  airlines  in  the  
twentieth  century.  The  following  chapter  acts,  therefore,  as  somewhat  of  a  
counterpoint  to  what  is  discussed  here.  It  engages  with  many  of  the  same  
themes  but  focuses  primarily  on  aviation  unions,  rather  than  regulatory  
agencies.  It  looks,  specifically,  at  the  arguments  put  forward  by  BALPA  for  the  
reduction  of  flying  and  duty  hours  between  1961  and  1973.    
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4  
Fatigue,  Trade  Unionism,  and  Public  Relations    
  
  
On  13  December  1972,  an  alarming  story  made  national  and  international  
headlines:  a  British  Overseas  Airways  (BOAC)  flight  crew  had  fallen  asleep  
mid-­flight  on  route  from  Sydney  to  Honolulu.  The  captain  of  the  airliner  
carrying  125  passengers  was  reported  to  have  ‘nodded  off’  over  Japan,  only  
to  wake  and  find  both  of  his  two  co-­pilots  and  flight  engineer  –  his  entire  flight  
deck  crew  –  asleep.1  Although  the  story  was  not  entirely  novel  it  received  an  
unprecedented  level  of  news  coverage.2  Released  to  the  press  by  the  British  
Airline  Pilots  Association  (BALPA),  it  marked  a  radical  new  public  relations  
approach  for  the  aviation  union.    
This  chapter  examines  the  events  leading  up  to,  and  immediately  after,  
the  release  of  the  sleeping  flight  crew  story.  It  is  structured  in  two  parts.  The  
first  looks  at  the  pay  and  productivity  agreements  negotiated  by  BALPA  
between  1960  and  1971.  During  this  period  fatigue  was  considered  secondary  
to  pay  within  union  negotiations.  In  line  with  contemporary  regulatory  
discourse,  it  was  framed  as  a  short-­term  phenomenon,  and  BALPA  was  often  
prepared  to  waive  claims  of  fatigue  in  favour  of  improved  pay  and  conditions  
for  members.  The  second  looks  at  the  radically  different  approach  to  fatigue  
BALPA  adopted  in  the  early  1970s.  It  examines  BALPA’s  public  relations  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Arthur  Reed,  ‘Ministry  Inquiry  over  BOAC  crew  asleep  at  controls  of  jet  flying  30,000  ft’,  
Times,  Dec  13  1972,  p.  1.  
2  A  similar  story  had  been  reported  in  1971,  see:  Arthur  Reed,  ‘Airline  pilots  asleep  on  duty,  
MP  says’,  Times,  Jun  28  1971,  p.  1.  
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policy,  with  a  particular  focus  on  the  Association’s  provocative  
communications  with  news  media  and  regulatory  agencies  between  
December  1972  and  April  1973.  Here  fatigue  became  a  cumulative  issue,  and  
took  priority  over  pay  settlements  in  a  bid  to  solve  the  scheduling  issues  that  
had  emerged  in  the  previous  decade,  in  part  as  a  result  of  the  pay  and  
productivity  deals  brokered  by  BALPA  during  this  period.  Public  relations  
releases  about  pilot  fatigue  were  central  to  this  new  strategy.  
As  a  whole,  the  chapter  seeks  to  draw  out  how  BALPA,  and  other  
contemporary  transport  unions,  framed  fatigue  in  negotiations  with  employers  
in  the  twentieth  century.  The  chapter  examines  how  BALPA  interacted  with  a  
number  of  agencies  including  regulators  and  associated  research  committees,  
notably  the  Bader  Committee,  news  media,  and  airlines.3  It  provides  another  
example  of  how  fatigue  was  negotiated  and  debated  following  its  emergence  
as  a  concern  in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  as  described  in  Chapter  
One  and  Chapter  Two.  It  thus  serves  as  a  counterpoint  to  the  previous  
chapter.  Not  only  does  it  engage  with  a  number  of  the  agencies  discussed  
previously,  but  it  also  has  a  number  of  conceptual  links  with  the  previous  
chapter,  particularly  in  the  second  section,  which  examines  how  BALPA  
communicated  the  perceived  risks  associated  with  pilot  fatigue  to  the  public.    
In  looking  at  the  workings  of  BALPA  and  its  engagement  with  fatigue,  
this  chapter  will  enter  into  several  well  discussed  fields.  For  instance,  the  
relationship  between  occupational  health  and  trade  unionism,  which  has  been  
the  subject  of  many  histories  of  the  workplace.  Scholarship  has  focused  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  As  in  the  previous  chapter  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations  is  referred  to  as  the  
Bader  Committee.  
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predominantly  on  the  occupational  health  issues  related  to  manual  and  heavy  
labour.  Mining,  factory  work,  and  the  asbestos  industry  have  received  
particular  attention.  The  key  debate  in  this  literature  centres  on  the  role  played  
by  the  Trades  Union  Congress  (TUC)  and  affiliated  unions  in  the  promotion  
and  protection  of  health  within  the  workplace.  Some  historians,  particularly  
those  interested  in  asbestos-­related  illnesses,  have  suggested  that  in  the  
twentieth  century  trade  unions  made  pay  a  priority  to  the  neglect  of  health  
issues.4  Trade  unions  have,  according  to  Ronald  Johnston  and  Arthur  McIvor,  
always  been  in  an  awkward  position  regarding  occupational  health  and  safety.  
As  the  front  line  of  defence  against  unsafe  work  practices,  their  main  rationale  
was  to  represent  their  members’  interests.  This  frequently  meant  that  pay  and  
working  hours  were  prioritised  over  occupational  health  matters.5  Johnston  
and  McIvor  have  been  particularly  critical  of  the  trade  unions  that  represented  
workers  in  the  asbestos  industry.  Self-­help  and  pressure  groups,  they  have  
argued,  made  more  effort  to  both  publicise  the  asbestos  issue  and  assert  the  
rights  of  ill  workers.6  The  argument  that  unions  did  not  do  enough  to  protect  
their  members  from  occupational  health  risks  dominated  historical  scholarship  
on  the  subject  for  much  of  the  twentieth  century.    
In  recent  years  some  historians  have  challenged  the  prevailing  
narrative.  Scholars  such  as  David  Rosner,  Gerald  Markowitz,  Joseph  Melling,  
Mark  Bufton,  and  Vicky  Long,  have  argued  that  trade  unions  were  just  as  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  For  examples  of  this  interpretation  see:  Paul  Weindling,  ‘Linking  Self  Help  and  Medical  
Science:  The  Social  History  of  Occupational  Health’  in  Paul  Weindling  (ed.),  The  Social  
History  of  Occupational  Health,  (Beckenham:  Croom  Helm,  1985),  pp.  2-­31;;  Geoffrey  
Tweedale,  Magic  Mineral  to  Killer  Dust:  Turner  and  Newall  and  the  Asbestos  Hazard,  (Oxford:  
Oxford  University  Press,  2000);;  Ronald  Johnston  and  Arthur  McIvor,  Lethal  Work:  A  History  
of  the  Asbestos  Tragedy  in  Scotland,  (East  Linton:  Tuckwell  Press,  2000).    
5  Johnston  and  McIvor,  Lethal  Work,  p.  147.  
6  Ibid.  
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concerned  with  workplace  safety  and  working  conditions,  as  with  monetary  
compensation.7  Workers  and  unions,  Rosner  and  Markowitz  have  argued,  
often  saw  disease  as  rooted  in  long  hours,  poor  ventilation,  and  exposure  to  
dusts  and  other  toxins;;  and  low  wages  that  eliminated  the  possibility  of  proper  
housing,  clothing,  and  food  were  seen  to  compound  the  problems  of  the  
workplace.8  The  pursuit  of  fair  wages,  reasonable  working  hours,  and  
workplace  safety,  were,  historians  have  thus  contended,  often  
complementary,  not  competing,  aims.    
Much  has  been  written  about  the  role  of  trade  unions  in  industrial  
bargaining.  Attention  has  focused  primarily  on  the  organisation  of  industrial  
action.  The  public  relations  strategies  of  unions  have,  in  comparison,  received  
very  little  attention  from  historians  of  work  and  unionism.  This  may  be  
because  for  most  of  the  twentieth  century  trade  unions  received  poor  press.  
From  the  1970s  press  coverage  of  union  activities  was  particularly  negative.  
James  Curran  and  James  Seaton  have  gone  so  far  as  to  say  that  the  trade  
union  movement  was  weakened  by  media  coverage.9  Reporting  of  industrial  
relations  tended  to  focus  on  conflict.  It  was  framed  in  terms  of  its  harmful  
consequences,  not  the  causes  of  worker  dissatisfaction.  The  three  most  
frequently  recurring  themes  in  national  daily  reports  of  industrial  disputes  in  
1975  were,  as  Curran  and  Seaton  have  outlined,  loss  of  output,  loss  of  work  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  For  examples  of  this  interpretation  see:  Mark  W.  Bufton  and  Joseph  Melling,  ‘Coming  Up  for  
Air:  Experts,  Employers,  and  Workers  in  Campaigns  to  Compensate  Silicosis  Sufferers  in  
Britain,  1918-­1939’,  Social  History  of  Medicine,  18,  1  (2005)  63-­86;;  Vicky  Long,  The  Rise  and  
Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory:  The  Politics  of  Industrial  Health  in  Britain,  1914-­60,  (Basingstoke:  
Palgrave  Macmillan,  2011).  
8  David  Rosner  and  Gerald  Markowitz,  Deadly  Dust:  Silicosis  and  the  On-­Going  Struggle  to  
Protect  Workers’  Health,  (Michigan:  University  of  Michigan  Press,  2006).    
9  James  Curran  and  Jean  Seaton,  Power  Without  Responsibility:  The  Press,  Broadcasting,  
and  New  Media  in  Britain,  sixth  edition,  (Oxford:  Routledge,  2002).    
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by  those  not  involved,  and  inconvenience  or  danger  to  the  public.10  In  general,  
the  national  press  endorsed  the  basic  tenets  of  the  capitalist  system:  private  
enterprise,  profit,  the  free  market,  and  the  rights  of  property  ownership.11  On  
the  whole  the  mainstream  media  were  not  interested  in  reporting  union  
rationale  for  industrial  action.  As  a  result,  most  trade  union  officials  regarded  
the  press  as  adversaries.12    
In  some  instances,  though,  unions  benefitted  from  communication  with  
the  mass  media.  Melling  has  shown  that  Clive  Jenkins  (1926-­1999)  of  the  
Association  of  Supervisory  Staffs  and  Executive  Technicians  (ASSET)  used  
the  national  press  to  his  advantage.  He  proved,  according  to  Melling,  a  ready  
litigant  who  drew  a  considerable  income  from  successful  libel  actions  against  
the  press.13  Jenkins  also  founded  and  edited  Trade  Union  Affairs  as  a  forum  
for  serious  debate  on  industrial  strategy  and  public  policy.  According  to  
Melling,  much  of  the  success  Jenkins  enjoyed  by  the  1960s  can  be  attributed  
to  his  skills  as  a  writer,  broadcaster,  and  self-­publicist.14    
These  public  relations  activities,  however,  rarely  focused  on  issues  of  
fatigue.  Indeed,  the  proliferation  of  fatigue  and  exhaustion  among  workers  
was  not  a  major  concern  of  trade  unions  until  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  
century.  Before  this  time,  unions  tended  to  be  more  interested  in  immediate  
workplace  dangers.  Traumatic  injuries  and  deaths  at  work  were  afforded  a  
higher  profile  than  the  longer-­term  effects  of  insidious  and  invisible  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  Ibid.    
11  Ibid.    
12  Joseph  Melling,  ‘Managing  the  White-­Collar  Union:  Salaried  Staff,  Trade-­Union  Leadership,  
and  the  Politics  of  Organized  Labour  in  Postwar  Britain,  c.  1950-­1968’,  International  Review  
of  Social  History,  48  (2003)  245-­271.  
13  Ibid.  
14  Ibid.  
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occupational  health  issues,  like  fatigue.  As  noted  by  Long,  a  greater  
ambivalence  surrounded  ailments  which  could  be  exacerbated  by  workplace  
conditions  but  which  were  found  in  the  population  at  large.15  Fatigue  was  a  
common  complaint  among  the  British  populace  in  the  twentieth  century.  
According  to  Edward  Shorter,  in  the  1920s  roughly  one  in  five  patients  visited  
the  doctor  complaining  of  tiredness  and  malaise.16  Fatigue  was,  as  such,  low  
on  the  list  of  union  priorities.  When  unions  mentioned  fatigue  before  the  1950s  
it  tended  to  be  in  relation  to  traumatic  injuries  when,  for  example,  fatigued  
workers  were  involved  in  factory  accidents.17  
This  chapter  marks  a  break  with  previous  scholarship  in  two  key  ways.  
First,  it  shifts  the  focus  on  heavy  and  manual  industries  to  a  sedentary,  skilled  
profession:  civil  aviation.  Throughout  the  twentieth  century  pilots  were  highly  
paid  and  civil  aviation  –  a  ‘young  and  dynamic’  industry  –  was  held  up  by  the  
mainstream  media  as  a  prestigious  and  modern  profession.18  Second,  pilot  
fatigue  occupies  a  more  ambiguous  position  than  many  other  occupational  
health  complaints.  As  noted  in  Chapter  Three  fatigue,  unlike  most  work-­
related  ailments,  was  not  exclusively  an  issue  of  worker  welfare.  There  were  
two  major  points  of  difference.  On  the  one  hand,  within  the  aviation  industry,  
pilot  fatigue  was  a  serious  safety  concern.  More  liable  to  misjudgements  when  
fatigued,  a  tired  pilot  was  potentially  a  danger  to  passengers.  The  close  
relationship  between  the  occupational  health  of  workers  and  passenger  safety  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory.  
16  Edward  Shorter,  From  Paralysis  to  Fatigue:  A  History  of  Psychosomatic  Illness  in  the  
Modern  Era,  (New  York:  Free  Press,  1992).  
17  Roger  Cooter  and  Bill  Luckin,  ‘Accidents  in  History’  in  Roger  Cooter  and  Bill  Luckin  (eds.),  
Accidents  in  History:  Injuries,  Fatalities  and  Social  Relations  (Amsterdam:  Rodopi,  1997),  pp.  
1-­17.  
18  Mark  L.  Kahn,  ‘Regulatory  Agencies  and  Industrial  Relations:  The  Airlines  Case’,  The  
American  Economic  Review,  42,  2  (1952)  686-­698,  p.  686.  
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meant  that  unions  and  employers  perceived  pilot  fatigue  differently  to  other  
work-­related  health  concerns.  On  the  other  hand,  pilot  fatigue  was  inextricably  
linked  to  working  hours  and  scheduling,  a  major  bone  of  contention  between  
unions  and  employers  from  the  1950s  onwards.  Balanced  scheduling,  unions  
argued,  could  prevent  the  onset  of  fatigue.  Scheduling,  flight  time  limitations,  
and  fatigue  thus  became  interwoven  in  union  rhetoric  and  operator-­union  
negotiations.  When  making  the  case  for  a  reduction  in  pilot  fatigue  for  reasons  
of  health  and  safety,  unions  were  also,  in  effect,  campaigning  for  changes  to  
working  hours  and  conditions.  
Discussions  about  fatigue,  health,  safety,  and  working  hours  were  not  
limited  to  the  aviation  industry.  Several  other  industries,  particularly  those  that  
employed  professional  drivers,  such  as  the  railway  and  goods  transportation  
industries,  saw  similar  arguments  from  unions  in  the  twentieth  century.  For  
example,  in  the  1930s  London  bus  drivers  complained  that  intensive  
scheduling  and  ‘speed  up’  affected  worker  health  and  was  a  major  cause  of  a  
gastric  illness  known  as  ‘busman’s  stomach’.19  In  this  instance  illness  played  
a  crucial  mediating  role  in  the  negotiations  between  unions  and  employers.  
Indeed,  Rhodri  Hayward  has  suggested  that  busman’s  gastritis  was  central  to  
the  Transport  and  General  Workers’  Union’s  (TGWU)  case.  Part  of  the  
radicalism  of  the  union’s  claim  lay,  according  to  Hayward,  in  its  ability  to  turn  a  
dispute  about  working  practices  into  a  clinical  debate  about  the  aetiology  of  
disease.20  Pilot  fatigue  was,  then,  one  of  many  different  manifestations  of  
wider  social  concerns  about  working  hours,  fatigue,  and  stress  in  twentieth-­
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Rhodri  Hayward,  ‘Busman’s  Stomach  and  the  Embodiment  of  Modernity’,  Contemporary  
British  History,  31,  1  (2017)  1-­23.  
20  Ibid.  
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century  Britain.  This  chapter  seeks  to  deconstruct  and  analyse  why  the  
relationship  between  fatigue,  safety,  and  working  hours  gained  increasing  
cultural  purchase  in  the  late  twentieth  century  and  asks  whether,  given  its  
nebulous  nature,  fatigue  was  a  useful  bargaining  tool  for  unions  in  industrial  
negotiations.  
  
Productivity,  Pilot  Utilisation,  and  Trade  Unionism  in  Post-­War  Britain  
The  term  ‘white-­collar  worker’  comes  laden  with  different  meanings  and  
assumptions.  For  much  of  the  twentieth  century  the  term  referred  to  non-­
manual  workers.  In  his  1970  study  of  white-­collar  unionism,  professor  of  
industrial  relations  George  Sayers  Bain  (1939-­present)  suggested  that  the  
term  encompassed:  
  
Foremen,  overlookers,  and  supervisors;;  scientists,  technologists,  and  
technicians;;  clerical  and  administrative  workers;;  security  personnel;;  
professions;;  salesmen,  commercial  travellers,  and  shop  assistants;;  
government  administrators  and  executive  officials;;  and  specially  
‘creative’  occupations  such  as  artists,  musicians,  and  entertainers.21  
  
These  groups,  according  to  Bain,  saw  themselves  as  ‘belonging  more  to  
management  than  with  manual  workers,  and  are  generally  regarded  by  
manual  workers  as  one  of  “them”  rather  than  one  of  “us”’.22  White-­collar  
workers  were  increasingly  unionised  from  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century.  
According  to  McIvor  membership  was  up  by  50%  between  1939  and  1950,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  George  Sayers  Bain,  The  Growth  of  White-­Collar  Unionism,  (Oxford:  Clarendon  Press,  
1970),  p.  4.  
22  Ibid.  p.  4.  
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from  6.3  million  to  9.3  million.23  By  1960  there  were  280  white-­collar  unions  
and  nineteen  partially  white-­collar  unions,  which  made  up  almost  20%  of  the  
total  TUC  membership.24  As  Bain  suggested  in  1970,  however,  in  real  terms  
the  degree  of  unionisation  among  white-­collar  workers  was  ‘considerably  less’  
than  that  found  among  manual  workers.25  According  to  Bain  by  1970  only  
30%  of  the  white-­collar  workforce  was  unionised,  compared  with  50%  of  the  
manual  workforce.26    
The  transport  sector  was  highly  unionised  in  comparison  with  other  
white-­collar  occupations.  In  1965  it  was  second  only  to  mining,  the  
archetypical  unionised  industry.27  Aviation,  as  a  whole,  was  heavily  unionised.  
Both  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  were  highly  represented.  The  propensity  to  
unionisation  in  civil  aviation  can  be  explained  by  the  long  spells  workers  spent  
away  from  home.  In  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century,  long-­haul  crews  
were  scheduled  on  trips  that  lasted  for  weeks  at  a  time.  During  these  periods,  
crew  members  relied  on  unions  to  represent  their  interests.  As  former  cabin  
attendant  Elizabeth  Powell  recalled:  
  
So  often  when  things  were  happening  back  here  [in  Britain]  you  had  to  
rely  on  …  your  union  to  protect  your  better  interests  because  you  might  
be  …  down  in  Australia.  Where  …  we’re  not  part  of  the  balloting  and  so  
on  and  so  forth.28  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Arthur  McIvor,  Working  Lives:  Work  in  Britain  since  1945,  (Basingstoke:  Palgrave  
Macmillan,  2013).  
24  Bain,  The  Growth  of  White-­Collar  Unionism.  
25  Ibid.  p.  37.  
26  Ibid.  
27  McIvor,  Working  Lives.  
28  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
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It  was,  according  to  Elizabeth  Powell,  for  that  reason  that  flight  deck  and  cabin  
crew  ‘all  joined  the  unions  in  those  days’.29  
Even  in  instances  where  white-­collar  workers  were  heavily  unionised,  
as  in  the  transport  sector,  contemporary  commentators  tended  to  perceive  
white-­collar  unions  in  different  terms  to  the  unions  that  represented  manual  
workers.  White-­collar  unions  were  thought  to  be  more  conservative  than  
manual  unions  and  more  concerned  with  status.  One  such  measure  of  this  
was  their  reluctance  to  affiliate  to  the  TUC  or  the  Labour  Party.  From  the  
middle  and  late  twentieth  century,  however,  white-­collar  unions  increasingly  
affiliated  to  the  TUC.  Indeed,  in  the  1960s  and  1970s  a  number  of  politically  
conservative  unions,  including  the  National  and  Local  Government  Officers’  
Association  and  the  National  Union  of  Teachers,  affiliated  with  the  TUC.  
The  1960s  and  1970s  were,  according  to  Ronald  Johnston  and  Elaine  
McFarland,  characterised  by  closures,  redundancies,  and  political  agitation.30  
In  this  respect  civil  aviation  was  similar  to  several  other  industries,  including  
mining  and  healthcare,  where  union  members  dissatisfied  with  working  
conditions  and  job  security  engaged  in  frequent  industrial  action.  31  It  was  in  
this  context  of  industrial  unrest  that  BALPA  negotiated  with  airline  
managements  on  issues  of  fatigue  and  working  hours.    
Formed  in  1937  by  Eric  Lane-­Burslem,  by  the  mid-­1960s  BALPA  was  
by  far  the  largest  union  representing  pilots  and  flight  deck  crew  in  Britain.  By  
1966  almost  90%  of  pilots  across  all  British  airlines  were  represented  by  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Ibid.  
30  Ronald  Johnston  and  Elaine  McFarland,  ‘With  God  in  the  Workplace:  Industrial  Chaplains  
in  Scottish  Heavy  Industry,  1970s-­1990’,  Oral  History,  38,  1  (2010)  55-­67.  
31  A.  N.  J.  Blain,  Pilots  and  Management:  Industrial  Relations  in  the  UK  Airlines,  (London:  
George  Allen  and  Unwin,  1972),  p.  25.  
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BALPA.32  BALPA  was  a  white-­collar  union  and,  as  such,  BALPA  
representatives  were  keen  to  stress  the  professional  expertise  of  the  
Association’s  members.  BALPA  did  not  present  itself  as  a  trade  union,  but,  
like  teaching  unions  and  medical  associations,  as  a  professional  organisation  
that  shared  neither  interests  nor  methods  with  unions  representing  manual  
workers.33  In  spite  of  this  lack  of  congruence  with  the  goals  and  methods  of  
other  unions,  BALPA  affiliated  with  the  TUC  in  1943.  The  Association’s  
relationship  with  the  TUC  was,  however,  precarious  throughout  the  twentieth  
century.  BALPA  often  failed  to  implement  TUC  policy,  particularly  with  regards  
to  the  use  of  negotiators.34    
The  policies  pursued  by  British  trade  unions,  and  especially  by  white-­
collar  unions  in  the  second  half  of  the  twentieth  century,  remain  the  subject  of  
vigorous  debate.  Many  writers  have  contrasted  the  egalitarian  principles  of  
these  institutions  and  the  radical  rhetoric  of  their  leaders  with  the  narrow  
sectional  interests  that  they  served  in  practice.35  BALPA  was  no  exception.  
Although  no  academic  histories  have  been  written  about  the  Association,  
contemporary  lay  commentators  were  often  critical  of  its  procedures  and  
policies.  BALPA  was  criticised,  variously,  for  employing  controversial  public  
relations  strategies,  the  unprofessional  nature  of  its  negotiations,  and  its  
policy,  in  the  1960s,  of  privileging  pay  over  health  and  safety  concerns.36  
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33  R.  D.  Coates,  Teachers’  Unions  and  Interest  Group  Politics:  A  Study  in  the  Behaviour  of  
Organised  Teachers  in  England  and  Wales,  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1972);;  
Kelly  Loughlin,  ‘“Your  Life  in  Their  Hands”:  The  Context  of  a  Medical-­Media  Controversy’,  
Media  History,  6,  2  (2000)  177-­188.    
34  John  Bentley,  ‘Pearson  Prevails  on  Pilots:  BALPA  Returns  to  the  National  Joint  Council’,  
Flight  International,  Mar  14  1968,  p.  368.  
35  Melling,  ‘Managing  the  White-­Collar  Union’.  
36  Modern  Records  Centre  (hereafter  referred  to  as  MRC)  MSS.248/4/3,  Anon,  ‘Capten,  art  
tha  sleepin’  there  above?’,  Guardian,  Dec  14  1972.  
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Although  it  courted  controversy  throughout  the  twentieth  century,  BALPA  
played  a  major  role  in  almost  all  industrial  negotiation,  arbitration,  and  strike  
action  within  the  aviation  industry  in  the  twentieth  century.37    
BALPA  first  referred  to  fatigue  in  negotiations  with  airline  
managements  and  state  regulators  in  the  1950s.  In  this  period  there  were  no  
regulations  governing  the  length  of  single  duty  periods  and  it  was  not  
uncommon  for  pilots  to  fly  schedules  requiring  as  much  as  twenty-­four  hours  
continuous  duty.38  These  working  practices  were  generally  accepted  by  pilots  
in  the  inter  and  immediate  post-­war  years.  According  to  Blain  this  was  
because  in  the  1930s  and  1940s  aircraft  tended  to  travel  at  relatively  slow  
speeds  and  services  were  ‘relatively  infrequent’.39  Pilots  were,  therefore,  often  
content  to  accept  long  duty  periods  in  order  to  avoid  standing  by  for  extended  
periods,  particularly  if  it  meant  they  were  permitted  more  days  off  at  home.  By  
the  early  1950s,  however,  scheduling  had  become  a  source  of  continuous  
dispute  between  aviation  unions  and  airline  operators.  Although  limits  were  in  
place  –  pilots  were  not  allowed  to  exceed  1,000  flying  hours  a  year,  and  were  
entitled  to  an  average  of  seven  days  off  each  month  –  BALPA  became  
increasingly  anxious  about  a  growing  tendency  among  certain  operators  to  
exceed  the  agreed  restrictions.  Following  a  serious  aviation  accident  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  The  Association  amassed  a  huge  number  of  records,  now  stored  in  the  Modern  Records  
Centre  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  The  National  Archives.  Records  from  these  archives,  
alongside  a  number  of  newspaper  and  other  news  media  sources  form  the  basis  of  this  
chapter.  As  this  chapter  focuses  predominantly  on  BALPA,  much  subsequent  discussion  is  
dominated  by  issues  relating  to  pilots  and  co-­pilots.  Other  crew  members  are  discussed  in  the  
chapter  that  follows.  
38  Blain,  Pilots  and  Management.  
39  Ibid.  p.  238.  
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supposedly  caused  by  long  working  hours  and  crew  fatigue  in  1954  BALPA  
made  fatigue  its  number  one  priority.40     
BALPA  published  a  memorandum  on  flight  time  limitations  on  2  
December  1954  through  which  the  Association  attempted  to  influence  the  
Bowhill  Working  Party.41  The  memorandum  sought  to  exploit  the  blurred  lines  
between  health,  safety,  and  social  concerns  that  fatigue  encapsulated.  An  
article  published  in  the  Association’s  journal  The  Log  stated  that:    
  
It  may  be  desirable  to  campaign  for  the  medical  and  social  objective  
simultaneously,  arguing  that,  if  the  social  objectives  are  achieved,  then  
the  medical  and  safety  objectives  will  automatically  be  covered.42    
  
To  this  end,  the  memorandum  called  for  specific  and  detailed  regulations,  with  
different  maximum  duty  hours  depending  on  the  nature  of  the  flight,  rather  
than  the  blanket  limitation  of  1,000  flying  hours  a  year  that  had  been  in  place  
since  1947.  It  also  recommended  that  more  rest  time  should  be  spent  at  
home,  arguing  that  fatigue  and  stress  were  likely  to  accrue  the  longer  one  
spent  away  from  loved  ones  and  creature  comforts.  The  Bowhill  Working  
Party  was  not  convinced  by  BALPA’s  memorandum.43  The  committee’s  final  
report,  published  on  15  December  1954,  argued  that  BALPA’s  memorandum  
failed  to  show  that  a  relationship  existed  between  ‘the  limitations  proposed  
and  the  arguments  presented  in  support  of  them’.  The  Bowhill  Working  Party  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  The  National  Archives  (hereafter  referred  to  as  TNA)  BT/248/110:  BALPA  Memorandum,  
‘Flight  Time  Limitations’,  2  December  1954.  
41  As  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue  and  Flight  Time  
Limitations  is  referred  to  as  the  Bowhill  Working  Party.  
42  TNA  BT/248/110:  extract  from  The  Log,  ‘Fatigue  Control  By  Legislation’,  3.  
43  TNA  BT/248/110:  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue:  Minutes  of  the  Fourth  Meeting  
Held  on  3  September  1954,  p.  2.  
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also  criticised  BALPA  for  presenting  a  solution  that  was  ‘too  complicated  to  be  
effectively  translated  into  statutory  requirements’.44  The  report  concluded  that  
BALPA  had  exaggerated  the  dangers  of  fatigue:    
  
The  unions’  allegations  are  unsubstantiated  and  …  there  appears  to  
have  been  some  truth  to  the  operators’  suggestion  that  the  unions’  
object  in  making  these  allegations  is  to  further  their  aim  of  using  the  
problem  of  fatigue  to  achieve  an  industrial  end.45  
  
BALPA’s  first  attempt  at  using  fatigue  to  negotiate  for  more  favourable  
working  conditions  was,  thus,  ineffective.  What  follows  outlines  how  the  
Association  recycled  and  repackaged  fatigue  in  its  negotiations  with  airlines  
and  state  regulators  in  the  1960s  and  1970s.  
  
The  British  Airline  Pilots  Association,  Pay,  and  Productivity    
In  the  1960s  BALPA  entered  into  a  series  of  negotiations  with  airlines  centred  
on  pay  and  productivity.  As  noted  in  Chapter  Two,  in  this  period  air  tourism  
expanded  considerably  and  airlines  sought  to  rework  roster  arrangements  to  
meet  this  growing  demand.  In  this  context,  BALPA  had  a  strong  bargaining  
position,  which  it  used  to  seek  increased  pay  in  exchange  for  more  intensive  
working  hours  or,  as  the  union  framed  it  in  this  period,  improved  productivity.    
Productivity,  of  course,  is  not  a  settled  term  and  has  historically  meant  
different  things.  Today,  the  term  ‘productivity’  refers  to  a  basic  economic  
concept.  It  is  used  by  economists  as  a  measure  of  input-­output  relations  both  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  TNA  BT/248/110:  Report  of  the  Working  Party  on  Operating  Crew  Fatigue  and  Flight  Time  
Limitations,  15  Dec  1954,  p.  6.  
45  Ibid.  p.  6.  
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on  the  microlevel  of  single  firms  or  factors,  and  on  the  macrolevel  of  large-­
scale  economic  systems.  Histories  of  productivity  initially  centred  on  
economics.  From  the  1990s  Joseph  Melling,  Alan  Booth,  Stephen  Broadberry,  
and  others  explored  productivity  in  relation  to  manufacturing  and  industry.  
Debate  centred,  particularly,  on  British  economic  performance  during  the  ‘long  
boom’  (1950-­1973)  and  whether  or  not  there  was  a  ‘productivity  gap’  between  
Britain  and  other  western  European  countries  at  this  time.46  In  recent  years  
historical  work  on  productivity  has  expanded  its  scope  beyond  economics.  
Historians  have  looked  at  how  the  notion  of  productivity  became  closely  linked  
with  work  and  the  workplace,  and  have  variously  examined  how  it  affected  
working  conditions  and  practices,  health  and  safety,  and  how  the  concept  
became  linked  with  masculinity  and  work  ethic.47    
In  recent  years  this  scholarship  has  increasingly  focused  on  the  human  
factor  in  relation  to  productivity;;  in  other  words,  how  the  body  of  the  worker  
was  central  to  material  production.  Peter-­Paul  Bänziger,  Marcel  Streng,  and  
Mischa  Suter  take  this  approach  in  Histories  of  Productivity.  Exploring  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46  See  for  example:  S.  N.  Broadberry  and  N.  F.  R.  Crafts,  ‘Britain’s  Productivity  Gap  in  the  
1930s:  Some  Neglected  Factors’,  Journal  of  Economic  History,  52,  3  (1992)  531-­558;;  
Sebastian  Ritchie,  ‘A  New  Audit  of  War:  The  Productivity  of  Britain’s  Wartime  Aircraft  Industry  
Reconsidered’,  War  and  Society,  12,  1  (1994)  125-­147;;  Jim  Tomlinson,  ‘Inventing  “Decline”:  
The  Falling  Behind  of  the  British  Economy  in  the  Postwar  Years’,  Economic  History  Review,  
49,  4  (1996)  731-­757;;  Alan  Booth,  Joseph  Melling,  and  Christoph  Dartmann,  ‘Institutions  and  
Economic  Growth:  The  Politics  of  Productivity  in  West  Germany,  Sweden  and  the  United  
Kingdom,  1945-­1955’,  The  Journal  of  Economic  History,  57,  2  (1997)  416-­444;;  Alan  Booth,  
‘The  Broadberry-­Crafts  View  and  the  Evidence:  A  Reply’,  Economic  History  Review,  56,  4  
(2003)  736-­742;;  Stephen  Broadberry  and  Nicholas  Crafts,  ‘UK  Productivity  Performance  from  
1950  to  1979:  A  Restatement  of  the  Broadberry-­Crafts  View’,  Economic  History  Review,  56,  4  
(2003)  718-­735;;  Alan  Booth,  ‘The  Manufacturing  Failure  Hypothesis  and  the  Performance  of  
British  Industry  during  the  Long  Boom’,  Economic  History  Review,  56,  1  (2003)  1-­33.  
47  For  work  and  working  conditions  see:  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory;;  Alan  
Derickson,  ‘“No  Such  Thing  as  a  Night’s  Sleep”:  The  Embattled  Sleep  of  American  Fighting  
Men  from  World  War  II  to  the  Present’,  Journal  of  Social  History,  47,  1  (2013)  1-­26;;  for  health  
and  safety  at  work  see:  Christopher  Sirrs,  ‘Accidents  and  Apathy:  The  Construction  of  the  
“Robens  Philosophy”  of  Occupational  Safety  and  Health  Regulation  in  Britain,  1961-­1974’,  
Social  History  of  Medicine,  29,  1  (2016)  66-­88;;  for  masculinity  and  work  ethic  see:  R.  
Johnston  and  A.  McIvor,  ‘Dangerous  Work,  Hard  Men  and  Broken  Bodies:  Masculinity  in  the  
Clydeside  Heavy  Industries,  c.  1930-­1970s’,  Labour  History  Review,  69,  2  (2004)  135-­153.  
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productivity  through  the  lens  of  body  history,  they  lay  out  the  aims  of  the  
volume  as  such:  
  
We  are  interested  in  how  productivity  became  both  a  guiding  concept  
of  economic  thought  and  the  framing  principle  of  a  variety  of  economic  
practices.  To  that  end,  we  systematically  related  the  history  of  this  
essentially  contested  concept  to  the  body,  starting  from  the  point  of  
view  that  the  body  is  an  interface,  perhaps  even  the  interface,  
connecting  the  various  aspects  and  histories  of  productivity.  Here  the  
body  is  an  anchor  point;;  it  is  only  in  the  body  –  moving,  deploying  its  
energy,  expending  itself  –  that  notions  of  productivity  take  concrete  
form.48  
  
The  volume’s  authors  use  economics  as  a  ‘framing  principle’  but  the  focus  of  
the  essays  is  on  productivity  at  a  human  level,  specifically,  how  the  concept  of  
productivity  has  been  applied  to  human  bodies  in  terms  of,  for  example,  
caloric  input  and  output.49  Productivity  in  this  volume,  as  in  other  recent  
works,  is  focused  on  the  energetic  body.  
The  concept  of  productivity  has  a  long  history  stretching  back  to  the  
eighteenth  century.  During  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth  centuries  
productivist  thinking  and  the  concept  of  productivity  had  to  battle  for  
predominance  against  other  ways  of  considering  production  and  the  
economy.  Other  concepts  –  namely  the  bourgeois  discourse  of  moderation  
and  the  communitarian  notion  of  duty  propagated  by  Christian  churches  –  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48  Peter-­Paul  Bänziger,  Marcel  Streng,  and  Mischa  Suter,  ‘Histories  of  Productivity:  An  
Introduction’  in  Peter-­Paul  Bänziger  and  Mischa  Suter  (eds.),  Histories  of  Productivity:  
Genealogical  Perspectives  on  the  Body  and  the  Modern  Economy,  (Abingdon:  Routledge,  
2017),  pp.  1-­20,  p.  2.  
49  Ibid.  p.  2.  
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were  equally  prominent.  In  the  1900s  these  notions  were  largely  displaced,  
and  productivity  was  established  as  the  most  dominant  concept  in  European  
economics.  At  this  time  productivity  was  conceived  as  an  abstract,  
optimisable  relationship  between  input,  output,  and  time.50    
This  new  formulation  of  productivity  first  gained  traction  in  Britain  
during  the  First  World  War  under  the  auspices  of  the  Health  of  Munitions  
Workers  Committee  (HMWC),  established  in  1915.51  The  relationship  
between  output  and  conditions  of  work  was  then  further  investigated  by  the  
Industrial  Fatigue  Research  Board  (IFRB)  in  the  interwar  years.52    As  Chapter  
One  has  described,  the  Board  sought  the  most  efficient  modes  of  work,  rather  
than  the  quickest,  which  brought  it  into  conflict  with  American  schools  of  
scientific  management.53  Indeed,  much  of  the  work  produced  by  the  IFRB  
indicated  that  productivity  was  closely  linked  to  working  hours  and  rest.  The  
Board  suggested  that  working  over  a  certain  number  of  hours  without  a  rest  
break  was  a  false  economy.54  Productivity,  the  IFRB  argued,  dropped  
significantly  towards  the  end  of  a  long  shift  as  workers  became  increasingly  
bored  and  tired.  The  most  productive  worker,  the  Board  argued,  was  ‘the  
steady  worker’.55  Workers  should  not,  the  IFRB  thus  reasoned,  be  compelled  
to  complete  work  quickly  but  should  be  encouraged  to  maintain  a  steady  pace  
and  take  regular  rest  breaks.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50  Peter-­Paul  Bänziger  and  Mischa  Suter,  ‘Transformations  of  Twentieth-­Century  
Productivism:  Introduction  to  Part  II’  in  Peter-­Paul  Bänziger  and  Mischa  Suter  (eds.),  Histories  
of  Productivity:  Genealogical  Perspectives  on  the  Body  and  the  Modern  Economy,  (Abingdon:  
Routledge,  2017),  pp.  113-­116.  
51  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory.  
52  A.  J.  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’,  Medical  History,  
31,  2  (1987)  160-­189.  
53  McIvor,  Working  Lives.  
54  McIvor,  ‘Manual  Work,  Technology,  and  Industrial  Health,  1918-­39’.  
55  Anon,  ‘Fatigue  and  Output  in  the  Boot  Industry’,  The  Lancet,  196,  5075  (1920)  1154-­1155,  
p.  1155.  
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By  the  1940s  employers  and  regulators  had  begun  to  accept  these  
arguments.  The  1941  Annual  Report  of  the  Factory  Inspectorate  asserted  that  
reasonable  hours  of  work  and  good  working  conditions  were  essential  to  
obtain  maximum  output.56  In  light  of  this,  several  employers  introduced  rest  
break  schemes  as  a  preventative  measure  to  help  workers  suffering  from  
accumulative  fatigue.57  Alan  Derickson  has  suggested  that  the  1940s  also  
gave  rise  to  a  now  familiar  workplace  institution:  the  coffee  break.58  The  
importance  of  rest  breaks  in  the  avoidance  of  exhaustion  and  breakdown  
among  workers  also  permeated  popular  discourse  in  the  second  half  of  the  
twentieth  century.59  The  field  of  self-­help  made  frequent  references  to  the  
importance  of  rest  and  relaxation  in  the  maintenance  of  personal  productivity  
on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic.  John  Edmund  Haggai’s  (1924-­present)  1959  
self-­improvement  publication  How  to  Win  Over  Worry,  for  example,  
recommended  taking  an  afternoon  nap  to  increase  productivity.60  By  the  mid-­
twentieth  century  then,  the  importance  of  rest  for  productivity  had  permeated  
both  academic  and  lay  circles.  
In  the  mid-­1960s  the  concept  of  productivity  became  increasingly  
central  to  discussions  of  work  performance  and  earnings.  In  the  early  and  
middle  twentieth  century  research  had  focused  mainly  on  heavy  industry  and  
manufacturing,  where  output  was  used  as  a  clear  measure  of  productivity.  
From  the  1960s,  however,  the  concept  of  productivity  was  generalised  to  
other  sectors  of  industry,  including  professional  and  service  work.  In  this  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory.  
57  Ibid.    
58  Derickson,  “No  Such  Thing  as  a  Night’s  Sleep”.  
59  Long,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Healthy  Factory.  
60  John  Edmund  Haggai,  How  to  Win  Over  Worry:  A  Practical  Formula  for  Victorious  Living,  
(Michigan:  Zondervan,  1959).  
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period  time  and  motion  studies  were  increasingly  carried  out  in  settings  where  
production  did  not  factor.  In  the  early  1960s  a  number  of  work  studies  were  
carried  out  in  hospitals  and  general  practice  surgeries.  These  were  
particularly  common  in  the  latter,  due  to  a  contemporary  interest  in  the  
efficiency  of  general  practitioners.  As  David  Armstrong  has  shown,  the  role  of  
general  practitioners  changed  dramatically  in  the  early  and  middle  twentieth  
century.61  The  shift  from  home-­based  practice  to  health  centre  settings  
strengthened  the  boundary  between  domestic  life  and  work,  which  
fundamentally  reconstructed  the  spatial  and  temporal  aspects  of  practice  
activity.  Under  the  new  system,  general  practitioners  complained  of  increasing  
time  pressures.  As  one  general  practitioner  noted  in  1962,  ‘there  is  indeed,  no  
slack  nowadays’.62  Armstrong  has  argued  that  in  the  interwar  years,  time  had  
a  different  meaning  in  general  practice.63  Hours  of  work  were  not  formalised.  
There  were  no  designated  off-­duty  periods.  The  growth  of  specialist  clinics  
and  health  centres  in  the  post-­war  period,  which  used  appointment  systems  
and  opened  and  closed  at  set  times,  however,  prompted  an  increasing  
acknowledgement  and  management  of  time.  Time  constraints  became  a  
structured  feature  of  modern  practice  work,  and  produced  a  particular  time  
orientation  among  general  practitioners.    
It  was  in  contexts  such  as  this  that  work  study  techniques  from  industry  
were  advocated.  The  rationale  was,  as  Armstrong  has  suggested,  to  find  
methods  of  using  time  and  effort  more  economically.64  Drawing  on  techniques  
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64  Ibid.  
   223  
developed  by  Frank  (1868-­1924)  and  Lilian  Gilbreth  (1878-­1972)  in  the  1920s,  
the  work  studies  of  British  general  practice  carried  out  in  the  1960s  outlined  a  
number  of  design  and  spatial  practices  which  would  economise  the  work  of  
physicians.65  As  one  general  practitioner  noted  in  1965,  minor  changes  to  the  
placement  of  furniture  and  resources  could  have  noticeable  effects  on  the  
time  and  ease  of  work.66  Under  Margaret  Thatcher’s  premiership  the  
discourse  of  productivity  was  then  used  as  one  justification  for  increasing  
managerialism  in  the  National  Health  Service  (NHS).  As  Martin  Moore  has  
suggested,  managerialism,  with  its  grounding  in  information  and  monitoring,  
had,  by  the  mid-­1980s,  become  a  primary  means  through  which  the  NHS  
sought  to  save  money  and  improve  efficiency.67  
  The  concept  of  productivity  acted  as  a  validation  of  piecework  in  other  
instances.  Indeed,  the  relationship  between  time,  output,  and  remuneration  
was  made  explicit  in  a  number  of  productivity  deals  broached  in  the  1960s  
and  1970s.  In  the  1960s  the  concept  of  productivity  increasingly  featured  in  
negotiations  between  employers  and  trade  unions.  The  Labour  government  of  
1964-­1970  promoted  the  use  of  productivity  deals  as  a  way  of  facilitating  
changes  to  working  practices  and  wage  increases.  Productivity  deals,  for  the  
most  part,  involved  the  agreement  of  workers  to  changes  intended  to  improve  
productivity  in  return  for  an  increase  in  pay  or  other  benefits.  By  1973  one  
third  of  all  industrial  workers  were  governed  by  productivity  deals.68  In  spite  of  
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their  popularity,  productivity  deals  were  controversial.  A  number  of  left-­wing  
commentators  criticised  the  system.  Tony  Cliff  (1917-­2000),  a  Trotskyist  
activist  and  later  founding  member  of  the  Socialist  Workers’  Party,  was  
particularly  vocal  in  his  disapproval.  Productivity  deals,  Cliff  argued  in  his  
1970  publication  The  Employers’  Offensive,  harmed  workers  in  two  main  
ways:  they  worsened  working  conditions,  and  they  empowered  employers  
rather  than  workers.69  As  Cliff  noted  in  the  closing  pages  of  The  Employers’  
Offensive,  however,  recognition  of  undesirable  consequences  and  effective  
resistance  to  productivity  deals  were  different  matters:  
  
Now  comes  the  64,000  dollar  question  –  how  do  we  fight  a  productivity  
deal?  I  hope  no  one  who  has  read  this  book  so  far  will  be  in  any  doubt  
where  I  stand  on  the  question  of  productivity  dealing  –  bitterly  and  
unalterably  opposed  to  it.  But  this  does  not  in  itself  solve  the  problem  of  
developing  a  strategy  for  fighting  them.  Any  fool  can  denounce  a  
productivity  deal  and  say  we  should  have  nothing  to  do  with  it.  It  is  an  
entirely  different  matter  to  lead  a  group  of  workers  in  successfully  
resisting  such  a  deal.70  
  
In  spite  of  their  apparent  pitfalls  productivity  deals  were  often  attractive  to  
workers  because  of  the  benefits  they  entailed.  
   In  the  1960s  BALPA  brokered  a  number  of  productivity  deals  with  
British  airlines.  Between  1961  and  1970  BALPA  negotiated  with  airlines  on  
issues  of  workload,  working  hours,  and  pay  on  six  separate  occasions.  The  
Association  negotiated  with  BOAC  management  twice,  and  with  British  
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European  Airways  (BEA)  management  on  four  separate  occasions.  A  number  
of  the  negotiations  between  BEA  and  BALPA  broke  down,  specifically,  in  
1961,  1963,  and  1966.  As  described  in  Chapter  Two,  in  these  instances,  BEA  
and  BALPA  were  referred  to  arbitration  under  Hugh  Patrick  Ruffell  Smith  
(1911-­1980),  a  member  of  the  Royal  Air  Force’s  (RAF)  Medical  Branch  
between  1938-­1961  and  a  licenced  pilot.71  In  each  instance  Ruffell  Smith  
undertook  an  investigation  of  pilot  workload  and  working  conditions,  and  
produced  a  report  that  advocated  flight  time  limitations  based  on  a  points  
system.  One  point  was  allotted  for  take-­off,  one  point  for  landing,  and  one  
point  for  every  hour  of  flying.  Points  were  also  allotted  for  unfavourable  
environmental  and  flying  conditions.  Half  a  point  was,  for  example,  allotted  
when  the  in-­flight  temperature  exceeded  thirty  degrees  centigrade.72  In  all  
cases  BEA  management  and  BALPA  initially  accepted  Ruffell  Smith’s  system  
but  on  two  occasions,  in  1965  and  1967,  there  were  further  negotiations  
between  BEA  and  BALPA.  These  negotiations  centred  on  pay  and  
productivity.    
The  1965  negotiations  encompassed  a  number  of  issues.  BALPA  
presented  BEA  with  a  list  of  fifty-­five  different  grievances.  Pilot  workload  and  
pay  were,  however,  prioritised.  The  dispute  was  settled  in  April  1965,  after  
BALPA  called  for  a  twenty-­four  hour  walkout.73  BEA  offered  pilots  a  raft  of  pay  
increases  including  an  8.2%  pay  increase  backdated  to  October  1964,  with  
further  increases  of  4.5%  in  1966  and  4%  in  1967.  In  return,  BALPA  accepted  
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a  number  of  proposals  to  increase  pilot  productivity.74  BEA’s  chairman  
Anthony  Horace  Milward  (1905-­1981)  agreed  the  pay  rise  on  the  basis  that  
pilots  disregarded  the  Ruffell  Smith  points  system.  These  ‘adjustments’  would,  
Milward  told  pilots,  ‘enable  you  [BEA  pilots]  to  put  in  extra  effort,  particularly  in  
the  summer  months’.75    
In  1967,  BALPA  and  BEA  reached  a  similar  agreement.  BEA,  faced  
with  a  crew  deficit  of  fifty-­two  pilots,  proposed  an  interim  policy  of  ‘extra  pay  
for  extra  work’.76    BEA  had  tried  to  recruit  163  extra  pilots,  but  due,  as  airline  
managers  put  it  to  BALPA  in  a  meeting  on  27  April  1967,  to  a  ‘world-­wide  
shortage  of  airline  pilots’,  only  111  were  recruited.77  With  a  view  to  finding  a  
solution  to  the  pilot  shortage  problem,  discussions  between  BEA  management  
and  BALPA  representatives  were  held  in  April  1967.  BALPA  expected  a  
considerable  number  of  BEA  pilots  to  volunteer  for  the  ‘extra  duties’  in  return  
for  ‘reasonable  extra  payment’.78  The  following  terms  were  agreed:  
  
a)  For  the  period  1  July  to  31  October,  temporary  major  changes  in  the  
existing  negotiated  agreements  for  flying  hours  and  duty  periods  have  
been  agreed  so  that  the  additional  duties  required  can  be  obtained.  
b)  Rosters  would  be  prepared  in  accordance  with  existing  agreements  
and,  in  the  case  of  pilots  who  had  volunteered  for  additional  duties,  
these  duties  will  be  specially  shown  in  their  rosters.  All  of  these  extra  
duties  will  be  undertaken  during  their  normal  off-­duty  time.  
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c)  Special  payments  for  these  extra  duties  will  be  negotiated  between  
BEA  and  BALPA  in  the  normal  way.79  
  
According  to  BEA  management,  this  agreement  would  lead  to  more  flying  
hours  but  not  more  hours  of  overall  work.  It  was,  the  airline  argued:  ‘more  a  
question  of  increased  flexibility,  rather  than  an  increase  in  the  number  of  
hours  of  duty’.80  The  agreement  was  renewed  in  November  1967  for  a  further  
six  months.81  Before  the  agreement  expired  a  further  settlement  was  reached  
on  1  January  1968.  The  new  agreement  came  into  effect  immediately,  and  
continued  in  place  until  April  1969.  As  in  prior  iterations,  adjustments  were  
made  to  the  Ruffell  Smith  points  system.  The  aim  was  to  increase  productivity  
to  195  points  in  twenty-­eight  days,  equivalent  to  170  hours  of  duty  a  month.  It  
was  agreed  that  duty  periods  may  at  times  extend  to  the  maximum  length  
permitted  under  Civil  Aviation  Publication  (CAP)  295  and  that  rest  periods  
may  fall  within  the  ‘minima  laid  down  by  the  Board  of  Trade’.82  Essentially  
then,  it  was  agreed  that  airlines  could  schedule  right  up  to  the  limits  laid  down  
in  CAP  295.    
Following  the  cessation  of  this  agreement,  further  talks  were  held  
between  BEA  and  BALPA  in  September  1969.  Although  BALPA  claimed  to  
act  in  its  members’  interests,  not  all  pilots  were  happy  with  the  workload  
effects  of  the  pay  and  productivity  agreements  brokered  with  airlines  in  this  
period.  To  this  end,  the  1969  talks  elicited  heated  responses  from  some  pilots.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  Ibid.  p.  2.  
80  MRC  MSS.248/3/26:  BALPA  Notes  of  Meeting  Held  Between  BEA,  BALPA,  The  Board  of  
Trade,  and  the  Ministry  of  Labour,  27  April  1967,  p.  3.  
81  MRC  MSS.248/3/26:  Memorandum  of  Agreement  for  Service  Between  BEA  and  BALPA,  1  
November  1967.  
82  MRC  MSS.248/3/26:  Memorandum  of  Agreement  for  Service  Between  BEA  and  BALPA,  1  
January  1968,  p.  13.  
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Captain  Stanley  Key,  who  was  later  implicated  in  the  1972  Staines  air  
disaster,  was  particularly  critical  of  the  1969  talks.  In  a  letter  to  BEA’s  
industrial  officer  R.  F.  Trowbridge,  Key  made  two  major  complaints.  First,  he  
complained  that  BALPA  had  entered  into  discussions  with  BEA  without  
consulting  BEA  pilots.  Secondly,  he  argued  that  BALPA’s  use  of  the  term  
‘productivity’  was  inappropriate.  ‘I  would  say’,  Key  began,  ‘that  the  use  of  the  
word  “productivity”  by  our  current  representatives  can  only  be  to  pay  lip  
service  to  the  known  desire  of  the  majority  of  BEA  pilots  to  earn  more  money  
for  more  work’.83  
Reprimands  from  members  did  not  deter  BALPA  from  entering  into  
further  productivity  agreements.  On  13  June  1970,  BEA  and  BALPA  reached  
a  new  productivity  deal,  resulting  in  a  13.5%  increase  in  pilots’  salaries  in  
return  for  ‘increased  productivity’.84    The  agreement,  which  was  valid  between  
18  June  1970  and  27  June  1971,  called  for  an  increase  in  pilot  ‘work  effort’.85  
There  was  to  be  a  slight  change  in  how  extra  work  was  achieved.  Previously,  
productivity  deals  between  BEA  and  BALPA  had  focused  on  more  efficient  
turnarounds  to  increase  the  number  of  sectors  pilots  could  complete  in  a  
single  day.  In  the  new  agreement,  however,  pilot  productivity  was  increased  
by  ‘substituting  a  duty  day  for  a  day  off’.86  Referred  to  as  an  ‘annotated  day’,  
pilots  were  permitted  to  substitute  up  to  two  days  off  for  duty  days  in  any  two  
consecutive  twenty-­eight  day  roster  periods.87  The  points  accrued  by  pilots  on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83  MRC  MSS.248/3/27:  Letter  from  Stanley  Key  to  R.  F.  Trowbridge,  9  September  1969,  p.  1.  
84  MRC  MSS.248/3/27:  Appendix  to  the  Minutes  of  the  115th  Meeting  of  the  BEA  Pilots  Local  
Council,  held  on  13  June  1970:  Joint  Press  Statement  Issued  by  BEA  and  BALPA  on  13  June  
1970,  p.  1.  
85  MRC  MSS.248/3/27:  BEA  Pilots  Scheduling  Limitations  Document:  Increase  in  Work  Effort,  
1970,  p.  1.  
86  Ibid.  p.  1.  
87  Ibid.  p.  1.  
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‘annotated  days’  did  not  count  towards  the  existing  weekly  and  monthly  
maximum  set  by  BEA,  so  allowed  the  airline  to  schedule  pilots  for  up  to  
fourteen  additional  points  per  roster.88  BEA  expected  that  this  system  would  
entail  a  10%  increase  in  work  effort.  
Between  1960  and  1971  BALPA  drew  on  the  discourse  of  productivity,  
the  political  ‘watchword’  of  the  decade,  to  buttress  arguments  for  better  pay  
and  working  conditions.89  Prior  to  this,  BALPA  had  shied  away  from  making  
productivity  claims  about  pilots,  preferring  instead  to  stress  their  professional  
expertise.  The  dominant  model  of  productivity  in  the  twentieth  century  defined  
worker  productivity  as  the  rate  of  output  in  a  given  period.90  To  the  twentieth-­
century  layman  increased  productivity  suggested  that  a  greater  amount  of  
work  was  being  done  in  the  same  timeframe  as  before.  As  the  above  
demonstrates,  however,  debates  about  productivity  were  contingent.  Though  
the  productionist  discourse  was  dominant,  productivity  was  conceived  of  in  
different  terms  outside  the  factory.  When  BALPA  referred  to  pilot  productivity,  
for  instance,  this  entailed  efficient  deployment  of  pilots  and  aircraft.  
Productivity,  according  to  BALPA,  referred  to  pilot  utilisation  by  an  airline,  
rather  than  the  amount  of  work  a  pilot  completed  in-­flight.  This  discourse  of  
pilot  utilisation  was  at  odds  with  the  claims  BALPA  had  made  in  the  previous  
decade.  It  was,  particularly,  contrary  to  the  concerns  the  Association  had  
raised  in  the  1950s  about  the  medical,  safety,  and  social  implications  of  pilot  
fatigue.91  
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89  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  BALPA,  ‘Flight  Fatigue:  Report  of  the  Special  Committee’,  second  
edition,  May  1972,  with  notes  by  Ninian  Davies,  p.  37.  
90  McIvor,  Working  Lives.  
91  TNA  BT/248/110:  extract  from  The  Log,  ‘Fatigue  control  by  legislation’,  3.  
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In  real  terms,  the  productivity  deals  brokered  between  BALPA  and  
airlines  meant  that  pilots  completed  more  work  in  fewer  days.  As  a  result,  
pilots  worked  more  intensive  schedules  but  had  more  time  off.  As  the  Bader  
Committee  commented  in  1972  of  the  1960-­1971  pay  and  productivity  deals:  
  
The  outcome  of  these  agreements  has  been  the  tendency  to  
concentrate  flying  and  duty  hours  within  a  minimum  number  of  days  in  
order  to  achieve  longer  uninterrupted  periods  off  duty.  This  practice  
has  in  our  view  increased  rather  than  reduced  the  possibility  of  
fatigue.92  
  
Increasing  the  number  of  uninterrupted  days  off,  BALPA’s  primary  social  
objective,  exacerbated  fatigue  as  it  often  led  to  more  intensive  and  
imbalanced  scheduling  by  airline  operators.  BALPA’s  Flight  Fatigue  
Committee  admitted  in  it’s  1972  report  that  in  the  1960s  BALPA  had  ‘made  
concessions’  on  flight  time  limitations  and  working  practices  based  on  pay  
settlements.93  Essentially,  ‘a  scientifically  based  system  [Ruffell  Smith’s  points  
system]  was  set  aside  in  the  interests  of  productivity’  and  pay  increases.94  
These  concessions,  BALPA  admitted  in  1972,  did  not  give  the  ‘fullest  
consideration  to  safety’:  
  
Thus  as  part  of  the  negotiations  for  increased  pay,  more  strenuous  
working  patterns  were  conceded  without  full  appreciation  of  their  
subsequent  effects  on  flight  fatigue.95  
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1973,  p.  12.  
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In  their  quest  for  increased  pay,  BALPA  had  drawn  on  and  refashioned  a  
popular  discourse  –  productivity  –  and,  ultimately,  exacerbated  the  conditions  
under  which  fatigue  was  likely.    
  
Transport  Unions  and  Professional  Drivers’  Hours  
In  1967  new  flight  time  limitations  –  in  the  form  of  an  updated  Air  Navigation  
Order  and  circular,  CAP  295  –  were  introduced  by  the  Board  of  Trade  with  the  
intention  of  protecting  aircrews  against  excessive  fatigue.  These  limitations  
were,  however,  largely  permissive.  Although  the  maximum  permissible  flying  
hours  were  reduced  in  the  1967  Air  Navigation  Order  from  115  to  100  hours,  
the  regulations  introduced  under  CAP  295  were  not  legally  enforceable.  CAP  
295  was  merely  intended  to  ‘assist  operators  in  establishing  the  principles  
which  should  determine  the  limits  and  minimum  rest  periods  to  be  set’.96  All  
that  operators  were  legally  required  to  do  was  introduce  a  policy  about  the  
scheduling  of  rest  periods;;  they  did  not  need  to  adhere  to  specific  limits  other  
than  those  set  in  the  Air  Navigation  Order.    
The  1967  flight  time  limitations  were  introduced  in  a  context  of  wider  
reforms  for  professional  drivers.  The  reforms  affecting  transport  workers  in  
other  industries  were  far  more  detailed  and  restrictive  than  those  laid  out  in  
the  1967  Air  Navigation  Order  and  CAP  295.  Transport  unions  were  more  
effective  in  reducing  the  hours  of  professional  drivers  than  BALPA  were  in  
reducing  the  working  hours  of  pilots  for  two  primary  reasons.  First,  unions  
representing  other  transport  workers  prioritised  shorter  working  hours  over  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96  Board  of  Trade,  CAP  295:  Flight  Time  Limitations  and  Avoidance  of  Excessive  Fatigue  in  
Aircrews,  (London:  HMSO,  1967),  p.  3.  
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increased  pay.  As  Hayward  has  suggested,  in  the  early  decades  of  the  
twentieth  century  the  TGWU  brokered  a  number  of  deals  with  employers  that  
led  to  tighter  schedules  in  order  to  secure  better  pay.  97  By  the  1960s,  
however,  the  union  prioritised  working  conditions  over  pay.  Shorter  working  
hours,  the  TGWU  argued  in  this  period,  would  increase  driver  productivity,  so  
workers  would  be  able  to  ‘get  through  in  10  hours  what  …  [was  previously]  
done  in  11’.98  Employers  would  not,  the  TGWU  thus  concluded,  notice  any  
measurable  decline  in  worker  output  if  drivers’  hours  of  work  were  reduced.  
The  contrast  with  BALPA  is  instructive  here.  As  noted  above,  BALPA  made  a  
similar  argument  about  worker  productivity  in  the  1960s.99  Rather  than  calling  
for  reduced  working  hours,  however,  BALPA  suggested  that  increased  pilot  
productivity  should  be  rewarded  with  ‘extra  pay’.100  
Transport  unions  framed  fatigue  as  an  issue  affecting  safety  as  well  as  
productivity.  They  held  that  fatigue  increased  ‘accident  proneness’  when  
driving.101  While  they  initially  framed  this  as  an  occupational  health  risk  for  
drivers  who  were,  transport  unions  argued  in  1961,  likely  to  be  involved  in  a  
work-­related  accidents  when  fatigued,  transport  unions  reframed  the  issue  of  
fatigue  in  1967  as  one  of  public  safety.102  Fatigued  drivers,  it  was  argued,  
were  more  likely  to  cause  accidents,  thus  endangering  the  lives  of  other  road  
users,  and  constituting  ‘a  danger  to  the  public’.103  By  emphasising  the  health  
and  safety  of  the  travelling  public,  rather  than  the  worker,  transport  unions  
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98  TNA  MT/92/107:  Letter  from  J.  H.  Locke  to  Minister  for  Transport,  20  December  1966.  
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were  able  to  secure  a  number  of  changes  to  the  general  working  conditions  of  
professional  drivers.  By  the  mid-­twentieth  century  road  safety  was  well-­
established.  Indeed,  laws  relating  to  road  safety  stretched  back  to  the  
nineteenth  century.104  Traffic  accidents  and  the  safety  of  pedestrians  and  
other  road  users  were  deeply  embedded  in  debates  about  transport  and  
driving  by  the  1960s.105  Civil  aviation  was,  however,  established  post-­war  and,  
as  the  previous  chapter  has  shown,  although  regulations  were  produced  to  
ensure  safety  as  it  pertained  to  aircraft  in  the  immediate  post-­war  years,  there  
was  little  interest  in  human  factors  until  the  mid-­1950s.    
Following  the  implementation  of  the  1967  regulations  for  professional  
drivers,  and  given  the  fact  that  the  road  transport  and  aviation  industries  faced  
similar  challenges  –  namely  the  impact  of  technological  innovations:  faster  
speeds,  long  continuous  duty  hours,  and  busier  roads  and  flight  paths  –  
BALPA  reframed  its  arguments  about  fatigue  to  reflect  those  made  by  other  
transport  unions.  The  Association’s  arguments  and  objectives  shifted  in  this  
period.  The  union’s  focus  on  pay  and  productivity  was  replaced  by  a  new  
concern  with  safety  and  working  practices.  This  change  of  approach  saw  
BALPA  use  stories  of  sleeping  pilots  –  the  most  compelling  and  terrifying  
manifestation  of  pilot  fatigue  –  to  provoke  public  support  and  influence  official  
investigations  into  fatigue.  
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Relations  (Amsterdam:  Rodopi,  1997),  pp.  234-­254;;  Bill  Luckin,  ‘A  Kind  of  Consensus  on  the  
Roads?  Drink  Driving  Policy  in  Britain  1945-­1970’,  Twentieth  Century  British  History,  21,  3  
(2010)  350-­374.  
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Public  Relations,  Pilot  Fatigue,  and  Industrial  Bargaining  
In  the  1970s  the  British  media  increasingly  reported  on  the  health  and  safety  
of  workers.  The  national  press  widely  covered,  for  instance,  the  publication  of  
the  Safety  and  Health  at  Work  Committee’s  report  in  June  1972.106  One  story  
in  particular  kept  making  headlines.  Although  workers  from  a  number  of  
industries  had  complained  about  the  potential  dangers  of  fatigue  when  driving  
and  operating  heavy  machinery  since  the  turn  of  the  century,  in  1972,  
following  reports  that  an  entire  BOAC  flight  crew  had  fallen  asleep  mid-­flight,  
workplace  fatigue  made  national  headlines.  The  level  of  coverage  was  
unprecedented.  No  other  occupational  health  story  received  equivalent  
attention  until  the  late  1970s,  when  the  asbestos  scandal  began  to  unfold.107  
Although,  as  Ayesha  Nathoo  and  Kelly  Loughlin  have  shown,  medical  issues  
had  been  widely  reported  since  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century,  pilot  
fatigue  was  one  of  the  first  major  occupational  health  and  safety  stories  to  
make  national  news.108  Prior  to  the  1970s  journalists  rarely  discussed  
occupational  health  and  safety,  except  in  relation  to  high  profile  disasters  
which  affected  publics  as  well  as  workers,  such  as  the  catastrophic  landslide  
at  Aberfan,  South  Wales  in  1966  that  killed  144  people.109    
Against  a  backdrop  of  trade  unionism  and  industrial  action  in  the  1970s  
a  number  of  investigative  journalists  turned  their  attention  to  the  field  of  
occupational  health  and  safety.  Although  similar  in  content  to  many  of  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106  See  for  example:  Bryn  Jones,  ‘Big  Safety  Shake-­Up’,  Daily  Mirror,  Jul  20  1972,  p.  4;;  Alan  
Hamilton,  ‘Robens  report  urges  tighter  factory  safety  laws’,  Times,  Jul  20  1972,  p.  19;;  Anon,  
‘Cutting  Out  The  Risks’,  Times,  Jul  20  1972,  p.  21.  
107  Tweedale,  Magic  Mineral  to  Killer  Dust.  
108  Ayesha  Nathoo,  Hearts  Exposed:  Transplants  and  the  Media  in  1960s  Britain,  (London:  
Palgrave  Macmillan,  2009);;  Kelly  Loughlin,  ‘The  History  of  Medicine  in  Contemporary  Britain:  
Reflections  on  the  Role  of  Audio-­Visual  Sources’,  Social  History  of  Medicine,  13,  1  (2000)  
131-­145.  
109  Sirrs,  ‘Accidents  and  Apathy’.    
   235  
articles  that  had  been  published  in  the  1950s  and  1960s  on  industrial  
accidents  and  near  misses,  the  tone  and  scale  of  reporting  changed  in  the  
1970s.  Investigative  journalists  critiqued  the  positivist  image  of  British  society  
that  had  dominated  news  publications  in  the  years  directly  following  the  
Second  World  War.  Journalists  were  particularly  critical  of  supposed  
advances  in  medicine,  science,  and  technology.  Programmes  such  as  BBC’s  
Panorama  and  ITV’s  World  in  Action  employed  dedicated  personnel  to  
investigate  and  report  on  such  matters.110  The  tone  of  reporting  tended  to  be  
sceptical  and  anti-­authoritarian,  and  did  not  shy  away  from  apportioning  
blame,  particularly  to  apparently  powerful  individuals  or  institutions.  
The  writing  that  appeared  on  occupational  health  and  safety  in  the  
early  1970s  followed  these  broad  trends.  Media  outlets  engaged  with  pilot  
fatigue  in  a  number  of  ways,  but  most  often  used  fatigue  as  a  vector  through  
which  other  issues,  often  relating  to  modernity  and  its  apparent  discontents,  
could  be  discussed.  Though  in  some  ways  an  era  of  increasing  affluence  and  
consumerism,  the  early  1970s  were  politically  volatile  years.  Post-­war  
optimism  had  given  way  to,  as  Nathoo  has  put  it,  ‘a  sceptical,  anti-­
authoritarian  individualism’.111  While  people  across  the  social  spectrum  could  
afford  and  accepted  domestic  technologies,  this  period  also  witnessed  
growing  public  disillusionment  with  high  technology.112  Aerospace  technology  
offered  a  potent  manifestation  of  the  risks  and  unintended  consequences  of  
technological  innovation,  and  served  to  exemplify  a  number  of  broader  
themes  about  the  modern  world  of  technology  and  work.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110  Nathoo,  Hearts  Exposed.  
111  Ibid.  p.  3.  
112  Ibid.  
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By  the  1970s  the  British  media  was  an  important  component  of  
contemporary  society.  The  British  public  were  increasingly  media-­conscious.  
As  entertainment  and  news  information  became  immediately  available,  the  
result  of  same-­day  reporting,  protests,  wars,  and  social  injustices  became  
increasingly  visible.  The  news  media  provided  a  platform  for  issues  to  be  
raised  and  opinions  to  be  heard  by  vast  and  disparate  audiences.113  Yet  
media  interest  in  and  reporting  of  occupational  health  issues  has  barely  been  
looked  at  historically.  Given  the  amount  of  work  that  has  been  published  in  
recent  years  about  the  relationship  between  medicine  and  the  media,  it  is  
surprising  that  media  engagement  with  occupational  health  and  safety  has  
received  so  little  attention  from  historians  of  work  and  medicine.114  Although  
some  scholars  have  engaged  with  issues  relating  to  occupational  health  and  
the  media  –  asbestos,  for  example,  has  received  some  attention  –  this  has,  
for  the  most  part,  been  brief.115  Focusing  predominantly  on  the  years  1972  
and  1973,  what  follows  here  examines  media  engagement  with  one  
particularly  pervasive  hazard  for  British  tourists:  the  fatigue  of  airline  pilots.  
The  mainstream  media  consistently  documented  issues  relating  to  
commercial  aviation  in  the  twentieth  century.  A  number  of  major  national  
newspapers  had  dedicated  air  correspondents  whose  sole  purpose  was  to  
research  and  report  on  industry  affairs,  be  that  the  building  or  expansion  of  
airports,  industrial  action,  or  air  accidents.  Henry  Serrano  Villard  has  
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114  For  example:  Susan  E.  Lederer  and  Naomi  Rogers,  ‘Media’  in  Roger  Cooter  and  John  
Pickstone  (eds.),  Medicine  in  the  Twentieth  Century,  (Amsterdam:  Harwood  Academic  
Publishers,  2000),  pp.  487-­502;;  Roger  Cooter  and  Claudia  Stein,  ‘Coming  into  Focus:  
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115  Loughlin,  ‘The  History  of  Medicine  in  Contemporary  Britain’.  
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suggested  that  accidents  involving  commercial  airliners  often  made  the  most  
‘sensational  headlines’.116  Given  the  number  of  passengers  aircraft  could  
accommodate,  the  potential  for  loss  of  life  was  huge.  An  air  crash  thus  made  
for  a  potentially  tragic,  and  dramatic,  story.    
In  the  late  1940s  and  early  1950s  reporting  tended  to  focus  on  crashes  
involving  military  aircraft,  in  large  part  because  these  could  carry  so  many  
more  passengers  than  civilian  aircraft.  The  Globemaster,  a  large  transport  
aircraft  used  by  the  American  Air  Force,  could  for  example  carry  up  to  200  
passengers.  In  1953,  when  a  Globemaster  carrying  American  pilots  to  Korea  
after  leave  crashed  in  Tokyo,  the  story  was  widely  reported.  Touted  as  the  
‘worst  crash  in  aviation  history’,  the  Globemaster  crash  was  afforded  a  far  
greater  word  count  in  the  19  June  1953  edition  of  the  Times  than  two  civilian  
air  crashes  reported  on  the  same  page:  a  crash  between  Vientiane  and  
Saigon  which  killed  twenty-­five  passengers,  and  a  crash  near  Sao  Paulo  in  
which  ten  passengers  and  seven  crew  members  were  killed.117  Analysis  of  
these  crashes  was  minimal.  In  comparison  with  the  Globemaster  disaster,  
which  included  a  consideration  of  the  day’s  weather  and  details  of  the  usual  
service  operated  by  the  American  Air  Force,  the  Times  included  only  the  most  
basic  details  of  the  commercial  air  accidents:  the  intended  destination  of  the  
flights  and  the  number  of  casualties.  Throughout  the  1950s  and  1960s  
incidents  involving  military  aircraft  continued  to  take  precedence.  From  the  
early  1970s,  however,  crashes  involving  civil  aircraft  began  to  be  more  widely  
reported,  no  doubt  because  by  1970,  when  the  Boeing  747  was  first  flown  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
116  Henry  Serrano  Villard,  Contact!  The  Story  the  Early  Birds,  (London:  Arthur  Barker,  1987).  
117  Anon,  ‘127  Killed  in  Air  Crash:  Worst  in  Aviation  History’,  Times,  Jun  19  1953,  p.  6;;  Anon,  
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commercially  in  Britain,  the  seating  capacity  of  commercial  airliners  increased  
from  around  150  in  the  Boeing  707  up  to  around  360  in  the  Boeing  747.  The  
scale  of  potential  human  hurt  had  more  than  doubled.  
Between  1954  and  1972  a  number  of  civil  aviation  accidents  made  
national  headlines:  the  1954  BOAC  Lockheed  Constellation  crash,  which  
killed  thirty-­three  of  the  forty  passengers  and  crew;;  the  1957  Blackbushe  
airport  crash,  which  killed  all  five  crew  and  twenty-­nine  of  the  thirty  
passengers  on  board;;  and  the  1972  Staines  air  disaster,  which  killed  118  
people.  The  public  inquiries  following  each  crash  were  not  conclusive,  but  all  
pointed  towards  some  error  in  the  skill  or  judgement  of  the  flight  crew.  The  
1972  crash,  involving  BEA  Trident  Papa  India,  received  a  significant  amount  
of  news  coverage,  no  doubt  due  to  the  high  death  toll.  Although  the  crash  was  
officially  attributed  to  ‘an  abnormal  heart  condition’,  a  number  of  newspaper  
correspondents  focused  their  reports  on  other  issues.118  Coverage  focused  on  
industrial  issues,  namely  the  working  conditions  of  BEA  pilots,  pilot-­
management  relations,  and  pilot  morale.  A  number  of  articles  published  in  the  
Times  discussed  Captain  Stanley  Key’s  long  hours  of  work  and  ‘lack  of  free  
weekends’.119  Drawing  on  letters  of  complaint  penned  by  Key  in  the  months  
preceding  his  death,  the  Times  noted  that  on  several  occasions  Key  had  been  
subjected  to  long  delays  before  flights  –  once  having  to  stand-­by  for  five  hours  
before  take-­off  –  worked  extended  hours,  and  experienced  fatigue  as  a  result.  
The  Staines  air  disaster  marked  the  beginning  of  what  was  to  be  eighteen  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118  Air  Accidents  Investigation  Branch,  Trident  I  G-­ARPI:  Report  of  the  Public  Inquiry  into  the  
causes  and  circumstances  of  the  accident  near  Staines  on  18  June  1972,  (London:  HMSO,  
1973),  p.  54;;  Anon,  ‘Trident  pilot’s  heart  trouble  started  when  he  was  20,  pathologist  tells  
crash  inquiry’,  Times,  Dec  6  1972,  p.  3.  
119  Anon,  ‘Pilot  gave  warning  of  crash  risk  in  using  inexperienced  crews  “two  hours  before  
Trident  take-­off”’,  Times,  Nov  29  1972,  p.  4.  
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months  of  intense  media  scrutiny  of  the  aviation  industry.  Only  a  few  weeks  
after  the  air  crash  made  headlines  a  new  story  broke  that  had  far-­reaching  
implications  for  the  safety  of  air  passengers.  
Public  relations  as  a  profession  first  emerged  in  the  early  twentieth  
century.  Predicated  on  the  idea  that  an  individual’s  or  company’s  public  image  
needed  to  be  actively  managed  by  dedicated  publicity  experts,  it  was  
developed  alongside  professions  such  as  market  research.  Associated  initially  
with  political  and  corporate  cultures,  it  was  first  established  and  
institutionalised  in  America.120  Public  relations,  as  a  distinct  profession,  
flourished  in  the  United  Kingdom  in  the  decades  following  the  Second  World  
War.  According  to  Nathoo,  by  1963  there  were  about  3,000  public  relations  
professionals  in  Britain,  more  than  in  any  other  country.121  Between  1961  and  
1962  the  British  government  spent  £4.2  million  at  home  and  £20.2  million  
overseas  on  its  information  services.  In  addition  to  government  departments,  
many  charities,  industries,  and  trade  associations  began  to  employ  public  
relations  officers.122  Public  relations  intended  to  mobilise  public  interest,  
maintain  media  profiles,  and  shape  policy  agendas  in  line  with  the  aims  and  
interests  of  a  particular  organisation.123    
The  operation  of  public  relations  and  managed  communication  within  
the  field  of  health  and  welfare  policy  is  commonly  recognised,  although  little  
researched  by  historians.  A  number  of  historians  have  analysed  the  
development  of  press  and  public  relations  activity  in  relation  to  non-­
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121  Ibid.  
122  Ibid.  
123  Kelly  Loughlin,  ‘Publicity  as  Policy:  The  Changing  Role  of  Press  and  Public  Relations  at  
the  BMA,  1940s-­1980s’  in  Virginia  Berridge  (ed.),  Making  Health  Policy:  Networks  in  
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governmental  and  medical  organisations,  including  the  British  Medical  
Association  (BMA).124  Little  scholarship  has,  however,  been  produced  which  
focuses  particularly  on  how  trade  unions  communicated  health  and  safety  
information  to  the  public.125    
The  following  examines  how  BALPA  communicated  information  about  
pilot  health  –  and  the  implications  this  had  for  passenger  safety  –  to  the  
public.  It  focuses  exclusively  on  public  relations  in  the  1970s,  following  
BALPA’s  employment  of  a  new  public  relations  officer,  Gordon  Hurley.  
Hurley’s  policies  were  provocative,  and  received  significant  attention  from  the  
news  media.  Although  BALPA  had  engaged  with  the  media  before  1972,  
particularly  under  general  secretary  Denis  Follows  between  1946  and  1962,  
Hurley’s  approach  was  novel.  Follows  and  others  had  taken  a  tentative  
approach  to  union-­public  relations.  Follows  had  written  short  articles  for  
newspapers  that  set  out  recommendations  for  revised  flight  time  limitations.  
Following  the  Kallang  accident  in  1954,  for  example,  Follows  wrote  a  short  
piece  for  the  Times  outlining  his  ‘recommendations  to  the  minister’  regarding  
maximum  duty  hours.126  Hurley,  however,  was  far  more  radical.  He  employed  
tactics  similar  to  those  used  by  Jenkins  and  ASSET  in  the  1960s:  he  wrote  
provocative  letters  to  newspaper  editors,  published  a  number  of  articles  in  
BALPA’s  internal  publication  The  Log,  and  from  1972  alongside  other  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124  Loughlin,  ‘Publicity  as  Policy’;;  Peter  Bartrip,  Themselves  Writ  Large:  The  British  Medical  
Association  1832-­1966,  (London:  BMJ  Publishing  Group,  1996);;  Gareth  Millward,  ‘“A  Matter  
of  Commonsense”:  The  Coventry  Poliomyelitis  Epidemic  1957  and  the  British  Public’,  
Contemporary  British  History,  0,  0  (2016),  pp.  1-­23,  available  at:  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13619462.2016.1247701  [last  accessed  17  September  2017].  
125  Geoffrey  Tweedale’s  work  on  the  Asbestosis  Research  Council  is  a  notable  exception,  
see:  Geoffrey  Tweedale,  ‘Science  or  Public  Relations?  The  Inside  Story  of  the  Asbestosis  
Research  Council’,  American  Journal  of  Industrial  Medicine,  38,  6  (2000)  723-­34.  
126  D.  Follows,  ‘Duty  Hours  of  Pilots:  Recommendations  to  Minister’,  Times,  Nov  20  (1954),  p.  
7.  
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members  of  the  Association  began  to  strategically  release  material  to  both  the  
press  and  members  of  parliament.127  
  
Sleepiness  and  Sensationalism  
The  aviation  industry  experienced  an  unprecedented  period  of  strife  in  the  late  
1960s.128  Pilot-­management  relations  had  soured  considerably  and,  in  part  
because  of  the  pay  and  productivity  agreements  brokered  by  BALPA,  pilots  
increasingly  complained  about  general  working  conditions  and  quality  of  life.  
Airline  operators  still  had  ultimate  control  of  scheduling  in  this  period.  The  
rules  contained  within  CAP  295  were  permissive  and,  as  such,  operators  had  
to  ensure  only  that  aircrew  were  not  scheduled  beyond  the  statutory  
limitations  laid  out  in  the  1967  Air  Navigation  Order.  Pilots  were,  according  to  
BALPA,  often  under  pressure  from  airlines  to  extend  duty  periods.  Under  the  
Air  Navigation  Order  pilots  were  able  to  use  their  discretion  to  extend  duty  
periods  in  extenuating  circumstances,  if  for  example,  flights  were  delayed  due  
to  poor  weather  conditions.  BALPA  argued,  however,  that  pilots  rarely  felt  
they  had  a  choice  in  the  matter.  Fearing  retaliation  from  management,  most  
pilots,  the  Association  argued,  felt  obliged  to  extend  duty  periods  regardless  
of  whether  they  were  experiencing  fatigue.  The  purpose  of  the  legislation,  
‘public  protection’,  was,  BALPA  argued,  thus  wholly  ‘degraded’.129  BALPA  
became  increasingly  concerned  with  this  trend  and  in  1972  it  began,  for  the  
second  time  in  twenty  years,  to  campaign  for  a  reduction  in  pilots’  working  
hours.130  BALPA  claimed  that  pilot  workload  had  increased  considerably  since  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  Melling,  ‘Managing  the  White-­Collar  Union’.  
128  Blain,  Pilots  and  Management.  
129  MRC  MSS.248/4/2,  BALPA,  ‘Flight  Fatigue:  Report  of  the  Special  Committee’,  p.  39.  
130  As  noted  in  the  previous  chapter,  BALPA  had  launched  a  similar  campaign  in  the  1950s.  
   242  
1967,  when  the  current  government  guidelines  were  introduced  in  CAP  295.  
The  pattern  and  size  of  air  traffic  had,  the  Association  claimed,  ‘changed  
tremendously’  and  pilots  were  doing  more  take-­offs  and  landings,  widely  
acknowledged  to  be  the  most  fatiguing  parts  of  flying.131    
Motivated  by  these  concerns,  in  December  1972  BALPA  established  a  
special  committee  to  research  and  produce  a  report  on  the  prevalence  and  
severity  of  fatigue  among  commercial  airline  pilots.  Marking  the  now  
established  divorce  from  scientific  discussion  of  fatigue,  the  committee  
researched  the  issue  using  two  different  methods:  a  survey  of  members,  and  
a  re-­examination  of  past  accidents  that  had  been  deemed  by  investigators  to  
be  the  result  of  pilot  error.  All  discussion  of  survey  data  was  removed  from  the  
final  draft  of  BALPA’s  Flight  Fatigue  Report  in  response  to  legal  advice,  but  
the  media  nevertheless  reported  on  much  of  the  information  collected.132    
Several  hundred  pilots  completed  the  four-­page  questionnaire  
published  in  BALPA’s  quarterly  journal  The  Log.  The  questionnaire,  which  
looked  to  gauge  how  tiredness  affected  pilot  performance,  addressed  a  range  
of  issues  including  the  possible  symptoms  of  fatigue,  the  impact  of  fatigue  on  
the  safe  handling  of  aircraft,  the  pilots’  pattern  of  work  and  rest,  and  the  
method  by  which  pilots  were  woken  from  sleep  before  flight.  On  completing  
the  report  pilots  were  asked  to  sign,  with  their  name,  rank,  and  company,  
under  the  following  statement:  
  
Although  I  had  reservations  about  the  degree  of  fatigue  that  might  be  
produced  by  this  duty,  I  was  satisfied  that  …  the  safety  of  neither  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘Danger  in  the  Air?  When  Fatigue  Means  Disaster’,  Teeside  
Evening  Gazette,  Mar  8  1973.  
132  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  BALPA,  ‘Flight  Fatigue:  Report  of  the  Special  Committee’.  
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aircraft  nor  the  persons  therein  would  be  endangered  if  I  operated  the  
flight.  At  a  later  stage,  fatigue  …  became  apparent.133  
  
Between  2  and  8  December  a  total  of  six  news  items  appeared  in  local  and  
national  newspapers  about  the  survey.  Most  reports  were  short,  providing  
only  a  brief  outline  of  the  issues  covered  in  the  questionnaire.134  From  13  
December  news  coverage  of  the  questionnaire  and  its  results  accelerated  
considerably  following  the  release  of  a  report  from  BALPA  claiming  that  an  
entire  BOAC  flight  crew  had  fallen  asleep  mid-­flight  on  route  from  Sydney  to  
Honolulu.  The  captain  of  the  BOAC  aircraft  carrying  125  passengers  was  
reported  to  have  ‘nodded  off’  over  Japan,  only  to  wake  and  find  both  his  co-­
pilots  and  flight  engineer  asleep.135  The  story  was  not  entirely  novel.  In  June  
1971  the  Times  reported  that  Conservative  member  of  parliament  and  former  
pilot  Norman  Tebbit  (1931-­present)  had  ‘fallen  asleep’  whilst  on  duty.136  The  
1972  story,  however,  received  an  unprecedented  level  of  coverage.  
In  a  study  of  foreign  news,  Johan  Galtung  and  Mari  Holmboe  Ruge  
outlined  the  qualities  likely  to  make  a  story.  These  news  values  were:  
frequency  (how  well  the  time-­span  of  the  event  fitted  into  the  news  
organisation’s  schedule),  threshold  (the  reach  of  the  event,  generally  in  terms  
of  the  number  of  people  affected),  unambiguity  (an  event  with  a  clear  
interpretation  tended,  they  argued,  to  be  more  widely  reported),  cultural  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133  Anon,  ‘Pilots  Quizzed  by  Union  on  Fatigue’,  Financial  Times,  Dec  4  1972,  p.  6.  
134  See:  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘5000  pilots  questioned  on  fatigue’,  Glasgow  Herald,  Dec  2  
1972;;  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘Fatigue  Quiz  for  Pilots’,  Western  Daily  Press,  Dec  2  1972;;  
Anon,  ‘Pilots  Quizzed  by  Union  on  Fatigue’,  Financial  Times,  Dec  4  1972,  p.  6;;  MRC  
MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘Quiz  on  Fatigue’,  Middlesex  Chronicle,  Dec  8  1972.  
135  Reed,  ‘Ministry  Inquiry  over  BOAC  crew  asleep  at  controls  of  jet  flying  30,000  ft’,  Times,  
Dec  13  1972,  p.  1.  
136  Arthur  Reed,  ‘Airline  pilots  asleep  on  duty,  MP  says’,  Times,  Jun  28  1971,  p.  1.  
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proximity  (how  meaningful  the  story  was  in  terms  of  the  news  audience’s  own  
culture),  consonance  (how  well  the  event  matched  journalists’  expectations),  
composition  (weighting  in  relation  to  other  news),  actions  concerning  the  elite  
(in  the  original  study  this  referred  to  elite  nations  but  it  is  also  applicable  to  
high  status  occupational  groups),  personification  (events  which  could  be  
portrayed  as  the  actions  of  individuals),  and  negativity  (bad  news  was  said  to  
be  more  newsworthy  than  good  news).137    
BALPA’s  sleeping  flight  crew  revelation  evidently  matched  a  number  of  
these  criteria.  It  affected  a  large  number  of  people.  By  the  early  1970s  over  
two  million  Britons  travelled  abroad  by  plane  each  year.  It  centered  on  an  elite  
occupational  group  and,  given  the  implications  for  passenger  safety,  it  was  
overtly  negative.  There  was  also  an  element  of  continuity.  In  the  days  and  
weeks  leading  up  to  BALPA’s  press  release  aviation  had  made  more  
headlines  than  usual.  It  had  been  a  particularly  bad  year  for  air  crashes.  
Worldwide  over  1,700  passengers  and  crew  died  in  the  space  of  twelve  
months.  The  most  high-­profile  crash,  the  Staines  air  disaster  on  18  June  
1972,  had  taken  place  a  few  months  previously  but  was  also  heavily  reported  
throughout  November  and  early  December  as  the  public  inquiry  into  the  
accident  concluded.138  The  story  thus  continued  the  theme  of  human  fallibility  
and  passenger  safety  in  commercial  aviation  that  had  been  widely  covered  in  
British  newspapers  in  the  preceding  weeks.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Johan  Galtung  and  Mari  Holmboe  Ruge,  ‘The  Structure  of  Foreign  News:  The  
Presentation  of  the  Congo,  Cuba  and  Cyprus  Crises  in  Four  Norwegian  Newspapers’,  Journal  
of  Peace  Research,  2,  1  (1965)  64–91.    
138  See:  Anon,  ‘Pilot  gave  warning  of  crash  risk  in  using  inexperienced  crews  “two  hours  
before  Trident  take-­off”’,  Times,  Nov  29  1972,  p.  4;;  and  Anon,  ‘Trident  pilot’s  heart  trouble  
started  when  he  was  20,  pathologist  tells  crash  inquiry’,  Times,  Dec  6  1972,  p.  3.  
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It  was  also,  perhaps  most  importantly,  unambiguous:  sleeping  pilots  
were  dangerous.  December  1972  was  the  first  time  BALPA  had  focused  on  
sleepiness,  rather  than  tiredness,  in  their  discussion  of  pilot  fatigue.  The  
image  of  the  sleeping  pilot  was  less  ambiguous  than  that  of  the  tired  pilot.  
BALPA’s  argument  that  tiredness  caused  skill  decrement  and  could  contribute  
to  serious  incidents  by  causing  pilot  error  was,  while  supported  by  civil  and  
military  research,  complex  to  communicate  to  the  public.  The  safety  
implications  of  pilots  unintentionally  sleeping  on  the  flight  deck  were,  however,  
unambiguous.  The  potential  result  was  clear  and  deeply  frightening.    
To  say  the  sleeping  flight  crew  story  made  national  headlines  would  be  
an  understatement.  On  13  December  alone  over  thirty  local  and  national  
newspapers  carried  the  story.  It  made  the  front  page  of  a  number  of  national  
newspapers  including  the  Times,  the  Daily  Express,  the  Daily  Mail,  and  the  
Telegraph.139  Most  news  stories  relied  heavily  on  BALPA’s  version  of  events,  
quoting  extensively  from  interviews  with  Hurley.  This  was,  no  doubt,  because  
as  BALPA  released  the  findings  of  the  report  it  was  in  control  and  was  able  to  
organise  a  press  release  to  explain  the  implications  for  passenger  safety.  This  
tactic  ensured  that  BALPA’s  version  of  events  was  the  one  that  dominated  the  
reports  published  on  13  December.  BOAC  spokespersons  were  only  able  to  
give  a  short  reactive  press  release  in  response  to  the  story,  and  the  view  of  
airlines  was  engaged  with  less  as  a  result.  Hurley,  on  the  other  hand,  was  
quoted  at  length  in  a  number  of  local  and  national  newspapers.  Keen  to  use  
the  opportunity  to  further  BALPA’s  campaign  for  shorter  working  hours  and  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
139  Arthur  Reed,  ‘Ministry  Inquiry  over  BOAC  crew  asleep  at  controls  of  jet  flying  30,000  ft’,  
Times,  Dec  13  1972,  p.  1;;  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Douglas  Thompson,  ‘Peril  of  Sleeping  Pilots’  
Daily  Mail,  Dec  13  1972;;  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  E.  M.  Donaldson,  ‘BOAC  crew  “dozed  at  
30,000ft”’,  Telegraph,  Dec  13  1972.  
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more  balanced  rosters,  his  press  release  stated  that  the  overall  hours  flown  
by  the  captain  in  question  were  not  excessive.  In  the  twenty-­eight-­day  work  
periods  leading  up  to  the  one  in  which  the  flight-­deck  crew  unintentionally  
slept  on  duty,  the  captain  had  worked  well  within  the  100-­hour  limit  set  by  the  
Board  of  Trade.  Hurley  argued,  instead,  that  intensive  rostering  had  caused  
fatigue  in  the  short  term:  
  
The  fatigue  comes  in  when  some  BOAC  pilots  are  rostered,  for  
instance,  on  a  sixteen-­day  round  trip  to  the  Far  East,  flying  against  the  
clock  and  zone  changes.140  
  
The  irregularity  of  scheduling  and  a  disregard  for  the  flight  crews’  circadian  
rhythms,  not  the  hours  worked,  was,  according  to  Hurley,  the  problem.  
Intensive  scheduling  had,  he  argued,  resulted  in  ‘risk  situations’  in  hundreds  
of  other  instances.141  
Operators  accused  Hurley  of  hyperbole  –  of  exaggerating  both  the  
prevalence  and  the  dangers  of  pilot  fatigue  –  but  some  of  his  contemporaries  
released  statements  of  support.  Reiterating  his  earlier  argument,  Tebbit  came  
out  in  support  of  BALPA  in  an  interview  with  the  Telegraph.  Unintentional  
periods  of  sleep  on  the  flight  deck  were,  Tebbit  argued,  not  uncommon:  
  
All  too  many  of  my  former  colleagues  have  fallen  asleep  on  the  flight  
deck  and  I  have  done  so  myself  …  But  that  doesn’t  mean  we  were  
working  too  hard.  It  means  we  were  working  when  our  bodies  were  
crying  out  to  go  to  sleep.  This  is  because  of  the  odd  hours  at  which  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140  Frank  Robson,  ‘Jet-­tired!  Drama  of  pilots  who  dozed  off  at  30,000  feet’,  Daily  Express,  Dec  
13  1972,  p.  1.    
141  Mark  Dowdney,  ‘Boeing  Crew  Fell  Asleep  in  Mid-­Air’,  Daily  Mirror,  Dec  13  1972,  p.  7.  
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pilots  sometimes  start  work  and  because  breakfast  time  in  Hong  Kong  
is  bedtime  in  London.142  
  
Like  Hurley,  Tebbit  suggested  that  the  length  of  working  hours  were  not,  in  
general,  problematic.  It  was,  he  suggested,  the  distribution  of  hours  and  the  
effect  of  time  zone  changes  that  caused  dangerous  sleep-­inducing  fatigue.  
As  a  result  of  Hurley’s  press  release,  the  overwhelming  majority  of  the  
news  reports  that  appeared  on  13  December  1972  reframed  fatigue  in  its  
most  frightening  manifestation  –  as  sleep  –  and  focused  on  the  potential  risk  
pilot  fatigue  posed  to  passenger  safety.  Some  local  newspapers,  such  as  the  
Dundee  Evening  Telegraph  proposed  that  fatigue  might  explain  ‘some  recent  
air  disasters’.143  Others  called  for  an  immediate  government  inquiry  into  the  
matter  to  ensure  the  protection  of  the  travelling  public.  Frank  Robson,  reporter  
for  the  Daily  Express,  was  particularly  adamant  that  the  impact  of  schedules  
be  investigated:  
  
Lord  Boyd-­Carpenter!  Here  is  a  pressing  task  for  you,  as  chief  of  the  
newly  constituted  Civil  Aviation  Authority.  Order  an  immediate  inquiry  
into  aircrew  schedules.  And  change  them  if  necessary.144  
  
The  initial  reports  that  appeared  on  13  December  1972  tended  to  fall  on  the  
side  of  pilots,  situating  the  responsibility  for  safety  with  regulatory  bodies.  A  
report  in  the  Gloucester  Citizen  concluded  that,  given  the  potential  for  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  E.  M.  Donaldson,  ‘BOAC  crew  “dozed  at  30,000ft”’,  Telegraph,  Dec  13  
1972.  
143  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  “Dropping  Off”,  Dundee  Evening  Telegraph,  Dec  13  1972.  
144  Frank  Robson,  ‘Jet-­tired!  Drama  of  pilots  who  dozed  off  at  30,000  feet’,  Daily  Express,  Dec  
13  1972,  p.  1.  
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‘hideous  loss  of  life’  in  air  disasters,  it  was  ‘reassuring  that  the  pilots  
themselves  …  [were]  campaigning  for  improvements’.145  At  this  point  then,  the  
story  seemed  to  be  a  public  relations  success  for  BALPA.  It  had  catapulted  
pilot  health  and  working  hours  into  the  public  arena  and  most  initial  reports  
were  overtly  sympathetic  to  the  pilots’  cause.    
Most  of  the  journalists  who  covered  the  story  initially  were  air  or  
transport  correspondents.  Arthur  Reed  of  the  Times  was  an  air  
correspondent,  as  were  Edward  Mortlock  Donaldson  of  the  Daily  Telegraph,  
Michael  Donne  of  the  Financial  Times,  Keith  Thompson  and  Frank  Robson  of  
the  Daily  Express,  and  Angus  McPherson  of  the  Daily  Mail.  Others  covered  
stories  related  to  travel,  transport,  and  defence.  David  Fairhall  of  the  Guardian  
covered  issues  relating  to  national  defence  and  maritime  services,  while  
Harvey  Elliot  of  the  Daily  Mail  wrote  on  travel  and  transport  generally.  The  
only  high-­profile  journalist  to  cover  the  story  who  was  drawn  from  more  
mainstream  journalism  was  business  correspondent  Michael  Cassell  of  the  
Financial  Times.  Most  of  the  journalists  covering  the  story  did  not,  therefore,  
necessarily  have  much  experience  reporting  issues  relating  to  occupational  
health  and  safety,  medicine,  or  employment.  For  example,  in  Reed’s  term  at  
the  Times  between  1967  and  1981,  he  wrote  mainly  on  airports,  technical  
developments,  and  occasionally  on  industrial  action.  Other  air  correspondents  
were  experienced  pilots.  Some,  such  as  Donaldson,  had  served  in  the  RAF  
during  the  Second  World  War.  For  these  reasons,  many  air  correspondents  
presented  a  largely  sympathetic  account  of  the  story.  They  tended  to  privilege  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘The  perils  of  pilot  fatigue’,  Gloucester  Citizen,  Dec  13  1972.  
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BALPA’s  point  of  view,  and  often  included  extended  quotations  from  
interviews  with  pilots.146    
Air  correspondents  were  critical  of  airline  management.  Some  adopted  
the  sceptical  and  probing  style  of  investigative  journalism.  Donaldson,  
perhaps  the  air  correspondent  with  the  most  extensive  personal  experience  of  
flight,  alluded  to  an  industry  cover-­up  of  the  dangers  of  fatigue.  In  an  article  
published  on  14  December  1972,  Donaldson  argued  that  a  report  produced  
by  BOAC’s  director  of  medical  services,  Frank  Preston,  in  1966  ‘had  been  
kept  secret’.  The  article  contained  a  number  of  verbatim  quotes  from  pilots,  
including  the  following  from  a  BOAC  pilot:  ‘We  were  told  that  it  was  industrial  
dynamite  and  that  it  had  been  stopped  at  board  level.  We  never  knew  what  it  
contained.’147  In  line  with  pilot  testimonies,  Donaldson  argued  that  BOAC  
management  had  knowingly  placed  workers  and  passengers  in  potentially  
dangerous  situations  by  covering  up  the  1966  report.    
In  an  article  published  in  the  Sunday  Observer  a  few  days  later,  Tebbit  
also  alluded  to  potential  misconduct,  specifically  collusion  between  Harold  
Wilson’s  1964-­1970  Labour  government  and  national  carriers  BEA  and  
BOAC,  which  were  state  owned  in  this  period.148  The  daily  limit  on  pilot  
working  hours  –  sixteen  hours  –  had  been  vociferously  condemned  by  crews  
in  1966,  but  after  ‘consultations’  with  airlines,  government  ministers  approved  
limits  that  they  had  earlier  proposed  be  drastically  reduced.149  Adopting  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
146  See  for  example,  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  E.  M.  Donaldson,  ‘Dozing  Pilots  Inquiry  Begun  by  
Minister’,  Telegraph,  Dec  14  1972.  
147  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  E.  M.  Donaldson,  ‘Dozing  Pilots  Inquiry  Begun  by  Minister’,  Telegraph,  
Dec  14  1972.  
148  BEA  and  BOAC  merged  in  1974,  to  form  British  Airways  (BA).  BA  was  then  privatised  in  
1987  by  the  Conservative  government.  
149  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Norman  Tebbit,  ‘Air  crashes  that  could  be  avoided’,  Sunday  Observer,  
Dec  17  1972.  
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tone  and  linguistic  style  of  investigative  journalists,  Tebbit’s  use  of  language  
indicated  a  degree  of  scepticism  here  and  suggested  that  the  entanglement  of  
airlines  with  the  British  government,  and  as  such  industry  regulators,  may  
have  allowed  concerns  about  safety  to  be  side-­lined  in  favour  of  financial  gain  
in  this  instance.  
In  the  immediate  aftermath  of  BALPA’s  exposé  a  number  of  air  
correspondents  emphasised  the  hectic  work  schedules  of  pilots.  Thompson  
suggested  in  the  Daily  Express  that  the  fast-­paced  nature  of  civil  aviation,  
particularly  the  trend  for  turn-­arounds  as  short  as  thirty  minutes,  might  be  a  
safety  issue.150  Others  suggested  that  the  pressures  under  which  airline  pilots  
worked  eroded  morale  and  affected  pilot-­management  relations.  Donne  
called,  in  the  Financial  Times,  for  this  to  be  investigated  closely.151  Some  
journalists  even  went  so  far  as  to  suggest  that  poor  management  was  the  
primary  cause  of  pilot  stress.  In  a  Daily  Mail  article  critical  of  airline  
management,  Elliot  suggested  that:  
  
One  of  the  main  ways  of  overcoming  fatigue  is  to  improve  morale  …  
On  the  other  hand,  cost-­conscious  managements  have  been  too  
detached,  as  a  result  of  which  they  have  displayed  lamentable  
ignorance  of  the  real  problems  involved  while  pontificating  from  their  
homes  in  Weybridge  or  Woking.152  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
150  Keith  Thompson,  ‘The  letter  of  fear  signed  by  46  pilots’,  Daily  Express,  Dec  14  1972,  p.  10.  
151  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Michael  Donne,  ‘The  pressure  under  which  airline  pilots  work’,  
Financial  Times,  Dec  15  1972.  
152  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Harvey  Elliott,  ‘Airline  bosses  are  rapped’,  Daily  Mail,  Dec  15  1972.  
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BOAC  management  –  absent  and  out-­of-­touch  with  the  rank  and  file  –  were,  
according  to  this  narrative,  primarily  responsible  for  ‘stress  and  fatigue  among  
airline  pilots’.153  
Elliott  focused  at  length  on  testimony  provided  by  BOAC’s  former  
director  of  medical  services,  Kenneth  Bergin.  In  November  1972  Bergin  
delivered  a  paper  at  BALPA’s  Technical  Symposium  ‘Outlook  on  Safety’.  
Focused,  generally,  on  the  problem  of  human  fallibility  in  airline  flying,  the  
symposium  covered  a  number  of  areas  including  error,  ergonomics,  
standardisation,  and  regulation.  Bergin’s  paper  focused  on  the  effects  of  
fatigue  on  flight  safety.  In  his  paper  Bergin  argued  that  the  problem  of  fatigue  
had  not  yet  been  remedied  because,  as  David  Wooley  put  it  in  the  conference  
proceedings  published  in  aviation  weekly  Flight  International,  of  the:  
  
Prima  donna  attitude  of  some  pilots  alongside  the  excessive  
detachment  of  some  managers,  and  …  too  much  timidity  in  some  of  
the  medical  officers  who  were  placed  between  the  two  sides  and  in  a  
position  to  improve  communications.154    
  
As  in  earlier  Flying  Personnel  Research  Committee  (FPRC)  studies,  Bergin  
argued  that  medical  officers  were  crucial  in  the  negotiation  of  working  
practices  and  management  of  fatigue.  They  occupied,  as  Charles  Symonds  
(1890-­1978)  and  Denis  J.  Williams  suggested  in  1942,  a  unique  social  
position  in  airlines  and  had,  thus,  a  responsibility  to  mediate  between  flight  
deck  crew  and  managers.155  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153  Ibid.  
154  David  Wooley,  ‘Outlook  on  Safety’,  Flight  International,  Nov  23  1972,  737-­739,  p.  738.  
155  TNA  AIR  57/8:  C.  P.  Symonds  and  Denis  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(e):  Investigation  of  
Psychological  Disorders  in  Flying  Personnel:  Personal  Investigation  in  Fighter  Command’,  
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In  the  immediate  days  and  weeks  following  the  conference  Bergin’s  
paper  was  only  discussed  in  specialist  aviation  publications,  such  as  Flight  
International.  After  the  release  of  the  sleeping  flight  crew  story,  however,  it  
was  widely  referred  to  in  the  mainstream  media.  In  his  article  for  the  Daily  
Mail,  which  focused  particularly  on  the  former  medical  director’s  assessment  
of  management  and  leadership,  Elliott  included  several  extended  quotations  
from  Bergin’s  paper,  including  the  following:    
  
There  is  a  marked  lack  of  leaders  in  industry  who  really  understand  the  
psychology  of  leadership  and  there  have  been  some  lamentable  
examples  in  airlines  in  recent  years  …  It  is  almost  unbelievable  if  one  
observes  the  reactions  of  a  group  of  people  who  are  well  led,  well-­
motivated  and  morale  is  high  and  compare  the  same  group  under  
identical  circumstances  when  badly  led  and  with  poor  morale  …  It  is  
my  duty  to  point  out  …  that  where  this  internecine  strife  is  going  on  
erosion  and  corrosion  of  confidence  will  exist.  And  that,  in  its  turn,  will  
produce  a  complex  train  of  psychological  problems  which  are  stressful  
to  all  concerned  and  in  the  case  of  pilots  may  be  dangerous.156  
  
Bergin  argued  that  airline  managements  tended  to  overlook  issues  relating  to  
pilot  fatigue  because  of  their  preoccupation  with  profit.  A  number  of  air  
correspondents  and  contemporary  commentators  focused  on  this  issue  in  the  
days,  weeks,  and  months  following  the  release  of  the  sleeping  flight  crew  
story.  Tebbit,  for  example,  was  critical  of  the  lack  of  airline  spending  on  
human  factors  in  aviation.  While  ‘enormous  sums’  were  spent  on  the  design  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
August  1942;;  TNA  AIR  57/8:  C.  P.  Symonds  and  Denis  Williams,  ‘FPRC  Report  412(f):  
Investigation  of  Psychological  Disorders  in  Flying  Personnel:  Personal  Investigation  in  
Bomber  Command’,  August  1942.  
156  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Harvey  Elliott,  ‘Airline  bosses  are  rapped’,  Daily  Mail,  Dec  15  1972.  
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aircraft  to  ‘build  in’  safety,  he  argued,  comparatively  little  was  spent  on  the  
promotion  of  pilot  comfort  and  health,  an  ‘absurd’  state  of  affairs  according  to  
Tebbit.157  Saving  money  on  issues  relating  to  safety,  including  the  payment  of  
staff,  was,  Tebbit  argued  in  an  article  published  in  the  Sunday  Observer,  an  
ultimately  misinformed  move  by  airlines  as  negative  press  relating  to  
accidents  and  other  near  misses  –  such  as  the  sleeping  flight  crew  story  –  
would  likely  deter  passengers  from  flying  and  thus  effect  turnover  and,  
ultimately,  profit.  
Fatigue  and  its  causes,  however,  were  not  uncontested,  even  among  
pilots.  Those  sceptical  about  the  sleeping  flight  crew  exposé  sought  to  
challenge  and  undermine  the  sympathetic  narrative  presented  by  air  
correspondents  and  former  pilots,  such  as  Tebbit.  These  more  critical  
accounts  tended  to  be  produced  by  transport  reporters,  who  focused  on  
industries  other  than  aviation.  A  number  of  particularly  critical  pieces,  
including  one  printed  in  the  Guardian  on  14  December  1972,  were  published  
anonymously.158  Such  commentaries  repeatedly  made  three  claims:  that  
pilots  overstated  their  workload,  that  pilots  and  unions  were  more  interested  in  
pay  than  safety,  and  that  the  responsibility  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue  lay  
with  pilots.  Regarding  workload,  a  number  of  commentators  suggested  that,  
as  the  pay  and  working  hours  of  pilots  compared  favourably  with  other  
occupational  groups,  they  were  not  in  a  position  to  complain  about  workplace  
fatigue.  As  Fairhall  noted  in  an  article  for  the  Guardian:  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Norman  Tebbit,  ‘Air  crashes  that  could  be  avoided’,  Sunday  Observer,  
Dec  17  1972.  
158  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  See  Anon,  ‘Capten,  art  tha  sleepin’  there  above?’,  Guardian,  Dec  14  
1972.  
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The  fact  is  pilots  work  short  hours  for  a  lot  of  money  …  surely  the  least  
we  can  expect  of  their  sense  of  duty  is  that  they  keep  themselves  
awake,  however  tired  they  may  be.159  
  
An  article  published  in  the  Guardian  anonymously  on  the  same  date  echoed  
these  sentiments.  It  suggested  that  the  working  hours  of  pilots  were  not  
‘unbearably  taxing’  given  the  other  privileges  of  the  job:  a  ‘five-­figure  salary  …  
and  long  rest  periods’.160    
   A  number  of  retired  airline  pilots  echoed  these  sentiments  in  letters  
written  to  newspaper  editors.  Many  of  these  argued,  in  line  with  broader  
arguments  about  the  effects  of  automation,  that  use  of  automatic  pilot  made  
work  physically  easier  and  reduced  fatigue.  As  Sarah  Hayes  and  Alison  
Haggett  have  shown,  this  stance  was  not  universally  adopted.  in  the  middle  
and  late  twentieth  century  a  number  of  medical  bodies,  including  the  World  
Health  Organisation,  argued  that  automation  had  a  number  of  unintended  
consequences,  including  potential  psychological  costs.161  This  nuance  was  
not,  however,  represented  in  the  pages  of  British  newspapers.  The  letters  
published  by  British  broadsheets  argued,  simply,  that  automation  had  so  
simplified  the  work  of  airline  pilots  that  in-­flight  sleep  was  induced  by  
boredom.  As  retired  pilot  W.  D.  Williams  put  it  in  a  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  
Telegraph:  ‘is  this  not  a  case  of  sitting  in  a  comfortable  chair  in  front  of  a  desk  
with  so  little  to  do  that  one  is  overtaken  by  drowsiness?’162  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  David  Fairhall,  ‘Dream  Flights’,  Guardian,  Dec  14  1972.  
160  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘Capten,  art  tha  sleepin’  there  above?’,  Guardian,  Dec  14  1972.  
161  Sarah  Hayes,  ‘Industrial  Automation  and  Stress,  c.  1945-­79’  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  Stress  
in  Post-­War  Britain,  1945-­85,  (London:  Pickering  and  Chatto,  2015),  pp.  75-­94;;  Alison  
Haggett,  A  History  of  Male  Psychological  Disorders  in  Britain,  1945-­1980,  (Basingstoke:  
Palgrave  Macmillan,  2015).  
162  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  W.  D.  Williams,  ‘Little  to  do?’,  Telegraph,  Dec  20  1972.  
   255  
A  number  of  journalists  suggested  that  pilots  and  unions  were  more  
concerned  with  pay  than  safety.  An  article  published  anonymously  in  the  
Guardian  on  14  December  1972,  for  example,  suggested  that  BALPA  was  
using  a  ‘scare  story’  as  a  public  ‘weapon  against  BOAC’  in  the  hope  that  such  
public  disclosures  would  ‘frighten  away  passengers’  unless  the  airline  was  
‘seen  to  act  in  the  pilots’  favour’.163  The  article  argued  that  the  release  of  the  
sleeping  flight  crew  story  was  part  of  a  public  relations  strategy,  as  chairman  
of  BALPA,  Laurie  Taylor,  was  a  member  of  the  recently-­established  Bader  
Committee,  ‘so  it  was  likely  that  the  committee  would  soon  have  been  aware  
of  BALPA’s  own  pieces  of  evidence’.164  The  suggestion,  then,  was  that  the  
disclosure  was  an  intentional  act  on  the  part  of  BALPA  to  influence  
corporation  policy  through  the  media  before  the  outcome  of  the  Bader  
Committee.    
This  contention  was  echoed  by  a  number  of  former  airline  pilots  in  
letters  published  in  national  newspapers.  Retired  airline  pilot  William  Sheperd  
expressed  his  disapproval  of  the  exposé  in  a  letter  to  the  editor  of  the  Times  
on  15  December  1972:  
  
That  BALPA  should  have  produced  a  scare  about  tired  pilots  will  
surprise  few  of  us  …  These  dubious  ploys  are  regularly  rehearsed  as  
preludes  to  demands  for  inordinate  pay  increases.165  
  
The  release  of  the  sleeping  flight  crew  story  was,  according  to  Sheperd,  part  
of  an  intentional,  and  historic,  industrial  bargaining  strategy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘Capten,  art  tha  sleepin’  there  above?’,  Guardian,  Dec  14  1972.  
164  Ibid.  
165  William  Sheperd,  ‘Pilots’  Hours  of  Work  and  Rest’,  Times,  Dec  15  1972,  p.  15.  
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The  final,  and  perhaps  most  serious,  criticism  levelled  against  pilots  
following  the  release  of  the  sleeping  flight  crew  story  related  to  crew  
misbehaviour  and  irresponsibility.  Several  articles  suggested  that  
responsibility  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue  lay  primarily  with  flight  crew.  The  
implication  was  that  if  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  experienced  fatigue  in  the  
air,  this  was  a  result  of  individual,  rather  than  structural,  failings.  A  number  of  
publications  raised  suspicions  of  ‘eve-­of-­flight  nightclubbing’.166  Philip  Jordan  
of  the  Daily  Mail  suggested  that  pilots’  coping  mechanisms  were  
inappropriate.  For  rest,  the  prescription  was:  ‘Drink  beer,  take  drugs  or  sleep  
with  the  stewardess’.167  Two  former  airline  pilots  called  for  an  investigation  
into  how  crew  members  utilised  rest  periods  for  this  reason.168  Reporting  of  
this  kind  continued  for  the  rest  of  the  month.  By  1973  even  some  previously  
sympathetic  air  correspondents,  such  as  the  Telegraph’s  Donaldson,  
suggested  that  pilots  sometimes  attended  ‘parties  instead  of  going  to  bed  at  
their  journey’s  end’.169  
By  1973  it  had  become  clear  to  BALPA’s  senior  management  that  the  
sleeping  flight  crew  exposé  had  not  had  the  desired  effect.  It  had  not  led  to  
the  introduction  of  new  flight  time  limitations,  and  journalists  were  beginning  to  
publish  commentaries,  in  line  with  broader  media  coverage  of  unions  in  the  
1970s,  that  BALPA  and  the  workers  the  Association  represented  were  self-­
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Anon,  ‘Capten,  art  tha  sleepin’  there  above?’,  Guardian,  Dec  14  1972.  
167  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Philip  Jordan,  ‘The  high  jinks  of  top-­flight  pilots’,  Daily  Mail,  Dec  14  
1972.  
168  William  Sheperd,  ‘Pilots’  Hours  of  Work  and  Rest’,  Times,  Dec  15  1972,  p.  15;;  Anthony  
Cavendish,  ‘Pilots’  Hours  of  Work  and  Rest’,  Times,  Dec  15  1972,  p.  15.  
169  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  E.  M.  Donaldson,  ‘Cut  likely  in  pilot  flying  time  after  fatigue  report’,  
Telegraph,  Apr  9  1973.  
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interested  and  irresponsible.  The  contentious  nature,  and  apparent  failure,  of  
BALPA’s  new  approach  is  evident  also  in  the  fate  of  its  Flight  Fatigue  Report.  
  
The  Flight  Fatigue  Report  
In  1972  BALPA  established  a  Flight  Fatigue  Committee  to  investigate  the  
severity  and  prevalence  of  fatigue  in  commercial  aviation.  The  Committee  
defined  fatigue  in  broad  functional  terms,  as  ‘that  degree  of  tiredness  which  
leads  to  impaired  ability  to  fly  accurately  and  make  correct  decisions’.170  
BALPA’s  Flight  Fatigue  Committee,  thus,  sought  to  underline  the  close  
relationship  between  pilot  fatigue,  error,  and  accidents.  As  Bridget  M.  Hutter  
and  Sally  Lloyd  Bostock  have  suggested,  accidents  have  an  emotive  power.  
Strong  emotions  are  roused  by  news  of  serious  injury  or  tragic  death,  
especially  when  there  are  large  numbers  of  victims.  The  power  of  accidents  to  
command  attention  and  stimulate  emotions  in  turn  has  social  consequences.  
Accidents  create  expectations  and  demands  for  action.  Not  only  must  some  
response  be  made,  it  must  be  seen  to  be  made.  A  concrete  instance  of  harm  
brings  home  the  realities  of  risk  in  a  way  that  abstract  information  in  the  form  
of  probabilities  and  risk  assessments  cannot  do.171  BALPA’s  Flight  Fatigue  
Committee  sought  to  exploit  the  emotional  power  of  accidents.  As  such,  it  
focused  primarily  on  the  relationship  between  fatigue  and  air  crashes.  The  
Committee  re-­investigated  ten  accidents  that  took  place  between  1967  and  
1970,  in  which  pilot  error  was  identified.  Although  none  of  the  original  accident  
reports  cited  fatigue  as  a  causal  factor,  BALPA  suggested  that  fatigue  had  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170  MRC  MSS.248/4/2,  BALPA,  ‘Flight  Fatigue:  Report  of  the  Special  Committee’,  p.  1.  
171  Bridget  M.  Hutter  and  Sally  Lloyd-­Bostock,  ‘The  Power  of  Accidents:  The  Social  and  
Psychological  Impact  of  Accidents  and  the  Enforcement  of  Safety  Regulations’,  The  British  
Journal  of  Criminology,  30,  4  (1990)  409-­422.  
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compounded  the  difficulties  of  all  pilots  involved  and  should  be  considered  a  
primary  cause  in  six  of  the  ten  accidents.172    
On  19  February  1973  BALPA  presented  the  Bader  Committee  with  a  
preliminary  version  of  the  Flight  Fatigue  Report.  In  a  1973  article,  Industrial  
Management  analysed  the  events  leading  up  the  publication  of  the  Bader  
Committee  report.  BALPA,  the  article  suggested,  had  not  carried  out  
proceedings  professionally.  The  Association,  according  to  the  article,  went  to  
the  Bader  Committee  to  make  their  recommendations  ‘displaying  the  attitude,  
“If  you  don’t  do  what  we  want  we’ll  get  things  changed  sooner  or  later  
anyway”’.173  This,  the  article  suggested,  was  perhaps  not  the  ‘wisest’  method  
of  presenting  suggestions  concerning  a  ‘highly  volatile  issue’  to  an  
‘independent,  objective  body’.174  Possibly  as  a  result  of  BALPA’s  ‘naivety  and  
sheer  blundering’,  as  Industrial  Management  put  it,  the  Bader  Committee  did  
not  accept  BALPA’s  contention  that  past  accidents  had  been  caused  by  
fatigue.175  The  Committee,  in  fact,  excluded  all  discussion  of  accidents  from  
it’s  final  report,  published  in  June  1973.  ‘On  the  evidence  we  received’,  the  
Bader  Committee  concluded,  ‘we  were  unable  to  decide  whether  fatigue  had  
caused  any  accident  to  a  United  Kingdom  registered  aircraft  in  recent  years’.  
‘The  absence  of  vital  information  in  many  accident  reports’,  the  Committee  
continued,  ‘prevented  us  from  making  deductions  based  on  accident  
information.’176    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172  BALPA  were  not  the  first  to  attempt  to  produce  a  report  on  the  relationship  between  pilot  
fatigue  and  accidents.  In  1961  the  Air  Ministry  began  research  for  a  report  on  the  subject,  
see:  TNA  AIR  2/14723:  Letter  from  A.  B.  Goorney  to  Air  Ministry,  10  July  1961.  
173  Anon,  ‘Airlines  stall  on  pilot  demands’,  Industrial  Management,  73,  7/8  (1973)  38-­41,  p.  40.	  
174  Ibid.  p.  40.  
175  Ibid.  p.  40.  
176  TNA  DR/13/4:  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  p.  14.  
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The  cavalier  style  employed  by  BALPA  at  the  meeting  with  the  Bader  
Committee  speaks  volumes  of  the  Association’s  overall  approach  to  industrial  
bargaining.  BALPA  representatives  did  not  consider  themselves  trade  
unionists  in  the  traditional  sense,  but  high-­status  professionals  with  a  wealth  
of  personal  and  organisational  experience.  Although  BALPA  was  formally  
associated  with  the  TUC  throughout  the  1960s  and  1970s,  it  rarely  adhered  to  
TUC  policy,  particularly  with  regards  to  industrial  negotiations.  Negotiations  
were  carried  out  ‘not  by  professional  negotiators’,  as  per  TUC  policy,  but  by  
members  of  the  Association.  These  elected  representatives  were,  according  
to  Industrial  Management,  often  ‘poor  negotiators’.177  They  lacked  formal  
training  and  had,  at  most,  two  years’  experience.  The  Association’s  lack  of,  as  
Blain  put  it  in  1972,  ‘competent  professional  guidance  in  the  field  of  trade  
union  representation’,  caused  serious  difficulties  during  negotiations.178  
Operators  cited  this  as  a  primary  cause  of  disputes  between  management  
and  pilots.179    
The  situation  was  not  improved  by  BALPA’s  capricious  public  relations  
policy.  On  5  April  1973  BALPA  sent  the  completed  Flight  Fatigue  Report  to  
fifty  parliamentarians  deemed  to  have  a  ‘special  interest  in  aviation’.180  These  
members  of  parliament,  the  Association  trusted,  ‘would  be  BALPA’s  strongest  
allies’.181  It  was  hoped  that,  if  convinced  by  the  Flight  Fatigue  Report,  these  
parliamentarians  would  advocate  for  stricter  regulation  of  flight  and  duty  times.  
In  a  covering  letter  BALPA’s  chairman,  E.  S.  Linstead,  asked  that  recipients  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177  Anon,  ‘Airlines  stall  on  pilot  demands’,  40.  
178  Blain,  Pilots  and  Management,  p.  75.  
179  Ibid.  
180  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  Letter  from  E.  S.  Linstead  to  fifty  members  of  parliament,  5  April  1973.  
181  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  Minutes  of  the  Meeting  of  the  Special  Committee  of  the  National  
Executive  Council  on  Flight  Fatigue,  9  March  1973,  p.  5.  
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treat  the  report  ‘as  confidential  from  the  general  public  and  press’.182  
Unsurprisingly  though,  given  its  wide  distribution,  the  report  was  released  to  
the  press  a  few  days  later.  It  seems,  from  Flight  Fatigue  Committee  meeting  
minutes,  that  this  was  Linstead’s  intention:  
  
Mr  [Omar]  Malik  [chairman  of  BALPA’s  Flight  Fatigue  Committee]  
pointed  out  that  since  the  BALPA  Report  had  been  available  for  nearly  
a  month,  each  week  that  elapsed  increased  the  danger  of  it  being  
‘leaked’  to  the  Press.  Captain  Linstead  said  that  in  some  ways  this  
would  be  an  advantage.183  
  
Details  of  the  report  were  published  widely  in  the  mainstream  media,  much  to  
the  dismay  of  airline  operators.  Senior  executives  within  the  airline  industry  
deemed  the  report  intentionally  ‘alarmist’,  and  many  were  incensed  that  that  
they  had  not  been  given  sight  of  it  in  advance.184  Group  managing  director  of  
the  British  Airways  Board,  H.  E.  Marking,  was  particularly  critical  of  BALPA’s  
decision  to  distribute  the  report  given  their  agreement,  on  15  December  1972  
‘that  neither  side  would  make  any  statement  which  was  inflammatory’  and  
likely  to  damage  airline-­union  relations.185  In  a  letter  to  Linstead  written  shortly  
after  the  ‘leak’,  Marking  suggested  that  the  distribution  of  the  report  to  
parliamentarians  ‘was  in  effect  inviting  a  leak’:  
  
I  read  that  this  came  about  as  the  result  of  an  unofficial  disclosure  and  
not  as  a  release  by  BALPA,  but  with  the  wide  distribution  which,  so  I  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  Letter  from  E.  S.  Linstead  to  fifty  members  of  parliament,  5  April  1973.  
183  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  Minutes  of  the  Meeting  of  the  Special  Committee  of  the  National  
Executive  Council  on  Flight  Fatigue,  9  March  1973,  p.  5.  
184  Tim  Reed,  ‘Call  to  reduce  pilots’  hours  of  work  expected’,  Times,  Apr  9  1973,  p.  1.  
185  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  Letter  from  H.  E.  Marking  to  E.  S.  Linstead,  11  April  1973.  
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understand,  was  given  to  the  report  it  was,  I  suggest,  not  reasonable  to  
think  that  a  leak  would  not  occur.  As  we  all  know,  if  something  is  to  be  
kept  confidential  it  must  be  restricted  to  a  very  small  number  of  
persons,  and  that  is  why  I  regret  so  much  that  BALPA  gave  this  
submission  such  an  unnecessarily  wide  distribution.186    
  
The  managing  director  of  British  Airways,  J.  M.  Sauvage,  was  also  critical  of,  
what  he  termed,  ‘BALPA’s  PR  activities’.  In  a  letter  to  Linstead  on  12  April  
1973,  he  urged  BALPA  not  to  ‘involve  Britannia’  in  future  ‘PR  efforts’.187    
Senior  members  of  BALPA  were  also  critical  of  the  report’s  wide  
circulation  prior  to  its  publication  in  the  national  press.  Taylor,  BALPA’s  former  
chairman,  argued  that  the  Association  should  have  kept  the  report  private  until  
the  Bader  inquiry  was  complete.  As  the  Daily  Mail  reported  on  9  April  1973,  
this  created  tensions  within  the  Association:  
  
Publication  of  the  BALPA  memorandum  at  this  stage  has  already  
caused  a  row.  The  former  chairman  of  BALPA,  Captain  Laurie  Taylor  –  
co-­opted  on  to  the  Bader  committee  –  tried  to  get  the  pilots  to  keep  the  
report  private  until  the  whole  Bader  inquiry  was  over.  It  is  an  obvious  
attempt  to  influence  findings  of  the  official  inquiry.188    
  
Tensions  within  the  Association  persisted  for  several  months.  A  few  days  after  
the  publication  of  the  Flight  Fatigue  Report,  Linstead  wrote  to  all  
parliamentary  members  who  had  received  a  copy  of  the  preliminary  report,  
asking  that  it  be  returned  to  BALPA.  The  Association  received  surprised  and  
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187  MRC  MSS.248/4/2:  Letter  from  J.  M.  Sauvage  to  E.  S.  Linstead,  12  April  1973.  
188  MRC  MSS.248/4/3:  Angus  Macpherson,  ‘“Tired-­out”  pilots  call  for  cut  in  flying  hours’,  Daily  
Mail,  Apr  9  1973.  
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sometimes  sarcastic  responses  from  members.  I.  Chancellor,  for  example,  
suggested  that  recalling  the  reports  after  their  wide  publication  was  ‘akin  to  
bolting  the  stable  door  after  the  horse  has  gone’.189  It  is  unclear  whether  this  
seemingly  blundering  approach  to  public  relations  was  intentional  or  not.  Was  
it  merely  a  ruse?  An  attempt  to  make  the  report’s  wide  dissemination  appear  
unintentional,  just  as  much  of  a  shock  and  disappointment  to  BALPA  as  it  was  
to  the  airline  operators?  Or  does  it,  perhaps,  reveal  the  divisions  within  the  
Association?  It  seems,  from  the  internal  communications  between  senior  
BALPA  members,  that  both  interpretations  hold.  Some  members  of  the  
Association,  such  as  Linstead,  were  in  favour  of  the  report’s  disclosure  and  
facilitated  this.  Others,  including  Taylor  and  Malik,  saw  things  differently.  
BALPA’s  uncoordinated  approach  to  public  relations  was,  then,  reflective  of  
divisions  within  the  Association.  Given  the  disagreement  between  members  at  
the  highest  level  of  the  Association,  a  cohesive  public  relations  strategy  was  
out  of  the  question.  
As  a  result  of  continued  tensions  and  disagreements,  BALPA’s  Flight  
Fatigue  Committee  was  disbanded  in  May  1973,  before  the  official  publication  
of  the  Flight  Fatigue  Report.  The  Committee  expressed  ‘unanimous  concern’  
that  the  problem  of  pilot  fatigue  was  now  to  be  left  ‘in  vacuu’.  The  Committee’s  
members  agreed,  in  a  final  meeting  on  7  May  1973,  that  ‘all  changes  
influencing  the  new  regulations  by  pressure  of  pilot  opinion  would  be  lost’.190  
The  Committee  was  right  to  be  concerned.  Just  over  a  month  after  the  Flight  
Fatigue  Committee  was  disbanded  senior  members  of  BALPA  decided,  partly  
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in  response  to  legal  advice,  not  to  publish  the  Flight  Fatigue  Report.  It  was  felt  
that  with  the  issue  of  the  Bader  Committee’s  report:  
  
There  was  no  longer  any  urgency  in  revising  the  Flight  Fatigue  
Committee  Report  for  open  publication  and  that  the  first  priority  of  the  
Association  was  now  the  compiling  of  its  official  response  to  the  Bader  
report.191  
  
After  almost  two  years  of  concerted  effort  by  the  Flight  Fatigue  Committee,  
and  a  determined,  though  contentious,  public  relations  effort,  BALPA  ceded  
complete  control  to  industry  regulators.    
  
Conclusion:  Not  Safe,  Not  Fair  
In  June  1973  the  Bader  Committee  published  its  final  report.  The  Committee  
made  a  number  of  recommendations  about  flight  time  limitations  and  rest  
periods,  as  outlined  in  Chapter  Three,  but  one  of  its  major  conclusions  
focused  on  industrial  bargaining.  The  Committee  argued  that  the  agreements  
reached  between  airlines  and  unions  in  the  1960s  had  intensified  pilot  
workload.  Pay  and  productivity  agreements,  the  Committee  concluded,  had  
‘increased  rather  than  reduced  the  possibility  of  fatigue’.192  As  a  result,  the  
Bader  Committee  concluded  that  the  control  of  pilot  working  hours  and  fatigue  
prevention  ‘should  not  be  a  part  of  the  industrial  bargaining  process’.193  
BALPA  could,  therefore,  no  longer  exploit  the  ambiguous  nature  of  fatigue  to  
campaign  for  social,  financial,  and  safety  objectives  simultaneously.  After  
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1973  BALPA  rarely  referred  to  fatigue  in  industrial  negotiations.  When  the  
Association  did  raise  the  issue  of  fatigue  with  airline  operators  and  the  Civil  
Aviation  Authority  (CAA)  –  in  1987  under  the  auspices  of  the  Confidential  
Human  Factors  Incident  Reporting  Programme  (CHIRP),  and  1992,  following  
the  release  of  the  Joint  Aviation  Authorities’  draft  changes  to  European  flight  
time  limitations  –  its  claims  were  ignored.  By  the  early  1990s,  then,  the  
parameters  for  negotiating  on  matters  of  flight  time  limitations  had  been  reset:  
fatigue  was  no  longer  a  factor  that  held  any  weight  on  the  negotiating  table.    
In  other  national  and  occupational  contexts,  though,  fatigue  continued  
to  feature  heavily  in  industrial  bargaining.  As  recently  as  2016,  pilots  based  in  
the  United  Arab  Emrites  complained  of  fatigue  in  the  British  press.  In  July  
2016  FlyDubai  pilots  released  a  raft  of  confidential  air  safety  reports  to  the  
Guardian  in  much  the  same  tone,  and  with  much  the  same  aims,  as  BALPA  
had  in  1972.194  Recently  the  BMA  has  taken  a  similar  approach  in  response  to  
government  plans  to  introduce  a  new  contract  for  junior  doctors.  Indeed,  the  
campaign  against  the  imposition  of  the  new  contract  has  been  dominated  by  
two  slogans:  ‘not  safe,  not  fair’  and  ‘tired  doctors  make  mistakes’.  My  
assessment  of  BALPA  here  does,  therefore,  have  broader  implications.    
BALPA  successfully  drew  attention  to  the  issue  of  pilot  fatigue  in  1972.  
In  December  of  that  year  the  sleeping  flight  deck  story  was  widely  reported.  
Following  an  internal  dispute,  however,  the  Association  ceased  its  public  
relations  campaign  and  ceded  complete  control  to  regulators.  As  the  previous  
chapter  has  shown,  the  subsequent  regulations  produced  in  CAP  371  were  
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website,  first  published  29  July  2016,  available  at:  
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permissive  and,  thus,  did  not  completely  protect  pilots  and  other  flight  deck  
crew  against  intensive  working  practices.  My  intention  here  is  not  to  assign  
blame  but,  rather,  to  reflect  on  the  responsibilities  trade  unions  have  to  
workers  and,  in  some  instances,  publics.  Trade  unions  have  a  responsibility  to  
protect  workers  by  publicising  grievances  but  also,  crucially,  negotiating  with  
employers  and  lawmakers  to  ensure  safe  working  conditions.  BALPA  
succeeded  in  publicising  workplace  fatigue  in  the  1970s,  but  had  only  
marginal  policy  impact.  The  BMA,  if  it  is  to  succeed  in  protecting  workers  and  
publics  against  the  fatigue  of  junior  doctors  will  need  to  continue  the  
necessary,  if  laboured,  negotiations  with  the  government  and  not,  as  BALPA  
did,  completely  cede  control  to  external  agencies.  
   Flight  deck  crew  were  central  to  BALPA’s  public  relations  campaign.  
The  reasons  for  this  were  multiple,  as  this  chapter  has  demonstrated,  but  
broadly  reflect  a  contemporary  preoccupation  with  pilot,  rather  than  flight  
attendant,  fatigue.  In  the  twentieth  century,  less  heed  was  paid  to  the  health  
and  welfare  of  flight  attendants,  in  comparison  with  their  colleagues  in  the  
cockpit.  The  reasons  for  this  are  unclear.  It  may  be  that  misogyny  is  to  blame,  
given  the  proportion  of  women  employed  as  cabin  crew.  There  may,  also,  
have  been  issues  of  status.  It  could,  for  example,  be  a  result  of  the  way  the  
work  of  flight  attendants  was  framed  in  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century.  
As  Alan  Derickson,  Kathleen  Barry,  and  others  have  argued,  the  duties  of  
cabin  crew  were  conceptualised  as,  primarily,  service  and  emotion  work.195  
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Though  officially  carried  in  flight  for  reasons  of  health  and  safety,  the  work  of  
flight  attendants  in  twentieth-­century  Britain  was  not  deemed  an  area  worthy  
of  study  or  regulation  until  the  mid-­1970s.  Drawing  on  a  rich  base  of  oral  
history  interviews  with  retired  flight  attendants,  the  following  chapter  
challenges  the  notion  that  cabin  crew  work  was  defined  by  interpersonal  
labour.  It  argues,  instead,  that  fatigue  featured  heavily  in  the  lived  experiences  
of  cabin  attendants.
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5  




On  8  January  1989,  a  Boeing  737-­400  aircraft  crashed  on  to  the  embankment  
of  the  M1  motorway  near  Kegworth  in  Leicestershire.  On  route  from  London  
Heathrow  to  Belfast,  a  fan-­blade  broke  in  the  aircraft’s  left  engine.  As  a  result,  
the  air-­conditioning  was  disrupted  and  the  flight  deck  filled  with  smoke.  The  
flight  deck  crew  believed  that  this  indicated  a  fault  in  the  aircraft’s  right  engine,  
since  earlier  models  of  the  Boeing  737  ventilated  the  flight  deck  from  the  right.  
They  were  unaware  that  the  new  737-­400  used  a  different  system  and  that  
the  left  engine,  not  the  right,  was  compromised.  The  crew  mistakenly  shut  
down  the  right  engine.  The  left  engine  initially  operated  normally  during  the  
subsequent  descent,  which  persuaded  the  flight  deck  crew  that  they  had  dealt  
with  the  emergency  correctly.  The  crew  initiated  a  diversion  to  East  Midlands  
Airport  and  received  radar  direction  from  air  traffic  control  to  position  the  
aircraft  for  an  instrument  approach  to  land.  The  flight  deck  crew  relayed  this  
information  to  passengers  and  cabin  crew.  The  approach  continued  normally,  
until  the  left  engine  abruptly  lost  power  roughly  two  miles  from  the  runway.  
Efforts  to  restart  the  aircraft’s  right  engine  were  not  successful.  The  aircraft  
continued  to  descend  and  struck  a  field  adjacent  to  the  eastern  embankment  
of  the  M1  motorway.  It  then  passed  through  trees  and  suffered  a  second  
severe  impact  on  the  western  embankment  of  the  motorway  before  coming  to  
rest  on  a  wooded  embankment  approximately  900  metres  from  its  intended  
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destination:  runway  twenty-­seven  at  East  Midlands  Airport.  Thirty-­nine  
passengers  died  in  the  accident  and  a  further  eight  passengers  died  later  from  
their  injuries.  Of  the  other  seventy-­nine  occupants,  seventy-­four  suffered  
serious  injury.      
The  Air  Accidents  Investigation  Branch  (AAIB)  concluded,  in  an  
accident  report  published  on  24  August  1990,  that  the  following  factors  
contributed  to  the  incorrect  response  of  the  flight  crew:  
  
1.   The  combination  of  heavy  engine  vibration,  noise,  shuddering  and  
an  associated  smell  of  fire  were  outside  their  training  and  
experience.  
2.   They  reacted  to  the  initial  engine  problem  prematurely  and  in  a  way  
that  was  contrary  to  their  training.  
3.   They  did  not  assimilate  the  indications  on  the  engine  instrument  
display  before  they  throttled  back  the  No  2  [right]  engine.  
4.   As  the  No  2  [right]  engine  was  throttled  back,  the  noise  and  
shuddering  associated  with  the  surging  of  the  No  1  [left]  engine  
ceased,  persuading  them  that  they  had  correctly  identified  the  
defective  engine.  
5.   They  were  not  informed  of  the  flames  which  had  emanated  from  the  
No  1  [left]  engine  and  which  had  been  observed  by  many  on  board,  
including  3  cabin  attendants  in  the  aft  cabin.1  
  
The  AAIB  concluded  that,  ‘had  some  initiative  been  taken  by  one  or  more  of  
the  cabin  crew  who  had  seen  the  distress  of  the  left  engine’,  the  ‘accident  
could  have  been  prevented’.2  As  such,  the  AAIB  recommended  that  ‘training  
exercises  for  pilots  and  cabin  crew  should  be  introduced  to  improve  co-­
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Air  Accidents  Investigation  Branch,  Report  on  the  accident  to  Boeing  737-­400  G-­OBME  near  
Kegworth,  Leicestershire  on  8  January  1989,  (London:  HMSO,  1990),  p.  2.  
2  Ibid.  p.  106.  
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ordination  between  technical  and  cabin  crews  in  response  to  an  emergency’.3  
The  report  argued  that  such  training  would  have  a  two-­fold  benefit.  It  would  
serve,  on  the  one  hand,  to  provide  pilots  with  the  knowledge  that  cabin  crew  
were  ‘a  source  of  information  that  should  be  considered  in  certain  
emergencies’.4  Equally,  it  would  equip  cabin  crew  with  the  technical  and  
interpersonal  skills  to  effectively  communicate  with  flight  deck  crew  in  
emergencies.  In  response  to  these  recommendations,  the  Civil  Aviation  
Authority  (CAA)  made  annual  crew  resource  management  (CRM)  training  
mandatory  for  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew.5  This  training  was  typically  
classroom-­based,  involving  a  combination  of  lectures,  discussion  and  informal  
role-­play,  and  included  core  skill  modules  on  personal  and  interpersonal  
human  factors.6  
This  chapter  examines  crew  relations  prior  to  the  introduction  of  CRM  
training  in  the  mid-­1990s.  Here  I  argue  that,  though  regulatory  policy  focused  
on  individual  and  company-­centred  strategies  for  the  avoidance  of  fatigue,  
throughout  the  twentieth  century  crew-­wide  coping  mechanisms  were  integral  
to  the  management  of  fatigue  in  flight.  Drawing  on  a  rich  base  of  oral  history  
testimonies,  I  argue  that  these,  largely  informal,  solutions  relied  on  good  
relations  both  within  and  between  the  flight  deck  and  the  cabin.  Whereas  
Chapter  One  and  Chapter  Two  of  this  thesis  looked  at  how  fatigue  was  
constituted  in  industry  and  military  settings,  and  Chapter  Three  and  Chapter  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Ibid.  p.  150.  
4  Ibid.  p.  109.  
5  Annual  CRM  training  was  made  mandatory  for  pilots  in  1993  and  cabin  crew  in  1995,  see:  
Rhona  Flin,  Paul  O’Connor  and  Kathryn  Mearns,  ‘Crew  Resource  Management:  Improving  
Team  Work  in  High  Reliability  Industries’,  Team  Performance  Management,  8,  3/4  (2002)  68-­
78.  
6  Ibid.  
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Four  explored  how  fatigue  was  configured  in  regulatory  and  trade  union  
discourses,  this  chapter  turns  to  quotidian  understandings  and  experiences  of  
fatigue.  
Here  I  discuss,  for  the  first  time  in  detail,  the  experiences  of  cabin  crew.  
So  far,  this  thesis  has  focused  primarily  on  flight  deck  crew:  on  flight  
engineers,  navigators,  and  pilots.  This  focus  reflects  twentieth  century  
preoccupations.  For  much  of  the  century,  fatigue  was  investigated  and  
regulated  only  in  instances  where  flight  deck  crew  were  affected.  The  reasons  
for  this  were  complex  and  changed  over  time,  but  as  previous  chapters  have  
shown,  for  much  of  the  century  the  fatigue  of  pilots  was  primarily  
conceptualised  as  a  barrier  to  flight  safety.  This  rationale  underlay  many  of  
the  regulations  governing  pilots’  hours  of  work  and  rest  throughout  the  post-­
war  period.  The  same  rationale  was  not,  however,  applied  to  cabin  crew.  
Though  cabin  crew  were  carried  in  flight  for  safety  reasons  –  to  evacuate  
passengers  in  case  of  emergency  –  throughout  the  twentieth  century  the  
fatigue  of  cabin  crew  was  not  deemed  a  threat  to  passenger  safety.    
The  fatigue  of  pilots  and  other  flight  deck  crew  members  was  heavily  
researched  and  regulated  by  military  and  civil  organisations  in  the  twentieth  
century,  and  is  thus  well-­represented  in  the  archival  record.  This  is  not,  
however,  the  case  for  cabin  crew.  There  are  three  reasons  for  this.  Firstly,  as  
described  above,  the  fatigue  of  cabin  crew  was  not  deemed  a  pressing  threat  
to  passenger  safety.  Secondly,  researchers  and  unions  interested  in  the  
health  and  welfare  of  cabin  crew  tended  to  prioritise  other  issues.  Given  the  
gendered  nature  of  cabin  crew  work,  concerns  centred  on  the  effects  of  
regular  flight  on  feminine  issues,  such  as  menstruation,  pregnancy,  and  
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menopause.7  Finally,  cabin  crew  did  not  articulate  their  experiences  in  terms  
that  regulators  and  researchers  understood  as  dangerous  or  concerning.  
Their  experiences  were  not,  therefore,  taken  seriously.  The  language  cabin  
crew  used  to  articulate  their  experiences  was  complex.  Crew  members  used  a  
wide  range  of  contemporary  lay  terms,  including  ‘tiredness’,  ‘sleepiness’,  
‘weariness’,  and  ‘nervous  exhaustion’.8  These  terms  comprised  the  popular  
language  of  mental  and  physical  fatigue  in  twentieth-­century  Britain.  It  is  
telling,  however,  that  in  communicating  their  experiences  pilots  and  other  
flight  deck  crew  rarely  used  popular  terminology.  Most,  instead,  used  
semantics  specific  to  the  aviation  industry.  They  spoke  almost  exclusively  of  
‘fatigue’,  and  framed  their  narratives  in  line  with  regulatory  discourse.  Flight  
time  limitations  were  consistently  referred  to.  Flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  
understood  and  conceptualised  how  they  felt  differently.  Though  employed  
within  the  same  industry,  their  terms  of  reference  were  different.  While  cabin  
crew  drew  on  a  broader  popular  vernacular,  pilots  engaged  with  expert  
discourses.    
Given  the  scarcity  of  published  and  archival  material  available  in  
relation  to  cabin  crew  fatigue,  this  chapter  relies  more  heavily  on  oral  
testimonies  than  the  others  in  this  thesis.  Examination  of  these  testimonies  
suggests  that,  though  contemporary  concern  with  cabin  crew  fatigue  –  at  least  
according  to  the  official  record  –  was  slight,  fatigue  was  prominent  in  the  lived  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  R.  G.  Cameron,  ‘Effect  of  flying  on  the  menstrual  function  of  air  hostesses’,  Aerospace  
Medicine,  40,  9  (1969)  1020-­1023;;  R.  G.  Cameron,  ‘Should  Air  Hostesses  Continue  Flight  
Duty  During  the  First  Trimester  of  Pregnancy?’,  Aerospace  Medicine,  44,  5  (1973)  552-­556;;  
Roberta  Lessor,  ‘Consciousness  of  Time  and  Time  for  the  Development  of  Consciousness:  
Health  Awareness  Among  Women  Flight  Attendants’,  Sociology  of  Health  and  Illness,  7,  2  
(1985)  191-­213.  
8  Jill  Kirby,  ‘Working  Too  Hard:  Experiences  of  Worry  and  Stress  in  Post-­War  Britain’  in  Mark  
Jackson  (ed.),  Stress  in  Post-­War  Britain,  1945-­85,  (London:  Pickering  and  Chatto,  2015),  pp.  
59-­74.  
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experience  of  cabin  attendants.  This  chapter  is  structured  in  two  parts.  The  
first  examines  Arlie  Russell  Hochschild’s  thesis  about  emotional  labour,  as  
performed  by  cabin  crew.9  It  shows  that,  while  for  some  crew  members  the  
management  of  emotions  was  a  crucial  part  of  the  job,  Hochschild’s  focus  on  
emotions  does  not  accurately  reflect  either  contemporary  British  research  on  
the  health  and  wellbeing  of  cabin  crew,  or  the  lived  experience  of  many  crew  
members.  In  Britain  both  crew  members  and  researchers  tended  to  frame  
their  discussion  of  cabin  crew  health  in  physiological  terms.  Rather  than  
emotional  labour,  research  studies  and  oral  testimonies  focused  on  physical  
factors,  such  as  circadian  dysrhythmia  and  manual  labour.  The  second  part  of  
this  chapter  examines  how  relations  between  pilots,  flight  attendants,  and  
airline  executives  had  implications  for  fatigue,  rest,  and  working  hours.  
Extending  the  remit  of  this  thesis  beyond  structural  and  person-­centred  
narratives,  it  is  argued  that  effective  management  of  fatigue  in  both  the  flight  
deck  and  the  cabin  relied  as  much  on  social  relations  between  crew  members  
as  it  did  on  adherence  to  flight  time  limitations.    
  
Historicising  Hochschild:  Service  Work  and  Emotional  Labour  
Today  the  history  of  emotions  is  a  distinctive  sub-­field,  often  connecting  
histories  of  gender,  health,  and  psychiatry.10  Historians  are  also  increasingly  
exploring  the  role  of  emotions  in  the  workplace,  with  a  particular  focus  on  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Arlie  Russell  Hochschild,  The  Managed  Heart:  Commercialization  of  Human  Feeling,  
second  edition,  (London:  University  of  California  Press,  2003).  
10  See  for  instance,  Thomas  Dixon’s  work  on  weeping  and  masculinity,  Rhodri  Hayward’s  on  
emotions  and  psychotherapy,  and  Anne  Harrington’s  research  on  mother  love  and  mental  
illness:  Thomas  Dixon,  Weeping  Britiannia:  Portrait  of  a  Nation  in  Tears,  (Oxford:  Oxford  
University  Press,  2015);;  Rhodri  Hayward,  ‘Enduring  Emotions:  James  L.  Halliday  and  the  
Invention  of  the  Psychosocial’,  Isis,  100,  4  (2009)  827-­838;;  Anne  Harrington,  ‘Mother  Love  
and  Mental  Illness:  An  Emotional  History’,  Osiris,  31,  1  (2016)  94-­115.  
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emotional  labour  and  service  work.  In  a  recent  article  published  in  Women’s  
History  Review,  Claire  Langhamer  examined  women’s  feelings  about  paid  
work,  the  impact  of  paid  employment  on  emotional  wellbeing,  and  the  
management  of  feelings  in  the  workplace  in  the  long  1950s.  Drawing  explicitly  
on  the  work  of  Hochschild,  Langhamer’s  article  sought  to  historicise  two  
related  sociological  concepts:  emotional  labour  and  emotional  burden.11  Prior  
to  this,  though  these  concepts  were  widely  discussed  within  the  sociology  of  
work,  few  historians  had  explored  them  in  any  detail.12    
Hochschild’s  The  Managed  Heart,  first  published  in  1983,  presents  a  
sociological  thesis  about  organisational  emotion.  Her  argument,  though  
complex,  rests  on  a  single  ontological  issue:  the  distinction  between  emotion  
work  and  emotional  labour.  For  Hochschild,  emotion  work  describes  the  
process  of  managing  and  presenting  emotions  in  the  private  sphere  among,  
for  example,  family  and  friends.  Emotional  labour,  on  the  other  hand,  
describes  the  management  of  feelings  in  public  spaces,  such  as  the  
workplace.  This  labour,  according  to  Hochschild,  ‘requires  one  to  induce  or  
suppress  feeling  in  order  to  sustain  the  outward  countenance  that  produces  
the  proper  state  of  mind  in  others’.13  In  other  words,  in  jobs  where  certain  
facial  and  bodily  displays  are  expected  of  workers,  emotional  labour  may  be  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  Claire  Langhamer,  ‘Feelings,  Women  and  Work  in  the  Long  1950s’,  Women’s  History  
Review,  26,  1  (2017)  77-­92.  
12  For  sociological  works  that  have  engaged  with  and  contested  this  concept,  see:  Sharon  C.  
Bolton  and  Carol  Boyd,  ‘Trolley  Dolley  or  Skilled  Emotion  Manager?  Moving  on  from  
Hochschild’s  Managed  Heart’,  Work,  Employment,  and  Society,  17,  2  (2003)  289-­308;;  Paul  
Brook,  ‘In  Critical  Defence  of  “Emotional  Labour”:  Refuting  Bolton’s  Critique  of  Hochschild’s  
Concept’,  Work,  Employment  and  Society,  23,  3  (2009)  531-­548;;  Drew  Whitelegg’s  article  on  
the  dialectics  of  emotional  labour  in  the  airline  industry  is  a  notable  exception,  see:  Drew  
Whitelegg,  ‘Cabin  Pressure:  The  Dialectics  of  Emotional  Labour  in  the  Airline  Industry’,  The  
Journal  of  Transport  History,  23,  1  (2002)  73-­86.  
13  Hochschild,  The  Managed  Heart,  p.  7.  
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required  to  achieve  this.14  In  some  instances  this  may  include  the  disguising  
of  ‘fatigue  and  irritation’,  in  others  it  may  include  a  gentle  intonation  or  a  
friendly  smile.15  This  form  of  labour  is,  according  to  Hochschild,  particularly  
prevalent  in  workplaces  where  interaction  with  the  public  is  required  as  
standard:  in  service  work,  religious  ministry,  teaching,  and  also  the  transport  
industry.    
According  to  Hochschild’s  thesis,  emotional  labour  can  be  performed  in  
two  different  ways,  surface  acting  and  deep  acting.  In  the  former,  workers  act  
out  their  role  obligations  without  fully  subscribing  to  the  norms  set  by  their  
employer.  Their  performance  may  seem  convincing  to  employers  and  
customers,  but  the  worker  retains  a  sense  of  self  that  is  separate  to  that  on  
display.  Deep  acting,  however,  refers  to  the  internalisation  of  the  feelings  that  
workers  are  required  to  display.  According  to  Hochschild  many  emotional  
labourers  engage  in  deep  acting  either  by  changing  what  they  feel  or  
changing  what  they  feign  in  an  attempt  to  both  enhance  the  quality  of  the  
emotional  display  and  to  diminish  the  likelihood  of  emotional  dissonance  and  
burnout.  This  is  because  surface  acting  can  be  fatiguing  while  deep  acting  
requires  less  conscious  effort  on  the  part  of  the  worker.  For  workers  new  to  
public-­facing  jobs,  the  emotional  dissonance  created  by  surface-­acting  can  be  
particularly  tiring.  As  one  World  Airways  worker  Hochschild  interviewed  
explained:  
  
Sometimes  I  come  off  a  long  trip  in  a  state  of  utter  exhaustion,  but  I  find  
I  can't  relax.  I  giggle  a  lot,  I  chatter,  I  call  friends.  It’s  as  if  I  can't  release  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Ibid.  
15  Ibid.  p.  8.  
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myself  from  an  artificially  created  elation  that  kept  me  ‘up’  on  the  trip.  I  
hope  to  be  able  to  come  down  from  it  better  as  I  get  better  at  the  job.16  
  
In  some  ways  then,  Hochschild’s  theory  of  emotional  labour  shows  similarities  
with  interwar  theories  of  flying  stress,  which  framed  fatigue  as  the  result  of  
psychological  or  emotional  disturbance.  Emotions,  according  to  both  theories,  
have  the  power  to  cause  physical  symptoms.17  
The  Managed  Heart  focused  on  workers  from  two  public-­facing  
professions  in  America,  both  of  which  required  the  ‘face-­to-­face  delivery  of  
service’:  flight  attendants  and  debt  collectors.18  Though  Hochschild  focused  
entirely  on  America,  and  the  flight  attendants  she  interviewed  were  drawn  
solely  from  American  airlines,  her  thesis  has  been  widely  applied.19  As  a  
result  of  Hochschild’s  publication,  emotional  labour  has  become  so  widely  
associated  with  cabin  crew  work  that  it  is  often  the  primary  case  study  
employed  by  researchers  investigating  the  management  of  feelings  at  work  in  
the  modern  world.  Though  social  scientists  broadly  accept  that  emotional  
labour  is  pertinent  to  the  work  of  cabin  crews  today,  little  historical  work  has  
examined  whether  this  also  held  true  in  the  past.20  What  follows  here  aims  to  
historicise  Hochschild’s  thesis.  With  a  specific  focus  on  cabin  crew  working  for  
British  airlines  in  the  post-­war  period,  I  examine  the  place  of  emotions  within  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  Ibid.  p.  4.  
17  Caitriona  Curley  and  Tony  Royle  ‘The  degradation  of  work  and  the  end  of  the  skilled  
emotion  worker  at  Aer  Lingus:  is  it  all  trolley  dollies  now?’,  Work,  Employment  and  Society,  
27,  1  (2013)  105-­121.  
18  Hochschild,  The  Managed  Heart,  p.  8.  
19  For  example  see:  Curley  and  Royle  ‘The  degradation  of  work  and  the  end  of  the  skilled  
emotion  worker  at  Aer  Lingus’;;  Claire  Williams,  ‘Sky  Service:  The  Demands  of  Emotional  
Labour  in  the  Airline  Industry’,  Gender,  Work  and  Organization,  10,  5  (2003)  513-­550;;  Joan  
Sangster  and  Julia  Smith,  ‘Beards  and  Bloomers:  Flight  Attendants,  Grievances  and  
Embodied  Labour  in  the  Canadian  Airline  Industry,  1960s-­1980s’,  Gender,  Work  and  
Organization,  23,  2  (2016)  183-­199.  
20  See:  Whitelegg,  ‘Cabin  Pressure’;;  Sangster  and  Smith,  ‘Beards  and  Bloomers’.  
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broader  discourses  of  cabin  crew  health  and  fatigue.  In  doing  so,  I  tease  out  
both  how  cabin  crew  conceptualised  –  in  terms  of  causes  and  effects  –  and  
experienced  fatigue.  
  
Passenger-­Crew  Relations  and  Emotional  Labour  
Historically  cabin  crew  were  carried  in  flight  primarily  for  reasons  of  health  and  
safety.  Indeed,  British  airlines  only  hired  trained  nurses  as  crew  prior  to  World  
War  Two.  In  the  post-­war  period,  however,  the  role  of  cabin  crew  in  Britain  
changed.  As  Frank  Jackson  has  noted  of  the  British  Overseas  Airways  
Corporation  (BOAC),  between  the  1940s  and  1960s  cabin  crew  were  
rebranded  as  in-­flight  attendants  with  an  emphasis  on  the  service  and  comfort  
of  passengers.21  As  Lucy  Budd,  Morag  Bell,  and  Adam  P.  Warren  have  
shown  though,  cabin  crew  continued  to  play  an  important  role  in  passenger  
healthcare  throughout  the  century.  They  were  trained  to  recognise  and  
respond  to  outbreaks  of  infection,  administer  painkillers,  and  were  able  to  give  
supplementary  oxygen  to  passengers  if  necessary.22    
Drew  Whitelegg  has  shown,  however,  that  the  service  side  of  the  role  
was  emphasised  by  airlines.23  By  the  early  1960s,  cabin  crew  duties  involved  
the  service  of  food  and  drink,  the  sale  of  duty-­free  goods,  and  the  care  and  
entertainment  of  passengers.  Conversation  with  passengers  formed  a  crucial  
part  of  this.  As  Rose  Green,  a  flight  attendant  who  worked  for  BOAC  between  
1970  and  1980,  noted:  ‘You  were  really  encouraged  to  talk  to  passengers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Frank  Jackson,  ‘The  New  Air  Age:  BOAC  and  Design  Policy’,  Journal  of  Design  History,  4,  
3  (1991)  167-­185.  
22  Lucy  C.  S.  Budd,  Morag  Bell  and  Adam  P.  Warren,  ‘Taking  Care  in  the  Air:  Jet  Air  Travel  
and  Passenger  Health,  a  Study  of  the  British  Overseas  Airways  Corporation  (1940-­1974)’,  
Social  History  of  Medicine,  25,  2  (2011)  446-­461.  
23  Whitelegg,  ‘Cabin  Pressure’.  
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That  was  actually  your  main  job  to  stand  there  and  talk  to  them,  wasn’t  it?’24  
Charles  Green,  who  worked  as  a  cabin  attendant  for  BOAC  between  1967  
and  2005,  concurred.  According  to  his  recollections,  crew  members  would  
often  spend  the  majority  of  their  time  in  flight  making  conversation  with  
passengers  to  ensure  their  needs  were  attended  to:  ‘I  mean  you’d  talk  about  
seven  hours  say  between  London  and  New  York,  and  when  you  did  the  
return,  you  talked  about  six  hours.’25    
Some  crew  members  found  these  lengthy  interactions  with  passengers  
emotionally  demanding.  Isaac  Shaw,  who  worked  as  cabin  crew  for  both  
BOAC  and  British  European  Airways  (BEA)  between  1967  and  2003,  
commented  that:  ‘of  course  any  other  interaction  with  other  people  apart  from  
your  friends  who  you  can  relax  with,  is  going  to  take  it  out  of  you’.26  Similarly  
Patrick  Smith,  who  worked  as  a  flight  attendant  between  1967  and  2007,  
noted  that  having  to  please  passengers  was  one  of  the  most  difficult  parts  of  
working  on  commercial  jets.  Though  he  worked  mainly  for  BOAC,  he  ‘had  a  
spate  on  freighters’  which  he  described  as  ‘wonderful,  no  passengers,  so  all  I  
had  to  look  after  was  the  flight  deck  which  suited  me  down  to  the  ground’.27  
These  testimonies  seemingly  support  Hochschild’s  contention  that  emotional  
labour  in  the  service  of  ‘being  nice’  to  passengers  was  widely  expected  of,  
and  experienced  by,  cabin  attendants  in  post-­war  Britain.28    
For  many,  though,  communication  with  passengers  was  not  in  and  of  
itself  a  stressful  endeavor.  In  fact,  many  of  the  men  and  women  who  were  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  Interview  with  Rose  Green,  21  November  2016.  
25  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
26  Interview  with  Isaac  Shaw,  26  January  2017.  
27  Interview  with  Patrick  Smith,  3  February  2017.  
28  Hochschild,  The  Managed  Heart,  p.  163.  
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employed  as  flight  attendants  by  commercial  airlines  in  the  second  half  of  the  
twentieth  century  found  their  work  satisfying  and  enjoyable.  Rigorous  
recruitment  processes,  and  self-­selection,  meant  that  most  flight  attendants  
were  temperamentally  suited  to  the  job.  They  were  gregarious  and  chose  to  
work  as  cabin  crew,  at  least  in  part,  because  they  enjoyed  interacting  with  
members  of  the  public.29  This  congruence  between  the  personal  values  of  
individual  workers  and  the  requirements  of  the  job  role  meant  that,  when  
emotional  labour  was  required  of  crew  members  in  flight,  it  was  not  
necessarily  as  difficult  or  exhausting  as  Hochschild’s  thesis  suggests.30  As  
Julia  Evans,  who  was  employed  as  cabin  crew  for  a  number  of  airlines  from  
1972  suggested,  though  work  could  be  physically  tiring  it  was  also  ‘very  
rewarding’:  
  
I  couldn’t  believe  how  hard  I  was  working.  I’ve  never  worked  so  hard  in  
my  life  and  I’ve  never  felt  so  tired  in  my  life  after  a  night  sector,  but  it  
was  very  very  very  rewarding.  It  was  rewarding  because  you  enjoyed  
looking  after  your  passengers  and  you  got  a  lot  of  interaction  with  your  
passengers.31  
  
Hochschild’s  thesis  –  that  the  wants  and  needs  of  employees  and  companies  
rarely  overlapped  –  appears,  in  this  case,  incorrect.  In  twentieth-­century  
Britain  it  seems,  rather,  that  airlines  and  flight  attendants  had  ‘common  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Ongoing  work  by  Claire  Langhamer  suggests  the  same  may  also  be  true  of  other  public-­
facing  workers,  including  nurses  and  nuns.  
30  Recent  sociological  works  have  reached  the  similar  conclusions,  see:  Curley  and  Royle  
‘The  degradation  of  work  and  the  end  of  the  skilled  emotion  worker  at  Aer  Lingus’;;  Williams,  
‘Sky  Service’.  
31  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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interests’.32  The  cabin  attendants  interviewed  for  this  thesis  certainly  spoke  
highly  of  the  job.  
Dutch  sociologist  Cas  Wouters  (1943-­present)  suggested  shortly  after  
the  publication  of  The  Managed  Heart,  that  Hochschild’s  preoccupation  with  
the  ‘costs’  of  emotional  labour  resulted  in  a  ‘one-­sided  and  moralistic  
interpretation  of  the  working  conditions  of  flight  attendants’.  The  ‘joy’  of  the  job  
was  emphasised  in  many  of  the  oral  testimonies  collected  for  this  thesis.33  
Many  former  cabin  attendants  focused,  in  particular,  on  the  novel  experiences  
and  opportunities  that  working  in  civil  aviation  afforded  them.  For  many  of  the  
men  and  women  employed  as  flight  attendants  in  the  post-­war  period,  their  
primary  reason  for  working  as  crew  was,  as  Patrick  Smith  put  it,  ‘to  see  the  
world’.34    Indeed,  a  number  of  the  former  cabin  attendants  interviewed  for  this  
thesis  warmly  recalled  the  places  that  they  had  been  and  the  ‘great  sights’  
that  they  had  seen,  and  emphasised  how  ‘lucky’  they  had  been  to  be  afforded  
such  ‘marvellous  opportunities’.35  As  Julia  Evans  put  it:    
  
For  me  it  was  one  of  the  most  marvellous  opportunities  I  had  ever  been  
given  in  my  life.  All  the  places  I  had  read  about  …  suddenly  I  had  the  
opportunity  to  go  and  see  them.36  
  
Charles  Green  concurred.  On  visiting  India’s  Taj  Mahal  or  New  York  City,  he  
would  ‘pinch  himself’:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  Cas  Wouters,  ‘The  Sociology  of  Emotions  and  Flight  Attendants:  Hochschild’s  Managed  
Heart’,  Theory,  Culture  and  Society,  6  (1989)  95-­123,  p.  100-­116,  p.  100.  
33  Ibid.  p.  118.  
34  Interview  with  Patrick  Smith,  3  February  2017.  
35  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016;;  Interview  with  Matthew  Hart,  26  January  
2017;;  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
36  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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Three  and  a  half  hours  ago  I  was  in  London  and  I’m  walking  down  Fifth  
Avenue  and  someone’s  paying  me  to  do  it,  and  from  somebody  who  
started  work  in  a  factory  I  never  lost  sight  of  that.37  
  
Class  and  social  standing  were,  no  doubt,  important  here.  The  men  and  
women  employed  by  British  airlines  to  work  as  flight  attendants  were  drawn  
primarily  from  lower-­middle-­class  backgrounds.  Many  began  their  working  
lives  in  administrative  or  secretarial  roles  and  some,  like  Charles  Green,  were  
employed  in  factories.  For  many,  then,  airline  employment  offered  
opportunities  that  would  otherwise  be  unavailable.  Airline  work  made  travel  
and  cultural  engagement  possible  for  workers.  For  many,  this  was  a  major  
benefit.  Indeed,  it  was  the  primary  reason  most  of  the  retired  cabin  attendants  
interviewed  for  this  thesis  sought  employment  in  commercial  aviation.  
Airline  work  offered  more,  though,  than  travel  opportunities.  It  allowed  
workers  entrance  into  interpersonal  circles  that  were  otherwise  closed  to  
them.  Prior  to  economic  deregulation  in  the  1980s,  flight  in  post-­war  Britain  
was  a  glamorous  affair.  Cabin  attendants  were  imbued  with  status  and  allure  
by  virtue  of  their  association  with  the  industry.  The  men  and  women  employed  
as  cabin  attendants  in  post-­war  Britain  were  often  invited  to  functions  in  the  
countries  they  visited.  As  Rose  Green  recalled:  
     
You  always  had  to  take  something  smart  with  you  in  case  you  got  
invited  to  embassies  and  things  like  that,  which  you  did  …  You  always  
had  to  have  a  long  dress.38  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
38  Interview  with  Rose  Green,  21  November  2016.  
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Work,  then,  offered  cabin  attendants  entry  into  new  social  and  cultural  
environments  at  the  day’s  end.    
For  those  employed  in  the  first-­class  cabin,  novel  interpersonal  
interactions  were  also  central  to  the  working  day.  A  number  of  the  retired  
cabin  staff  interviewed  for  this  thesis  reflected  fondly  on  their  encounters  with  
celebrity  passengers.  Patrick  Smith,  who  worked  in  BOAC’s  first-­class  cabin  
for  most  of  his  career,  said  that  engaging  with  celebrity  passengers  was  ‘an  
absolute  delight’.  The  Duchess  of  York  travelled  in  his  service  a  number  of  
times  and  he  got  to  know  her  well:  ‘We  called  her  princess  to  start  with  then,  
“call  me  Fergie”,  so  we  called  her  Fergie  and  that’s  how  you  went  on.  You  
know  you  just  treated  them  like  a  normal  person’.39    
Some  crew  members  found  these  conversations  with  celebrity  
passengers  invigorating.  Jacob  Evans,  who  worked  in  BOAC’s  first-­class  
cabin  throughout  the  1970s,  intentionally  sought  out  interaction  with  celebrity  
passengers  when  he  was  feeling  tired:  
  
Every  aircraft  you  had  a  passenger  list.  Every  single  person  was  down  
there  and  the  important  ones  were  highlighted  so  if  I  was  feeling  really  
really  tired  and  I  didn’t  have  another  hour  left  in  me,  I  thought  I’ll  go  and  
bother  Sean  Connery  for  a  minute  …  And  that  got  me  through  it.  I  
mean  that  was  perfect  because  I  was  enjoying  my  time  in  the  aircraft,  I  
had  access  to  the  people  and  no  one  ever  turned  you  away.  They  were  
really  really  more  obliging  …  Oh  God  how  long  have  we  got  to  go,  
another  eleven  hours.  I  think  I’ll  spend  half  an  hour  with  Sean  Connery  
and  he’ll  give  me  a  boost,  and  after  Sean  Connery  you’d  look  at  the  list  
and  think  who  can  I  speak  to  next?40  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Interview  with  Patrick  Smith,  3  February  2017.  
40  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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Jacob  and  Julia  Evans,  a  married  couple  who  flew  together  in  the  1970s,  
particularly  enjoyed  their  interactions  with  ‘people  of  the  day’.41  Their  
testimonies  were  peppered  with  anecdotes  about  these  encounters.  They  
recalled  meeting  celebrities  they  had  ‘always  admired’,  including  John  
Lennon,  George  Harrison,  Joan  Collins,  and  Shirley  MacLaine.42  Julia  Evans  
described  one  encounter,  with  actor  Peter  Fonda,  that  brought  home  the  
unusual  social  position  of  airline  work:  
  
I  remember  sitting  down  one  evening,  I  was  scrambling  eggs  for  thirty-­
six  for  the  breakfast  service.  In  my  galley  everybody  was  asleep,  
[Jacob]  was  just  pacing  round  making  sure  everyone  was  alright  and  
this  chap  came  and  sat  on  the  stairs  …  and  I  said,  ‘can  I  get  you  
anything?’  And  he  said  ‘no,  do  you  mind  if  I  talk  to  you?’  And  I  said,  
‘that’s  fine’.  He  said,  ‘this  is  a  real  novelty  for  me  …  to  be  travelling  on  
a  commercial  jet’.  He  said,  ‘my  jumbo  jet’s  in  for  service’.  That  was  
Peter  Fonda.  What  do  you  say  to  somebody,  you  know?  Here  I  am  a  
kid  from  the  sticks  …  mixing  with  these  [people].43  
  
Celebrity  passengers  were  often  kind  and  accommodating,  pleased  to  speak  
with  cabin  attendants  at  length.    
Crew  members  sometimes  had  difficulties  managing  the  behavior  of  
other  passengers,  however.  By  the  mid-­1980s  jumbo  jets,  like  the  Boeing  747,  
could  accommodate  hundreds  of  passengers.  The  increase  of  seating  
capacity  had  implications  for  the  work  of  cabin  crew.  As  retired  flight  attendant  
Matthew  Hart  put  it,  ‘obviously  if  you’ve  got  four  hundred  people  locked  up  in  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans  and  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
42  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
43  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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an  airplane  over  fourteen  hours  you’re  going  to  get  an  awful  lot  of  human  
issues  in  that  time’.44  Problems  arose  most  often  when  passengers  were  
intoxicated.  These  instances  were  emotionally  trying  for  inexperienced  crew  
members.  Charles  Green,  who  worked  as  cabin  crew  for  BOAC,  said  that  he  
only  became  comfortable  dealing  with  inebriated  and  abusive  passengers  
after  several  decades  of  work:  
  
Of  course  as  time  progresses  and  you  get  more  experienced  in  the  job  
you  see  not  the  same  events  happening,  but  similar  sorts  of  events  so  
you  draw  on  the  experience  that  you’ve  [had]  before  …  I  mean  if  you’ve  
got  a  passenger  who  is  getting  violent  or  aggressive  …  well  I’ve  seen  it  
where  a  new  member  of  the  crew  is  a  bit  lost  because  it’s  a  bit  
daunting  to  have  a  six  foot  guy  who’s  had  one  too  many  beers  shouting  
at  them.45  
  
Elizabeth  Powell,  who  worked  as  cabin  crew  for  BOAC  between  1969  and  
1975,  concurred.  She  said  that  issues  with  passengers  –  or  indeed  other  crew  
members  –  who  were  ‘a  bit  worse  for  wear’  could  be  particularly  ‘upsetting  
when  you  find  you  can’t  control  it’.46  Elizabeth  Powell  described  one  
particularly  trying  instance,  an  occasion  when  the  chief  attendant  was  
inebriated  in  flight.  She  and  her  colleagues  in  the  flight  deck  organised  a  
means  of  dealing  with  the  situation  so  as  not  to  alert  the  passengers.  Though  
lesser  qualified  than  some  other  flight  attendants,  Elizabeth  Powell  took  
charge  of  the  cabin,  splitting  herself  ‘between  the  first  class  and  the  back’  for  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44  Interview  with  Matthew  Hart,  26  January  2017.  
45  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
46  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
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meal  service,  ‘as  the  chief  would  have  done’.47  In  this  instance  crew  members  
worked  hard  –  physically  and  emotionally  –  to  ensure  that  passengers  were  
unaware  of  the  situation.  As  Elizabeth  Powell  recalled:    
  
We  were  smiling  with  the  passengers  out  there,  getting  on  with  our  job  
the  best  we  could  …  And  everybody  worked  their  socks  off  to  make  
sure  that  none  of  the  passengers  ever  noticed  there  was  anything  
wrong.48    
  
Elizabeth  Powell  and  her  colleagues  sought,  as  a  matter  of  course,  to  shield  
passengers  from  the  difficulties  they  were  experiencing  with  their  chief  of  staff  
and,  as  such,  in  this  instance  emotional  labour  was  required.  It  is  important  to  
note,  however,  that  Elizabeth  Powell  and  the  other  retired  cabin  attendants  
interviewed  for  this  thesis  were  keen  to  emphasise  that  these  instances  did  
not  occur  regularly.  As  such,  though  emotional  labour  was  expected  in  
instances  of  high  stress,  cabin  staff  did  not  endure  tiring  emotional  labour  on  a  
day-­to-­day  basis.  
Flight  attendants  often  tried  to  resolve  difficult  situations  on  their  own,  
at  least  initially,  but  it  was  common  practice  to  involve  senior  cabin  staff  and  
flight  deck  crew  if  passenger  behaviour  did  not  improve  rapidly.  In  situations  
where  passengers  did  not  respond  to  cabin  attendants,  flight  deck  crew  were  
called  on  to  defuse  tensions.  Elizabeth  Powell  remembered  one  instance  with  
a  particularly  uncooperative  male  passenger  that  required  her  to  bring  ‘the  
captain  into  it’.  Finding  that  she  ‘couldn’t  control  the  person’,  she  requested  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47  Ibid.  
48  Ibid.  
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that  the  captain  ‘come  down  and  have  a  word’:  ‘This  guy  was  standing  in  the  
middle  of  the  aisle,  and  …  as  [the  captain]  walked  up  this  guy  said  “oh  my  
God  here  comes  God”.’49  This  practice  created,  according  to  Hochschild,  a  
gendering  of  emotional  labour.50  It  was,  she  argued,  one  ‘sort  of  job  for  a  
woman  and  another  sort  of  job  for  a  man’.  For  men,  the  principal  hidden  task  
was  to  maintain  his  identity  in  a  ‘woman’s  occupation’  by  coping  with  difficult  
passengers  ‘for’  female  colleagues.  For  women  on  the  other  hand,  emotional  
labour  involved  dealing  with  the  displaced  anger  and  frustration  of  passengers  
calmly,  in  a  way  that  would  not  attract  the  attention  of  other  passengers.51    
Hochschild’s  thesis,  based  on  the  assumption  that  flight  deck  crew  and  
senior  cabin  staff  were  almost  all  male  and  cabin  staff  were  mostly  female,  
does  not  hold  here.  In  Britain,  unlike  America,  flight  attendant  work  was  not  
sharply  gendered  in  the  post-­war  period.52  Women  were  in  the  majority,  but  
did  not  entirely  dominate  the  workforce.  In  1973,  for  example,  4,750  women  
and  2,355  men  were  employed  as  cabin  crew  by  British  airlines.53  Women  
were  likely  to  hold  positions  junior  to  their  male  counterparts,  however.  This  
was  due,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  propensity  for  male  crew  members  to  stay  in  
the  role  for  longer.  Female  cabin  attendants  were,  until  the  1980s,  expected  to  
retire  on  marriage.54  For  this  reason,  female  crew  members  were  less  likely  to  
ascend  the  career  ladder  and,  as  such,  male  and  female  crew  members  often  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
50  Hochschild,  The  Managed  Heart.  
51  Ibid.  p.  172.  
52  Phil  Tiemeyer,  Plane  Queer:  Labor,  Sexuality,  and  AIDS  in  the  History  of  Male  Flight  
Attendants,  (London:  University  of  California  Press,  2013);;  in  the  1980s  men  made  up  15%  of  
the  cabin  crew  workforce  in  America,  Hochschild,  The  Managed  Heart.  
53  TNA  BT  248/511:  CAA  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations  Working  Paper,  ‘Background  
Notes:  Cabin  Attendants’,  5  September  1973.  
54  Kathleen  M.  Barry,  Femininity  in  Flight:  A  History  of  Flight  Attendants,  (London:  Duke  
University  Press,  2007).  
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took  different  roles.  Men  worked  on  the  bar,  or  in  managerial  positions,  and  
women  ‘did  the  sales  of  the  perfume  and  things’.55  Both  male  and  female  
cabin  attendants,  however,  had  contact  with  passengers  and,  though  female  
attendants  found  themselves  the  target  of  verbal  abuse  more  often  than  their  
male  counterparts,  all  were  expected  to  manage  passenger  behaviour  and,  if  
necessary,  engage  in  surface  acting.  
It  is  worth  dwelling,  briefly,  on  the  place  of  nostalgia  in  cabin  crew  
narratives.  Historians  often  dismiss  nostalgia,  the  expression  of  an  idealised  
and  often  longed-­for  past,  as  false  historical  consciousness.  Nostalgia  is  not,  
however,  synonymous  with  misrepresentation  or  fabrication.  Oral  historians,  
such  as  Jennifer  Helgren,  have  argued  that  nostalgia  often  serves  a  
purpose.56  Nostalgic  departures  from  fact  allow  historians  to  explore  how  
individuals  invest  past  experiences  with  meaning.  Many  of  the  testimonies  
presented  here  are  self-­consciously  nostalgic  for  a  culture  that  no  longer  
exists  in  commercial  aviation.  For  many  of  the  men  and  women  employed  as  
aircrew  in  post-­war  Britain,  flight  was  special.  It  was  an  occasion  passengers  
dressed  for:  ‘Females  dressed  the  part.  Guys  wore  lounge  suits  and  ties’.57  In  
this  narrative,  passengers  are  painted  as  quiet,  respectful  and  bound  by  the  
rules  of  social  etiquette.  These  nostalgic  reflections  offer  an  often  barely  
veiled  critique  of  the  present.  A  number  of  the  former  flight  deck  crew  and  
cabin  attendants  interviewed  for  this  thesis  commented  with  distaste  on  the  
changes  associated  with  low-­cost  operation.  Lack  of  respect  and  abusive  
behaviour  are,  many  argued,  now  commonplace  in  the  cabin.  As  one  former  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55  Interview  with  Rose  Green,  21  November  2016.  
56  Jennifer  Helgren,  ‘A  “Very  Innocent  Time”:  Oral  History  Narratives,  Nostalgia  and  Girls’  
Safety  in  the  1950s  and  1960s’,  The  Oral  History  Review,  42,  1  (2015)  50-­69.  
57  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
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pilot  put  it:  ‘I  don’t  know  how  …  [today’s]  cabin  staff  put  up  with  some  of  what  
they  do’.58  A  number  of  retired  cabin  attendants  commented  in  interview  that,  
given  the  changes  to  commercial  aviation,  they  would  not  seek  employment  
as  cabin  staff  today.  It  is  unlikely  the  division  between  post-­war  and  present-­
day  operations  is  quite  as  stark  as  that  presented  by  some  interviewees,  
given  that  low-­cost  airlines  operated  increasingly  from  the  1980s.  Indeed,  
cabin  crew  work  could  be  emotionally  trying  at  times  throughout  the  century,  
even  for  those  employed  by  national  carriers.    
While  difficulties  with  passengers  were  by  no  means  commonplace,  at  
times  when  emotional  labour  was  required  the  strain  of  surface  acting  was  
often  exacerbated  by  the  space  of  the  aircraft.  There  were  very  few  private  
crew-­only  spaces  available  prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  Boeing  747  in  the  
1980s.  For  much  of  the  century  then,  crews  performed  duties  almost  entirely  
in  view  of  passengers.  In  instances  where  privacy  was  required,  however,  
crews  had  ways  of  creating  it.  Elizabeth  Powell  recalled  an  instance  where,  to  
stop  her  from  becoming  agitated,  her  chief  locked  her  in  the  on-­board  toilet:  ‘I  
was  getting  very  tense  and  my  chief  threw  me  in  the  loo  and  locked  the  loo  
from  the  outside.  [Laughs]  “Stay  in  there  until  you’ve  calmed  down!”’59    
The  lack  of  in-­flight  privacy  also  had  implications  for  how  crew  
members  rested  during  and  after  meal  services.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  
Boeing  747  by  BOAC  in  the  1980s,  the  staff  area  on  many  long-­haul  planes  
was  permeable  to  passengers.  It  was,  as  Charles  Green  recalled,  merely  a  
‘curtained  off  area’  with  passenger  seats,  a  place  for  crew  members  to  ‘have  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58  Interview  with  Andrew  Murray,  4  March  2016.  
59  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
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break  and  have  a  meal’.60  As  Charles  Green  explained,  however,  cabin  
attendants  were  rarely  screened  entirely  from  passengers  during  their  break  
periods:  
  
You  were  in  full  view  of  the  passengers,  so  invariably  somebody  would  
want  something.  It’s  like  anybody  who  does  whatever  job,  you  like  
some  time  away  from  your  work  even  for  an  hour  but  you  couldn’t  do  
that  if  you  were  sat  in  a  position  like  that.  So  often  you  couldn’t  say  it  
was  a  very  good  rest  at  all.  Well  it  wasn’t  a  rest  it  was  a  meal.61  
  
As  Charles  Green’s  testimony  suggests,  the  lack  of  privacy  of  the  crew  rest  
area  on  long-­haul  flights  meant  that  surface  acting  was  required  from  crews  
throughout  the  working  day.  They  were  always  on  display  to  passengers,  
even  during  scheduled  rest  breaks.    
The  permeability  of  the  crew  rest  area  also  had  implications  for  the  
physical  rest  that  crews  could  achieve.  As  Julia  Evans  recalled:  
  
You  never  had  the  chance  to  sit  down  and  have  a  proper  meal.  Even  if  
you  sat  down  to  eat,  and  even  if  you  were  allocated  some  time  off,  the  
bell  rings  and  somebody  wants  you,  they’re  your  fare-­paying  
passengers,  they’re  going  to  take  priority.  You  could  be  sitting  on  a  
seat  …    everyone  would  be  watching  a  movie  or  something  and  then  
the  curtain  would  go  back  and  …  someone  or  four,  five  people  would  
want  something.  So  that’s  fine,  that’s  what  we’re  they’re  for,  well  apart  
from  safety.62  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
61  Ibid.  
62  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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Given  that  the  crew  rest  area  was  located  within  the  aircraft’s  main  cabin  prior  
to  the  introduction  of  the  Boeing  747  in  the  1980s,  passengers  often  disturbed  
crew  members  during  their  rest  breaks.  Flight  attendants  had  little  emotional  
privacy  and  their  opportunities  for  uninterrupted  rest  were  limited.  The  retired  
cabin  crew  interviewed  for  this  thesis  tended  to  emphasise  the  implications  of  
this  –  fatigue  –  rather  than  the  apparent  burden  of  emotional  labour  in  their  
testimonies.  What  follows  here,  then,  aims  to  extend  Hochschild’s  thesis.  It  
argues  that,  though  much  of  the  literature  produced  on  the  health  and  
wellbeing  of  cabin  crew  in  the  past  twenty  years  has  focused  primarily  on  
emotional  labour,  these  issues  were  not  prioritised  in  the  years  prior  to  this.  
Indeed,  I  argue  in  what  follows  that  while  emotional  labour  was  certainly  
expected  of  crew  during  particularly  difficult  moments,  it  did  not  define  the  
experiences  of  cabin  attendants  working  for  commercial  airlines  in  post-­war  
Britain.    
  
Physical  Exhaustion  and  Circadian  Dysrhythmia    
In  the  twentieth  century,  the  health  of  flight  deck  crew  was  well  studied.  Little  
attention  was,  however,  paid  to  the  health  hazards  of  cabin  crew  work.  
Indeed,  though  pilot  fatigue  was  widely  researched  and  regulated  during  and  
after  World  War  Two,  there  was  no  serious  discussion  of  fatigue  as  it  
pertained  to  cabin  crew  until  the  late  1960s.63  In  1969  the  British  Airways  
Medical  Service  carried  out  the  first  study  of  cabin  crew  workload  and  fatigue.  
The  research  team  published  their  findings  in  a  series  of  articles  from  1973.64  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  Anon,  ‘Any  Questions?’,  British  Medical  Journal,  4,  5572  (1967)  167.  
64  F.  S.  Preston,  H.  P.  Ruffell  Smith,  V.  M.  Sutton-­Mattocks,  ‘Sleep  loss  in  air  cabin  crew’,  
Aerospace  Medicine,  44,  8  (1973)  931-­935;;  R.  M.  Barnes,  ‘Physical  energy  expenditure  in  
long-­haul  cabin  crew’,  Aerospace  Medicine,  44,  7  (1973)  783-­785;;  F.  S.  Preston,  
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The  study  examined  the  entire  lifestyle  of  cabin  attendants.  As  Isaac  Shaw,  
who  partook  in  the  study,  recalled:  
  
The  idea  was  you  kept  a  sleep  log  for  three  months,  a  little  yellow  
book,  and  some  time  during  that  three  months  they  hoped  to  get  one  of  
the  BOAC  doctors  to  fly  with  you  and  take  your  blood  pressure  …  
they’d  …  stay  in  the  same  hotel  and  do  the  same  routine.  That  didn’t  
happen.  It  happened  with  a  few  people  but  I  never  saw  one,  most  
people  didn’t  I  think.65  
  
As  Isaac  Shaw  described,  researchers  rarely  flew  with  crew  members.  Like  
many  other  studies  of  flying  fatigue  in  the  post-­war  period,  the  BOAC  
investigation  relied  instead  on  self-­reports,  in  this  case  the  records  produced  
by  cabin  crew.  Crew  members  were  asked,  as  reported  by  Isaac  Shaw,  to  
keep  detailed  sleep  logs  for  six  months  in  which  they  were  required  to:  
  
Say  obviously  the  date,  what  time  you  woke  up,  GB  and  local,  if  you  
were  working  or  if  it  was  a  rest  day,  what  the  work  pattern  was  or  if  you  
had  a  day  of  rest  at  home,  and  then  when  you  went  to  bed,  how  tired  
you  felt  when  you  went  to  bed  and  so  on.  And  you  marked  it  one  to  ten,  
with  an  arrow.66    
  
Based  on  the  self-­reports  of  140  stewards  and  stewardesses,  the  study  
concluded  that  long-­haul  cabin  crews  had  to  contend  with  three  major  issues:  
circadian  dysrhythmia,  sleeplessness,  and  menstrual  problems.  Time  zone  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Physiological  Problems  in  Air  Cabin  Crew’,  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Society  of  Medicine,  67,  
9  (1974)  825-­829.  
65  Interview  with  Isaac  Shaw,  26  January  2017.  
66  Ibid.  
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changes,  resulting  in  circadian  dysrhythmia,  were  deemed  to  have  the  
greatest  effect  on  performance  and  wellbeing.  The  study  suggested  that  this  
was  ‘probably  the  greatest  problem  facing  the  airline  crew  member’.67  This  
problem,  the  study  concluded,  was  at  its  most  acute  during  round-­the-­world  
trips,  where  crews  could  be  away  from  base  for  up  to  twenty-­one  days.  In  
these  instances,  where  crew  members  were  continually  moving  and  crossing  
new  time  zones,  there  would  be  ‘frequent  adjustment  to  biological  rhythms’.68  
In  these  instances  circadian  disruption  and  fatigue  were,  the  report  concluded,  
practically  inevitable.  
These  conclusions  broadly  reflect  the  narratives  constructed  by  cabin  
crew.  Almost  every  retired  flight  attendant  interviewed  for  this  thesis  
commented  that  the  circadian  disruption  associated  with  long-­haul  flight  was  
by  far  the  most  difficult  issue  they  had  to  contend  with  as  a  result  of  work.  
Indeed,  some  crew  members  purposefully  transferred  from  long-­haul  to  short-­
haul  work  to  avoid  crossing  time  zones.  Isaac  Shaw,  who  transferred  from  
BOAC  to  BEA  part-­way  through  his  career,  said  that  becoming  a  ‘flat-­earther’  
was  the  ‘best  thing’  he  ever  did  for  his  health.69  When  asked  why  he  
transferred  from  BOAC  to  BEA,  he  cited  ‘tiredness’:  
  
It  was  less  money  but  it  was  certainly  worthwhile  in  health  and  lifestyle  
…  When  you  worked  for  BOAC  you  started  your  trip  and  at  the  end  of  
the  trip  you  got  so  many  nights  off,  not  days,  so  many  nights  off  after  
the  trip  depending  on  its  length.  So  let’s  say  you  did  …  an  eight-­day  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  Preston,  ‘Physiological  Problems  in  Air  Cabin  Crew’,  p.  826.  
68  Ibid.  p.  825.  
69  Interview  with  Isaac  Shaw,  26  January  2017;;  ‘flat-­earther’  is  a  colloquial  term  used  within  
civil  aviation  to  refer  to  crews  who  flew  short-­haul  and,  thus,  did  not  see  the  curvature  of  the  
earth.  
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trip,  you’d  get  four  nights  off,  which  is  three  days.  So  the  first  day  you  
were  totally  shattered.  As  soon  as  I  got  in  I  just  went  to  bed,  that  was  it.  
The  second  day  you  were  getting  over  it.  The  third  day  you  were  
preparing  to  go  on  your  next  trip,  and  then  the  fourth  day  you  went  on  
your  next  trip.  And  so  you  were  continually  going  east  one  time,  west  
the  next  time,  you’d  just  got  over  one,  or  you  thought  you  did,  and  you  
were  off  somewhere  to  do  it  again.  Whereas  when  I  went  …  to  short-­
haul,  we  had  a  six-­three  roster,  so  they  could  do  what  they  wanted  with  
you  for  six  days,  obviously  within  flight  limitations,  but  then  on  the  three  
days  off,  and  it  was  sometimes  three  and  a  half  if  you  had  an  early  on  
your  last  trip,  you  were  totally  with  it  for  the  three  days,  and  you  knew  
when  you  were  going  away  you  didn’t  have  to  mentally  prepare  to  be  
going  to  Australia  or  anything  like  that.  You  were  just  going  to  be  going  
there  and  back  or  just  a  quick  night  stop,  and  to  me  that  was  brilliant.70  
  
Julia  Evans  also  cited  circadian  dysrhythmia  as  one  of  the  reasons  she  
transferred  from  long-­haul  to  short-­haul  flying.  She  made  the  decision  after  a  
series  of  particularly  difficult  trips:  
  
I’d  done  an  LA  and  back,  I’d  had  four  nights  at  home,  that  was  minus  
eight.  I’d  done  an  Anchorage  and  Tokyo  following  that,  which  was  
minus  seven  plus  eight  minus  seven,  and  I  got  in  this  house  and  I  
couldn’t  sleep  at  all.  Nothing  worked.  My  digestive  system  didn’t  work,  
my  sleeping  patterns  didn’t  work,  my  skin  was  all  pasty,  and  I  didn’t  feel  
well.  I  was  doing  the  laundry  at  three  in  the  morning.  I  couldn’t  sleep.  
Twelve  o’clock  I  was  somewhere  else,  maybe  in  bed  for  an  hour  and  
getting  up  again.  So  that  was  …  when  I  went  to  short-­haul.71  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70  Interview  with  Isaac  Shaw,  26  January  2017.  
71  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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Julia  Evans,  like  many  of  her  colleagues,  found  sleep  difficult  after  
transmeridian  flight.  These  difficulties  were  compounded  when  flights  were  
closely  spaced,  as  Elizabeth  Powell  explained:  ‘that  was  constantly  there  
especially  with  the  very  short,  you  know,  there  and  back  trips’.72  
The  only  ‘cure’  for  circadian  dysrhythmia  was  a  rest-­and-­recovery  
period  of  sufficient  length  for  the  body  to  readjust.73  Though,  as  Ross  
McFarland  of  Harvard’s  School  of  Public  Health,  commented  in  a  1975  paper  
on  transmeridian  air  travel,  there  were  ‘great  individual  differences’  here,  most  
people  required  several  days  to  adapt  to  time  zone  changes.74  Given  the  
nature  of  the  job,  however,  cabin  crew  were  rarely  allotted  enough  time  off  to  
completely  recover  from  the  effects  of  transmeridian  travel.  Medical  
sociologist  Roberta  Lessor  suggested  in  1985  that,  for  this  reason,  many  flight  
attendants  engaged  in  drug  taking,  namely  the  use  of  ‘uppers’  and  ‘downers’  
to  be  able  to  wake  up  and  work  or  go  to  bed  and  sleep  at  times  that  were  
‘foreign’  to  their  routine.75  None  of  the  retired  flight  attendants  interviewed  for  
this  thesis  confessed  to  using  stimulants,  but  several,  mostly  female,  crew  
members  who  worked  for  BOAC  in  the  1970s  recalled  taking  sleeping  pills  
such  as  Mogadon  during  their  long-­haul  careers.  Crew  members,  in  the  main,  
only  used  sleeping  tablets  when  they  felt  they  really  needed  them.  They  were,  
as  Elizabeth  Powell  described,  a  ‘sort  of  back  up’,  not  to  be  ‘taken  as  a  matter  
of  course’.76  There  was  a  recognition  among  cabin  crew  that  hypnotics  were  
not  a  good  long-­term  solution  to  circadian  dysrhythmia,  and  some  crew  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
72  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
73  Lessor,  ‘Consciousness  of  Time  and  Time  for  the  Development  of  Consciousness’,  p.  200.  
74  Ross  A.  McFarland,  ‘Air  Travel  Across  Time  Zones’,  American  Scientist,  63,  1  (1975)  23-­
30,  p.  25.  
75  Lessor,  ‘Consciousness  of  Time  and  Time  for  the  Development  of  Consciousness’,  p.  200.  
76  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
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members  felt  that  taking  sleep  pills  made  them  ‘feel  worse  in  the  end’,  so  they  
were  reserved  for  particularly  acute  episodes  of  sleeplessness.77  
The  other  major  contention  of  the  BOAC  report  –  that  the  physical  
energy  expenditure  of  cabin  crew  was  within  acceptable  limits  –  was,  
however,  not  supported  by  the  testimonies  of  crew  members.  In  the  BOAC  
study  the  physical  energy  expenditure  of  crews  was  measured  during  training  
mock-­ups  using  a  Max-­Planck  respirometer.78  The  subject  wore  a  
respirometer  on  their  back.  In  this  way  all  expired  gases  could  be  measured  
and  analysed.  For  each  task  the  expected  energy  expenditure  was  then  
calculated  in  kilojoules.  The  study  found  that  the  energy  expenditure  of  a  
stewardess  on  an  average  day  was  ‘above  that  of  an  average  shop  assistant’,  
but  ‘about  equal  to  a  young  housewife’.79  Some  trips,  however,  elicited  
greater  energy  expenditure.  The  energy  expended  by  cabin  attendants  on  the  
London  to  Miami  flight,  for  example,  was  ‘comparable  with  that  of  a  building  
worker  or  a  steel  worker  but  somewhat  less  than  that  of  a  farmer  or  coal  
miner’.80  Generally,  though,  it  was  agreed  that  the  physical  energy  
expenditure  of  cabin  attendants  was  within  acceptable  limits.    
These  conclusions  were  not  reflected  in  the  narratives  of  the  men  and  
women  I  interviewed.  The  physically  demanding  nature  of  the  job  was  
stressed  by  several  of  the  retired  crew  members  interviewed  for  this  thesis.  
Many  former  flight  attendants  noted  the  large  amount  of  walking  involved,  as  
Julia  Evans  put  it:  ‘you’d  walk  twelve,  fifteen  miles  across  the  Atlantic’.81  This  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77  Interview  with  Rose  Green,  21  November  2016.  
78  Barnes,  ‘Physical  energy  expenditure  in  long-­haul  cabin  crew’.  
79  Preston,  ‘Physiological  Problems  in  Air  Cabin  Crew’,  p.  827;;  Ibid.  p.  828.  
80  Ibid.  p.  827;;  Ibid.  p.  828.  
81  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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was  made  all  the  more  difficult  by  the  movement  of  heavy  carts,  full  of  duty-­
free  goods.  Female  crew  members  measured  their  activity  by  the  fit  of  their  
shoes.  Elizabeth  Powell  recalled  that,  after  particularly  busy  days,  her  feet  
would  often  swell:  
  
Because  you’re  on  the  run  all  the  time  you  will  get  off  the  other  end  
absolutely  exhausted.  And  I  can  remember  a  few  trips  where  I  came  
down  the  steps  of  the  aircraft  with  my  shoes  in  my  hands  …  Because  
you  run  around  so  much  you  know  your  feet  swell,  and  you  just  
couldn’t  put  your  shoes  on  to  get  back  off  the  plane.82  
  
To  alleviate  the  swelling  in  their  feet,  flight  attendants  were  advised  by  
BOAC’s  medical  officers  to  adopt  a  restorative  yogic  pose  –  viparita  karani,  
otherwise  known  as  legs-­up-­the-­wall  pose.  Julia  Evans  recalled  that,  after  
arriving  at  the  crew  hotel  post-­flight,  crews  would  shower  and  then  adopt  the  
pose  before  going  out  for  the  evening:  ‘You’d  just  put  your  legs  up  against  the  
wall  to  allow  the  blood  to  settle  back  down  again  and  we  used  to  do  that  and  
read  newspapers.’83    
The  fit  of  shoes  was  at  once  a  litmus  test  for  effort,  and  a  cause  of  
fatigue.  Joan  Sanger  and  Julia  Smith  have  argued  that  walking  up  and  down  
the  aircraft  cabin  in  high-­heeled  shoes  could  be  exhausting.84  The  uniform  
requirements  for  female  members  of  staff  had,  thus,  broader  implications.  
High-­heeled  shoes  literally  generated  fatigue,  but  in  other  ways  uniform  
mitigated  these  effects.  Common  attire  fostered  a  sense  of  shared  identity.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
83  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
84  Sangster  and  Smith,  ‘Beards  and  Bloomers’.  
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Like  nurses  and  other  medical  professionals,  flight  attendants  wore  a  uniform  
that  set  them  apart  from  others  in  their  work  space.85  It  marked  them  out  as  a  
distinct  collective  and,  as  the  following  section  attests,  this  cultivated  
communal  ties  that  helped,  in  some  instances,  to  mitigate  the  effects  of  
fatigue.  
The  oral  testimonies  presented  here  suggest  that  Hochschild  
overstated  the  costs  of  emotional  labour.  In  line  with  the  conclusions  of  later  
sociologists,  these  testimonies  suggest  that,  for  the  most  part,  crew  members  
enjoyed  their  work.  On  the  whole,  they  found  interactions  with  passengers  
pleasurable  and  appreciated  the  perks  of  the  job:  travel  to  exotic  locations,  the  
opportunity  to  stay  in  ‘five  star  hotels’,  and  ‘access  to  celebrities’.86  These  
testimonies  instead  suggest  that  a  major  cost  of  cabin  crew  work  was  physical  
tiredness.  While  only  two  former  flight  attendants  interviewed  for  this  thesis  
cited  fatigue  as  their  primary  concern,  all  recalled  at  least  one  instance  where  
they  experienced  overwhelming  exhaustion  as  the  result  of  work.  Elizabeth  
Powell,  for  example,  recalled  that  while  most  of  the  time  she  could  ‘keep  up  
with  the  comings  and  goings  of  our  strange  times’  when  things  were  ‘going  
smoothly’,  she  said  that  she  did  experience  fatigue  in  certain  circumstances.87  
She  suffered  from  ‘nervous  exhaustion’  following  a  period  of  intensive  
scheduling  and  ‘heavy  workload’  during  the  1971  India-­Pakistan  War,  and  
sometimes  experienced  fatigue  in  flight  if  she  ‘didn’t  manage  to  get  a  few  
hours  of  extra  sleep  before  pick-­up’  for  a  long-­haul  flight.88  She  described  one  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85  Penny  Starns,  Nurses  at  War:  Women  on  the  Frontline  1939-­45,  (Stroud:  Sutton  
Publishing,  2000).  
86  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
87  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
88  Ibid.  
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instance  where  she  felt  particularly  fatigued  following  a  bad  night’s  sleep  and  
a  delay  prior  to  take-­off  from  New  York:  
  
I  was  so  tired  because  I  hadn’t  managed  to  get  that  kip  in  the  
afternoon.  That  extra  time  meant  when  everybody  got  their  heads  
down  and  we’d  fed  them  and  they  were  all  asleep,  I  got  a  couple  of  
blankets  and  lay  down  on  the  galley  floor,  and  I  fell  asleep  for  about  
half  an  hour,  three  quarters  of  an  hour,  just  to  keep  me  going.  I  was  so  
tired,  I  laid  my  head  down  on  the  floor  and  I  could  hear  the  workings  of  
everything  going  on  under  the  floor,  and  I  thought  I’m  never  going  to  
sleep  in  this  noise  but  I  was  just  so  tired  that  I  did  doze  off  for  half  an  
hour.  It  felt  like  desperation  and  it  was,  it  was  at  that  point  where  I  knew  
I  wouldn’t  be  able  to  still  be  on  my  feet  and  serving  breakfast,  if  I  didn’t  
actually  close  my  eyes  for  a  short  while.89  
  
In  this  instance  Elizabeth  Powell  was  able  to  alleviate  fatigue  by  taking  a  short  
unscheduled  rest  break  during  a  period  of  light  workload.  This  was  possible  
because  other  crew  members  agreed  that  they  would  cover  her  duties  while  
she  rested.  Anecdotes  of  this  type  peppered  the  testimonies  of  many  of  the  
former  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  interviewed  for  this  thesis.  What  follows  
here  examines  the  communal  management  of  fatigue  in  more  detail.  
  
Crew  Relations  and  Fatigue  Management  
The  physical  and  emotional  pressures  of  civil  aviation,  coupled  with  long  
periods  away  from  home,  fostered  intense  friendships.  These  relationships  
were,  however,  often  short  lived  as  crews  changed  with  each  trip.  Wouters  
has  argued  that  the  ‘social  promiscuity’  of  cabin  crew  friendships  could  be  
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emotionally  damaging.  Indeed,  he  cited  ‘social  promiscuity’  as  the  primary  
emotional  ‘danger’  of  cabin  crew  work.90  This  does  not,  however,  reflect  the  
lived  experiences  of  flight  attendants  employed  by  British  airlines  in  the  post-­
war  period.  Indeed,  many  of  the  retired  cabin  attendants  interviewed  for  this  
thesis  reflected  fondly  on  the  supportive  friendships  that  grew  out  of  intensive  
periods  of  togetherness  during  trips.  Charles  Green  recalled  of  his  working  
relationships  at  BOAC:  
  
Camaraderie  was  very  very  good,  and  I  think  that  was  the  great  thing  
about  flying,  that  you  met  a  group  of  strangers  at  Heathrow  …  and  all  
the  way  through  it,  you  would  hear  details  of  their  private  life  that  they  
would  probably  never  discuss  with  people  outside  …  because  you  
became  so  close  as  a  family  for  that  short  time.91  
  
As  Charles  Green  described  these  ties  of  friendship  were  often  short-­lived:  
‘when  you  got  back  to  London  …  you  might  not  see  one  another  again’.92  The  
spatial  and  temporal  limitations  of  relationships  did  not,  however,  dull  their  
intensity.  The  friendships  fostered  on  trips  were  socially  important.  Elizabeth  
Powell  recalled  of  her  time  working  at  BOAC  that:  
  
In  long-­haul  in  particular,  if  you’re  going  away  for  any  length  of  time  
you’re  each  other’s  family.  You’ve  got  no  one  else  to  refer  to  when  
things  are  wrong,  in  the  way  that  you  would  go  home  and  talk  
something  over  with  your  family.  We  talked  amongst  ourselves.93  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90  Wouters,  ‘The  Sociology  of  Emotions  and  Flight  Attendants’,  p.  118.  
91  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
92  Ibid.  
93  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
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‘We  were’,  she  concluded,  ‘each  other’s  family.  You  had  to  be’.94  
Civil  aviation  presented  a  number  of  health  challenges.  Illness  was  
frequent.  Food  poisoning  and  ‘tummy  upsets’  were  particularly  common  
complaints.  As  former  pilot  Gerard  Hunt  described,  ‘you’d  go  to  India  and  
people  would  get  jippy  tummies  …  they’d  get  …  Bombay  belly’.95  The  close,  if  
short-­lived,  relations  between  crew  members  were  important  in  these  
instances.  Elizabeth  Powell  described  how  crew  members  cared  for  each  
other  during  periods  of  illness:  
  
We  took  care  of  each  other.  If  somebody  wasn’t  well,  a  couple  of  
members  of  the  crew  would  make  sure  they  were  OK,  go  to  the  
pharmacist  and  get  them  something  to  take.96  
  
Crew  relations  also  had  important  implications  for  fatigue  management.  What  
follows  here  is  structured  in  two  parts.  The  first  examines  how  crews  
managed  fatigue  communally  in  flight,  with  a  particular  focus  on  informal  rest  
breaks.  The  second  outlines  the  importance  of  relations  between  crew  
members  and,  importantly,  between  crew  members  and  airline  executives  in  
decisions  about  discretion.  
  
Controlled  Rest  in  the  Cabin  and  the  Cockpit  
From  1975,  both  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  were  required  to  have  rest  periods  
scheduled  by  the  companies  they  worked  for  in  accordance  with  the  
regulations  laid  down  in  Civil  Aviation  Publication  (CAP)  371.  On  long-­haul  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94  Ibid.  
95  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
96  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
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flights  all  members  of  crew  were  allocated  a  rest  period  in  a  bunk,  but  some  
found  it  difficult  to  rest  or  sleep  in  this  environment.  Stephen  Harris,  who  
worked  as  cabin  crew  between  1989  and  2013,  found  ‘switching  off’  difficult:  
  
You’ve  done  everything  and  you’ll  be  lying  in  your  bunk  and  you’ll  be  
like  ‘oh  I  never  got  that  coffee  for  13C’,  or  …  ‘oh  so  and  so  asked  me  
for  something’.  Switching  off  was  very  difficult.97  
  
Emotional  disconnection  from  work  was  difficult  for  Stephen  Harris.  For  many  
others,  though,  the  physical  space  of  bunks  was  an  issue.  As  one  former  flight  
engineer  put  it,  bunk  rest  was  not  ‘conducive  to  good  sleep’.98  Bunk  areas  in  
long-­haul  aircraft  were  often  cramped  and  resting  crew  members  were  
sometimes  disturbed  by  their  colleagues  during  periods  of  bunk  rest.  Retired  
flight  engineer  Jeffrey  Cooper  suggested  in  interview  that,  given  the  cramped  
conditions,  resting  crew  members  often  found  themselves  being  clambered  
over  by  others:  ‘there  was  the  crew  change  and  you  were  sleeping  on  a  bunk  
and  someone  climbed  over  the  top’.99  As  such,  fatigue  remained  a  common  
complaint,  even  after  the  introduction  of  bunk  rest  in  the  1970s.  Cabin  and  
flight  deck  crews  continued  to  rely  on  informal  practices,  developed  during  
and  immediately  after  World  War  Two,  for  the  management  of  fatigue  in  flight.  
In  the  cockpit,  flight  deck  crews  instituted  an  in-­seat  rest  rota,  a  
practice  widely  referred  to  as  controlled  rest  in  present-­day  literature.  Flight  
crew  first  instituted  this  system  prior  to  the  introduction  of  bunk  rest  on  long-­
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
97  Interview  with  Stephen  Harris,  7  December  2016.  
98  Interview  with  Jeffrey  Cooper,  24  January  2017.  
99  Ibid.  
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haul  flights.  As  James  Hall,  who  worked  as  a  pilot  for  BOAC  from  the  mid-­
1960s,  recalled:  
  
I  was  the  first  officer  of  course  on  707s  and  747s,  and  if  you  were  with  
a  good  captain  he  would  say  ‘hey  look  you  go  off  …  watch  for  a  couple  
of  hours’,  sitting  in  what’s  basically  a  very  uncomfortable  pilot’s  seat,  
‘and  just  have  a  zizz  and  I’ll  mind  the  [controls]  and  then  when  you  
come  to  I’ll  have  a  little  zizz’  and  that  was  the  way  it  worked  on  those  
sort  of  airplanes.100  
  
The  release  of  the  sleeping  flight  crew  story  in  1972  made  regulators  critical  of  
this  practice,  but  it  nevertheless  remained  widespread  throughout  the  latter  
decades  of  the  twentieth  century.  Crew  organised  in-­seat  rest  between  them  
though,  as  former  flight  engineer  Jeffery  Cooper  recalled,  the  captain  had  the  
final  say:  ‘“can  I  close  my  eyes  for  a  minute?”  and  he’d  say  yes  or  no’.101  If  
everything  was  in  place  and  workload  was  low,  captains  would  often  allow  
other  members  of  the  flight  crew  to  have  a  short  in-­seat  rest.  Crew  members  
tacitly  agreed  that  each  of  them  would  be  allowed  to  rest  at  some  point  during  
flight,  and  so  rarely  slept  for  more  than  twenty  minutes  each.  Instances  where  
crew  members  slept  for  longer  were  unusual.  As  former  captain  Gerard  Hunt  
recalled:  
  
I  remember  one  time  coming  back  on  a  DC-­10,  and  the  co-­pilot  just  
didn’t  feel  very  well  at  all,  and  when  we  got  to  the  cruising  level  which  
would  be  what  half  an  hour  after  take-­off,  I  said  ‘well  look,  you  know,  
just  have  a  sleep’.  Anyway  he  slept  and  he  slept  and  he  slept,  until  we  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100  Interview  with  James  Hall,  30  March  2016.  
101  Interview  with  Jeffrey  Cooper,  24  January  2017.  
   302  
got  to  Ireland,  and  every  time  he  kind  of  turned  over  I  thought  oh  he’s  
going  to  wake  up  now,  I’ll  be  able  to  close  my  eyes  for  a  few  moments  
myself.102  
  
In  this  instance  Gerard  Hunt’s  co-­pilot  slept  for  an  extended  period,  far  longer  
than  the  twenty-­minutes  he  had  expected  when  he  had  sanctioned  the  rest.  
For  the  most  part  though,  the  system  ‘worked  quite  well’,  and  all  flight  deck  
crew  were  able  to  benefit  from  short  in-­seat  rest  periods.103  
   Flight  attendants  instituted  a  similar  system.  A  number  of  interviewees  
recalled  that,  if  an  aircraft  was  not  at  full  capacity,  crew  members  would  rest  in  
the  cabin,  often  covered  by  a  blanket  to  shield  themselves  from  passengers.  
In  other  instances,  cabin  attendants  slept  on  the  floor  of  the  galley  between  
meal  services.  As  in  the  flight  deck,  these  informal  periods  of  rest  in  flight  
were  arranged  between  cabin  staff  on  a  principle  of  reciprocity  and  mutual  
benefit.  They  were  organised  to  ensure  firstly,  that  every  member  of  crew  was  
allocated  an  informal  rest  period  at  some  point  during  flight  if  they  so  wished  
and,  secondly,  that  the  workload  of  resting  crew  members  was  covered.  As  
Elizabeth  Powell  recalled,  the  allocation  of  informal  rest  periods  in  the  cabin  
was  rarely  problematic:  
  
A  nap  on  board?  Well  we  usually  …  would  say  ‘oh  I’m  alright  you  go  
and  have  a  lie  down’.  You  know  if  somebody  started  to  …  say  ‘oh  God  
I’m  feeling  weary  I  didn’t  get  [any]  sleep  this  afternoon’.  You’d  say  
‘when  we’ve  finished  the  meal  service  pull  a  blanket  over  you  so  that  
nobody  can  see  you’.  [Laughs]  …  But  we  …  gave  to  each  other.  
Nobody  went  ‘I  want  to  go  first’  or  anything  like  this  …  it  was  just  very  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
103  Interview  with  Paul  White,  17  March  2016.  
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co-­operative.  We  were  all  very  co-­operative  on  the  plane,  you  needed  
to  be.104    
  
In  these  informal  instances  of  crew  rest,  then,  crew  members  tended  to  
cooperate.  There  was  a  tacit  recognition  on  all  sides  that  if  one  crew  member  
was  permitted  to  rest  by  their  colleagues,  the  favour  would  be  returned,  so  
that  all  crew  members  benefitted  from  this  system.  In  other  instances,  though,  
external  pressures  complicated  crew  relations.  
  
Discretion  and  Crew-­Management  Relations  
When  CAP  371  came  into  force  in  1975  it  relied  on  an  existing,  though  
underused,  concept:  captain’s  discretion.  Referred  to  in  regulatory  discourse  
since  the  1960s,  discretion  allowed  captains  to  extend  flying  duty  periods  
beyond  the  maximum  limitation  of  fourteen  hours.  For  the  Bader  Committee,  
discretion  was  necessary  to  allow  operators  to  legally  field  crews  in  certain  
situations.105  ‘We  consider’,  the  Committee  stated,  ‘that  it  remains  necessary  
to  retain  provision  for  the  commander  of  an  aircraft  to  extend  a  Flying  Duty  
Period  beyond  the  maximum  which  may  be  scheduled,  providing  
circumstances  warrant  such  action’.106  Discretion  was  only  supposed  to  be  
used  in  ‘exceptional  circumstances’  but,  as  Charles  Green  recalled,  it  ‘used  to  
happen  quite  a  bit  to  get  the  operation  done’.107  This  was  permitted  under  
CAP  371  because,  although  captains  were  legally  required  to  notify  the  airline  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104  Interview  with  Elizabeth  Powell,  30  January  2017.  
105  As  in  previous  chapters,  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations  is  referred  to  as  the  
Bader  Committee.  
106  TNA  DR/13/4:  Douglas  Bader,  ‘Report  of  the  Committee  on  Flight  Time  Limitations’,  June  
1973,  p.  19.  
107  Interview  with  Charles  Green,  21  November  2016.  
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when  discretion  was  used,  they  were  not  obliged  to  inform  the  CAA  if  the  
flying  duty  period  was  extended  by  less  than  two  hours.108  As  a  Confidential  
Human  Factors  Incident  Reporting  Programme  (CHIRP)  Incident  Report  
noted  in  1987,  because  of  this  the  CAA  could  not  identify  flights  that  regularly  
required  ‘discretionary  time  due  to  unrealistic  rostering’.109  Aware  of  this  
apparent  loop-­hole  a  number  of  operators  intentionally  scheduled  flights  up  to  
two  hours  above  the  limits  laid  down  in  CAP  371,  operating  to  the  letter  of  the  
regulations  rather  than  in  their  spirit.110    
   The  decision  to  extend  flight  duty  periods  ultimately  lay  with  the  
captain.  The  consent  of  the  entire  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  was,  however,  
usually  sought.  As  former  captain  Gerard  Hunt  recalled:    
  
I  would  talk  to  the  crew  and  …  say  ‘look  how  is  everybody  feeling?’  
Including  the  cabin  crew,  and  if  someone  said  ‘I  just  cannot  do  it  
because  I  am  so  tired  I  might  become  unsafe’  I’d  say  ‘fine  we  won’t  do  
it’.111  
  
Flight  deck  and  cabin  crews  may  not  have  worked  together  prior  to  a  request  
to  go  out  of  hours.  It  was  common,  for  example,  for  cabin  attendants  to  work  
almost  a  full  day  before  flight  crew  joined  them.112  Cabin  attendants  often  
discussed  their  thoughts  initially  as  a  group,  and  then  each  had  a  chance  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  15,  December  1987,  
available  at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  2016].  
109  Ibid.  p.  5.  
110  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  26,  March  1992,  p.  3,  
available  at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  accessed  23  March  2016].  
111  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
112  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
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speak  privately  with  the  chief  of  cabin  staff.  As  former  flight  attendant  Stephen  
Harris  described:  
  
So  away  from  the  flight  crew  we  would  have  a  chat,  the  whole  crew  
and  we  had  to  come  to  a  unanimous  decision  if  there  was  any  sort  of  
doubts  in  why  we  were  going,  the  people  that  were  on  the  sort  of  edge  
of  ‘do  we  go  don’t  we  go’  would  then  have  an  opportunity  to  talk  to  the  
CSD  [Cabin  Services  Director]  on  their  own,  because  it  might  be  that  
they  don’t  want  to  discuss  why  they  don’t  want  to  go,  and  they  don’t  
want  to  feel  pressured  so  they  might  sort  of  go  and  have  a  little  chat  
but  …  everybody  had  to  agree.113  
  
Ultimately  then,  consensus  was  necessary.  As  Stephen  Harris  reflected  
though,  the  need  for  unanimity  could  cause  problems:  
  
Everybody’s  got  a  different  lifestyle  …  somebody  might  be  at  home  and  
they’ve  had  the  same  days  off  as  you  but  they’ve  got  two  kids  …  
they’ve  had  to  run  around  they  haven’t  had  their  sleep  …  maybe  they  
didn’t  sleep  on  their  crew  rest,  or  they  were  in  their  hotel  and  they  didn’t  
sleep.114  
  
Even  when  crews  had  worked  the  same  or  very  similar  rosters,  their  personal  
circumstances  impacted  on  their  quality  of  rest  and  consequent  alertness.  A  
unanimous  decision  was,  therefore,  often  difficult  to  reach.    
Other  interviewees  described  a  further  problem  with  discretion:  the  
requirement  to  appraise  prospective  lethargy.  As  former  pilot  Gerard  Hunt  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113  Interview  with  Stephen  Harris,  7  December  2016.  
114  Ibid.  
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explained,  this  was  particularly  difficult  for  long-­haul  crews  who  were  expected  
to  gauge  how  they  would  feel  in  up  to  twelve  hours’  time:  
  
I  think  the  difficult  thing  about  it  is  how  do  you  judge  yourself  how  
you’re  going  to  feel  in  eleven  hours’  time  …  particularly  on  long-­haul  …  
I  can  understand  it  more  on  short-­haul  where  you’re  doing  maybe  two  
or  three  sectors  and  you  know  the  last  route,  ‘I’m  just  too  tired  to  do  
that  last  bit  I’m  not  going  to  go  into  discretion’.  But  …  in  long-­haul  …  
you  have  to  decide  whether  you’re  going  to  go  into  discretion  …  before  
you’ve  taken  off  …  how  do  you  throw  your  mind  forward,  think  how  bad  
you’ll  feel?115  
    
In  part  because  of  the  difficulties  involved  in  imagining  how  he  would  feel  in  
the  future,  Gerard  Hunt  said  that  he  would  normally  ‘just  try  and  get  on  with  it’  
and  agree  that  flight  times  could  be  extended.116  
Airlines  employed  a  carrot  and  stick  approach  to  encourage  
compliance  with  discretionary  requests.  Large  airlines,  such  as  BEA  and  
BOAC  offered  incentives.  These  were  not  part  of  official  policy,  but  were  
widely  employed  on  an  informal  basis.  For  example,  it  was  commonplace  for  
crew  members  to  be  scheduled  on  a  ‘really  good  trip’  if  they  agreed  to  extend  
their  duty  hours,  as  a  form  of  compensation.  As  former  cabin  attendant  Jacob  
Evans  recalled:  
  
There  was  always  that  sweetener,  that  …  you  could  have  a  really  good  
trip  the  next  trip.  You  could  have  a  ten-­day  St  Lucia.  Now  if  you  went  
out  of  hours  you  would  lose  that  ten-­day  St  Lucia,  somebody  else  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
116  Ibid.  
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would  get  it.  So  it  was  very  tempting  to  …  hang  on  to  that  trip  and  just  
say,  ‘we’ll  give  the  company  another  half  an  hour’  …  it  was  a  little  
carrot.117  
  
For  cabin  attendants  working  for  major  airlines,  there  was  also  a  significant  
financial  incentive  to  work  beyond  scheduled  hours.  The  daily  overseas  
allowance  assigned  to  cabin  crew  increased  with  the  number  of  hours  worked.  
As  such,  when  cabin  crew  extended  their  duty  hours  they  were  financially  
compensated.  Retired  cabin  attendant  Patrick  Smith  said  that  this  was  a  
major  incentive:  
  
There  was  daily  overseas  allowances  overtime  which  was  a  rate  after  
nine  hours  …  higher  rate  after  ten  hours,  higher  rate  after  twelve  hours,  
higher  rate  after  fifteen  hours,  after  seventeen  hours  it  just  went  
through  the  roof  …  That  was  an  incentive  …  if  there’s  a  financial  
reward  then  you  do  it  …  sometimes  it  was  only  a  matter  of  forty-­five  
minutes,  fifty  minutes,  an  hour,  you’d  just  do  it.118  
  
Employing  a  system  widely  used  in  pay  and  productivity  deals  in  civil  aviation  
and  the  wider  workforce,  the  national  carriers  financially  compensated  crew  
members  who  agreed  to  work  beyond  their  scheduled  hours.119  
Smaller  operators  and  charter  companies,  however,  tended  to  employ  
a  strategy  of  deterrents.  Low-­cost  carriers,  such  as  Dan  Air  and  Laker  
Airways,  were  known  to  threaten  crews  with  termination  if  they  refused  to  use  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117  Interview  with  Jacob  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
118  Interview  with  Patrick  Smith,  3  February  2017.  
119  Chapter  Four  examines  pay  and  productivity  deals  in  more  detail.  
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discretion.  For  this  reason  Isaac  Shaw,  who  worked  for  BEA  and  BOAC  
throughout  his  career,  felt  ‘very  lucky’  to  work  for  a  national  carrier:    
  
We  had  a  bit  of  clout,  and  so  we  could  stand  up  to  them.  But  if  you  
were  with  people  like  Freddie  Laker  and  so  on,  then  you  were  out  of  a  
job  …  They  used  to  say  sell  your  bed  and  fly  for  free.120    
  
Trade  unions  were  concerned  that,  for  this  reason,  discretion  put  undue  
pressure  on  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew.  The  British  Airline  Pilots  Association  
(BALPA)  voiced  concerns  about  this  to  the  Bader  Committee,  prior  to  the  
introduction  of  CAP  371.  The  Association’s  Flight  Fatigue  Report,  formally  
presented  to  the  Bader  Committee  in  1972,  stated  that:  
  
The  legislation  allows  the  pilot  to  extend  duty  periods  at  his  discretion  –  
a  feature  of  great  value  to  the  Operators.  However,  it  does  not  protect  
him  against  retaliation  from  his  management  if  he  chooses  not  to  
extend  his  duty  period,  should  this  appear  to  him  to  be  prudent.121  
  
The  Bader  Committee  did  not,  however,  take  heed  of  BALPA’s  concerns  and,  
as  Chapter  Three  has  shown,  discretion  continued  to  be  allowed  under  CAP  
371.  
With  the  growth  of  inclusive  tour  operators  and  low-­cost  carriers  in  the  
1980s,  more  airlines  than  ever  rostered  crews  to  the  ‘absolute  limit  of  CAP  
371’.122  As  such,  the  slightest  delay  necessitated  the  use  of  the  captain’s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
120  Interview  with  Isaac  Shaw,  26  January  2017.  
121  MRC  MSS.248/4/2  BALPA,  ‘Flight  Fatigue:  Report  of  the  Special  Committee’,  second  
edition  May  1972  with  notes  by  Ninian  Davies,  p.  39.  
122  MRC  MSS.248/8/1:  Roger  Green  and  Roy  Skinner,  ‘CHIRP  and  Fatigue’,  The  Log,  48,  5  
(October  1987)  6-­11,  p.  8.  
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discretionary  power  to  extend  the  duty  day.  Trade  unions,  and  increasingly  
CHIRP,  argued  that  in  these  instances  flight  deck  and  cabin  crews  had  little  
choice  but  to  extend  their  duty  day  ‘for  fear  of  action  against  them’.123  The  
testimonies  of  pilots  and  cabin  crew  employed  in  the  late  1980s  and  early  
1990s  attest  to  this.  Julia  Evans,  who  worked  as  cabin  crew  for  a  Dorset-­
based  airline  in  the  1990s,  found  herself  under  ‘an  awful  lot  of  pressure’  to  
agree  to  extend  her  duty  day  on  one  occasion.  As  she  explained:  
  
I  had  gone  up  to  the  airport  and  it  was  foggy  and  so  they  bussed  us  to  
Southampton.  We  got  to  Southampton  and  Southampton  got  fog  bound  
so  they  bussed  us  back.  So  we  fiddled  about  with  this  for  about  six  
hours  …  we’d  been  up  since  six  in  the  morning  at  the  airport,  this  was  
going  to  stretch  well  past  midnight.  You  could  see  where  it  was  going  
…  [so]  I  pulled  the  crew  on  that  …  [the  Managing  Director  of  the  airline]  
went  ballistic  …  I  did  think  that  was  my  job  gone.124    
  
Julia  Evans  estimated  that,  in  total,  the  episode  cost  the  airline  around  
£500,000  in  hotel  fees  and  compensation.  As  a  result,  she  was  certain  she  
would  lose  her  job  but  her  colleagues,  including  the  aircraft’s  captain,  
supported  her  decision  and  she  remained  in  post.  
   Pilots  based  at  small  airlines  were  also  subject  to  ‘a  lot  of  pressure’  not  
to  report  fatigue.125  Philip  Gray,  a  pilot  who  spent  a  number  of  years  ‘doing  
nights  with  DHL’,  described  an  instance  where  he  refused  to  extend  a  duty  
period  as  the  result  of  fatigue:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123  See  for  example:  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reports:  Feedback  No.  25,  
November  1991,  p.  4,  available  at  https://www.chirp.co.uk/newsletters/air-­transport  [last  
accessed  23  March  2016];;  Confidential  Human  Factors  Incident  Reporting  Programme:  
Feedback  No.  26,  p.  3.  
124  Interview  with  Julia  Evans,  28  November  2016.  
125  Interview  with  Philip  Gray,  26  January  2017.  
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A  lot  of  pressure.  But  because  …  I  was  at  the  top  end  of  my  career,  
they  needed  me  more  than  I  needed  them  I  was  able  to  weather  it  and  
I  just  bore  the  consequences.  But  …  you  have  to  remember  that  
especially  in  the  DHL  operation  at  night,  there  [were]  no  managers  
there  so  it  was  all  down  to  the  roster  staff  …  They  have  pressure  put  
on  them  that  they  have  to  get  this  done,  and  then  if  you’re  ringing  up  
and  saying  ‘no  I  ain’t  doing  it’,  then  they  have  to  ring  up  a  manager  
who’s  at  home  asleep,  so  it’s  a  different  thing.  There’s  a  lot  of  pressure  
put  on  them  as  well.126  
  
As  Philip  Gray’s  testimony  suggests,  there  was  pressure  on  employees  
throughout  the  company  to  ensure  that  flights  took  place  as  planned.  These  
pressures,  coupled  with  the  financial  and  social  incentives  for  flight  deck  and  
cabin  crews  to  extend  their  duty  hours,  caused  some  instances  of  what  would  
now  be  termed  presenteeism.  None  of  the  former  pilots,  flight  engineers,  or  
cabin  attendants  interviewed  for  this  thesis  recalled  instances  where  they  
agreed  to  extend  their  duty  day  when  they  did  not  feel  fit.  A  number  of  
interviewees  said,  however,  that  for  the  most  part  they  just  tried  to  ‘get  on  with  
it’,  indicating  that  personal  and  health  considerations  were  not  important.127  
  
Conclusion:  Closing  the  Communication  Loop  
Though  a  deeply  personal  issue  experientially,  fatigue  was  also  a  social  
experience  for  workers  in  the  aviation  industry.  As  this  chapter  has  
demonstrated,  throughout  the  post-­war  period  in-­flight  fatigue  was  managed  
communally.  Flight  deck  and  cabin  crews  instated  informal  systems  of  in-­seat  
rest  that  allowed  crew  members  the  opportunity  to  sleep  during  flight  outside  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126  Ibid.  
127  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
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of  officially  sanctioned  rest  periods.  This  was  made  possible  by  the  goodwill  of  
other  crew  members.  Throughout  the  post-­war  period  then,  crew  relations  
were  of  crucial  importance  to  flight  safety.  This  was  not,  however,  recognised  
at  a  policy  level.  Though  some  researchers  and  airline  employees,  including  
Hugh  Patrick  Ruffell  Smith  (1911-­1980)  and  Kenneth  Bergin,  discussed  the  
importance  of  relations  and  the  psychology  of  leadership  in  the  1960s  and  
1970s,  it  was  only  in  the  1990s  that  policy  makers  started  to  take  crew  
relations  seriously.  The  1989  Kegworth  air  crash  was  instrumental  here.  As  
noted  in  the  introduction  of  this  chapter,  it  transpired  after  the  Kegworth  crash  
that  the  cabin  crew  had  known  which  engine  was  on  fire,  but  had  not  
communicated  this  information  to  the  aircraft’s  flight  deck  crew.128  The  AAIB  
report  following  the  incident  concluded  that,  ‘had  some  initiative  been  taken  by  
one  or  more  of  the  cabin  crew  who  had  seen  the  distress  of  the  left  engine’,  
the  ‘accident  could  have  been  prevented’.129    The  message  was  clear:  crew  
relations  were  essential  to  flight  safety.  Following  the  recommendations  of  the  
AAIB,  the  CAA  mandated  that  first  flight  deck  crew,  and  then  from  1995  all  
crew  members,  should  receive  annual  CRM  training.    
British  CRM  training  was  based  initially  on  the  American  model.  
Influenced  by  the  1979  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  
(NASA)  workshop,  ‘Resource  Management  on  the  Flight  Deck’  and  Ruffell  
Smith’s  simulator  study  carried  out  in  the  same  year,  American  CRM  training  
focused  on  the  social  environment  of  the  cockpit.130  It  was  concerned,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
128  Flin,  O’Connor  and  Mearns,  ‘Crew  Resource  Management’.  
129  Air  Accidents  Investigation  Branch,  Report  on  the  accident  to  Boeing  737-­400  G-­OBME,  p.  
106.  
130  H.  P.  Ruffell  Smith,  A  Simulator  Study  of  the  Interaction  of  Pilot  Workload  with  Errors,  
Vigilance,  and  Decisions,  NASA  Technical  Memorandum  78482,  January  1979,  p.  35,  
available  at:  
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principally,  with  the  ‘problem  of  the  macho  pilot’,  and,  in  particular,  the  effect  
of  the  captain  on  the  social  atmosphere  and  working  conditions  within  the  
cockpit.131  Training  exercises  focused  primarily  on  teaching  captains  basic  
psychology  and  interpersonal  skills.  For  example,  in  American  Airlines  as  part  
of  the  upgrade  programme  completed  prior  to  captaincy,  pilots  were  required  
to  undertake  training  on  a  basic  psychoanalytic  theory  –  transactional  analysis  
–  as  it  related  to  their  job  role.132  The  purpose  of  this  training  was  to  make  
new  captains  ‘a  little  more  aware  of  how  they  might  operate  in  transacting  or  
dealing  with  people’  in  the  cockpit.133    
Following  this  model,  British  CRM  training  initially  focused  on  individual  
psychology.  As  Gerard  Hunt,  one  of  a  small  group  of  people  involved  in  the  
development  of  British  CRM  courses,  recalled,  early  iterations  of  CRM  in  
Britain  focussed  largely  on  the  identification  of  personal  traits  and  
temperament  using  psychoanalytic  models  of  personality.  The  Myers-­Briggs  
Type  Indicator,  an  introspective  questionnaire  designed  to  indicate  how  
people  perceive  the  world  and  make  decisions,  was  widely  used.134    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.picma.org.uk/sites/default/files/Documents/Background/NASA%201979%20sim%
20study%20crew%20errors.pdf  [last  accessed  6  April  2017].  
131  Robert  L.  Helmreich,  ‘Sociology  Psychology  on  the  Flight  Deck’  in  George  E.  Cooper,  
Maurice  D.  White,  and  John  K.  Lauber  (eds.),  Resource  Management  on  the  Flight  Deck:  
Proceedings  of  a  NASA/Industry  Workshop  held  at  San  Francisco,  California  June  26-­28,  
1979,  NASA  Conference  Publication  2120,  March  1980,  pp.  17-­30,  p.  22,  available  at:  
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132  W.  W.  Estridge  and  J.  L.  Mansfield,  ‘Upgrade  and  Interpersonal  Skills  Training  at  American  
Airlines’  in  George  E.  Cooper,  Maurice  D.  White,  and  John  K.  Lauber  (eds.),  Resource  
Management  on  the  Flight  Deck:  Proceedings  of  a  NASA/Industry  Workshop  held  at  San  
Francisco,  California  June  26-­28,  1979,  NASA  Conference  Publication  2120,  March  1980,  pp.  
87-­96,  available  at:  https://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19800013796.pdf  
[last  accessed  6  April  2017].  
133  Ibid.  p.  93.  
134  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
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From  1995,  though,  CRM  training  in  Britain  increasingly  adopted  a  
‘systematic  approach  to  safety’.135  As  Gerard  Hunt  recalled,  the  movement  
from  a  personality-­focused  to  a  systems-­based  approach  happened  
organically:  
  
One  day  one  of  our  number,  [who  had  a]  psychology  degree  …  found  
Jim  Reason’s  work,  and  he  came  and  gave  us  some  printed  things  
about  organisational  accidents  and  that  was  a  complete  game  
changer.136  
  
Professor  of  Psychology  at  the  University  of  Manchester,  James  Reason  
argued  in  Human  Error,  first  published  in  1990,  that  humans  are  fallible  and  
errors  are  to  be  expected,  even  in  the  best  organisations.137  Errors,  he  
argued,  were  consequences,  not  causes.  Blunders  occurred  not  as  a  result  of  
the  perversity  of  human  nature,  but,  often,  because  of  wider  institutional  and  
cultural  factors.  For  Reason,  then,  systemic  risk  management  was  more  
important  than  the  assignment  of  individual  responsibility  or  blame.  This  
approach  fundamentally  affected  the  design  and  implementation  of  
countermeasures  to  unsafe  practices.  Rather  than  disciplinary  or  legal  action,  
aimed  at  the  punishment  of  individual  shortcomings,  the  systems  approach  
called  for  detailed  analysis  of  processes  and  structures  within  a  given  
organisation.  In  basic  terms,  then,  this  meant  the  identification  of  
‘weaknesses’  in  organisational  systems.  As  Reason  put  it  a  decade  later:  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135  Ibid.  
136  Ibid.  
137  James  Reason,  Error  Management,  (New  York:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1990).  
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Countermeasures  are  based  on  the  assumption  that  though  we  cannot  
change  the  human  condition  we  can  change  the  conditions  under  
which  humans  work.  A  central  idea  is  that  of  system  defences.  All  
hazardous  technologies  possess  barriers  and  safeguards.  When  an  
adverse  event  occurs,  the  important  issue  is  not  who  blundered,  but  
how  and  why  defences  failed.138  
  
For  Reason,  safeguards  were  central  to  the  systems  approach.  While  some  
defences  could  be  engineered,  others  relied  on  people.    
From  the  mid-­1990s,  British  CRM  training  was  predicated  on  this  
approach.  The  argument  held  that  good  interpersonal  relations  were  central  to  
flight  safety.  Much  of  the  training  provided  by  CRM,  then,  focussed  on  
mitigating  the  cultural  and  social  problems  common  to  civil  aviation.  Particular  
attention  was  paid  to  levelling  the  steep  status  gradient  between  captains  and  
other  crew  members.  Flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  were  trained  in  
communication  and  team  work.  The  focus  was  less  on  individual  
performance,  as  in  the  earliest  iterations  of  CRM,  and  more  on  the  behaviours  
of  the  flight  deck  and  cabin  crew  as  a  cohesive  whole.  
At  the  turn  of  the  century,  CRM  was  increasingly  introduced  to  other  
workplace  settings.  In  2000  occupational  psychologist  Robert  Helmerich  
(1937-­2012)  advocated  its  employment  in  health  settings.  Flight  crews  and  
medical  practitioners  faced,  Helmrich  argued,  ‘common  interpersonal  problem  
areas’.139  This  included,  particularly,  difficulties  communicating  with  people  
from  different  specialties  and  of  different  occupational  statuses.  In  aviation,  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138  James  Reason,  ‘Human  Error:  Models  and  Management’,  British  Medical  Journal,  320,  
7237  (2000)  768-­770,  p.  769;;  Ibid.  p.  768.  
139  Robert  L.  Helmreich,  ‘On  Error  Management:  Lessons  from  Aviation’,  British  Medical  
Journal,  320,  7237,  (2000)  781-­785,  p.  783.  
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poor  communication  between  the  cabin  and  the  cockpit  could  prove  
disastrous,  as  in  the  case  of  the  1989  Kegworth  air  crash.  In  a  medical  setting  
miscommunication  and  the  failure  of  colleagues  to  speak  out  against  unsafe  
practices  could  have  equally  tragic  consequences.  Helmreich  referred  to  an  
instance  of  a  fatigued  anaesthetist  who  slept  intermittently  throughout  a  
surgery  and  committed  a  number  of  errors  as  a  result.  Consequently,  a  
healthy  child  died.  Helmreich  cited  both  the  ‘pressure  to  perform  when  
fatigued’  and  the  failure  of  nurses  and  surgeons  to  speak  up  as  the  key  
causes  of  this  patient  death.140    
Though  some  National  Health  Service  (NHS)  trusts  were  receptive  to  
Helmreich’s  argument,  many  medical  practitioners  were  not.  As  Jeremy  
Butler,  general  manager  of  flight  training  at  British  Airways  (BA)  and  later  
member  of  the  NHS  Research  and  Ethics  Committee,  noted:  
  
The  medical  profession  will  not  do  anything  without  evidence  …  In  
aviation,  I  fear  that  we  have  not  gathered  in  sufficient  detail  or  depth  
the  evidence  for  human  factors  [and]  CRM  interventions  as  a  
necessary  component  in  improving  safety.  I  introduced  CRM  to  BA  on  
an  instinctive  feel,  after  attending  conferences  and  seminars  in  …  
[America],  but  with  very  little  research  or  analysis  and  no  idea  of  how  to  
measure  outcomes  of  safety  improvement  …  All  this  preamble  is  to  say  
that  we,  involved  in  aviation  human  factors,  have  been  remiss  in  not  
acquiring  and  documenting  the  evidence  that  HF  [human  factors]  and  
CRM  have  improved  aviation  safety.  We  should  have  been  measuring  
the  effects  of  our  interventions,  doing  genuine  research  and  writing  
learned  articles  in  Aerospace  for  years,  but  we  haven’t.141  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140  Ibid.  p.  784.  
141  Jeremy  Butler  cited  in  Patrick  Mitchell,  Safer  Care:  Human  Factors  for  Healthcare  Trainer’s  
Manual,  (Argyll  and  Bute:  Swan  and  Horn,  2013),  p.  viii.  
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This  intuitive  approach  to  policy  and  intervention  was  not  specific  to  the  
aviation  industry.  The  broadening  acceptance  of  evidence  based  medicine  in  
healthcare  circles,  however,  called  for  more  measured  methodology  and  
application.  CRM  could  not  provide  this.  
   The  skills  taught  in  CRM  training  sessions  were  not  necessarily  new  to  
everyone.  As  CRM  trainer  Gerard  Hunt  recounted,  some  of  the  crew  
members  he  worked  with  prior  to  the  introduction  of  CRM  training  in  the  1990s  
were  ‘were  fantastic  at  CRM  although  they’d  never  heard  about  it’,  they  had  
an  ‘intuitive  way  of  doing  things’,  of  ‘managing  people’  and  ‘being  leaders’  
without  ever  needing  to  be  taught.142  The  introduction  of  formal  CRM  training  
in  the  1990s,  however,  marked  a  turning  point  in  British  regulatory  policy.  
Non-­technical  skills  training  covered  a  broad  range  of  issues,  including  
assertiveness,  situation  awareness,  and  fatigue  management.  Fatigue,  then,  
was  subsumed  within  a  broader  rubric:  human  factors.  Though  fatigue  had  
been  considered  alongside  other  human  factors  under  the  auspices  of  CHIRP  
since  1982,  it  was  the  only  issue  deemed  worthy  of  regulation  by  the  CAA  
until  1993.  Fatigue  continued  to  be  controlled  by  specific  regulations  
throughout  the  late  twentieth  and  early  twenty-­first  centuries  but  its  inclusion  
in  CRM  training  undermined  its  previously  unique  position  in  civil  aviation.  
While  concerns  about  fatigue  had  dominated  civil  aviation  throughout  the  
century,  the  introduction  of  CRM  prompted  a  reconceptualisation  of  the  
condition.  It  became  considered  as  one  of  many  factors  important  to  flight  
safety;;  not,  as  previously,  the  single  most  important  human  factor.  As  such,  
fatigue  was,  from  the  mid-­1990s,  increasingly  side-­lined  by  regulatory  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  Interview  with  Gerard  Hunt,  8  February  2017.  
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agencies.  Indeed,  in  2016  formal  responsibility  for  flight  time  limitations  was  
transferred  beyond  the  CAA,  to  the  European  Aviation  Safety  Agency.  As  in  
industry  in  the  immediate  post-­war  period,  the  special  status  afforded  to  
fatigue  was  rescinded.  





Fatigability  is  a  characteristic  of  all  living  things  and  its  natural  remedy  
is  rest,  and  it  is  important  to  recognise  that  alternating  periods  of  
activity  and  rest  are  merely  illustrations  of  the  rhythmicity  which  
pervades  all  life,  as  evidenced  by  the  seasons  of  the  year,  the  ebb  and  
flow  of  the  sea,  the  beat  of  the  heart,  and  the  states  of  asleep  and  
awake.1    
  
This  is  how  James  L.  Birley  (1884-­1934)  described  fatigue  in  a  lecture  
delivered  at  the  Royal  Air  Force  (RAF)  Staff  College  on  1  March  1923.  It  was  
important  to  understand  and  mitigate  the  effects  of  fatigue,  Birley  told  his  
audience,  for  the  maintenance  of  morale  and  courage  in  fighting  men.  Mental  
health,  Birley  argued,  ‘depends  on  the  presence  of  a  state  of  equilibrium  
between  instinctive  tendencies  and  the  forces  by  which  they  are  controlled’.  
Fatigue  was,  he  argued,  ‘the  most  frequent  cause  of  weakening  of  the  
controlling  forces’.2  When  fatigued  or  sleep  deprived,  combatants  were  liable  
to  breakdown.  As  Chief  Medical  Officer  to  the  RAF  during  the  First  World  War,  
Birley  observed  the  effects  of  fatigue  first  hand.3  At  the  Battle  of  the  Somme,  
otherwise  healthy  young  airmen  suffered  nervous  breakdowns  in  ‘alarming  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  J.  L.  Birley,  ‘Psychology  of  Courage’,  The  Lancet,  201,  5199  (1923)  779-­785,  p.  784.  
2  Ibid.  p.  784.  
3  Mark  Jackson,  ‘Men  and  Women  under  Stress:  Neuropsychiatric  Models  of  Resilience  
during  and  after  the  Second  World  War’  in  Mark  Jackson  (ed.),  Stress  in  Post-­War  Britain,  
1945-­85,  (London:  Pickering  and  Chatto,  2015),  pp.  111-­130.  
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proportions’.4  It  was  in  this  context  that  the  relationship  between  exhaustion  
and  the  mental  and  physical  health  of  flyers  became  clear  to  Birley.  There  
was,  according  to  Birley,  no  easy  prophylaxis  or  cure  for  flying  fatigue.  A  
combination  of  adequate  rest  and  leave  was  the  only  demonstrably  effective  
solution.  The  institution  of  ‘short  shifts  …  as  in  all  other  communities  where  
industrial  fatigue  was  to  be  expected’  was,  Birley  argued,  the  only  means  of  
perceptibly  reducing  ‘the  permanent  wastage  from  this  cause’.5  Drawing  on  a  
model  of  fatigue  management  popularised  by  the  Health  of  Munitions  Workers  
Committee  (HMWC)  and  the  Industrial  Fatigue  Research  Board  (IFRB)  during  
and  immediately  after  the  First  World  War,  Birley  called  for  limitations  on  duty  
hours.  
Concerns  about  flying  fatigue  intensified  during  the  Second  World  War.  
As  airpower  became  increasingly  central  to  British  military  strategy,  the  health  
and  efficiency  of  flyers  was  granted  increasing  importance  by  RAF  medical  
advisers.  Chapter  Two  has  shown  that  the  complex  model  of  fatigue  
developed  by  interwar  theorists  of  flying  stress  influenced  later  research.  The  
Flying  Personnel  Research  Committee  (FPRC)  attributed  flying  fatigue  to  a  
range  of  psychological,  physiological,  and  environmental  factors,  as  in  Birley’s  
assessment.  It  is  worth  noting,  though,  that  a  definitive  medical  model  of  
fatigue  was  not  developed  in  this  period.  In  some  circles  fatigue  was  framed  
as  the  result  of  mental  distress,  while  in  others  it  was  considered  a  primarily  
physiological  phenomenon.  Physiological  and  psychological  markers  of  
fatigue  were,  however,  not  agreed  upon,  though  research  in  this  area  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  J.  L.  Birley,  ‘Goulstoninan  Lectures  on  the  Principles  of  Medical  Science  as  Applied  to  
Military  Aviation:  Lecture  I’,  The  Lancet,  195,  5048  (1920)  1147-­1151,  p.  1147.  
5  Ibid.  p.  1151.  
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continued  long  into  the  post-­war  period.  Fatigue,  instead,  came  to  be  viewed  
in  functional  terms.  FPRC  researchers  were  in  agreement  that  fatigue  caused  
operational  inefficiency.  Evidence  from  simulator  tests  and  operational  flight  
suggested  that  this  often  resulted  in  human  error  and  ‘accident  proneness’.6    
After  the  war  flying  fatigue  became  somewhat  divorced  from  medical  
and  scientific  discourses,  but  the  assumption  that  it  had  implications  for  flight  
safety  remained.  For  most  of  the  century  flying  fatigue  was  conceptualised  in  
the  functional  terms  popularised  during  World  War  Two.  In  line  with  the  
presentation  of  fatigue  in  other  transport  sectors,  it  was  deemed  a  potential  
hazard  to  workers  and  publics.  Air  crashes  acted  as  trigger  points  here.  The  
scale  of  human  hurt  in  air  crashes  prompted  serious  consideration  of  aircrew  
fatigue  by  regulatory  bodies.  Indeed,  flight  safety  was  cited  as  the  justification  
for  the  regulation  of  aircrew  schedules  by  industry  regulators  and  trade  unions  
throughout  the  twentieth  century.  As  Chapter  Three  demonstrated  though,  
concerns  about  safety  did  not  entirely  dominate  regulatory  debate  in  the  
twentieth  century.  As  in  the  regulation  of  health  and  safety  hazards  more  
broadly,  commercial  and  administrative  interests  loomed  large  throughout  the  
period.    
Pay  was  also  a  central  concern  for  trade  unions  in  the  middle  twentieth  
century.  In  the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries,  industrial  fatigue  was  
framed  primarily  in  productivist  terms.  As  Chapter  Four  demonstrates,  trade  
unions  drew  on  and  exploited  this  discourse  in  campaigns  for  improved  pay  in  
the  1960s.  Later  in  the  century  though,  unions  reframed  discussions  of  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  TNA  AIR  57/10:  Squadron  Leader  D.  D.  Reid,  ‘FPRC  Report  508:  The  Influence  of  
Psychological  Disorder  on  Efficiency  in  Operational  Flying’,  September  1942,  p.  11.  
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working  hours  and  fatigue  in  terms  of  safety.  It  was  in  this  context  that  the  
most  compelling  –  and,  frankly,  frightening  –  manifestation  of  fatigue,  as  
sleep,  saw  cultural  expression  in  the  post-­war  period.    
Complex  and  indefinite,  fatigue  was  contested  throughout  the  century.  
The  initial  tensions  present  in  Birley’s  assessment  remained.  Fatigue  was,  at  
once,  psychological  and  physiological  in  nature  and  cause.  While  a  number  of  
attempts  were  made  to  clearly  determine  the  aetiology  and  somatic  
expression  of  fatigue  in  the  laboratory,  scientific  and  medical  consensus  was  
not  reached  in  the  twentieth  century.  Throughout  the  century  researchers  and  
regulators  relied,  instead,  on  self-­report  and  expert  testimony.  Unlike  industrial  
fatigue  management  in  the  early  twentieth  century,  science  and  medicine  
were  not  central  to  state  or  airline  policy.  Though  there  remained  a  tacit  
recognition  that  fatigue  had  psychological  and  physiological  causes  and  
expressions,  most  discussion  of  aircrew  fatigue  centred  on  the  structural  and  
environmental  issues  identified  as  important  by  trade  unions.  Hours  of  work  
and  rest  were  central  here.    
It  was  in  this  context  that  debates  about  responsibility  for  and  of  publics  
were  played  out.  A  central  tension  existed,  as  in  broader  post-­war  regulatory  
discourse,  between  the  apparent  responsibility  of  individuals  to  adequately  
prepare  for  and  use  rest  periods,  and  the  responsibilities  of  employers  and  the  
state  to  facilitate  this.  Though  debate  about  hours  of  work  and  rest  dominated  
regulatory  and  trade  union  discourses  this  did  not  entirely  reflect  the  lived  
experiences  of  aircrew.  As  Chapter  Five  has  shown,  there  was  a  dissonance  
between  official  and  quotidian  understandings  of  fatigue.  Flight  deck  crew  and  
cabin  attendants  consistently  attributed  the  cause  of  fatigue  elsewhere.  Oral  
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history  narratives  focused  on  the  length  of  commutes,  sleeping  difficulties,  
and  the  effect  of  circadian  dysrhythmia  induced  by  rapid  time  changes.    
In  certain  occupational  contexts,  then,  fatigue  continued  to  structure  
debates  about  work,  wellbeing,  and  responsibility  into  the  late  twentieth  
century.  While  the  language  of  stress  came  to  dominate  discussions  of  mental  
and  physical  malaise  in  the  workplace  more  broadly,  fatigue  remained  the  
dominant  discourse  in  safety  critical  industries.  In  the  post-­war  period,  fatigue  
continued  to  frame  discussions  about  the  relationship  between  working  
environments  and  the  health  and  wellbeing  of  workers  in  civil  aviation.  This  is  
not  to  say  that  models  of  fatigue  were  unaffected  by  the  growth  of  stress  
research.  The  hormonal  accounts  of  mental  distress  popularised  by  stress  
researchers  in  the  post-­war  period  structured  research  on  flying  fatigue  into  
the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century.  As  Chapter  Two  demonstrates,  
however,  unlike  stress,  biochemical  markers  for  fatigue  were  difficult  to  pin  
down.  As  such,  medical  models  of  fatigue  continued  to  use  performance  as  
an  indicator  of  mental  and  physical  distress.  Unlike  stress,  then,  fatigue  had  
no  clear  psychophysiological  basis.  It  remained,  instead,  vague  and  contested  
throughout  the  century.    
Scientific  and  medical  uncertainty  about  the  causes  and  consequences  
of  fatigue  allowed  it  to  be  mobilised  in  a  variety  of  ways,  as  described  above.  
Workers,  trade  unions,  airlines,  and  regulators  drew  on  different  models  of  
fatigue  to  serve  different  purposes.  In  some  instances,  fatigue  was  framed  in  
emotional  terms.  Drawing  on  the  psychological  model  of  fatigue  and  flying  
stress  popularised  by  Charles  Symonds  (1890-­1978)  and  Denis  J.  Williams  
during  wartime,  in  the  1960s  Hugh  Patrick  Ruffell  Smith  (1911-­1980)  argued  
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that  strained  interpersonal  relations  were  a  source  of  fatigue  for  many.  
Framing  fatigue  as  a  result  of  psychological  and  emotional  distress,  Ruffell  
Smith  called  for  airline  managers  to  improve  relations  with  crew  members.  A  
decade  later,  trade  unions  framed  fatigue  in  physiological  terns,  as  a  result  of  
sleep  loss  and  circadian  disruption.  In  this  context,  fatigue  was  reimagined  in  
its  most  terrifying  incarnation  –  as  sleep  –  to  bolster  union  calls  for  the  
introduction  of  health  and  safety  legislation.  Throughout  the  century,  though,  a  
functional  model  of  fatigue  remained  dominant.  As  in  the  nineteenth  and  
early-­twentieth  century,  fatigue  was  measured  in  terms  of  its  effect  on  
performance.  In  this  discourse  the  biological  body,  as  well  as  the  emotional  
health  of  workers,  was  kept  at  a  distance.  Fatigue  was,  instead,  framed  in  
abstract  statistical  terms.  It  was,  at  its  core,  a  diminished  capacity  for  work,  as  
it  had  been  since  the  nineteenth  century.  In  many  ways,  then,  this  is  a  history  
of  continuity  rather  than  change.  Though  new  concerns  were  attached  to  
performance  decrement  in  safety  critical  workplaces,  the  essential  model  of  
fatigue  was  unchanged.  
   There  are  several  ways  in  which  future  research  can  build  on  the  work  
begun  in  this  thesis.  Undoubtedly,  a  broader  history  of  workplace  fatigue  
would  be  useful  not  only  for  historians  of  occupational  health  and  disease,  but  
also  for  those  interested  in  discourses  of  productivity  and  safety.  As  this  thesis  
has  shown,  civil  aviation  provides  but  one  example  of  how  workplace  fatigue  
was  configured  and  managed  in  the  twentieth  century.  Examination  of  fatigue  
in  different  safety  critical  industries  would  shed  light  on  whether  the  
conclusions  reached  here  are  specific  to  the  aviation  industry,  or  whether,  
perhaps,  they  are  representative  of  broader  trends.  Similarly,  expanding  the  
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geographical  scope  of  this  research  beyond  Britain  would  shed  light  on  
whether  the  research  and  policies  discussed  here  are  distinctively  British  or,  
given  the  international  nature  of  the  aviation  industry,  they  are  representative  
of  global  trends.  Many  of  the  actors  described  were  not  confined  to  a  single  
national  context.  Following  his  employment  by  the  FPRC  Ruffell  Smith,  for  
example,  worked  with  the  National  Aeronautics  and  Space  Administration  
(NASA)  on  issues  relating  to  human  factors  and  interpersonal  relations.  An  
actor-­network  analysis  or  comparative  history  of  Britain  and  the  United  States  
may,  then,  shed  light  on  the  international  implications  of  British  flying  fatigue  
research.  
Given  the  on-­going  unrest  related  to  the  introduction  of  new  junior  
doctors’  contracts,  an  exploration  of  the  history  of  fatigue,  organisational  
culture  and  practices,  and  the  regulation  of  work  and  rest  in  the  NHS  is  
particularly  pertinent.  2016  saw  a  record  level  of  industrial  action  by  junior  
doctors  in  response  to  government  plans  to  introduce  a  new  contract  that  
reclassified  doctors’  normal  working  hours.  The  British  Medical  Association  
(BMA)  framed  its  criticism  of  the  contract  in  terms  of  patient  safety.  The  new  
contract,  the  Association  argued,  would  increase  doctors’  working  hours  and  
intensify  their  workload,  causing  fatigue  and  burnout.  This,  the  BMA  
suggested,  had  implications  for  patient  care.  The  Association  failed  to  
convince  Health  Secretary  Jeremy  Hunt  of  this,  however,  and  in  October  2016  
the  first  group  of  junior  doctors  in  England  started  work  under  the  terms  and  
conditions  of  the  new  contract.  While  further  industrial  action  has  been  
suspended,  the  BMA  remains  opposed  to  the  new  contract.    
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  By  examining  the  historical  roots  of  the  current  conflict,  and  by  
comparing  this  with  civil  aviation,  possibilities  for  compromise  and  agreement  
may  emerge.  Similarities  between  civil  aviation  and  medical  practice  were  
consistently  drawn  in  the  middle  and  late  twentieth  century.  The  occupations  
were  said  to  share  a  similar  professional  culture,  and  to  engage  in  
comparable  working  practices.  Hospitals,  like  airports,  never  close  and,  as  
such,  healthcare  providers  and  aircrew  operate  under  a  distinctive  but  shared  
set  of  circumstances.  Long  and  intensive  shifts  are  common.  Sleep  
deprivation  and  fatigue  are  widespread  as  a  result.  Responsibility  and  risk  
permeate  both  professions.  Though,  as  this  thesis  has  described,  these  
comparisons  were  drawn  out  by  a  number  of  contemporary  commentators,  no  
in-­depth  history  of  fatigue  in  the  NHS  has  been  written.  Today  doctors  and  
nurses  increasingly  seek  support  for  work-­related  illness  and  burnout  from  
services  like  the  NHS  Practitioner  Health  Programme.7  Scholarship  that  
critically  examines  the  structural  and  organisational  causes  and  
consequences  of  fatigue  in  the  NHS  is,  then,  not  only  intellectually,  but  also  
politically,  important.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  NHS  Practitioner  Health  Programme  is  a  confidential  NHS  treatment  service  for  doctors  and  
dentists,  see:  http://php.nhs.uk  [last  accessed  18  July  2017].  




Oral  History  Respondents  
  
Name   Born   Occupation   Interview  
Albert  Watson   1957   Pilot   5  January  2017  
Andrew  Murray   1954   Pilot   4  March  2016  
Charles  Green   1946   Cabin  Crew   21  November  2016  
Elizabeth  Powell   1944   Cabin  Crew   30  January  2017  
Gerard  Hunt   1951   Pilot   8  February  2017  
Isaac  Shaw   1944   Cabin  Crew   26  January  2017  
Jacob  Evans   1941   Cabin  Crew   28  November  2016  
James  Hall   1937   RAF/Navigator/Pilot   30  March  2016  
Jeffrey  Cooper   1939   Flight  Engineer   24  January  2017  
Julia  Evans   1950   Cabin  Crew   28  November  2016  
Matthew  Hart   1946   Cabin  Crew   26  January  2017  
Patrick  Smith   1947   Cabin  Crew   3  February  2017  
Paul  White   1931   RAF/Pilot/CHIRP   17  March  2016  
Philip  Gray   1947   Pilot   26  January  2017  
Rose  Green   1949   Cabin  Crew   21  November  2016  
Stephen  Harris   1969   Cabin  Crew   7  December  2016  
  
Pseudonyms  have  been  used  in  all  cases  to  protect  the  anonymity  of  
interviewees  and  to  safeguard  the  anonymity  of  the  people  and  places  
mentioned  in  the  interviews.    
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